for the children of this world are often wiferC H A P, in their generation than the children of hght. ^''• But the reafon of the obfervation is, that invo- "v— ^ luntary errors, unforefcen accidents, and in- vincible ignorance, which ailed deeply all the concerns of the prefent world, have no efPecl upon virtue or its reward.
In the common occurrences of life, a man of integrity, who hath exercifed his moral faculty in judging what is right and what is wrong, fees his duty without reafoning, as he fees the high way. The cafes that require reafoning are few, compared with thofe that require none; and a man may be very honed and vir- tuous who cannot reafon, and who knows not what demonftration means.
The power of reafoning, in thofe that have it, may be abufed in morals, as in other mat- ters. To a man who ufes it with an upright lieart, and a fmgle eye to find what is his duty, it will be of great ufe; but when it is ufed to juftify what a man has a ftrong inclination to do, it will only ferve to deceive himfelf and others. When a man can reafon, his palli- ons will reafon, and they are the mod cunning fophifts we meet with.
If the rules of virtue were left to be difcover- ed by demonftrative reafoning, or by reafoning of any kind, fad would be the condition of the far greater part of men, who have not the means of cultivating the power of reafoning. jAs virtue is the bufmefs of all men, the firil principles of it are written in their hearts, in characters fo legible, that no man can pretend ignorance of them, or of his obligation to prac- tife them.
Some ESSAY VIL Some knowledge of duty and of moral obli- gation is neceffary to all men. Without it they could not be moral and accountable creatures, nor capable of being members of civil fociety. It may therefore be prefumed, that Nature has put this knowledge within the reach of all men. Reafoning and demonftration are weapons which the greatefl part of mankind never was able to wield. The knowledge that is neceffary to all, muft be attainable by all. We fee it is fo in what pertains to the natural life of man.
Some knowledge of things that are ufeful, and things that are hurtful^ is fo neceffary to all men, that without it the fpecies would foon perifh. But it is not by reafoning that this knowledge is got, far lefs by dcmonflrative reafoning. It is by our fenfes, by memory, by experience, by information; means of knowledge that are open to all men, and put the learned and the unlearned, thofe [who can reafon and thofe who cannot, upon a level.
It may, therefore, be expefted from the analogy of nature, that fuch a knowledge of morals as is neceffary to all men, fhould be had by means more fuited to the abilities of all men than demonftrative reafoning is.
This, I apprehend, is in fa6l the cafe. When mens faculties are ripe, the firfl princi- ples of morals, into which all moral realbning may be refolved, are perceived intuitively, and in a manner more analogous to the perceptions of fenfe than to the conclufions of demonflra- ,tive reafoning.
Upon the whole, I agree with Mr. Locke, that propofiiions expreffmg the congruities and incongruities of things abflraft, which mo- ral words ftand for, may have all the evi- dence Whether Morality be Demonstrable. 393 dence of mathematical truths. But this is notC HAP. peculiar to things which mora), words ftand ^_2z~~^ tor. It is common to abftract propofitions of every kind. For inftance, you cannot take from a man what he has not. A. man cannot be bound and perfe6:ly free at the fame time. I think no man will call thefe moral truths, but they are neceflliry truths, and as evident as any in mathematics. Indeed, they are very nearly allied to the two which Mr. Locke gives as inflances of moral proportions capable of demonftration. Of fuch abftracl propofitions, I think it may more properly be faid, that they have the evidence of mathematical axioms, than that they are capable of demonftration.
There are propofitions of another kind, which alone deferve the name of moral propo- fitions. They are fuch as affirm fomething to be the duty of perfons that really exift. Thefe are not abftrad; proportions; and therefore Mr. Locke's reafoning does not apply to them. The truth of all fuch propofitions depends upon the conftitution and circumftances of the per- fons to whom they are applied.
Of fuch propofitions, there are fome that are felf-evident to every man that has a confci- ence; and thefe are the principles from which all moral reafoning muft be drawn. They may be called the axioms of morals. But our rea- foning from thefe axioms to any duty that is not felf-evident, can very rarely be demonftra- tive. Nor is this any detriment to the caufe of virtue, becaufe to a6t againft what appears moll probable in a matter of duty, is as real a tref- pafs againft the firft principles of morality, as to aft againft demonftration; and becaufe he who has but one talent in reafoning, and makes the proper ESSAY VII.
CHAP, proper ufe of it, fhall be accepted, as well as he to whom God has given ten.
