This This is the author's Achillean argument againll the evidence of reafon, from which he concludes, that a man who would govern his belief by reafon, mufl believe nothing at all, and that belief is an acl, not of the cogitative, but of the fenfitive part of our nature.
If there be any fuch thing as motion, (faid an antient Sceptic) the fwift-footed Achilles could never overtake an old man in a journey. For, fuppofe the old man to fet out a thoufand paces before AcHir>LES, and that while Achilles has travelled the thoufand paces, the old man has gone five hundred; when Achilles has gone the five hundred, the old man has gone two hundred and fifty; and "when Achilles has gone the two hundred and fifty, the old man is ftill one hundred and twenty-five before him. Repeat thefe eftima- tions in bifinitiwi, and you will ftill find the old man foremoft; therefore Achilles can never overtake him; therefore there can be no fuch thing as motion.
The reafoning of the modern Sceptic againfl reafon is equally ingenious, and equally con- vincing. Indeed, they have a great fimilari- If we trace the journey of Achilles two thoufand paces, we Ihall find the very point where the old man is overtaken: But this (hort journey, by dividing it into an infinite number of ft ages, with correfponding eftima- tions, is made to appear infinite. In like manner, our author, fubjefting every judg- ment to an infinite number of fucceffive proba- ble eftimations, reduces the evidence to no- thing.
To To return then to the argument of the mo-^ ^ J^ ' dern Sceptic. I examine the proof of a thco- __ ^'_^^_^ rem of Euclid. It appears to me to be flri£l Jemonftration. But I may have overlooked fome fallacy; therefore I examine it again and again, but can fmd no flaw in it. I find all that have examined it agree with me. I have now that evidence of the truth of the propofi- tion, which I and all men call demonftration, and that belief of it, which we call certainty.
Here my fceptical friend interpofes, and af- fures me, that the rules of logic reduce this de- monftration to no evidence at all. I am wil- ling to hear what flep in it bethinks fallacious, and why. He makes no objection to any part of the demonftration, but pleads my fallibility in judging. 1 have made the proper allowance for this already, by being open to convidlion. But, fays he, there are two uncertainties, the firft: inherent in the fubjecl, which I have al- ready fhown to have only probable evidence; the fecond ariftng from the weaknefs of the fa- culty that judges. I anfwer, It is the weak- nefs of the facjilty only that reduces this de- monftration to what you call probability. You muft not therefore make it a fecond uncer- tainty; for it is the fame with the firft. To take credit twice in an account for the fame article is not agreeable to the rules of logic. Hitherto therefore there is but one uncertain- ty, to wit, my fallibility in judging.
But, fays my friend, you are obliged by reafon to add a new uncertainty, derived from the poftibility of error in the eftimation you make of the truth and fidelity of your facul- ties. I anfwer, This CHAP. This eflimation Is ambiguoully exprefled; ^^' it may either mean an eitimation of my liable- nefs to err by the mlfapplication and abufe of my faculties; or it may mean an eftimation of my liablenefs to err, by conceiving my facul- ties to be true and faithful, while they may be falfe and fallacious in themfelves, even when applied in the beft manner. I (hall confider this eftimation in each of thefe fenfes.
If the firft be the eftimation meant, it is true that reafon direds us, as fallible creatures, to carry along with us, in all our judgments, a fenfe of our fallibility. It is true alfo, that we are in greater danger of erring in fome cafes, and lefs in others; and that this danger of er- ring may, according to the circumftances of the cafe, admit of an eftimation, which we ought likewife to carry along with us in every judgment we form.
When a demonftration is lliort and plain; when the point to be proved does not touch our intereft or our paifions; when the faculty of judging, in fuch cafes, has acquired ftrength by much exercife, there is lefs danger of er- ring; when the contrary circumftances takg place, there is more.
In the prefent cafe, every circumftance is favourable to the judgment I have formed. There cannot be lefs danger of erring in any cafe, excepting perhaps when I judge of a felf- evident axiom.
The Sceptic farther urges, that this decifi- on, though favourable to my firft judgment, being founded only on probability, muft ftill weaken the evidence of that judgment.
