In all matters belonging to our cognifance, every man muft be determined by his own final judgment, otherwife he does not ad the part of a rational being. Authority may add weight to one fcale; but the man holds the balance, and judges what weight he ought to allow to authority.
If a man fhould even claim infallibility, we muft judge of his title to that prerogative. If a man pretend to be an Ambaffador from hea- ven, we muft judge of his credentials. No claim can deprive us of this right, or excufe us for negledling to exercifc it.
As therefore our regard to authority may be either too great or too fmall, the bias of humian nature feems to lean to the firft of thefe ex- VoL. II. A a tremesj CHAP, tremes; and I believe it is good for men iii- \^III. general that it fhould do fo.
When this bias concurs with an indifference about truth, its operation will be the more powerful.
The love of truth is natural to man, and flrong in every well-difpofed mind. But it may be overborn by party-zeal, by vanity, by the defu'e of viclory, or even by lazinefs. "Wheh it is fuperior to thefe, it is a manly vir- tue, and requires the exercife of induftry, for- titude, felf-denial, candour, and opennefs to cbnvicfcion.
As there are perfons in the world of fo mean and abject a fpirit, that they rather chufe to owe their fubfiftence to the charity of others, than by induftry to acquire fome property of their own; fo there are many more who may be called mere beggars with regard to their opinions. Through lazincfs and indifference about truth, they leave to others the drudgery of digging for this commodity; they can have enough at fecond hand to ferve their occafions. Their concern is not to know what is true, but what is faid and thought onfuch fubjefts; and their underftanding, like their cloathsy is cut according to the fafliion.
This diftemper of the underffanding has taken fo deep root in a great part of mankind, that it can hardly be faid that they ufe their own judgment in things that do not concern their tem.poral interelf; nor is it peculiar to the ignorant; it infe6ls all ranks. We may guefs their opinions when we know where they were born, of v/hat parents, how educated, and what company they have kept. Thefe cir- cumflances determine their opinions in religi- on, in Dolitics, and in philofophv.
Of PREJUDICES, the Catifcs of ERROR. 355 1. A fecond general prejudice arifes from aC H A P. dlfpofition to meafure things lefs known, and ^^ lefs familiar, by thofe that are better known and more familiar.
This is the foundation of analogical reafon- Ing, to which we have a great pronenefs by nature, and to it indeed we owe a great part of our knowledge. It would be abfurd to lay afide this kind of reafoning altogether, and it is difficult to judge how far we may venture upon it. The bias of human nature is to judge from too flight analogies.
The objefts of fenfe engrofs our thoughts in the firft part of life, and are mod familiar through the whole of it. Hence in all ages men have been prone to attribute the human figure and human paffions and frailties- to fupe- rior intelligences, and even to the Supreme Being.
There is a difpofition iji men to materialize every thing, if I may be allowed the expreffion; that is, to apply the notions we have of mate- rial objeds to things of another nature. Thought is confidered as analogous to motion in a body; and as bodies are put in motion by impulfes, and by impreffions made upon them by contiguous objefts, we are apt to conclude that the mind is made to think by impreffions made upon it, and that there muft be fome kind of contiguity between it and the obje6ts of thought. Hence the theories of ideas and impreffions have fo generally prevailed.
Becaufe the moft perfect works of human artiits are made after a model, and of mate- rials that before exifted, the ancient Philofo- phers univerfally believed that the world was made of a pre-exiftent uncreated matter; and A a 2 many CHAP, many of them, that there were eternal and un- ^ • created models of every fpecies of things which God made.
The miftakes in common life, which are owing to this prejudice, are innumerable, and cannot efcape the fiighteft obfervation. Men judge of other men by themfelves, or by the fmail circle of their acquaintance. The felfifh man thinks all pretences to benevolence and public fpirit to be mere hypocrify or felf-deceit. The generous and open hearted believe fair pretences too eafily, and are apt to think men better than they really are. The abandoned and proiiigate can hardly be perfuaded that there is any fuch thing as real virtue in the world. The ruftic forms his notions of the manners and characters of men from thofe of his coun- try village, and is eafily duped when he comes into a great city.
