At the fame time it muil be acknowledged, that all the obje£ls we perceive are individuals. Every object of fenfe, of memory, or of con- fcioufnefs, is an individual objecl:. All the good things we enjoy or defire, and all the evils we feel or fear, muft come from individu- als; and I think we may venture to fay, that every creature which God has made in the heavens above, or in the earth beneath, or in the waters under the earth, is an individual.
How comes it to pafs then, that in all lan- guages general words make the greatefl part of the language, and proper names but a very fmall and inconfiderable part of it?
This feeming ftrange phasnomenon may, I think, be eafily accounted for by the following obfervations.
Firjl, Though there be a few individuals that are obvious to the notice of all men, and therefore have proper names in all languages; fuch as the fun and moon, the earth and fea; yet the greateft part of the things to which we think fit to give proper names are local; known perhaps to a village or to a neighbourhood, but OF GENERAL WORDS. 9!
but unknown to the greater part of thofe who C H A PI ipeak the fame language, and to all the reft of ^-. mankind. The names of fiich things being confined to a corner, and liaving no names anfwering to them in other languages, are not accounted a part of the language, any more than the cuftoms of a particular hamlet are ac- counted part of the lav/ of the nation.
For this reafon, there are but few proper names that belong to a language. It is next to be confidered why there mull be many ge- neral words in every language.
Secondly, It may be obferved, that every in- dividual objecl that falls within our view has various attributes; and it is by them that it becomes ufeful or hurtful to us: We know not the effence of any individual objed:; all the knowledge we can attain of it, is t\it knowledge of its attributes; its quantity, its various qualities, its various relations to other things, its place, its fituation, anc{ motionv'?. It is by fuch attributes of things only that we can communicate our knowledge of them -to others: By their attributes, our hopes or fears from them are regulated; and it is only by attention to their attributes that we can make them fubfervient to our ends; and therefore we give names to fuch attributes.
Now all attributes muft from their nature be expreffed by general words, and are fo exprelT" cd in all languages. In the ancient philofo- phy, attributes in general v/ere called by two names which exprefs their nature. They were called univerfah, becaufe they might belong- equally to many individuals, and are not con- fined to one: They were alfo called predica- bles, becaufe whatever is predicated, that is, affirmed C H A P. affirmed or denied of one fubjed, may be, of more, and therefore is an univerfal, and ex- ^'-^'^'^''^ prefl'ed by a general word. A predicable there- fore fignifies the fame thing as an attribute, with this difference only, that the firft is La- tin, the lafl: Englifh. The attributes we find either in the creatures of God, or in the works of men, are common to many individuals: We either find it to be fo, or prefume it may be fo, and give them the fame name in every fubjed to which they belong.
There are not only attributes belonging to individual fubjeds, but there are likewife at- tributes of attributes, which may be called fe- condary attributes. Moft attributes are capa- ble of different degrees, and different modifi- cations, which mufl be expreffed by general words.
Thus it is an attribute of many bodies to be moved; but motion may be in an endlefs va- riety of direftions. It may be quick or flow, redilineal or curvilineal; it may be equable, or accelerated, or retarded.
As ail attributes, therefore, whether pri- mary or fecondary, are expreffed by general words, it follows, that in every proportion we exprefs in language, what is affirmed or denied of the fubjett of the propofition muft be expreiTed by general words: And that the fubjed: of the propofition may often be a ge- neral word, will appear from the next obfer- vation.
Thirdly^ The fame faculties by which we diftinguiih the different attributes belonging to the fame fubjed, and give names to them, en- able us iikewife to obferve, that many fubjefts agree in certain attributes, while they differ in others.
OF GENERAL WORDS. 93 others. By this means we are enabled to re-C HAP. duce individuals which are infinite, to a limi- ^' ^ ted number of clafl'es, which are called kinds and forts; and in the fcholaftic language, genera and /pedes.
Obferving many individuals to agree in cer- tain attributes, we refer them all to one clafs, and give a name to the clafs: This name com- prehends in its fignification not one attribute only, but all the attributes which diftinguifh that clafs; and by affirming this name of any individual, we affirm it to have all the attri- butes which characterize the clafs: Thus men, dogs, horfes, elephants, are fo many different claffes of animals. In like manner we marfhal other fubflances, vegetable and in- animate, into claffes.
