Our judgment of beauty is not indeed a dryC II A P. and unafteding judgment, like that of a ma- thematical or metaphyfical truth. By the con- ftitution of our nature, it is accompanied with an agreeable feeling or emotion, for which we have no other name but the fenfe of beauty. This fenfe of beauty, like the perceptions of our other fenfes, implies not only a feeling, but an opinion of fome quahty in the object which occafions that feeling.
In objeds that pleafe the tafte, we always judge that there is fome real excellence, fome fuperiority to thofe that do not pleafe. In fome cafes, that fuperior excellence is diftinftly perceived, and can be pointed out; in other cafes, we have only a general notion of fome excellence which we cannot defcribe. Beau-^ ties of the former kind may be compared to the primary qualities perceived by the external fenfes; thofe of the latter kind, to the fecon- dary.
7. Beauty or deformity in an object, refults from its nature or flrudture. To perceive the beauty therefore, we muft perceive the nature or ftrudlure from which it refults. In this the internal fenfe differs from the external. Our external fenfes may difcover qualities which do not depend upon any antecedent perception. Thus I can hear the found of a bell, thoufrh I never perceived any thing elfe belonging to it. But it is impofTible to perceive the beauty of an obje£t without perceiving the objeft, or at leaft conceiving it. On this account. Dr. HuTCHESoN called the fenfes of beauty and harmony reflex or fecondary fenfes; becaufe the beauty cannot be perceived unlefs the objed be perceived by fome other power of the mind. Thus the fcnfc of harmo- ny 4:o ESSAY VIII.
C H A P. ny and melody in founds fuppofes the external "^ ^enfe of hearing, and is a kind of feccndary to it. A man born deaf may be a good judge of beauties of another kind, but can have no notion of melody or hanmony. The like may be faid of beauties in colouring and in figure, which can never be perceived without the fen- fcs, by which colour and figure are perceived.
Of the Gbjeaf of Tq/h, and frjl of Novelty, l\ Philosophical analyfis of the objefts of ±X tafte is like applying the anatomical knife to a fine face. I'he defign of the Philo- fophcr, as well as of the Anatomifi:, is not to gratify tafle, but to improve knowledge. The reader ought to bd aware of this, that he may not entertain an expedation in which he will be difappointed.
By the objefls of tafle, I mean thofe quali- ties or attributes of things, which are by Na- ture adapted to pleafe a good tafle. Mr. Ad- dison, and Dr. Akenside after him, have re- duced them to three, to wit, novelty, gran- deur, and beauty. This divifion is fufficient for all I intend to fay upon the fubjedl, and therefore 1 fnall adopt it; cbferving only, that beauty is often taken in fo extenfive a fenfe as to comprehend all the objects of tafle; yet all the authors I have met with, who have given a divifion of the objedls of tafle, make beauty one fpecies.
I take the reafon of this to be, that we have lpe<iific names for fome of the qualities that pleafe pleafe the tafte, but not for all; and therefore CHAP, all thofe fall under the general name of beau- ' ty, for which there is no fpecihc name in the ^"^ divifion.
There are, indeed, fo many fpecies of beau- ty, that it would be as difficult to enumerate them perfectly, as to enumerate all the tafles we perceive by the palate. Nor does there appear to me fufficient reafon for making, as fome very ingenious authors have done, as many different internal fenfes as there are dif- ferent fpecies of beauty or deformity.
The divifion of our external fenfes is taken from the organs of perception, and not from the qualities perceived. We have not the fame means of dividing the internal; becaufe, though fome kinds of beauty belong only to objeds of the eye, and others to objects of the ear, there are many which we cannot refer to any bodily organ; and therefore I conceive every divifion that has been made of our in- ternal fenfes to be in fome degree arbitrary. They may be made more or fewer, according as we have diftind names for the various kinds of beauty and deformity; and I fufpecl the molt copious languages have not names for them alL Novelty is not properly a quality of the thing to which we attribute it, far lefs is it a fenfation in the mind to which it is new; it is a relation which the thing has to the know- ledge of the perfon. What is new to one man, may not be fo to another; what is new this moment, may be familiar to the fame per- fon fome time hence. When an objed is firfl brought to our knowledge, it is new, whether it be agreeable or not.