It is commonly taken for granted, that this narrow way of judging of men is to be cured only by an extenfive intercourfe with men of dilTerent ranks, profeiTions, and nations; and that the man whofe acquaintance has been con- fined within a narrow circle, muft have many prejudices and narrow notions, which a more extenfive intercoufe would have cured.
3. Men are often led into error by the love , of fimplicity, which difpofes us to reduce tilings to few principles, and to conceive a greater fimplicity in nature than- there really is.
To love fimplicity, and to be pleafed with it wherever we find it, is no imperfeftion, but the contrary. It is" the refult of good tafte*. We cannot but be pleafed to obferve, that all the changes of motion produced by the collifion Of PREJUDICES, the Caufcs r/ERROR. -^^y fion of bodies, hard, foft, or elaflic, are re-C H A P. ducible to three fimple laws of motion, which "^1^^- the induftry of Philofophers has difcovered. *^ "^ When we confider what a prodigious variety of efFefts depend upon the law of gravitation; how many phsenomena in the earth, fea, and air, which, in all preceding ages, had tortur- ed the wits of Philofophers, and occafioned a thoufand vain theories, are fliown to be the neceffary confequences of this one law; how the whole fyftem of fun, moon, planets, pri- mary and fecondary, and comets, are kept in order by it, and their feeming irregularities accounted for and reduced to accurate mea- fure; the fimplicity of the caufe, and the beauty and variety of the efFed:s, mufl give pleafure to every contemplative mind. By this noble difcovery, we are taken, as it were, be- hind the fcene in this great drama of Nature, and made to behold fome part of the art of the divine Author of this fyllem, which, before this difcovery, eye had not feen, nor ear heard, nor had it entered into the heart of man to conceive.
There is, without doubt, in every work of Nature all the beautiful fimplicity that is con- fiflent with the end for which it was made. But if we hope to difcover how Nature brings about its ends, merely from this principle, that it operates in the hmpleft and bed way, we deceive ourfelves, and forget that the wifdoni of Nature is more above the wifdom of man, than man's wifdom is above that of a child.
If a child fhould fit down to contrive how a city is to be fortified, or an army arranged in the day of battle, he would, no doubt, con- jecture what, to his underflanding, appeared the C H A P. the fimpleft and beft way. But could he ever ^^__J5Jj hit upon the true way? No furely. When he learns from fa£l how thefe effecls are produced, he will then fee how fooHfh his childilh conjeftures were.
We may learn fomething of the way in which Nature operates, from faft and obfervatipn; but if we conclude that it operates in fuch a manner, only becaufe to our underftanding, that appears to be the beft and fimpleft manner, we fliall always go wrong.
It was believed, for many ages, that all the variety of concrete bodies we find on this globe is reducible to four elements, of which they are compounded, and into which they may be refolved. It was the fimplicity of this theory, and not any evidence from fact, that made it to be fo generally received; for the more it is examined, we find the lefs ground to believe it.
The Pythagoreans and Platonifts were car- ried farther by the fame love of fimplicity. Pythagoras, by his (kill in mathematics, dif- covered, that there can be no more than five regular folid figures, terminated by plain fur- faces, which are all fimilar and equal; to wit, the tetrahedron, the cube, the octahedron, the dodecahedron, and the eicofihedron. As Na- ture works in the moft fimple and regular way, he thought that all the elementary bodies muft have one or other of thofe regular figures; and that the difcovery of the properties and relations of the regular folids would be a key to open the myfteries of Nature.
This notion of the Pythagoreans and Plato- nifts has undoubtedly great beauty and fim- plicity. Accordingly it prevailed, at leaft, to the 0/PREJUDICES, the Caufes of ERROR. 359 the time of Euclid. He was a Platonic Phi-C HAP. •lofopher, and is faid to have wrote all the ^^^^" books of his Elements, in order to difcover the' properties and relations of the five regular fo- lids. This ancient tradition of the intention of Euclid in writing his Elements, is coun- tenanced by the work itfelf. For the laft books of the Elements treat of the regular foiids, and all the preceding are fubfervient to the laft.
So that this moft ancient mathematical -work, which, for its admirable compofition, has ferved as a model to all fucceeding writers in mathematics, feem.s, like the firft two books of Newton's Principia, to have been intended by its author to exhibit the mathematical prin- ciples of natural philofophy.