CHAP. III.
Of probable Reafoning.
THE field of demonftration, as has been ob- ferved, is neceffary truth; the field of probable reafoning is contingent truth, not what neceffarily mud be at all times, but what is, or was, or ihall be.
No contingent truth is capable of ftri6l de- monftration; but neceffary truths may fome- times have probable evidence.
Dr. Wallis difcovered many important ma- thematical truths, by that kind of induction which draws a general conclufion from parti- cular premifes. This is not flricl demonflra- tion, but, in fome cafes, gives as full convic- tion as demonftration itfelf; and a man may be certain, that a truth is demonftrable before it ever has been demonftrated. In other cafes, a mathematical propofition may have fuch pro- bable evidence from induftion of analogy, as encourages the Mathematician to invefligate its demonftration. But ftill the reafoning pro- per to mathematical and other neceffary truths, is demonftration; and that which is proper to contingent truths, is probable reafoning.
Thefe two kinds of reafoning differ in other refpetts. In demonftrative reafoning, one ar- gument is as good as a thoufand. One de- monftration may be more elegant than ano- ther; it may be more eafily comprehended, or it may be more fubfervient to fome purpofe beyond OF PROBABLE REASONING. 395 beyond the prefent. On any of thcfe accounts^ ^,^^' it may defcrye a preference: But then it is fuf- ^ ficient by itfelf; it needs no aid from another; it can receive none. To add more demonllra- tions of the fame conclufion, would be a kind of tautology in reafoning; becaufe one de- monltration, clearly comprehended, gives ail the evidence we are capable of receiving.
The ftrength of probable reafoning, tor the moiL part, depends not upon any one argu- ment, but upon many, which unite their force, and lead to the fame conclufion. Any one of them by itfelf would be infufficient to convince; but the whole taken together may have a force that is irrefiftible, fo that to de- fire more evidence would be abfurd. Would any man feek new arguments to prove that there were fuch perfons as King Charles the Firft, or Oliver Cromwell?
Such evidence may be compared to a rope- made up of many flender filaments tv/ifled to- gether. The rope has flrcngth more than fuf- ficient to bear the ftrefs laid upon it, though no one of the filaments of which it is compofed would be fufficient for that purpofe.
It is a common obfervation, that it is un- reafonable to require demonllration for things which do not admit of it. It is no lefs unrea- fonable to require reafoning of any kind for things which are known without reafoning. All reafoning mud be grounded upon truths which are known v/ithout reafoninij. In every branch of real knowledge there mud be firlt principles whofe truth is known i-ntuitively, without reafoning, either probable or demon- ftrative. They are not grounded on reafon- ing, but all reafoning is grounded on them.
It ESSAY VII.
CHAP, It has been lliown, that there are firft; princi- ^"- pies of neceffary truths, and firft principles of contingent truths. Demonftrative reafoning is grounded upon the former, and probable reafoning upon the latter.
That we may not be embarrafled by the am- biguity of words, it is proper to obferve, that there is a popular meaning of probable evidence, which ought not to be confounded with the philofophical meaning, above explained.
In common language, probable evidence is confidered as an inferior degree of evidence, and is oppofed to certainty: So that what is certain is more than probable, and what is on- ly probable is not certain. Philofophers confi- der probable evidence, not as a degree, but as afpecies of evidence which is oppofed, not to certainty, but to another fpecies of evidence called demonftration.
Demonftrative evidence has no degrees; but probable evidence, taken in the philofo- phical fenfe, has all degrees, from the very leaft, to the greateft which we call certainty.
That there is fuch a city as Rome, I am as certain as of any propofition in Euclid; but the evidence is not demonftrative, but of that kind which Philofophers call probable. Yet, in common language, it would found oddly to fay, it is probable there is fuch a city as Rome, becaufe it would imply fome degree of doubt or uncertainty.
Taking probable evidence, therefore, in the philofophical fenfe, as it is oppofed to de- monftrative, it may have any degrees of evi- dence, from the leaft to the greateft.
I think, in moft cafes, we meafure the de- grees of evidence by the effett they have upon a found 1 OF PROBABLE REASONING. 397 a found underflanding, when comprehended^ ^^ ^• clearly and without prejudice. Every degree ^ of evidence perceived by the mind, produces a proportioned degree of alTent or belief. The judgment may be in perfect fufpenfe be- tween two contradictory opinions, when there is no evidence for either, or equal evidence for both. The lead preponderancy on one fide inclines the judgment in proportion. Belief is mixed with doubt, more or lefs, until we come to the higheft degree of evidence, when all doubt vanifhes, and the belief is firm and immoveable. This degree of evidence, the highefl the human faculties can attain, we call certainty.