It It is evident, therefore, with regard to no- velty, (whatever may be faid of other objeds of tafte) that it is not merely a fenfation in the mind of him to whom the thing is new; it is a real relation which the thing has to his knowledge at that time.
But we are fo conftituted, that what is new to us, commonly gives pleafure upon that ac- count, if it be not in itfelf difagrceable. It roufes our attention, and occafions an agreea- ble exertion of our faculties.
The pleafure we receive from novelty in ob- jefts has fo great influence in human life, that it well deferves the attention of Philofophers; and feveral ingenious authors, f)articularly. Dr. GiRARD in his Eflay on Tafte, have, I think, fuccefsfully accounted for it, from the principles of the human conflitution.
We can perhaps conceive a being fo made, that his happinefs confifts in a continuance of the fame unvaried fenfations or feelings, with- out any adive exertion on his part. Whether this be pofTible or not, it is evident that man is not fuch a being; his good confifts in the vi- gorous exertion of his active and intelledive powers upon their proper objeds; he is made for adion and progrefs, and cannot be happy without it; his enjoyments feem to be given bv Nature, not fo much for their own fake, as to encourage the exercife of his various povvers. That tranquillity of foul in which fome place human happinefs, is not a dead reft, but a re- gular progrefTive motion.
Such is the conftitution of man by the ap- pointment of Nature. This conftitution is perhaps a part of the imperfedion of our na- ture; OF NOVELTY.
ture; but it is v/ifely adapted to our ftate, CHAP, which is not intended to be ftationary, bat pro- ^'• greffive. The eye is not fatiated with feeing, nor the ear with hearing; fomething is always wanted* Defire and hope never ceafe, but re- main to fpur us on to fomething yet to be ac- quired; and, if they could ceafe, human hap- pinefs mud end with them. That our defire and hope be properly directed, is our part; that they can never be extinguiflied, is the work of Nature.
It is this that makes human life fo bufy a fcene. Man muft be doing fomething, good or bad, trifling or important; and he muft vary the employment of his faculties, or their exercife will become languid, and the pleafure that attends it ficken of courfe.
The notions of enjoyment, and of activity, confidered abftraclly, are no doubt very diffe- rent, and we cannot perceive a necefl'ary con- nexion between them. But, in our confti- tution, they are fo connected by the wifdoin of Nature, that they muft go hand in hand; and the firft muft be led and fupported by the laft.
An object at firft, perhaps, gave much plea- fure, while attention was diredled to it with vigour. But attention cannot be long confin- ed to one unvaried objeft, nor can it be car- ried round in the fame narrow circle. Curio- lity is a capital principle in the human confti- tution, and its food muft be what is in fome refpeft new. What is faid of the Athenians may in fome degree be applied to all mankind. That their time is fpent in hearing, or telling, or doing fome new thing.
Vol. 11. F f Into 434 ESSAY YiIL C H A Fv Jiito this part of the human conftitution, I ^ ^ • ^ think, we may refolve the pleafure we have from novelty in objects.
Curiofity is commonly ftrongeft in children and in young perfons, and accordingly novel- ty pleafes them mod. In all ages, in propor- tion as novelty gratifies curiofity, and occafi- ons a vigorous exertion of any of our mental ]-;ov/ers in attending to the new object, in the fame proportion it gives pleafure. In advan- ced life, the indolent and inactive have the ftrongell paffion for news, as a relief from a painful vacuity of thought.
But the pleafure derived from new objects^ in many cafes, is not owing folely or chiefly to their being new, but to fome other circum- ftance that gives them value. The new fa- fhion in drefs, furniture, equipage, and other accommodations of life, gives pleafure, not fo- much, as I apprehend, becaufe it is new, as becaufe it is a fign of rank, and diitinguifli- es a man from the vulgar.
In fome things novelty is due, and the want of it a real imperfection. Thus, if an author adds to the number of books, with which the public is already overloaded, we expert from Iiim fomething new; and if he fays nothing but what has been faid before in as agreeable a manner, we are juftly difgufted.