Here 1 cannot help being of a quite contrary opinion, nor can I imagine how an ingenious author Of Mr. HuME*j Scepildfm about Reafon. 413 author could impofe upon himfelf fo grofsly,C H A P, for furely he did not intend to impofe upon his ^^• reader. ^' ' After repeated examination of a propofition of Euclid, I judge it to be flri6lly demonftra- ted; this is my firfl judgment. But as I am liable to err from various caufes, I confider how far I may have been mifled by any of thcfe caufes in this judgment. My decifion upon this fecond point is favourable to my firfl judg- ment, and therefore as I apprehend, mufl flrengthen it. To fay, that this decifion, be- caufe it is only probable, mufl weaken the firfl evidence, feems to me contrary to all rules of logic, and to common fenfe.
The firfl judgment may be compared to the teflimony of a credible witnefs; the fecond, after a fcrutiny into the character of the wit- nefs, wipes off every objedlion that can be made to it, and therefore furely mufl confirm and not weaken his teflimony.
But let us fuppofe, that, in another cafe, I examine my firfl judgment upon fome point, and find, that it was attended with unfavoura- ble circumflances, what, in reafon, and ac- cording to the rules of logic, ought to be the efFe£l of this difcovery?
The efFed furely will be, and ought to be, to make me lefs confident in my firfl judgment, until I examine the point anew in more fa- vourable circumflances. If it be a matter of im- portance I return to weigh the evidence of my firfl judgment. If it was precipitate before, it mufl now be deliberate in every point. If at firfl I was in pafTion, I mufl now be cool. If I had an interefl in the decifion, I mufl place the interefl on the other fide.
It P- It is evident, that this review of the fubjeft may confirm my firfh judgment, notv^^ithftand- ing the fufpicious circumllances that attended it. Though the judge was biafled or corrupted, it does not follow, that the fentence was un- juft. The rectitude of the decifion does not depend upon the character of the judge, but upon the nature of the cafe. From that only, it mud be determined whether the decifion be jult. The circumftances that rendered it fuf- picious are mere prefumptions, which have no force againfl direct evidence.
Thus, I have confidered the effect of this eflimation of our liablenefs to err in our firfl judgment, and have allowed to it all the effedt that reafon and the rules of logic permit. In the cafe I firft fupppofed, and in every cafe where we can difcover no caufe of error, it affords a prefumption in favour of the firft judgment. In other cafes, it may afford a pre- fumption againfl it. But the rules of logic re- quire, that we fhould not judge by prefump- tions, where we have diredt evidence. The effect of an unfavourable prefumption fhould only be, to make us examine the evidence with the greater care.
The Sceptic urges, in the lafl place, that this eftimation muft t>e fubjected to another effimation, that to another, and fo on /;z infi- nitum; and as every new eflimation takes away from the evidence of the firft judgment, it muft at laft be totally annihilated.
I anfwer, firjl^ it. has been fhown above, that the firft eftimation, fuppofmg it unfa- vourable, can only afford a prefumption againft the firft judgment; the fecond, upon the fame fuppofition, will be only the prefumption of a prefump- Of Mr. Hume's Scepticifm about Reafon» 415 prefumptlon; and the third, the prefumption C H A P. that there is a prefumption of a prefumption. ^^•'^• This infinite feries of prefumptions refembles an infinite feries of quantities decreafing in geometrical proportion, which amounts only to a finite fum. The infinite feries of ftages of AcHiLLEs's journey after the old man, amounts only to two thoufand paces; nor can this infinite feries of prefumptions, outweigh one folid argument in favour of the firft judg- ment, fuppofing them all to be unfavourable to it.
Secondly^ I have (hown, that the eftimation of our firft judgment may ftrengthen it; and the fame thing may be faid of all the fubfequent eftimations. It v/ould, therefore, be as rea- fonable to conclude, that the firft judgment will be brought to infallible certainty v/hen this feries of eftimations is wholly in its favour, as that its evidence will be brought to nothing by fuch a feries fuppofed to be wholly unfavoura- ble to it. But, in reality, one ferious and cool re-examination of the evidence by which our firft judgment is fupported, has, and, in reafon, ought to have more force to ftrengthen or weaken it, than an infinite feries of fuch eftimations as our author requires.
Thirdly^ I know no reafon nor rule in logic, that requires that fuch a feries of eftimations fhould follow every particular judgment.
A wife man who has praclifed reafoning knows that he is fallible, and carries this con- vidion along with him in every judgment he forms. He knows likewife that he is more liable to err in fome cafes than in others. He has a fcalc in his mind, by which he eftimates his liablenefs to err, and by this he regulates the C H A P. the degree of his aflent in his firft judgment upon any point. ^"''"^''"^^ The author's rcafoning fuppofcs that a man, when he forms his hrft judgment, conceives himfelf to be infaHible; that by a fecond and fubfequent judgment, he difcovers that he is not infallible; and that by a third judgment, fubfequent to the fecond, he eflimates his lia- blenefs to err in fuch a cafe as the prefent..