Probable evidence not only differs in kind from demonflrative, but is itfelf of different kinds. The chief of thefe I fhall mention, without pretending to make a complete enume- ration.
The firfl kind is that of human teflimony, upon which the greatefl part of human know- ledge is built.
The faith of hiflory depends upon it, as well as the judgment of folema tribunals, with regard to mens acquired rights, and with re- gard to their guilt or innocence when they are charged with crimes. A great part of the bu- fmefs of the Judge, of Counfel at the bar, of the Hiftorian, the Critic, and the Antiquari- an, is to canvafs and weigh this kind of evi- dence; and no man can a6t with common prudence in the ordinary occurrences of life, who has not fome competent judgment of it.
The belief we give to teflimony in many ca- fes is not folely grounded upon the veracity of the teflifier. In a fmgle teftimony, we confider f^ CHAP, der the motives a man might have to falfify. '^- If there be no appearance of any fuch motive, ' ^^ much more if there be motives on^ the other fide, his'teflin^ony has uieight independent of his moral charader. If the teilimony be cir- cumftantial, we confider how far the circum- ftanccs agree together, and with things that are known. It is fo very difficult to fabricate a flory, which cannot be detefted by a judici- ous examination of the circumftances, that it acquires evidence, by being able to bear fuch a triah There is an art in detetfing falfe evi- dence in judicial proceedings, well known to able judges and barriiters; fo that I believe fev.' falfe witneifes leave the bar without fufpi- cion of their guilt.
When there is an agreement of many wit- neifes, in a great variety of circumftances, without the pofTibility of a previous concert, the evidence may be equal to that of demon- ftration.
A fecond kind of probable evidence, is the authority of thofe who are good judges of the point iri queflion.' 1 he fupreme court of ju- dicature of the Britifii nation,, is often deter- mined by the opinion of lawyers iri a point of law, of phyficians in a point of medicine, and of otiier ariifts, in what relates to their feveral profeffions. And, in the common affairs of life, we frequently rely upon the judgment of others, in points of which we are not proper judges ourielves.
A third kind of probable evidence, is that by which we recognife the identity of things, and perfons of our acquaintance: That two fwords, two horfes, or two perfons, may be fo perfectly alike, as not to be diltinguifhable by OF PROBABLE REASONING. 399 by thofe to whom they are befl: known, cannot C HAP. be fhown to be impoffible. But we learn either ^"• from nature, or from experience, that it never ^"^ happens; or fo very rarely, that a perfon or thing, well known to us, is immediately re- cognifed without any doubt, when we per- ceive the marks or figns by which we were in ufe to diftinguifh it from all other individuals of the kind.
This evidence we rely upon in the mofl im- portant affairs of Hfe; and, by this evidence, the identity, both of things and of perfons, is determined in courts of judicature.
A fourth kind of probable evidence, is that which we have of mens future actions and condudl, from the general principles of aclion in man, or from our knowledge of the indi- viduals.
Notwithftanding the folly and vice that is to be found among men, there is a certain de- gree of prudence and probity which we rely upon in every man that is not infane. If it were not fo, no man would be fafe in the com- pany of another, and there could be no fociety among mankind. If men were as much dif- pofed to hurt as to do good, to lie as to fpeak truth, they could not live together j they would keep at as great diflance from one another as poffible, and the race would foon perifh.
We expect that men will take fome care of themfelves, of their family, friends, and re- putation: That they will not injure others without fome temptation: That they will have. fome gratitude for good offices, and fome re- fentment of injuries.
Such maxims v/ith regard to human con- duel are the foundation of all political reafoning.
4C0 ESSAY VIL C H A P. Jng, and of common prudence in the conduct of life. Rardly can a man form any projeft in public or in private life, which does not de- pend upon the conduct of other men, as well as his own, and which does not go upon the fuppofition that men will a£r fuch a part in fuch circumftances. This evidence may be pro- bable in a verv hio^h degree, but can never be demonftrative. The beft concerted project may fail, and wife counfels may be fruilrated, becaufe fome individual atted a part which it would have been againil all reafon to expect.