It was long believed, that all the qualities of bodies, and all their medical virtues, were reducible to four; moifture and dryneis, heat and cold: And that there are only four tem- peraments of the human body; the fanguine, the melancholy, the bilious, and the phlegm matic. The chemical fyftem, of reducing all "bodies to fait, fulphur, and mercury, vi^as of the fame kind. For how many ages did men •believe, that the divifion of all the objeds of thought into ten categories, and of all that can be affirmed or denied of any thing, into five univerfals or predicables, were perfect enumerations?
The evidence from reafon that could be produced for thofe fyftems was next to no- thing, and bore no proportion to the ground they gained in the belief of men; but they were fimple and regular, and reduced things to a few principles j and this fupplied their want of evidence.
Of CHAP. Of all the fyftems we know, that of Des ^^^^' Cartes was moft remarkable for its fimplici- ^^'^''^^ ty. Upon one propofition, I think, he builds the whole fabric of human knowledge. And from mere matter, with a certain quantity ot motion given it at hrft, he accounts for all the ph^enomena of the material world.
The phyfical part of this fyftem was mere hypothefis. It had nothing to recommend it but its hmplicity; yet it had force enough to overturn the fyflem of Aristotle, after that fyfhem had prevailed for more than a thoufand years.
The principle of gravitation, and other at- tracting and repelling forces, after Sir Isaac Newton had given the ftrongefl evidence of their real exiftence in Nature, were rejeded by the greateft part of Europe for half a cen- tury, becaufe they could not be accounted for by matter and motion. So much were men enamoured with the hmpHcity of the Cartefian fyftem.
Nay, 1 apprehend, it was this love of fim- plicity, more than real evidence, that led Newton himfelf to fay, in the preface to his Principia, fpeaking of the phfenomena of the material world, " Nam multa me movent ut *' nonnihii fufpicer, ea omnia ex viribus qui- " bufdam pendere poife, quibus corporuni " particute, per caufas nondum cognitas, vel " in fe mutuo impelluntur, et fecundum figu- ** rns regulares cohasrent, vel ab invicem fu- " gantur et recedunt." For certainly we have no evidence from faft, that all the phtenome- na of the material world are produced by at- tracting or repelling forces.
With 0/PREJUDICES, the Caufes of ERROR. 361 With his ufual modefly, he propofes it only C H A P. as a flight fufpicion; and the ground of this. [i^ fafpicion could only be, that he faw that many of the phjcnomena of Nature depended upon caufes of this kind: and therefore was difpo- fed, from the limplicity of Nature, to think that all do.
When a real caufe is difcovered, the fame love of limplicity leads men to attribute efteds to it which are beyond its province.
A medicine that is found to be of jrreat ufe in one diftemper, commonly has its virtues multiplied, till it becomes a panacea. 1 hofe who have lived long, can recoliecl many in- (lances of this. In other branches of know- ledge, the fame thing often happens. V\^hen the attention of men is turned to any particu- lar caufe, by difcovering it to have remarkable effedts, they are in great danger of extending its influence, upon flight evidence, to things with which it has no connection. Such pre- judices arife from the natural defire of fim- plifying natural caufes, and of accounting for many phsenomena from the fame principie.
4. One of the moll copious fources oi error in philofophy is the mifapplication of our no- blell intellectual power to purpoies for which it is incompetent.
Of all the intellectual powers of man, that of invention bears the higheii price. It re- fembles mofl the power of creation, and is ho- noured with that name.
We admire the man who fliews a fuperiority in the talent of finding the means of accom- plifning an end; who can, by a happy com- bination, produce an effect, or make a difco- very beyond the reach of other men j who can draw CHAP, draw Important conclufions from circumftan- • ces that commonly pafs unobferved; who judges with the greateft fagacity of the defigns of other men, and the confequences of his own adions. To this fuperiority of underflanding we give the name of genius, and look up with admiration to every thing that bears the marks of it.
Yet this power, fo highly valuable in itfelf, and fo ufeful in the conduct of life, may be mifapplied; and men of genius, in all ages, have been prone to apply it to purpofes for which it is altogether incompetent.
The works of men and the works of Nature are not of the fame order. The force of geni- us may enable a man perfeftly to comprehend the former, and to fee them to the bottom. What is contrived and executed by one man may be perfe6tly underftood by another man. With great probability, he may from a part conjefture the whole, or from the effedU may conjecture the caufes; becaufe they are effects of a wifdom not fuperior to his own.