When novelty is altogether feparated from the conception of worth and utility, it makes but a flight impreflion upon a truly correct tafte. Every difcovery in nature, in the arts, aiul in the fciences, has a real value, and gives a rational pleafure to a good taiie. But things that have nothinsj to recommend them but no- Yclty, are fit only to entertain children, or thofe OF GRANDEUR.
thofe OF GRANDEUR.
thofe who are diflreffed from a vacuity of C HAP. thought. This quahty of objeds may there- ^^• fore be compared to the cypher in arithmetic, which adds greatly to the value of fignificant figures; but, when put by itfelf, fignifies noth- ing at all.
CHAP. Ill; Of Grandeur, THE qualities which pleafe the tafte are not more various in themfelves than are the emotions and feelings with which they affedt our minds.
Things new and uncommon affect us with a pleafmg furprife, which roufes and invigo- rates our attention to the object. But this emotion foon flags, if there is nothing but novelty to give it continuance, and leaves no effeft upon the mind.
The emotion raifed by grand objeds is aw- ful, folemn, and ferious.
Of all objects of contemplation, the Su- preme Being is the mod grand. His eternity, his irrimenfity, his irrefiflible power, his in- finite knowledge and unerring wifdom, his inflexible jufl:ice and reftitude, his fupreme government, conducting all the movements of this vaft univerfe to the noblefl: ends, and in the wifeft manner, are objects which fill the utmofl: capacity of the foul, and reach far be- yond its comprehenfion.
The emotion which this grandeft of all objects raifes in the human mind, is what we call devotion J a ferious recollected temper F f 2 which 436 ESSAY VIIL CHAP, which infpires magnanimity, and difpofes to ^ the moft heroic a£ls of virtue. ^'^^^^ The emotion produced by other objeds which may be called grand, thoo8;h in an in- ferior degree, is, in its nature and in its ef- feds, fimilar to that of devotion. It difpofes to ferioufnefs, elevates the mind above its ufual ftate, to a kind of enthufiafm, and infpires magnanimity, and a contempt of what is mean.
Such, I conceive, is the emotion which the contemplation of grand objedts raifes in us. "We are next to confider what this grandeur in objeds is.
To me it feems to be nothing elfe but fuch a degree of excellence, in one kind or another, as merits our admiration.
There are fome attributes of mind which have a real and intrinfic excellence, compared '. with their contraries, and which, in every degree, are the natural objeds of efteem, but, in an uncommon degree are objects of admi- ration. We put a value upon them becaufe they are intrinfically valuable and excellent.
The fpirit of modern philofophy would in- deed lead us to think, that the worth and va- lue we put upon things is only a fenfation in our minds, and not any thing inherent in the object; and that we might have been fo con- flituted as to put the higheft value upon the things which we now defpife,,and to defpife the qualities which we now highly efteem.
It gives me pleafure to obferve, that Dr. Price, in his Review of the Queftions con- cerning morals, ftrenuoufly oppofes this opi- nion, as well as that which refolves moral right and wrong into a fenfation in the mind of of the fpe£^tor. That judicious author faw CHAP, the confequences which thefe opinions draw ^^I- after them, and has traced them to their *— ■>^"~-' fource, to wit, the account given by Mr. Locke, and adopted by the generality of mo- dern Philofophers, of the origin of all our ideas, which account he fhows to be very de- fective.
This pronenefs to refolve every thing into feelings and fenfations, is an extreme into which we have been led by the defire of avoid- ing an oppofite extreme, as common in the ancient philofophy.
At firft, men are prone by nature and by habit to give all their attention to things exter- nal. Their notions of the mind, and its ope- rations, are formed from fome analogy they bear to objeds of fenfe; and an external ex- iftence is afcribed to things which are only conceptions or feelings of the mind.
This fpirit prevailed much in the philofophy both of Plato and of Aristotle, and pro^ duced the myfterious notions of eternal and felf-exiftcnt ideas, of materia prima, of fub- ftantial forms, and others of the like nature.
