Among nations that are civilized, and have intercourfe with one another, the nioft necef- fary and ufeful arts will be common; the im- portant parts of human knowledge will be common; their feveral languages will be fitted to it, and confequently to one another.
New inventions of general ufe give an eafy birth to new complex notions and new names, which fpread as far as the invention does. How many new complex notions have been formed, and names for them invented in the languages of Europe, by the modern inven- tions of printing, of gunpowder, of the ma- riner's compafs, of optical glaffes? The fimple ideas combined in thofe complex notions, and the affociating qualities of thofe ideas, are very ancient; but they never produced thofe com- plex notions until there was ufe for them.
What is peculiar to a nation in its cuftoms, manners, or laws, will give occafion to com- plex notions and words peculiar to the language of that nation. Hence it is eafy to fee, why an C H A P. an impeachment, and an attainder, in the *^- Englifli language, and oflracifm in the Greek language, have not names anfwering to them in other languages.
I apprehend, therefore, that it is utility, and not the aflbciating qualities of the ideas, that has led men to form only certain combi- nations, and to give names to them in lan- guage, while they negled; an infinite number that might be formed.
The common occurrences of life, in the in- tercourfe of men, and in their occupations, give occafion to many complex notions. We fee an individual occurrence, which draws our attention more or lefs, and may be a fubjeft of converfation. Other occurrences, fimilar to this in many refpecls, have been obferved, or may be expeded. It is convenient that wc fliould be able to fpeak of what is common to them all, leaving out the unimportant circum- ftances of time, place, and perfons. This we can do with great eafe, by giving a name to what is common to all thofe individual occur- rences. Such a name is a great aid to language, becaufe it comprehends, in one word, a great number of fimple notions, v/hich it would be very tedious to exprefs in detail.
Thus men have formed the complex notions of eating, drinking, fleeping, walking, rid- ing, running, buying, felling, plowing, fow- ing, a dance, a feaft, war, a battle, vidtory, triumph; and others without number.
Such things mult frequently be the fubjed of converfation; and if we had not a more compendious way of exprellmg them than by a detail of all the fimple notions they compre- hend, we {hould lofe the benefit of fpeech.
The Conceptions fanned by Combiination. 129 The different talents, difpofitions, and ha-CHAP. bits of men in fociety, being interefhing to ^^• thofe who have to do with them, will in every'"' " language have general names; fuch as wife, foolifli, knowing, ignorant, plain, cunning. In every operative art, the tools, inftruments, materials, the work produced, and the various excellencies and defeds of thefe, mufl have general names.
The various relations of perfoiis, and of things which cannot efcape the obfervation of men in fociety, lead us to many complex ge- neral notions: fuch as father, brother, friend, enemy, mailer, fervant, property, theft, re- bellion.
The terms of art in the fciences make another clafs of general names of complex no- tions; as in mathematics, axiom, definition, problem, theorem, demonftration.
I do not attempt a complete enumeration even of the clalTes of complex general con- ceptions. Thofe I have named as a fpecimen, 1 think, are moflly comprehended under what Mr. Locke calls mixed modes and relations; which, he juftly obferves, have names given thein in language, in preference to innumera- ble others that might be formed; for this rea- fon only, that they are ufeful for the purpofc of communicating our thoughts by language.
In all the languages of mankind, not only the writings and difcourfes of the learned, but the converfation of the vulgar, is almofl en- tirely made up of general words, which are the figns of general conceptions, either fimple or complex. And in every language, we find the terms fignifying complex notions to be Vol. II. K fuch.
C H A p. fuch, and only fuch, as the ufe of language '^- require*.
There remains a verv large clafs of complex general rerms, on i\hich I fl^all make fomeob- fervations; I mean thofe by which we name the fptcies, genera, and tribes of natural fubflan- cef.
It is utihty, indeed, that leads us to give ge- neral names to the various fpecies of natural fubftances; but, in combining the attributes which are included under the fpecific name, we are more aided and directed by Nature, than in forming other combinations of mixed modes and relations. In the laft, the ingre- dients are brought together in the occurrences of life, or in the aftions or thoughts of men. But, in the firft, the ingredients are united by nature in many individual fubftances which God has made. We form a general notion of thofe attributes, wherein many individuals agree. We give a fpecific name i:o this com- bination; which name is common to all fub- ftances havi.og thofe attributes, which either do or may exift. The fpecinc name compre- hends neither more nor fewer attributes than we find proper to put into its definition..It comprehends not time, nor place, nor even exigence, although there can be no individual without thefe.