Nor is it only fubflances that we thus form into claffes. We do the fame with regard to qualities, relations, aftions, affedions, paffi- ons, and all other things.
When a clafs is very large, it is divided in- to Subordinate claffes in the fame manner. The higher clafs is called a ge?ii{s or kind; the low- er a [pedes or fort of the higher: Sometimes a fpecies is ftill fubdivided into fubordinate fpe- cies; and this fubdivifion is carried on as far as is found convenient for the purpofe of lan- guage, or for the improvement of knowledge. In this diflribution of things into genera and /pedes ^ it is evident that the name of the fpe- cies comprehends more attributes than the name of the genus. The fpecies comprehends all that is in the genus, and thofe attributes likewife which diitinguiffi that fpecies from others belonging to the fame genus; and the more fubdivifions we make, the names of the lower CHAP, lower become ftlll the more comprehcnfive in ^^^ their fignification, but the lefs extenfive in their application to individuals.
Hence it is an axiom in logic, that the more extenfive any general term is, it is the lefs comprehenfive; and on the contrary, the more comprehenfive, the lefs extenfive: Thus, in the following feries of fubordinate general terms, animal, man. Frenchman, Parifian, every fubfequent term comprehends in its fig- nification all that is in the preceding, and fomething more; and every antecedent term extends to more individuals than the fubfe- quent.
Such divlfions and fubdivifions of things into genera and fpecies with general names, are not confined to the learned andpolifhed languages; they are found in thofe of the rudeft tribes of mankind: From which we learn, that the in- vention and the ufe of general words, both to fignify the attributes of things, and to fignify the genera and fpecies of things, is not a fubtile invention of Philofophcrs, but an operation which all men perform by the light of common fenfe. Philofophcrs may fpeculate about this operation, and reduce it to canons and apho- rlfms; but men of common underftanding, without knowing any thing of the philofophy of it, can put it in practice; in like manner as they can fee objects, and make good ufe of their eyes, although they know nothing of the flruclure of the eye, or of the theory of vifion.
Every genus, and every fpecies of things, may be either the fubject or the predicate of a propofition, nay of innumerable propofitions; for every attribute common to the genus or fpecies OF GENERAL WORDS.
95 fpecies may be affirmed of It; and the genus C H A P. may be affirmed of every fpecies, and both ge- ^• nus and fpecies of every individual to which ^"^"^""^ k extends.
Thus of man it may be affirmed, that he is an animal made up of body and mind; that he is of few days, and full of trouble; that he is capable of various improvements in arts, in knowledge, and in virtue. In a word, every thing common to the fpecies may be affirmed of man; and of all fuch propofitions, which are innumerable, man is the fubjecl.
Again, of every nation and tribe, and of every individual of the human race that is, or was, or fhall be, it may be affirmed that they are men. In all fuch propofitions, which are innumerable, man is the predicate of the pro- pofition.
We obferved above an extenfion and a comprehenfion in general terms; and that in any fubdivifion of things the name of the low- eft fpecies is moft comprehenhve, and that of the higheft genus moft extenfive. I would now obferve, that, by means of fuch general terms, there is aho an extenfion and compre- henfion of propofitions, which is one of the nobleft powers of language, and fits it for ex- preffing, with great eafe and expedition, the higheil attainments in knowledge, of which the human underflanding is capable.
When the predicate is a genus or a Jpecies, the propofition is more or lefs comprehenfive, according as the predicate is. Thus, w^hen I •fay that this feal is gold, by this fmgle propor- tion, I affirm of it all the properties which that metal is known to have. When I fay of any man CHAP, man that he is a Mathematician, this appella- ^- tion comprehends all the attributes that belong ^^''^'^^to him as an animal, as a man, and as one who has fludied mathematics. When I fay that the orbit of the planet Mercury is an el- lipfis, I thereby affirm of that orbit all the pro- perties which Apollonius and other Geome- tricians have difcovered, or may difcover, of that fpecies of figure.
Again, when the fubjeft of a propofition Is a ge7ius or a /pedes, the propofition is more or lefs extenfive, according as the fubjecl is. Thus when I am taught, that the three angles of a plane triangle are equal to two right an- gles, this properly extends to every fpecies of plane triangle, and to every individual plane triangle that did, or does, or can exift.