From the time of Des Cartes, philofophy took a contrary turn. That great man difco- vered, that many things fuppofed to have an external exiftence, were only conceptions or feelings of the mind. This track has been purfued by his fucceflbrs to fuch an extreme, as to refolve every thing into fenfations, feel- ings, and ideas in the mind, and to leave nothing external at all.
The Peripatetics thought, that heat and cold which we feel to be qualities of externa] ob- jects.
C H A P. je£l:s. The moderns make heat and cold to be ^^^' fenfations only, and allow no real quality of r"'"''^^^'^ body to be called by that name: And the fame judgment they have formed with regard to all fecondary qualitities.
So far Des Cartes and Mr. Locke wentt Their fucceffors being put into this track of converting into feelings things that were be- lieved to have an external exiftence, found that extenfion, folidity, figure, and all the primary qualities of body, are fenfations or tfeelings of the mind; and that the material •world is a phcsnomenon only, and has no ex- iftence but in our mind.
. It was then a very natural progrefs to con- ceive, that beauty, harmony, and grandeur, the objects of tafte, as well as right and wrong, the objeds of the moral faculty, are nothing but feelings of the mind.
Thofe who are acquainted with the writings of modern Philofophers, can eafily trace this doftrine of feelings, from Des Cartes down to Mr. Hume, who put the finifliing ftroke to it, by making truth and error to be feelings of the mind, and belief to be an operation of the fenfitive part of our nature.
To return to our fubjeft, if we hearken to the dilates of common fenfe, we muft be convinced that there is real excellence in forae things, whatever our feelings or our conftitu- tion be.
It depends no doubt upon our conftitution, whether we do, or do not perceive excellence where it really is: But the objed: has its excel- lence from its own conftitution, and not from ours, The The common judgment of mankind in thIsC H A P. matter fufficiently appears in the language of ^^^' all nations, which uniformly afcribes excel- lence, grandeur, and beauty to the objeft, and not to the mind that perceives it. And I be- lieve in this, as in mod other things, we fhall find the common judgment of mankind and true philofophy not to be at variance.
Is not power in its nature more excellent than weaknefs; knowledge than ignorance; wifdom than folly 5 fortitude than pufiUani- mity?
Is there no intrinfic excellence in felf-com- mand, in generofity, in pubHc fpirit? Is not friendfhip a better affedion of mind than ha- tred, a noble emulation, than envy?
Let us fuppofe, if poiTible, a being fo con- ilituted, as to have a high refpe£t for ignorance, weaknefs, and folly; to venerate cowardice, malice, and envy, and to hold the contrary qualities in contempt; to have an efleem for lying and falfehood, and to love moft thofe who impofed upon him, and ufed him word. Could we believe fuch a conftltution to be any thing elfe than madnefs and delirium? It is im- poffible. We can as eafily conceive a conftitu- tion, by which one Ihould perceive two and three to make fifteen, or a part to be greater than the whole.
Every one who attends to the operations of his own mind will find it to be certainly true, as it is the common belief of mankind, that efleem is led by opinion, and that every per- fon draws our efteem, as far only as he appears either to reafon or fancy to be amiable and \vorthy.
There ESSAY VIIL There ESSAY VIIL CHAP. There is therefore a real intrinfic excellence ^^^- In fome qualities of mind, as in power, know- ''^"^ledge, wifdom, virtue, magnanimity. Thefe in every degree merit efteem; but in an un- common degree they merit admiration; and that which merits admiration we call grand.
In the contemplation of uncommon excel- lence, the mind feels a noble enthufiaim, ■which difpofes it to the imitation of what it admires.
When we contemplate the charader of Cato, his greatnefs of foul, his fuperiority to pleafure, to toil, and to danger, his ardent zeal for the liberty of his country; when we fee him (landing unmoved in misfortunes, the lad pillar of the liberty of Rome, and falling nobly in his country's ruin, who would not wilh to be Cato rather than CjESar in all his triumph?