If the man proceed in this order, I grant, that his fecond judgment will, with good rea- fon, bring down the firft from fuppofed infalli- bility to fallibility; and that his third judgment will, in fome degree, either ftrengthen or weaken the firif, as it is correded by the fecond.
But every man of underftanding proceeds in a contrary order. When about to judge in any particular point, he knows already that he is not infallible. He knows what are the cafes in which he is mod or lead liable to err. The conviction of thefe things is always prefent to his mind, and influences the degree of his affent in his firft judgment, as far as to him appears reafonable.
If he fliould afterwards find reafon to fufpe£t his firft judgment, and defires to have all the fatisfaction his faculties can give, reafon will dire£t him not to form fuch a feries of eftima- tions upon eftimations, as this author requires, but to examine the evidence of his firft judg- ment carefully and coolly; and this review may very reafonably, according to its refult, either ftrengthen or weaken, or totally over- turn his firft judgment.
This infinite feries of eftimations, therefore, is not the method that reafon directs in order to Of Mr. Hume's Scepticiftn about Reafori. 41 y to form our judgment in any cafe. It is intro- CHAP, duced without neceility, without any ufe but ^^^" to puzzle the underftanding, and to make us think, that to judge, even in the fimplefl and plained cafes, is a matter of infurmcuntable difficulty and endlefs labour; juft as the anci- ent Sceptic, to make a journey of two thoafand paces appear endlefs, divided it into an infinite number of ftages.
But we obferved, that the eftimation which our author requires may admit of another meaning, which indeed is more agreeable to the expreffion, but inconfiftent with what he advanced before.
By the poilibility of error in the eflimation of the truth and fidelity of our faculties, may be meant, that we may err by efteeming our faculties true and faithful, while they niay be falfe and fallacious, even when ufed according to the rules of reafon and logic.
If this be meant, I anfwer, j^r/?. That the truth and fidelity of our faculty of judging is, and rnuft be taken for granted in every judg- ment and in everv eftimation.
If the Sceptic can ferioufly doubt of the truth and fidelity of his faculty of judging when properly ufed, and fufpend his judgment upon that point till he finds proof, his fcepti- cilm admits of no cure by reafoning, and he muft even continue in it until he have new faculties given him, which fliall have authority to fit in judgment upon the old. Nor is there any need of an endlefs fucceffion of doubts upon this fubjeft, for the firft puts an end to all judgment and reafoning, and to the poilibi- lity of convidion by that means. The Sceptic has here got pofleilion of a ftrong hold which Vol. II. E e is C H A P. is impregnable to reafoning, and we mufl leave ^^' him in poflefiion of it, till Nature, by other means, makes him give it up.
Secondly, I obferve, that this ground of fcepticifm, from the fuppofed infidelity of our faculties, contradicls what the author before advanced in this very argument, to wit, that *' the rules of the demonftrative fciences are " certain and infallible, and that truth is the " natural efled of reafon, and that error arifes " from the irruption of other caufes."
But perhaps he made thefe conceffions un- warily. He is therefore at liberty to retrad: them, and to reft his fcepticifm upon this fole foundation. That no reafoning can prove the truth and fidelity of our faculties. Here he ftands upon firm ground: For it is evident, that every argument offered to prove the truth and fidelity of our faculties, takes for granted the thing in queftion, and is therefore that kind of jophifm, which Logicians call petitio principii.
All we would afk of this kind of Sceptic is, that he would be uniform and confiftent, and that his pradice in life do not belie his pro- feffion of Scepticifm with regard to the fidelity of his faculties: For the want of faith, as well as faith itfelf, is beft fliown by works. If a Sceptic avoid the fire as much as thofe who believe it dangerous to go into it, we can hardly avoid thinking his fcepticifm to be feigned,2nd not real.
Our author indeed was aware, that neither his fcepticifm, nor that 6f any other perfon, was able to endure this trial, and therefore enters a caveat againft it. " Neither I, fays *' he, nor any other perfon, was ever fincerely " and Of Mr. Hume's Scepticifri about Reafon. 419 " and conftantly of that opinion. Nature, CHAP.