It is by means of fuch extenfive and com- prehenfive propofitions that human knowledge is condenfed, as it were, into a fize adapted to the capacity of the human mind, with great addition to its beauty, and without any dimi- nution of its diftinftnefs and perfpicuity.
General propofitions in fcience may be com- pared to the feed of a plant, which, according to fome Philofophers, has not only the whole future plant inclofed within it, but the feeds of that plant, and the plants that Ihall fpring from them through all future generations.
But the fimilitude falls fliort in this refpe£l, that time and accidents, not in our power, mufl concur to difclofe the contents of the feed, and bring them into our view; whereas the contents of a general propofition may be brought forth, ripened, and expofed to view at our pleafure, and in an inflant.
Thus OF GENERAL CONCEPTIONS. 97 Thus the wifdom of ages, and the moft fub- CHAP li!iic theorems of fdence, may be laid up, ^• like an Iliad in. a nut-fhell, and tranfmitted to * fu'ure generations, and this noble purpofe of language can only be accomplifhed, by means of general words annexed to the divifions and fubdivifions of things.
What has been faid in this chapter, I think, is fufficient to fhew, that there can be no lan- guage, not fo much as a fmgle propofition, without general words; that they muft make the greatefl part of every language, and that it is by them only that language is fitted to exprefs, with wonderful eafe and expedition, all the treafures of human wifdom and know- ledge.
CHAP. II.
Of general Conceptions.
A S general words are fo neceflary in lan- ji\_ guage, it is natural to conclude that there mufl be general conceptions, of which they are the figns.
Words are empty founds when they do not lignify the thoughts of the fpeaker; and it is only from their fignification rhat they are de- nominated general. Every word that is fpo- ken, confidered merely as a found, is an in- dividual found. And it can only be called a general word, becaufe that which it fignifies is general. Now, that which it fignifies, is conceived by the mind both of the fpeaker and hearer, if the word have a diftincl meaning, and be diflinclly underftood. It is therefore Vol. II. H impofhble CHAP, impofiible that words can have a general fig- ^^_J|^, nification, unlefs there be conceptions in the mind of the fpeaker, and of the hearer, of things that are general. It is to fuch that I give the name of general conceptions: And it ought to be obferved, that they take this deno- mination, not from the acl of the mind in conceiving, which is an individual acl, but from the object, or thing conceived, which is general.
We are therefore here to confider whether we have fuch general conceptions, and how they are formed.
To begin with the conceptions expreffed by general terms, that is, by fuch general words as may be the fubject or the predicate of a pro- pofition. They are either attributes of things, or they are genera or fpecies of things.
It is evident, with refpect to all the indivi-- duals we are acquainted with, that we have a more clear and diflintt conception of their at- tributes, than of the fubject to which thofe at- tributes belong.
Take, for inftance, any individual body wc have accefs to know, what conception do we form of it? Every man may know this from his confcioufnefs. He will find that he con- ceives it as a thing that has length, breadth, and thicknefs, fach a figure, and fuch a colour; that it is hard, or folt, or fluid; that it has fuch qualities, and is fit for fuch purpofes. If it is a vegetable, he may know where it grew, what is the form of its leaves, and flower, and feed. If an animal, what are its natural in- ftincts, its manner of life, and of rearing its young: Of thefe attributes belonging to this individual, and numberlefs others, he may furely OF GENERAL CONCEPTIONS. 99 furely have a difhinct conception; and he willC HAP. find words in language by which he can clearly "• and diftindlly exprefs each of them.
If we confider, in like manner, the concep- tion we form of any individual perfon of our acquaintance, we fhall find it to be made up of various attributes, which we afcribe to him; fuch as, that he is the fon of fuch a man, the brother of fuch another, that he has fuch an employment or office, has fuch a fortune, that he is tall or Ihort, well or ill made, comely or ill favoured, young or old, married or unmar- ried; to this we may add, his temper, his cha- racter, his abilities, and perhaps fome anec- dotes of his hifliory.