Such a fpedacle of a great foul flruggling with misfortune, Seneca thought not unwor- thy of the attention of Jupiter himfelf, " Ecce " fpeclaculum Deo dignum, ad quod refpiciat *' Jupiter fuo operi intentus, vir fortis cum " mala fortuna compofitus.'* As the Deity is of all objects of thought the moll grand, the defcriptions given in holy writ of his attributes and works, even when cloihed in fmiple expreffion, are acknowledged to be fubhme. The expreffion of Ivlofes, " And God laid, Let there be light, and there " v.'as iighr," has not efcaped the notice of LoNGiNUSj a Heathen Critic, as an example of the fublime.
What we call fublime in defcription, or in fpeech of any kind, is a proper expreffion of the admiration and enthufiafm which the fub- OF GRANDEUR. 441 jed produces in the mind of the fpeaker. If C HAP. this admiration and enthufiafm appears to be _ juft, it carries the hearer along with it involun- tarily, and by a kind of violence rather than by cool convidion: For no paffions are fo in- fectious as thofe which hold of enthufiafm.
But, on the other hand, if the paffion of the fpeaker appears to be in no degree juftified by the fubject or the occafion, it produces in the judicious hearer no other emotion but ridicule and contempt.
The true fublime cannot be produced folely by art in the compofition; it mud take its rife from grandeur in the fubjed, and a correfpond- ing emotion raifed in the mind of the fpeaker., A proper exhibition of thefe, though it Ihould be artlefs, is irrefiftible, like fire thrown into the midfl of combuftible matter, When we contemplate the earth, the fea, the planetary fyftem, the univerfe, thefe are vaftpbjeds; it requires a ftretch of imagination to grafp them in our minds. But they appear truly grand, and merit the highefl admiration, when we confider them as the work of God, who, in the fimple flyle of fcripture, flretched out the heavens, and laid down the foundation of the earth; or, in the poetical language of Milton, In his hand He took the golden compaflTes, prepared. In God's eternal flore, to circumfcribe This univerfe, and all created things. One foot he centered, and the other turn'd Round thro' the vafi profundity obfcure; And faid thus far extend, thus far thy bounds; This be thy juft circumference, O world.
CHAP, When we contemplate the world of Epicu- rus, and conceive the univerfe to be a fortui- tous jumble of atoms, there is nothing grand in this idea. The clafhing of atoms by blind chance has nothing in it fit to raife our concep- tions, or to elevate the mind. But the regular ftrufture of a vafl fyftem of beings, produced by creating power, and governed by the beft laws which perfe6t wifdom and goodnefs could contrive, is a fpeftacle which elevates the un- derltanding, and fills the foul with devout ad- miration.
A great work is a work of great power, great wifdom, and great goodnefs, well con- trived for fome important end. But power, wifdom, and goodnefs, are properly the attri- butes of mind only: They are afcribed to the work figuratively, but are really inherent in the author: And, by the fame figure, the gran* deur is afcribed to the work, but is properly inherent in the mind that made it.
Some figures of fpeech are fo natural and fo common in all languages, that we are led to think them literal and proper expreffions. Thus an adlion is called brave, virtuous, gene- rous; but it is evident, that valour, virtue, generofity, are the attributes of perfons only, and not of aftions. In the a£lion confidered abftra6lly, there is neither valour, nor virtue, nor generofity. The fame action done from a different motive may deferve none of thofc epithets. The change in this cafe is not in the aftion, but in the agent; yet, in all languages, generofity and other moral qualities are afcri- bed to adions. By a figure, we affign to the cffed a quality which is inherent only in the taufe.
By By the fame figure, we afcribe to a work^ ^ "* that grandeur which properly is inherent in the ^ J" ^ mind of the author.
When we confider the IHad as the work of the poet, its fubhmity was really in the mind of Homer. He conceived great characters, great actions, and great events, in a manner fuitable to their nature, and vi^ith thofe emoti- ons which they are naturally fitted to produce; and he conveys his conceptions and his emoti- ons by the mofl proper figns. The grandeur of his thoughts is refleded to our eye by his work, and therefore it is juitly called a grand work.
When we confider the things prefented to our mind in the Iliad, without regard to the poet, the grandeur is properly in Hector and Achilles, and the other great perfonages, human and divine, brought upon the ftage.