Another kind of probable evidence, the counterpart of the laft, is that by which we collect mens characters and deligns from their actions, fpeech, and other external figns.
We fee not mens hearts, nor the principles by which they are actuated; but there are ex- ternal figns of their principles and difpofitions, which, though not certain, may fometimesbe more trufted than their profeffions; and it is from external figns that v.-e muft draw all the knowledge we can attain of mens characters.
The next kind of probable evidence I men- tion, is that which Mathematicians call the probability of chances.
We attribute fome events to chance, becaufe we know only the remote caufe which mud produce fom.e one event of a number; but know not the more immediate caufe which determines a particular event of that number in preference to the others.
I think all the chances about which we rea- fon in mathematics are of this kind. Thus, in tiirowinc^ a juit die upon a table, we fay it is an equal chance which of the fix fides (liall be turned up: becaufe neither the perfon who throws.
OF PROBABLE REASONING. 401 throws, nor the byftanders know the preclfe C H A P. meafure of force and direciion neceflary to,^1!^ turn up any one fide rather than another. There are here therefore fix events, one of which muft happen; and as all are fuppofed to have equal probability, the probability of any one fide being turned up, the ace, for in- ftance, is as one to the remaining number five.
The probability of turning up two aces with two dice is as one to thirty-five; becaufe here there are thirty-fix events, each of which has equal probability.
Upon fuch principles as thefe, the do6lrine of chances has furnifhed a field of demonflra- tive reafoning of great extent, although the events about which this reafoning is employed be not neceffary, but contingent, and be not certain, but probable.
This may feem to contradict a principle be- fore advanced, that contingent truths are not capable of demonflration; but it does not: For, in the mathematical reafonings about chance, the conclufion demonflirated, is not, that fuch an event fhall happen, but that the probability of its happening bears fuch a ratio to the probability of its failing; and this con- clufion is neceffary upon the fuppofitions on which it is grounded.
The lafl: kind of probable evidence i fhall mention, is that by which the known laws of Nature have been difcovered, and the effefts which have been produced by them in former ages, or which may be expeded in time to come.
The laws of Nature are the rules by which the Supreme Being governs the world. We Vol. II. D d deduce ESSAY VII.
CHAP, deduce them only from fafts that fall within • ^ our own obfervation, or are properly attefted by thofe who have obferved them.
The knowledge of fome of the laws of Na- ture is neceifary to all men in the condudt of life. Thefe are foon difcovered even by fa- vages. They know that fire burns, that water drowns, that bodies gravitate towards the earth. They know that day and night, fum- mer and winter, regularly fucceed each other. As far back as their experience and informa- tion reach, they know that thefe have hap- pened regularly; and, upon this ground, they are led, by the conftitution of human nature, to expeft that they will happen in time to come, in like circumftances.
The knowledge which the Philofopher at- tains of the laws of Nature differs from that of the vulgar, not in the firfl principles on which it is grounded, but in its extent and ac- curacy. He collefts with care the phaenomena that lead to the fame conclufion, and compares them with thofe that feem to contradidl or to limit it. He obferves the circumftances on which every phtenomenon depends, and diftin- guifhes them carefully from thofe that are ac- cidentally conjoined with it. He puts natural bodies in various fituations, and applies them to one another in various ways, on purpofe to obferve the effed:; and thus acquires from his fenfes a more extenfive knowledge of the courfe of Nature in a fliort time, than could be colle£led by cafual obfervation in many ages. But what is the refult of his laborious re- fearches? It is, that, as far as he has been able to obferve, fuch things have always happened in fuch circumftances, and fuch bodies have always OF PROBABLE REASONING. 403 always been found to have fuch properties. ^ ^^ ^• Thefe are matters of fad, attefled by fenfe,, memory and teftimony, juft as the few fads which the vulgar know are attefled to them.
And what conclufions does the Philofopher draw from the fads he has colledted? They are, that like events have happened in former times in Hke circumflances, and will happen in time to come; and thefe conclufions are built on the very fame ground on which the fimple ruftic concludes that the fun will rife to-mor- row.
Fads reduced to general rules, and the con- fequences of thofe general rules, are all that we really know of the material world. And the evidence that fuch general rules have no exceptions, as well as the evidence that they will be the fame in time to come as they have been in time paft, can never be demonftrative. It is only that fpecies of evidence which Philo- fophers call probable. General rules may have "exceptions or limitations which no man ever had occafion to obferve. The laws of Nature may be changed by him who eflabliflied them. But we are led by our conflitution to rely upon their continuance with as little doubt as if ij: was demonftrable.