Such is the conception we form of individual perfons of our acquaintance. By fuch attri- butes, we defcribe them to thofe who know them not; and by fuch attributes Hiftorians give us a conception of the perfonages of former times. ' Nor is it poffible to do it in any other way.
All the diflinft knowledge we have or can attain of any individual, is the knowledge of its attributes: For we know not the effence of any individual. This feems to be beyond the reach of the human faculties.
Now, every attribute is what the ancients called an univerfaL It is, or may be, common to various individuals. There is no attribute • belonging to any creature of God which may not belong to others; and, on this account, attributes, in all languages, are exprelfed by general words.
It appears likewife, from every man's expe- rience, that he may have as clear and diftindl a conception of fuch attributes as we have H 2 named.
lOO ESSAY V.
named, and of innumerable others, as he can have of any individual to which they belong.
Indeed the attributes of individuals is all that we diftindly conceive about them. It is true, we conceive a fubjeft to which the attri- butes belong; but of this fubjett, when its at- tributes are fet afide, we have but an obfcure and relative conception, whether it be body or mind.
This was before obferved with regard to bo- dies, Effay II. chap. 19. to which we refer, and it is no lefs evident with regard to minds. What is it we call a mind? It is a thinking, intelligent, active being. Granting that think- ing, intelligence, and aftivity, are attributes of mind, I want to know what the thing or be- ing is to which thefe attributes belong? To this queftion I can find no Satisfying anfwer. The attributes of mind, and particularly its opera- tions, we know clearly; but of the thing itfelf we have only an obfcure notion.
Nature teaches us, that thinking and reafon- ing are attributes, which cannot exifl without a fubjed; but of that fubjeft I beheve the beft notion we can form implies little more than that it is the fubject of fuch attributes.
Whether other created beings may have the knowledge of the real eifence of created things, fo as to be able to deduce their attributes from their effence and conftitution, or whether this be the prerogative of him who made them, we cannot tell; but it is a knowledge which feems to be quite beyond the reach of the hu- man faculties.
We know the effence of a triangle, and from that effence can deduce its properties. It is an univerfal, and might have been conceived by the OF GENERAL CONCEPTIONS. loi the human mind, though no individual triangle CHAP, had ever exifled. It has only w^hat Mr. Locke ^^• calls a nominal effence, which is exprefled in its definition. But every thing that exifts has a real eflence, which is above our comprehen- fion; and therefore we cannot deduce its pro- perties or attributes from its nature, as we do in the triangle. We mufh take a contrary road in the knowledge of God's works, and fatisfy ourfelves with their attributes as fads, and with the general convi6tion that there is a fubjeft to which thofe attributes belong.
Enough, I think, has been faid, to fhow, not only that we may have clear and diftindt conceptions of attributes, but that they are the only things, with regard to individuals, of which we have a clear and diftin£l conception.
The other clafs of general terms are thofe that fignify the genera and /pedes into which we divide and fubdivide things. And if we be able to form diflindt conceptions of attri- butes, it cannot furely be denied that we may have diflincl conceptions of genera znd /pedes; becaufe they are only colledions of attributes which we conceive to exift in a fubjed, and to which we give a general name. If the attri- butes comprehended under that general name be diftindly conceived, the thing meant by the name mufl be diftindly conceived. And the name may juflly be attributed to every in- dividual which has thofe attributes.
Thus, I conceive diftinftly what it is to have wings, to be covered with feathers, to lay eggs. Suppofe then that we give the name of bird to every animal that has thefe three attributes. Here undoubtedly my conception of a bird is as diftind: as any notion of the attributes which are ESSAY V.
are ESSAY V.
CHAP, are common to this fpecies: And if this be adr ^^- mitted to be the definition of a bird, there is ^^ "" ^ nothing I conceive more diftindly. If I had never feen a bird, and can but be made to un- derftand the definition, I can eafily apply it to every individual of the fpecies, without dan- ger of miftake.
When things are divided and fubdivided by men of fcience, and names given to the genera and fpecies, thofe names are defined. Thus, the genera and fpecies of plants, and^of other natural bodies, are accurately defined by the writers in the various branches of natural hif- tory; fo that, to all future generations, the definition will convey a diftinft notion of the genus or fpecies defined.