Next to the Deity and his works, we admire great talents and heroic virtue in men, whe- ther reprefented in hiftory or in fiction. The virtues of Cato, Aristides, Socrates, Marcus Aurelius, are truly grand. Extra- ordinary talents and genius,- whether in Poets, Orators, Philofophers, or Lav/givers, are ob- jects of admiration, and therefore grand. We find writers of tafte feized with a kind of en- thufiafm in the defcription of fuch perfonages.
What a grand idea does Virgil give of the power of eloquence, when he compares the teinpefl: of the fea, fuddenly calmed by thq command of Neptune, to a furious fedition in a great city, quelled at once by a man of au- thority and eloquence.
Sic ait, ac dido citius tumlda gequora placat: Ac veluti magno in populo, fi forte coorta eft Seditio, C H A P.Seditio, fisevitque animis ignobile vulgus; ^^^- Jamque faces et faxa volant, furor arma "^-^"^^ miniftrat; Turn pietate gravem, et meritis, fi forte vinim quern Confpexere, filent, arredifque auribus adftant. Hie regit didis animos, et peclora mulcet. Sic cundus pelagi cecidit fragor.
The wonderful genius of Sir Isaac Newton, and his fagacity in difcovering the laws of Na- ture, is admirably expreifed in that Ihort h\x% fublime epitaph by Pope: Nature and Nature's laws lay hid in night j God faid. Let Newtoj^ be, and all was light.
Hitherto we have found grandeur only in qualities of mind; but it may be afked. Is there no real grandeur in n^aterial objeds?
It will perhaps appear extravagant to deny that there is; yet it deferves to be confidered, whether all the grandeur we afcribe to objeds of fenfe be not derived from fomething intel- ledual, of which they are the effeds or figns, or to which they bear fome relation or analogy.
Beftdes the relations of effed and caufe, of fign and thing fignified, there are innumerable iimilitudes and analogies between things of very ditFerent nature, which leads us to conned them in our imagination, and to afcribe to the one what properly belongs to the other.
Every metaphor in language is an inftance of this; and it muft be remembered, that a very great part of language, which we now account proper, was originally metaphorical; for the metaphorical meaning becomes the pro- per per as foon as it becomes the moft ufual; muchC II A P. more, when that which was at firft the proper ^^^ meaning falls into difufe. '"" The poverty of language, no doubt, contri- butes in part to the \ife of metaphor; and there- fore we find the mod barren and uncultivated languages the mod metaphorical. But the moll copious language may be called barren, compared with the fertility of human concep- tions, and can never, without the ufe of figures, keep pace with the variety of their delicate modifications.
But another caufe of the ufe of metaphor is, that we find pleafure in difcovering relations, fimilitudes, and analogies, and even contrafts that are not obvious to every eye. All figura- tive fpeech prefents fomething jpf this kind; and the beauty of poetical language feems to^ be derived in a great meafure from this fource. Of all figurative language, that is the moft common, the moft natural, and the moft agree- able, which either gives a body, if we may fo fpeak, to things intelledual. and clothes them with vifible qualities; or which, on the other hand, gives intelledual qualities to the objects of fenfe.
To beings of more exalted faculties, intel- lectual objeds may perhaps appear to moil ad- vantage in their naked fimplicity. But we can hardly conceive them but by means of fome analogy they bear to the objects of fenfe. The names we give them are almofl all metaphorical or analogical.
Thus the names of grand and fublime, as well as their oppofites, mean and low, are evi- dently borrowed from the dimenfions of body; yet it mufl be acknowledged, that many things are truly grand and fublime, to which we cannot ;ifcribe the dimenfions of height and extenfion.
Some Some Some analogy there is, without doubt, be- tween greatnefs of dimenfion, which is an ob- jccl of external fenfe, and that grandeur, w^hich is an object of tafle. On account of this ana- logy, the laft borrows its name from the firft; and the name being common, leads us to con- ceive that there is fomething common in the nature of the things.
But we fliall fmd many qualities of mind, denoted by names taken from fome quality of body to which they have fome analogy, with- out any thing common in their nature.