" by an abfolute and uncontrollable neceffity, jXr-^ " has determined us to judge, as well as to " bi;eathe and feel. My intention, therefore, ** fays he, in difplaying fo carefully the argu- *' ments of that fantaftic fed, is only to make " the reader fenfible of the truth of my hypo- *' thefis, that all our reafonings concerning *' caufes and cffedls, are derived frgm nothing " butcuflom, and that belief is more properly *' an aft of the fenfitive than of the cogita- " tive part of our nature."
We have before confidered the firft part of this hypothefis. Whether our reafoning about caufes be derived only from cuflom?
The other part of the author's hypothefis here mentioned is darkly exprefled, though the expreffion feems to be fludied, as it is put in Italics. It cannot furely mean that belief is not an aft of thinking. It is not, therefore, the power of thinking that he calls the cogita-^ ' tive part of our nature. Neither can it be the power of judging, for all belief implies judg- ment; and to believe a proportion means the fame thing as to judge it to be true. It feems, therefore, to be the power of reafoning that he calls the cogitative part of our nature.
If this be the meaning, I agree to it in part. The belief of firft principles is not an aft of the reafoning power: For all reafoning mufl be grounded upon them. We judge them to be true, and believe them without reafoning. But why this power of judging of firft princi- ples fhould be called the fenfitive part of our nature, I do not underftand.
As our belief of firft principles is an aft of pure judgment without reafoning j fo our be- E e 2 lief ESSAY VII.
CHAP, lief of the conclufions drawn by reafonlng ^^- from firfl: principles, may, 1 think, be called ^^"""^"^ an a6l of the-reafoning faculty.
Upon the whole, I fee only two conclufions that can be fairly drawn from this profound and intricate reafoning againfl reafon. The firft is. That we are fallible in all our judg- ments and in all our reafonings. The fecond. That the truth and fidelity of our faculties can never be proved by reafoning; and therefore our belief of it cannot be founded on reafoning. If thelaft be what the author calls his hypothe- fis, I fubfcribe to it, and think it not an hy- pothefis, but a manifeft truth; though I con- ceive it to be very improperly exprefled, by faying that belief is more properly an ad of the fenfitive than of the cogitative part of our nature.
ESSAY mUHuaanMEM ESSAY VIIL OF TASTE. CHAP. I.
Of Tqfte in generaL THAT power of the mind by which we are capable of difcerning and reliftiing the beauties of Nature, and whatever is excel- lent in the fine arts, is called tq/i^e.
The external fenfeof tafte, by which we dif- tinguifh and relifh the various kinds of food, has given occaiion to a metaphorical application of its name to this internal power of the mind, by which we perceive what is beautiful, and what is deformed or defedive in the various objefts that we contemplate.
Like the tafte of the palate, it relifhes fome things, is difgufted with others; with regard to many, is indifferent or dubious, and is con- fiderably influenced by habit, by alfociations, and by opinion. Thefe obvious analogies be- tween external and internal tafte, have led men, in all ages, and in all or moft pohfhed languages, to give the name of the external fenfe to this power of difcerning what is beau- tiful with pleafure, and what is ugly and faulty in its kind with difguft.
In CHAP. In treating of this as an intelle£tual power of ,^^^V_^ the mind, I intend only to make fome obfer- vations, firfl on its nature, and then on its objeds.
I. In the external fenfe of tafte, we are led by reafon and refleftion to diflinguilh between the agreeable fenfation we feel, and the quality in the objed which occafions it. Both have the fame name, and on that account are apt to be confounded by the vulgar, and even by Philofophers. The fenfation I feel when I tafte any fapid body is in my mind; but there is a real quality in the body which is the caufe of this fenfation. Thefe two things have the fame name in language, not from any fimilitude in their nature, but becaufe the one is the fign of the other, and becaufe there is little occafion in common life to diftinguiih them.
This was fully explained in treating of the fecondary qualities of bodies. The reafon of taking notice of it now is, that the internal power of tafte bears a great analogy in this refpect to the external.
When a beautiful objed is before us, we may diftinguifh the agreeable emotion it pro- duces in us, from the quality of the objed which caufes that emotion. When I hear an air in mufic that pleafes me, I fay, it is fine, it is excellent. This excellence is not in me; it is in the mufic. But the pleafure it gives is not in the mufic; it is in me. Perhaps I cannot fay what it is in the tune that pleafes my ear, as I cannot fay what it is in a fapid body that pleafes my palate; but there is a quahty in the fapid body which pleafes my palate, and I call it a delicious tafte; and there is a quahty in the tune that pleafes my tafte, and I call it a fine or an excellent air.