There are, without doubt, many words fig- nifying genera and fpecies of things, which have a meaning fomevvhat vague and indiftinft; fo that thofe who fpeak the fame language do not always ufe them in the fame fenfe. But if we attend to the caufe of, this indiftindnefs, we fhall find, that it is not owing to their being general terms, but to this, that there is no definition of them that has authority. Their meaning, therefore, has not been learn- ed by a definition, but by a kind of induftion, by obferving to what individuals they are ap- plied by thofe who underftand the language. We learn by habit to ufe them as we fee others do, even when we have not a precife meaning annexed to them. A man may know, that to certain individuals they may be applied with propriety; but whether they can be applied to certain other individuals, he may be uncertain, cither from want of good authorities, or from having OF GENERAL CONCEPTIONS. 103 having contrary authorities, which leave him^ HAP. in doubt. vJ-J^ Thus, a man may know, that when he ap- phes the name of bead to a Hon or a tyger, and the name of bird to an eagle or a turkey, he fpeaks properly. But whether a bat be a bird or a beaft, he may be uncertain. If there was any accurate definition of a beaft and of a bird, that was of fufficient authority, he could be at no lofs.
It is faid to have been fometimes a matter of difpute, with regard to a monftrous birth of a woman, whether it was a man or not. Al- though this may be in reality a queftioYi about the meaning of a word, it may be of import- ance, on account of the privileges which laws have annexed to the human character. To make fuch laws perfeftly precife, the definition of* a man would be neceflary, which 1 believe Legiilators have feldom or never thought fit to give. It is, indeed, very difficult to fix a defi- nition of fo common a word, and the cafes wherein it would be of any ufe fo rarely occur, that perhaps it may be better, when they do occur, to leave them to the determination of a judge or of a jury, than to give a definition, which might be attended with unforefeen con- fequences.
A genius or fpecies, being a colle£lion of at- tributes, conceived to exift in one fubjeft, a definition is the only way to prevent any addi- tion or diminuation of its ingredients in the conception of different perfons; and when there is no definition that can be appealed to as a ftandard, the name will hardly retain the moft perfect precifion in its fignification.
From ESSAY V.
CHAP. From what has been faid, I conceive it is ^^- evident, that the words which fignify genera ^"""^"^ an J fpecies of things have often as precife and definite a fignification as any words whatfoever; and that when it is otherwife, their want of precifion is not owing to their being general words, but to other caufes.
Having fliewn that we may have a perfectly clear and diftind: conception of the meaning of general terms, we may, I think, take it for granted, that the fame may be faid of other general words, fuch as prepofitions, conjunc- tions, articles. My defign at prefent being only tofliew, that we have general conceptions no lefs clear and diftinft than thofe of individu- als, it is fufficient for this purpofe, if this ap- pears with regard to the conceptions expreffed by general terms. To conceive the meaning of a general word, and to conceive that whi^ch it fignifies, is the fame thing. We conceive diftindly the meaning of general terms, there- fore we conceive diftindly that which they fig- nify. But fuch terms do not fignify any indi- vidual, but what is common to many indivi- duals; therefore we have a diftind conception of things common to many individuals, that is, we have diftinft general conceptions.
We muft here beware of the ambiguity of the word conception, which fomerimes fignifies the aft of the mind in conceiving, fometimes the thing conceived, which is the object of that ad. If the word be taken in the firft fenfe, I acknowledge that every a<3: of the mind is an individual ad; the univerfality, therefore, is not in the ad of the mind, but in the objed, or thing conceived. The thing conceived is an attribute common to many fubjeds, or it is a genus or fpecies common to many individuals.
Suppofe OF GENERAL CONCEPTIONS. 105 Suppofe I conceive a triangle, that is, a C H A P. plain figure terminated by three right lines. • He that underftands this definition diftinftly has adijflin^l conception of a triangle. But a trian- gle is not an individual; it is a fpecies. The act of my underftanding in conceiving it is an individual ad, and has a real exiftence; but the thing conceived is general, and cannot ex- ift without other attributes, which are not in- cluded in the definition.
Every triangle that really exifls muft have a certain length of fides and meafure of angles; it muft have place and time. But the defini- tion of a triangle includes neither exiftence, nor any of thofe attributes; and therefore they are not included in the conception of a triangle, which cannot be accurate if it comprehend more than the definition.