But the works of Nature are contrived and executed by a wifdom and power infinitely fu- perior to that of man; and when men attempt, by the force of genius, to difcover the caufes of the phsenomena of Nature, they have only the chance of going wrong more ingenioufly. Their conjectures may appear very probable to beings no wifer than themfelves; but they have no chance to hit the truth- They are like the conjectures of a child how a fhip of war is built, and how it is managed at fea.
Let the man of genius try to make an ani- mal, even the meanefl; to make a plant, or even a fmgle leaf of a plant, or feather of a bird 5 he will find that all his wif- dom I 0/PREJUDICES, the Caufes of ERROR. -^fil dom and fagacity can bear no comparifon with^ ^^.^ ^* the wifdom of Nature, nor his power with the ^^^^\^ power of Nature.
The experience of all ages {hows how prone ingenious men have been to invent hypothefes to explain the phacnomena of Nature; how fond, by a kind of anticipation, to difcover her fecrets. Inftead of a flow and gradual af- cent in the fcale of natural caufes, by a juft and copious induction, they would fhorten the work, and, by a flight of genius, get to the top at once. This gratifies the pride of hu- man underflanding; but it is an attempt be- yond our force, like that of Phaeton to guide the chariot of the fun.
When a man has. laid out all his ingenuity in fabricating a fyftem, he views it with the eye of a parent; he flrains phasnomena to make them tally with it, and make it look like the work of Nature.
The flow and patient method of induftion, the only way to attain any knowledge of Na- ture's work, was little underflood until it was delineated by Lord Bacon, and has been lit- tle follov/ed fmce. It humbles the pride of man, and puts him conftantly in mind that his molt ingenious conjeftures with regard to the works of God are pitiful and childilh.
There is no room here for the favourite ta- lent of invention. In the humble method of information, from the great volume of Nature we muft receive all our knowledge of Nature. "Whatever is beyond a juft interpretation of that volume is the work of man; and the work of God ought not to be contaminated by any mixture with it.
To CHAP. To a man of eenlus, felf-denial is a difficult ^^___V leffon in philofophy as well as in religion. To bring his fine imaginations and mod ingeni- ous conjectures to the fiery trial of experiment and induction, by which the greater part, if not the whole, will be found to be drofs, is a humiliating tafk. This is to condemn him to dig in a mine, when he would fly with the wings of an eagle.
In all the fine arts, whofe end is to pleafe, genius is defervedly fupreme. In the condud: of human affairs it often does wonders; but in all enquiries into the conilitution of Nature it mufl aft a fubordinate part, ill-fuited to the fuperiority it boafls. It may combine, but it mud not fabricate. It may collect evidence, but muft not fupply the want of it by conjec- ture. It may difplay its powers by putting Nature to the queftion in well-contrived expe- riments, but it muft add nothing to her an- fwers.
5. In avoiding one extreme, men are very apt to rufh into the oppofite. . Thus, in rude ages, men, unaccuflomed to fearch for natural caufes, afcribe every un- common appearance to the immediate interpo- fition of invifible beings; but when philofo- phy has difcovered natural caufes of many events, which, in the days of ignorance, were afcribed to the immediate operation of gods or daemons, they are apt to think, that all the phsenomena of Nature may be accounted for in the fame way, and that there is no need of an invifible Maker and Governor of the world.
Rude men are at firft difpofed to afcribe in- telligence and active power to every thing they fee move or undergo any change. " Savages, " fays 0/PREJUDICES, the Caufes of ERROR. z^S " fays the Abbe Raynal, wherever they fee^H A P, *' motion which they cannot account for, there ' " they fuppofe a foul." When they come to be convinced of the folly of this extreme, they are apt to run into the oppofite, and to think that every thing moves only as it is moved, and a(9:s as it is aded upon.
Thus, from the extreme of fuperftition, the trahfition is eafy to that of atheifm; and from the extreme of afcribing activity to every part of Nature, to that of excluding it altogether, and making even the determinations of intelli- gent beings, the links of one fatal chain, or the wheels of one great machine.