This OF TASTE IN GENERAL. 423 This ought the rather to be obferved, be-C HAP. caufe it is become a fafliion among modern ^* Philofophcrs, to refolvc all our perceptions into ' mere feelings or fenfations in the perfon that perceives, without any thing correfponding to thofe feelings in the external objeft. Accord- ing to thofe Philofophers, there is no heat in the fire, no tafte in a fapid body; the tafte and the heat being only in the perfon that feels them. In like manner, there is no beauty in any object whatfoever; it is only a fenfation or feeling in the perfon that perceives it.
The language and the common fenfe of mankind contradict this theory. Even thofe who hold it, find themfelves obliged to ufe a language that contradicts it. I had occafion to fhow, that there is no folid foundation for it when applied to the fecondary qualities of body; and the fame arguments fhow equally, that it has no folid foundation when applied to the beauty of objects, or to any of thofe qua- lities that are perceived by a good tafte.
But though fome of the qualities that pleafe a good talte rcfemble the fecondary qualities of body, and therefore may be called occult qualities, as we only feel their effect, and have no more knowledge of the caufc, but that it is fomething which is adapted by Nature to pro- duce that effect; this is not always the cafe.
Our judgment of beauty is in many cafes more enlightened. A work of art may appear beautiful to the mofl ignorant, even to a child. It pleafes, but he knows not why. To one who underftands it perfectly, and perceives how every part is fitted with exact judgment to its end, the beauty is not myfterious; it is per- fectly comprehended; and he knows wherein it confifts, as well as how it affeds him.
2. Wc may obferve, that, though all the tafles we perceive by the palate are either agree- able or difagreeable, or indifferent; yet, among thofe that are agreeable, there is great diverlity, not in degree only, but in kind. And as we have not generical names for all the different kinds of tafle, we diftinguifh them by the bodies in which they are found.
In like manner, all the objeds of our inter- nal tafle are either beautiful, or difagreeable, or indiuerent; yet of beauty there is a great diverfity, not only of degree, but of kind: The beauty of a demonfl ration, the beauty of a poem, the beauty of a palace, the beauty of apiece of mufic, the beauty of a fine woman, and many more that might be named, are different kinds of beauty; ana we have no names to diftinguifh them but the names of the different objefts to which they belong.
As there is fuch diverfity in the kinds of beauty as well as in the degrees, we need not think it ftrange that Philofophers have gone in- to difl'erent fyflems in analyfing it, and enu- merating its fimple ingredients. They have made many jufl obfervations on the fubjeft; but, from the love of fimplicity, have reduced it to fewer principles than the nature of the thing v- ill permit, having had in their eye forne particular kinds of beauty, Awhile they over- looked others.
There are moral beauties as well as natural; beauties in the objeds of fenfe, and in intel- lectual objedls; in the works of men, and in the works of God; in things inanimate, in brute animals, and in rational beings; in the conflitution of the body of man, and in the conftitution of his mind. There is no real excellence I OF TASTE IN GENERAL. 425 excellence which has not its beauty to a difcern- CHAP, ing eye, when placed in a proper point of ^ ^• view; and it is as difficult to enumerate the ingredients of beauty as the ingredients of real excellence.
3. The tafte of the palate may be accounted moft jufl and perfeti, when we relifh the things that are fit for the nourifhment of the body, and are difgufted with things of a con- trary nature. The manifeft intention of Na- ture in giving us this fenfe, is, that we may difcern what it is fit for us to eat and to drink, and what it is not. Brute animals are direded in the choice of their food merely by their tafte. Led by this guide, they chufe the food that Nature intended for them, and feldom make miftakes, unlefs they be pinched by hunger, or deceived by artificial compofi- tions. In infants likewife the tafte is com- monly found and uncorrupted, and of the fimple productions of Nature they relifli the things that are moft wholefome.
In like manner, our internal tafte ought to be accounted moft juft and perfect, when we are pleafed with things that are moft excellent in their kind, and difpleafed with the contrary. The intention of Nature is no lefs evident in this internal tafte than in the external. Every excellence has a real beauty and charm that makes it an agreeable object to thofe who have the faculty of difcerning its beauty; and this faculty is what we call a good tafte.