This work of the underftanding is abfolute- ly neceiTary for fpeaking intelligibly of the pro- duftions of Nature, and for reaping the be- nefits we receive, and avoiding the dangers we are expofed to from them. The individuals are fo many, that to give a proper name to each would be beyond the power of language. If a good or bad quality was obferved in an individual, of how fmall ufe v/ould this be, if there Conceptions formed by Combination. 13 1 there was not a fpecies in which the fame qua-C HAP. lity might be expeded? ^V.
Without fome general knowledge of the qualities of natural fubflances, human life could not be referved. And there can be no general knowledge of this kind, without re- ducing them to fpecies under fpecific names. For this reafon, among the rudefl nations, we find names for fire, water, earth, air, moun- tains, fountains, rivers; for the kinds of vege- tables they ufe; of animals they hunt or tame, or that are found ufeful or hurtful.
Each of thofe names fignifies in general a fubftance having a certain combination of at- tributes. The name therefore muft be com- mon to all fubftances in which thofe attributes are found.
Such general names of fubftances being found in all vulgar languages, before Philofo- phers began to make accurate divifions, and lefs obvious diftinftions, it is not to be expeft- ed that their meaning fliould be more precife than is neceifary for the common purpofes of life.
As the knowledge of Nature advances, more fpecies of natural fubftances are obferved, and their ufeful qualities difcovered. In order that this important part of human knowledge may be communicated, and handed down to future generations, it is not fufficient that the fpecies have names. Such is the fluctuating ftate of language, that a general name will not always retain the fame precife fignification, unlefs it have a definition in which men are dif- pofed to acquiefce.
There was undoubtedly a great fund of na- tural knowledge among the Greeks and Ro- mans in the time of Pliny. There is a great fund in his natural hiftory; but much of it is K 2 loft CHAP, loft to us, for this reafon among others, that ^^- we know not what fpecies of fubftance he ^~^~ ^ means by fuch a name.
Nothing could have prevented this lofs but an accurate definition of the name, by which the fpecies might have been diftinguifhed from all others, as long as that name and its defini- tion remained.
To prevent fuch lofs in future times, modern Philofophers have very laudably attempted to give names and accurate definitions of all the known fpecies of fubftances, wherewith the bountiful Creator hath enriched our globe.
This is neceifary, in order to form a copious and diftinct language concerning them, and confequently to facilitate our knowledge of them, and to convey it to future generations.
Every fpecies that is known to exiP. ought to have a name; and that name ought to be de- fined by fuch attributes as ferve beft to diftin- guifli the fpecies from all others.
Nature invites to this work, by having form- ed things fo as to make it both eafy and im- portant.
For, firji^ We perceive numbers of indivi- dual fubftances fo like in their obvious quali- ties, that the moft unimproved tribes of men confider them as of one fpecies, and give them one common name.
Secondly, The more latent qualities of fub- ftances are generally the fame in all the indivi- duals of a fpecies: So that what, by obferva- tion or experiment, is found in a few indivi- duals of a fpecies, is prefumed, and common- ly found to belong to the whole. By this we are enabled, from particular facls, to draw general conclufions. This kind of induction is indeed the mafter-key to the knowledge of Nature, Conceptions formed by Combination.
jj) Nature, without which we could form no ge- CHAP, neral conclufions in that branch of philofophy. ^^• -And, thirdly. By the very conftitution of '*''''"'''"*^ our nature, we are led, without reafoning, to afcribe to the whole fpecies what we have found to belong to the individuals. It is thus we come to know that fire burns, and water drowns; that bodies gravitate, and bread nou- rifhes.
The fpecies of two of the kingdoms of Na- ture, to wit, the animal and the vegetable,' feem to be fixed by Nature, by the power they have of producing their like. And in thefe, men in all ages and nations have accounted the parent and the progeny of the fame fpecies. The differences among Naturalifts, with re- gard to the fpecies of thefe two kingdoms, are very inconfiderable, and may be occafioned by the changes produced by foil, climate, and culture, and fometimes by monftrous pro- dutlions, which are comparatively rare.
In the inanimate kingdom we have not the fame means of dividing things into fpecies, and therefore the limits of fpecies feem to be more arbitrary: But from the progrefs already made, there is ground to hope, that even in this kingdom, as the knowledge of it advances, the various fpecies may be fo well diflinguifh- ed and defined as to anfwer every valuable pur- pofe.
When the fpecies are fo numerous as to bur- den the memory, it is greatly affifted by dif- tributing them into genera; the genera into tribes, the tribes into orders, and the orders into claffes.