The abufe of occult qualities in the Peripa- tetic philofophy led Des Cartes and his fol- lowers to rejed all occult qualities; to pretend to explain all the phaenomena of Nature by mere matter and motion, and even to fix dif- grace upon the name of occult quality.
6. Mens judgments are often perverted by their affeclions and paflions. This is fo com- monly obferved, and fo univerfally acknow- ledged, that it needs no proof nor illuftration.
The fecond clafs of idols in Lord Bacon's divifion are the idola fpecus.
Thefe are prejudices which have their ori- gin, not from the conflitution of human na- ture, but from fomething peculiar to the indi- vidual.
As in a cave objeds vary in their appear- ance according to the form of the cave and the maimer in which, it receives the Hght, Lord Bacon conceives the mind of every man to refemble a cave, which has its particular form, and its particular manner of being enlightened; and, from thefe circumftances, often gives falfe ESSAY VI.
C fi /> r. ialfe colours and a delufive appearance to ob- For this reafon, he gives the name of idola fpcciis to thofe prejudices which arife from the particular way in which a man has been train- ed, from his being addicted to fome particular profeffion, or from fomething particular in the turn of his mind.
A man whofe thoughts have been confined to a certain track by his profeffion or manner of life, is very apt to judge wrong when he ventures out of that track. He is apt to draw every thing within the fphere of his profeffion, and to judge by its maxims of things that have no relation to it.
The mere Mathematician is apt to apply meafure and calculation to things which do not admit of it. DireQ: and inverfe ratios have been applied by an ingenious author to meafure human afleftions, and the moral worth of anions. An eminent Mathematician attem.pted lo afcertain by calculation, the ratio in which the evidence of facts muft decreafe in the courfe of time, and fixed the period when the evi- dence of the facts on which Chriftianity is founded fhall become evanefcent, and when in confequence no faith fliall be found on the earth. I have feen a philofophical diffi^rtation publifhed by a very good Mathematician, wherein, in oppofition to the ancient divifion of things into ten categories, he maintains that there are no more, and can be no more than tvv'o categories, to wit, data and qiiafita.
The ancient Chemifts were wont to explain all the myfteries of Nature, and even of religi- on, by fait, fulphur, and mercury.
Mr.
Of PREJUDICES, the Caufes of ERROR. 367 Mr. Locke, I think, mentions an eminent C HAP. Mufician, who believed that God created the ^'^^^' world in fix days, and refted the fevcnth, be- *— ""V"^ caufe there are but feven notes in mufic. I knew one of that profeflion, who thought that there could be only three parts in harmony, to wit, bafs, tenor, and treble; becaufe there are but three perfons in the Trinity.
The learned and ingenious Dr. Henry More having very elaborately and methodically compiled his Erichiridiian Metaphyficwn, and Enchiridiian Ethicum^ found all the divifions and fubdivifions of both to be allegorically taught in the firfi: chapter of Genefis. Thus even very ingenious men are apt to make a ri- diculous figure, by drawing into the track, in which their thoughts have long run, things altogether foreign to it.
Different perfons, either from temper or from education, have different tendencies of underflanding, which, by their excefs, are un- favourable to found judgment.
Some have an undue admiration of antiquity, and contempt of whatever is modern j others go as far into the contrary extreme. It may be judged, that the former are perfons who value themfelves upon their acquaintance with ancient authors, and the latter fuch as have little knowledge of this kind.
Some are afraid to venture a ftep out of the beaten track, and think it fafefl to go with the multitude; others are fond of fmgularities, and of every thing that has the air of paradox.
Some are defultory and changeable in their opinions; others unduly tenacious. Mofl men have a predileftion for the tenets of their fed or party, and flill more for their own inven- tions.
The ESSAY VI.
CHAP. Vllf.
The idola fori are the fallacies arifing from the impcrfedions and the abufe of language, which is an inflrument of thought as well as of the communication of our thoughts.
o Whether it be the effect of conflitution or of habit, I will not take upon me to determine; bur, from one or both of thefe caufes, it hap- pens, that no man can purfue a train of thought or reafoning without the ufe of language. Words are the ngns of our thoughts; and the fign is fo aiTociated with the thing fignified, that the lafl can hardly prefent itfelf to the ima- gination, without drawing the other along with it.
A man who would compofe in any language, muit think in that language. If he thinks in one language what he would exprefs in ano- ther, he thereby doubles his labour, and after all, his expreinons will have more the air of a tranflaticn than of an orie:inal.