A man, who, by any diforder in his mental powers, or by bad habits, has contraQed a relifti for what has no real excellence, or what is deformed and defedlive, has a depra- ved tafte, like one who finds a more agreeable reUfh CHAP, relidi In afhes or cinders than in the moft ■wholefome food. As we muft acknowledge the tafte of the palate to be depraved in this cafe, there is the fame reafonto think the tafte of the mind depraved in the other.
There is therefore a juft and rational tafl:e, and there is a depraved and corrupted tafte. For it is too evident, that, by bad education, bad habits, and wrong aflbclations, men may acquire a relifh for naftinefs, for rudenefs, and ill breeding, and for many other deformi- ties. To fay that fuch a tafte is not vitiated, is no lefs abfurd than to fay, that the fickly girl who delights in eating charcoal and tobac- co-pipes, has as juft and natural a tafte as when ftie is in perfed: health.
4. The force of cuftom, of fancy, and of cafual afTociations, is very great both upon the external and internal tafte. An Eikimauxcan regale himfelf with a draught of whale-oil, and a Canadian can feaft upon a dog. A Kamf- chatkadale lives upon putrid fift», and is fome- times reduced to eat the bark of trees. The tafte of rum, or of green tea, is at firft as nau- fcous as that of ipecacuan, to fome perfons, who may be brought by ufe to relifn what they once found fo difagreeable.
When we fee fuch varieties In the tafte of the palate produced by cuftom and afTociations, and fome peihaps by conftitution, we may be the lefs furprifed that the fame caufes faould produce like varieties in the tafte of beauty; that the African fhould efteem thick lips and a flat nofe; that other nations fhould draw out theiV ears, till they hang over their fhoulders; that in one nation ladies fhould paint their faces.
OF TASTE IN GENERAL. 427 faces, and in another fhould make them fiiineC H A P. with greafe.
•5. Thofe who conceive that there is no ftandard in nature by which taite may be re- gulated, and that the common proverb. That there ought to be no difpute about tafle, is to be taken in the utmofl latitude, go upon flen- der and infufficient ground. The fame argu- ments might be ufed with equal force againfl: any ftandard of truth.
Whole nations by the force of prejudice are brought to believe the grofleft abfurdities; and why fhould it be thought that the tafte is lefs capable of being perverted than the judgment? It muft indeed be acknowledged, that men differ more in the faculty of tafte than in what we commonly call judgment; and therefore it may be expected that they fhould be more lia- ble to have their tafte corrupted in matters of beauty and deformity, than their judgment in matters of truth and error.
If we make due allowance for this, wc (hall fee that it is as eafy to account for the variety of taftes, though there be in nature a ftandard of true beauty, and confequently of good tafte; as it is to account for the variety and contrari- ety of opinions, though there be in nature a ftandard of truth, and confequently of right judgment.
6. Nay, if we fpeak accurately and ftriclly, we fhall find, that, in every operation of tafte, there is judgment implied.
When a man pronounces a poem or a palace to be beautiful, he affirms fomething of that poem or that palace; and every affirmation or denial expreffes judgment. For we cannot better define judgment, than by faying that it is 428 ESSAY VIIL C H A P. is an affirmation or denial of one thing con- cerning another. I had occafion to fhow, ^'^'^^ when treating of judgment, that it is implied in every perception of our external fenfes. There is an immediate convidion and belief of theexiilence of the quality perceived, whether it be colour, or found, or figure; and the fame thing holds in the perception of beauty or deformity.
If it be faid that the perception of beauty is merely a feeling in the mind that perceives, without any belief of excellence in the objed, the neceflary confequence of this opinion is, that vi?hen 1 fay Virgii/s Georgics is a beau- tiful poem, I mean not to fay any thing of the poem, but only fomething concerning myfelf and my feelings. Why fhould I ufe a language that expreffes the contrary of what 1 mean?
My language, according to the neceflary rules of conftrudion, can bear no other mean- ing but this, that there is fomething in the poem, and not in me', which I call beauty. Even thefe who hold beauty to be merely a feeling in the perfon that perceives it, find themfelves under a neceflity of exprefling them- felves, as if beauty were folely a quality of the objed, and not of the percipient.
No reafon can be given why all mankind {hould exprefs themfelves thus, but that they believe what they fay. It is therefore contra- ry to the univerfal fenfe of mankind, exprelT- cd by their language, that beauty is not really in the objed, but is merely a feeling in the perfon who is faid to perceive it. Philofo- phers fhould be very cautious in oppofing the common fenfe of mankind; for, when they do, they rarely mifs going wrong.
Our OF TASTE IN GENERAL. 4-9