I pretend not to have made a complete enu- meration of all the kinds of probable evidence 5 but thofe I have mentioned are fufficient to ihow, that jhe far greatefl: part, and the mod interefting part of our knowledge, mud reft upon evidence of this kind; and that many things are certain for which we have only that kind of evidence which Philofophers call pro- bable.
D d 2 CHAR CHAP. IV.
Of Mr. Hume's Scepticifm with regard to Reafon.
IN the Treatife of Human Nature, book. i. part 4. fed:, i. the author undertakes to prove two points: Firji, That all that is called human knowledge (meaning demonftrative knowledge) is only probability; and, fecondly. That this probability, when duly examined, evanifhes by degrees, and leaves at laft no evi- dence at all: So that, in the iflue, there is no ground to believe any one proportion rather than its contrary, and " all thofe are certainly *' fools who reafon or believe any thing/* According to this account, reafon, that boafted prerogative of man, and the light of his mind, is an ignis fatuus^ which mifleads the wandering traveller, and leaves him at laft in abfolute darknefs.
How unhappy is the condition of man, born under a neceflity of believing contradidlions, and of trufting to a guide who confelfes herfelf to be a falfe one!
It is feme comfort, that this dodrine can ne- ver be ferioufly adopted by any man in his fenfes. And after this author had fliown that " all the rules of logic require a total extindion " of all belief and evidence," he himfelf, and all men that are not infane, muft have believed many things, and yielded allentto the evidence which he had cxtinguifhed.
This indeed he is fo candid as to acknow- ledge. " He finds himfelf abfolutely and nc- " celfarily Of Mr. Hume'j Scepticifm about Reafon, 405 ** ceflarily determined, to live and talk and CHAP. " a£t like other people in the common affairs ^^• *' of life. And fmce reafon is incapable of*" ^'"^^ " difpelling thefe clouds, mod fortunately it *' happens, that Nature herfelf fuffices to that *' purpofe, and cures him of this philofophical " melancholy and delirium." See feet. 7.
This was furely a very kind and friendly interpofition of Nature; for the effeds of this philofophical delirium, if carried into life, muft have been very melancholy.
But what pity is it, that Nature (whatever is meant by that perfonage), fo kind in curing this delirium, fhould be fo cruel as to caufe it. Doth the fame fountain fend forth fweet waters and bitter? Is it not raore probable, that if the cure was the work of Nature, the difeafe came from another hand, and was the work of the Philofopher?
To pretend to prove by reafoning that there is no force in reafon, does indeed look like a philofophical delirium. It is like a man's pre- tending to fee clearly, that he himfelf and all other men are blind.
A common fympton of delirium is, to thiijk that all other men are fools or mad. This ap^ pears to have been the cafe of our author, who concluded, " That all thofe are certainly fools " who reafon or believe any thing.'* Whatever was the caufc of this delirium, it muft be granted, that if it was real and not feigned, it was not to be cured by reafoning: For what can be more abfurd than to at- tempt to convince a man by reafoning who difowns the authority of reafon. It was there- fore v&ry fortunate that Nature found other means of curing it.
It ESSAY VII.
It ESSAY VII.
It may, however, not be improper to en- quire, whether, as the author thinks, it was produced by a juft application of the rules of logic, or, as others may be apt to think, by the mifapplication and abufe of them.
Firji^ Becaufe we are fallible, the author in- fers that all knowledge degenerates into pro- babihty.
That man, and probably every created be- ing, is fallible; and that a fallible being can- not have that perfect comprehenfion and aflu- rance of truth which an infallible being has, I think ought to be granted. It becomes a fallible being to be modeft, open to new light, and fenfible, that by fome falfe bias, or by rafh judging, he may be mifled. If this be called a degree of fcepticifm, I cannot help approving of it, being perfuaded, that the man who makes the bed ufe he can of the faculties which God has given him, without thinking them more perfect than they really are, may have all the belief that is neceflary in the con- duct of life, and all that is neceflary to his ac- ceptance with his Maker.
It is granted then, that human judgments ought always to be formed with an humble fenfe of our fallibility in judging.
This is all that can be inferred by the rules of logic from our being fallible. And if this be all that is meant by our knowledge degene- rating into probabiHty, I know no perfon of a different opinion.