This fliows that our thoughts take their co- lour in fome degree from the language we ufe; and that, although language ought always to be fubfervicnt to thought, yet thought mud be at fome times, andin fome degree, fubfervient to language.
As a fervant that Is extremely ufcful and ne- ceiTary to his mailer, by degrees acquires an authority over him, fo that the mafter mud often yield to the fervant; fuch is the cafe with anguage. Its intention is to be a but it is fo ufeful and fo neceilary, that we cannot avoid being fometimes led by it when it ought to foUoV'/. We cannot Ihake of this impediment, we mud drag it along vvith us; and therefore mud direct our courfe, and regulate our pace, as it permits..
Language regard to fervant to the underdanding, Of PREJUDICES, the Caufes 0/ ERROR. 369 Language mufl: have many imperfedionsC H AP. when applied to philofophy, becaufe it was not,J/i[^ made for that ufe. In the early periods of fociety, rude and ignorant men ufe certain forms of fpeech, to exprefs their wants, their defires, and their tranfaclions with one another. Their language can reach no farther than their fpeculations and notions; and if their notions be vague and ill defined, the words by which they exprefs them muft be fo likewife.
It was a grand and noble proje£l of Bifhop "WiLKiNs, to invent a philofophical language, which fhould be free from the imperfeftions of vulgar languages. Whether this attempt will ever fucceed, fo far as to be generally ufeful, I fliall not pretend to determine. The great pains taken by that excellent man in this defign have hitherto produced no effect. Very few have ever entered minutely into his views j far lefs have his philofophical language and his real charadter been brought into ufe.
He founds his philofophical language and real character upon a fyflematisal divifion and fubdivifion of all the things which may be ex- preffed by language, and, inftead of the an- cient divificn into ten categories, has made forty categories, ox fum-nia genera. But whe- ther this divifion, though made by a very com- prehenfive mind, will always fuit the various fyftems that may be introduced, and all the real improvements that may be made in human knowledge, may be doubted. The difF.culty is flill greater in the fubdivifions \ fo that it is to be feared, that this noble attempt of a great genius will prove abortive, until Philofophers Vol. II. B b havs ESSAY VI.
C li A P have the fame cpinions and the fame fyftemsiii ^\^'^- the tafioiis branches of human knowledge.
There is more reafon to hope, that the lan- guage ufed by Philofophers may be gradually ittiproved in copioufnefs and in diftinftnefs j and that improrents in knowledge and in lan- guage may go hand in hand, and facilitate each other. Bet I fear the imperfeclions of lan- guage can never be perfectly remedied while our knowledge is imperfecl.
•However this may be, it is evident that the itiipeiieclions of language, and much more the aDufe of it, are the occafion of many errors; and that in many difputes which have engaged learned men, the difference has been partly, and in fome wholly, about the meaning of words.
Mr. Locke found it necelTary to employ a fourth part of his Effay on Human Underftand- ing about words; their various kinds; their imperfedion and abufe, and the remedies of both; and has made many obfervations up- on thefe fubkcts, well worthy of attentive perufal.
The fourth clafs of prejudices are the iddla theatric by which are meant prejudices arifing from the fyftems or feds, in which we have been trained, or which we have adopted.
A falfe fyftem once fixed in the mind, be- comes, as it were, the medium through which V. e fee obje£ls: They receive a tindure from it, and appear of another colour than when feen by a pure light.
Upon the lam.e fubjeS:, a Platonift, a Peri- patetic, and aii Epicurean, will think diffe- rently, not only in matters connected with his peculiar Of PREJUDICES, the Caufes 0/ ERROR. 371 peculiar tenets, but even in things remote from CHAP, A judicious hiftory of the different feels of Philofophers, and the different methods of philofophifmg, which have obtained among mankind, would be of no fmall ufe to direft men in the fearch of truth. In fuch a hiflory, what would be of the greateft moment is not fo much a minute detail of the dogmata of each fed, as a juft dehneation of the fpirit of the fed, and of that point of view in which things appeared to its founder. This was perfectly underftood, and, as far as concerns the the- ories of morals, is executed with great judg- ment and candour by Dr. Smith in his Theo- ry of moral fentiments.