Thus I think it appears to be evident, that we have general conceptions that are clear and diftin£t, both of attributes of things, and of genera and fpecies of things.
CHAP.
io6 ESSAY CHAP. HI.
Of general Conceptions formed by analyfing Objeds.
"E arc next to confider the operations of the underflanding, by which we arc enabled to form general conceptions.
Thefe appear to me to be three; frji. The refolving or analyfing a fubjecl into its known attributes, and giving a name to each attribute, which name fhall fignify that attribute, and nothing more.
Secondly, The obferving one or more fuch at- tributes to be common to many fubjeds. The firil is by Philofophers called abJlrad:ion:, the fecond may be called generalifing\ but both are commonly included under the name of ahjlracllon.
It is difficult to fay which of them goes firft, or whether they are not fo clofely connefted that neither can claim the Precedence. For on the one hand, to perceive an agreement between two or more objeds in the flime attribute, feems to require nothing more than to com- pare them together. A favage, upon feeing fnow and chalk, would find no difficulty in perceiving that they have the fame colour. Yet, on the* other hand, it feem.s impoffible that he ffiould obferve this agreement without abftradion, that is, diftinguiffiing in his con- ception the colour, wherein thofe two objects agree, from the other qualities, wherein they difagree.
It feems therefore, that we cannot generalife without feme degree of abflradionj but I ap- prehend Conceptions formed by Anahftng Objects. 1 07 prehend we may abftract without generalifmgrC HAP. For what hinders me from attending to the ^^^• whitenefs of-^'.iie paper before me, without ap- plying that colour to any other objed: The whitenefs of this individual object is an abftradt conception, but not a general one, while ap- plied to one individual only. Thefe two ope- rations, however, are fubfervient to each other; for the more attributes we obferve and diftinguilli in any one individual, the more agreements we fhall difcover between it and other individuals.
A third operation of the underftanding, by which we form abftrad: conceptions, is the combining into one whole a certain number of thofe attributes of which we have formed ab- flraft notions, and giving a name to that com- bination. It is thus we form abftracl notions of the genera and fpecies of things. Thefe three operations we fhall confider in order.
With regard to abftra<5lion, ftriftly fo called, I can perceive nothing in it that is difficult either to be underftood or praftifed. What can be more eafy than to diflinguifh the differ- ent attributes which we know to belong to a fubjeft? In a man, for inflance, to diflinguifli his fize, his complexion, his age, his fortune, his birth, his profeilion, and twenty other things that belong to him. To think and fpeak of thefe things with underilanding, is furely within the reach of every man endowed with the human faculties.
There may be diftinttions that require nice difcernment, or an acquaintance with the fub- jed: that is not common. Thus, a critic in painting may difcern the flyle of Raphael or Titian, when another man could not. A lawyer CHAP. lawyer may be acquainted with many diftin£li- ons in crimes, and contrads, and actions, which never occurred to a man who has not ftudied lav.'. One man may excel another in the talent of diflinguifhing, as he may in me- mory or in reafoning;, but there is a certain degree of this talent, without which a man would have no title to be confidered as a rea- fonable creature.
It ought likewife to be obferved, that attri- butes may v/ith perfed eafe be diftinguifiied and disjoined in our conception, which cannot be actually feparated in the fubjed. Thus, in a body, I can diftinguifh its folidity from its extenfion, and its weight from both. In ex- tenfion I can diftinguifh length, breadth, and thicknefs, yet none of thefe can be feparated from the body, or from one another. There may be attributes belonging to a fubject, and infeparable from it, of which we have no knowledge, and confequently no conception; but this does not hinder our conceiving dif- tindly thofe of its attributes which we know.
Thus, all the properties of a circle are in- feparable from the nature of a circle, and may be demonilrated from its definition; yet a man may have a perfedly diflinft notion of a circle, who knows very few of thofe properties of it which Mathematicians have domonllrated; and a circle probably has many properties which no Mathematician ever dreamed of.
It is therefore certain, that attributes, which in their nature are abfolutely infeparable from their fubjed:, and from one another, may be disjoined in our conception; one cannot exifl without the other, but one can be conceived without the other.
Having Conceptions formed by Analyftng ObjeSIs. 1 09