But it may be obferved, that the author here ufes the word probability in a fenfe for which I know no authority but his own. Philo- fophers underftand probability as oppofed to demonifration; the vulgar as oppofed to cer- tainty; Of Mr. Hume's Scepticifju about Reafon. 407 tainty; but this author underflands itasop-CHAP. pofed to infallibility, which no man claims.
One who believes himfelf to be fallible may ftill hold it to be certain that two and two mrke four, and that two contradiftory pro- pofitions cannot both be true. He may be- lieve fome things to be probable only, and other things to be demonftrable, without mak- ing any pretence to infallibility.
If we ufe words in their proper meaning, it is impoflible that demonftration fhould de- generate into probability from the imperfedli- on of our faculties. Our judgment cannot change the nature of the things about which we judge. What is really demonftration, will ftill be fo, whatever judgment we form con- cerning it. It may likewife be obferved, that when we miftake that for demonftration, which really is not, the confequence of this miftake is, not that demonftration degenerates into probability, but that what we took to be demonftration is no proof at all; for one falfe ftep in a demonftration deftroys the whole, but cannot turn it into another kind of proof.'
Upon the whole, then, this firft conclufion of our author. That the fallibility of human judgment turns all knowledge into probability, if underftood literally, is abfurd; but if it be only a figure of fpeech, and means no more, but that, in all our judgments, we ought to be fenfible of our faUibility, and ought to hold our opinions with that modefty that be- comes fallible creatures, which I take to be what the author meant, this, I think, nobody denies, nor was it neceffary to enter into a la- borious proof of it.
One 4o8 ESSAY VII.
One 4o8 ESSAY VII.
One is never in greater danger of tranfgref- fing agaiaft the rules of logic, than in attempt- ing to prove what needs no proof. Of this we have an inflance in this very cafe: For the author begins his proof, that all human judg- ments are fallible, with affirming that fome are infallible.
" In all demonftrative fciences, fays he, " the rules are certain and infallible; but " when we apply them, our fallible and un- " certain faculties are very apt to depart from " them, and fall into error."
He had forgot, furely, that the rules of de- monftrative fciences are dilcovered by our fal- lible and uncertain faculties, and have no au- thority but that of human judgment. If they be infallible, fome human judgments are infal- lible; and there are many in various branches of human knowledge which have as good a claim to infallibility as the rules of the demon- ftrative fciences.
We have reafon here to find fault with our author for not being fceptical enough, as well as for a miftake in reafoning, when he claims infallibility to certain decifions of the human faculties, in order to prove that all their deci- fions are fallible.
The fecond "^o'mt which he attempts to prove, is, That this probability, when duly examin- ed, fuffers a continual diminution, and at laft a total extinction.
The obvious confequence of this is, that no fallible being can have good reafon to believe any thing at all; but let us hear the proof. " In every judgment, we ought to correct the '* firft judgment derived from the nature of " the obje£t, by another judgment derived " from Of Mr. Hume'j Scepticifm about Reafon. 409 from the nature of the underftanding. Be-C HAP. fuie the original uncertainty inherent in the * fubjett, there arifes another, derived from the weaknefs of the faculty which judges. Having adjufted thefe two uncertainties to- ' gether, we are obliged, by our reafon, to add a new uncertainty, derived from the pollibility of error in the efhimation we make ' of the truth and fidelity of our faculties.
• This is a doubt, of which, if we would ' clofely purfue our realoning, we cannot • avoid giving a decifion. But this decifion, ' though it fliould be favourable to our pre- ' ceding judgment, being founded only on ' probability, mufl weaken flill farther our ' firfl evidence. The third uncertainty muft ' in like manner be criticifed by a fourth, ' and fo on without end.
" Now, as every one of thefe uncertainties ' takes away a part of the original evidence, ' it muft at laft be reduced to nothing. Let ' our firft belief be ever fo ftrong, it muft in- ' fallibly perifti, by pafting through fo many ' examinations, each of which carries off ' fomewhat of its force and vigour. No fi- ' nite objed can fubfift under a decreafe re- •' peated in infinitum.
" When I refleO: on the natural fallibility ■' of my judgment, I have lefs confidence in " my opinions, than when I only confider the " objefts concerning which I reafon. And " when I proceed ftill farther, to turn the " fcrutiny againft every fucceflive eftimation " I make of my faculties, all the rules of logic " require a continual diminution, and at laft " a total extinction of belief and evidence."
This