Sweetnefs and aufterity, fmiplicity and du- plicity, rectitude and crookednefs, are names common to certain qualities of mind, and to qualities of body to which they have fome ana- logy; yet he, would err greatly who afcribed to a body that fweetnefs or that fimplicity which are the qualities of mind. In like manner, greatnefs and meannefs are names common to qualities perceived by the external fenfe, and to qualities perceived by tafte; vet he may be in an error, who afcribes to the objects of fenfe that greatnefs or that meannefs, which is only an object of tafte.
As intellectual objects are made more level to our apprehenfion by giving them a vifible form; fo the objects of fenfe are dignified and made more auguft, by afcribing to them intel- lectual qualities which have fome analogy to thofe they really polTefs. The fca rages, the fky lowrs, the meadows fmile, the rivulets murmur, the breezes whifper, the foil is grate- ful or ungrateful; fuch expreffions are fo fa- miliar in common language, that they are fcarcely accounted poetical or figurative; but they give a kind of dignity to inanimate objects, and and make our conception of them more agree- CHAP, When wc confider matter as an inert, ex- tended, divifible and moveable fubftance, there feems to be nothing in thefe qualities which we can call grand; and when we afcribe grandeur to any portion of matter, however modified, may it not borrow this quality from fomething intelleftual, of which it is the eifeft, or fign, or inflrument, or to which it bears fome ana- logy; or, perhaps, becaufe it produces in the mind an emotion that has fome refemblance to that admiration which truly grand objects raife?
A very elegant writer on the fublime and beautiful, makes every thing grand or fublime that is terrible. Might he not be led to this by the fimilarity between dread and admira- tion? Both are grave and folemn palTions; both make a ftrong impreflion upon the mind; and both are very infedious. But they differ fpecifically, in this refpedt, that admiration fuppofes fome uncommon excellence in its ob- jeft, which dread does not. We may admire what we fee no reafon to dread; and we may dread what we do not admire. In dread, there is nothing of that enthufiafm which naturally accompanies admiration, and is a chief ingre- dient of the emotion raifed by what is truly grand or fublime.
Upon the whole, I humbly apprehend, that true grandeur is fuch a degree of excellence as is fit to raife an enthufiailical admiration; that this grandeur is found originally and properly in qualities of mind; that it is difcerned in ob- jeds of fenfe only by reflection, as the light we perceive in the moon and planets is truly the light of jhe fun. J and that thofe who look for grandeur 448 ESSAY viii.
C H A p. grandeur in mere matter, feek the living among *"^'^^^-^ If this be a miflake, it ought at lead to be granted, that the grandeur which we perceive in qualities of mind, ought to have a different name from that which belongs properly to the objects of fenfe, as they are very different in their nature, and produce very different emo- tions in the mind of the fpeClator.
CHAP. IV.
Of Beauty.
EAUTY is found in things fo various, and fo very different in nature, that it IS diiucult to fay wherein it confifts, or what there can be common to all the obje£ls in which it is found.
Of the objecrs of fenfe, we find beauty in colour, in found, in form, in motion. There are beauties of fpeech, and beauties of thought; beauties in the arts, and in the fci^ ences; beauties in actions, in affections, and in characters.
In things fo different, and fo unlike, is there any quality, the fame in all, which v/e may call by the name of beauty r What can it be that is common to the thought of a mind, and the form of a piece of matter, to an abftract theorem, and a ftroke of wit?
I am indeed unable to conceive any quality in all the different things that are called beau- tiful, that is the fame in them all. There feemxS to be no identity, nor even fimilarity, between the beauty of a theorem and the beau- ty ty of a piece of mufic, though both may be C H A P. beautiful. The kinds of beauty feem to be as ^^• various as the objeds to which it is afcribed.
But why fhould things fo different be callftd by the fame name? This cannot be without a reafon. If there be nothing common in the things themfelves, they mull have fome com- mon relation to us, or to fomething elfe, which leads us to give them the fame name.
All the objects we call beautiful agree in two things, which feem to concur in our fenfe of beauty. Firjl^ When they are perceived, or even imagined, they produce a certain agree- able emotion or feeling in the mind, and fe- condly^ This agreeable emotion is accompanied with an opinion or belief of their having fome perfection or excellence belonging to them.