Such a regular diflribution of natural fub- ftances, by divifions andfubdivifions, has got the name of a fyftem.
It ESSAY V.
It is not a fyftem of truths, but a fyftem of general terms, with their definitions; and it is not only a great help to memory, but faci- litates very much the definition of the terms. For the definition of the genus is common to all the fpecies of that genus, and fo is under- flood in the definition of each fpecies, without the trouble of repetition. In like manner, the definition of a tribe is underftood in the defi- nition of every genus, and every fpecies of that tribe; and the fame may be faid of every fuperior divifion.
The effedl of fuch a fyftematical diftribution of the productions of Nature, is feen in our fyftems of zoology, botany, and mineralogy; in which a fpecies is commonly defined accu- rately in a line or tv/o, which, without the fyftematical arrangement, could hardly be de- fined in a page.
With regard to the utility of fyftems of this kind, men have gone into contrary extremes; fome have treated them with contempt, as a mere dictionary of words; others, perhaps, reft in fuch fyftems, as all that is worth know- ing in the works of Nature.
On the one hand, it is not the intention of fuch fyftems to communicate all that is known of the natural produ£tions which they defcribe. The properties moft fit for defining and diftin- guilhing the feveral- fpecies, ars^ not always thofe that?re moft ufefui to be known. To diicover and to communici'.te the ufes of natu- ral fubftances in life, and in the arts, is no doubt that part of the bufmefs of a Naturalift which is the moft important; and the fyftema- tical arrangement of them is chiefly to be va- lued CoucEFTio'SS formed by Combination. ^2)5 lued for its fublerviency to this end. This^^^^^* every judicious Naturalid will grant.,, ^ J.^ But, on the other hand, the labour is no't to be defpifed, by which the road to an ufeful and important branch of knowledge is made eafy in all time to come; efpecially when tins labour requires both extenfive knowledge and great abilities.
The talent of arranging properly, and defi- ning accurately, is fo rare, and at the fame time fo ufeful, that it may very juftly be confi- dered as a proof of real genius, and as entitled to a higher degree of praife. There is an in- trinfic beauty in arrangement, which capti- vates the mind, and gives pleafure, even ab- ftradting from its utility; as in mofl: other things, fo in this particularly, Nature has join- ed beauty with utility. The arrangement of an army in the day of battle is a grand fpecla- cle. The fame men crowded in a fair, have no fuch effeci:. It is not more ftrange there- fore that fome men fpend their d.iys in Itudying fyftems of Nature, than that other men employ their lives in the ftudy of language^'. The moll important end of thole fyftems, lurely is to form a copious and an unambiguous lan- guage concerning the productions of Nature, by which every ufeful difcovery concerning them may be communicated to the prefeiu, and tranfmitted to all future generations, with- out danger of miftake.
General terms, efpecially fuch as are com- plex in their fignification, will never keep one precife meaning without accurate definition; and accurate definitions of fuch terms can in no way be formed fo eafily and advantageouf- CHAP. Ivj as by reducing the things they fignify into • a regular fyftem.
Very eminent men in the medical profeffion, in order to remove ail ambiguity in the names of difeafes, and to advance the healing art, have of late attem^pted to reduce into a fyfte- matical order the difeafes of the human body, and to give diflinft names, and accurate defi- nitions, of the feveral fpecies, genera^ orders, and claifes, into which they djftribute them; and I apprehend, that in every art and fcience, where the terms of the art have any ambiguity that obftructs its progrefs, this method will be found the eafieft and mod fuccefsful for the remedy of that evil.
It were even to be wiflied, that the general terms which we find in common language, as well as thofe of the arts and fciences, could be reduced to a fyftematical arrangement, and de- fined fo as that they might be free from ambi- guity; but perhaps the obflacles to this are in- surmountable. 1 know no man who has at- tempted it but Bifliop WiLKiNS in his Eifay towards a real character and a philofophical language. The attempt was grand, and wor- thy of a man of genius.
The formation of fuch fyflems, therefore, of the various productions of Nature, inftead of being defpifed, ought to be ranked among the valuable improvements of modern ages, and to be the more efteemed that its utility reaches to the moft diflant future times, and, like the invention of writing, ferves to embalm a moft important branch of human knowledge, and to preferve it from being corrupted or loft.
CHAP.
Of NAMES ^/-^^w 10 GENERAL NOTIONS.
Obfervations concerning the Names given to our general Notions.
HAVING now explained, as well as I am able, thofe operations of the mind by which we analyfe the objefts which Nature prefents to our obfervation, into their fimple attributes, giving a general name to each, and by which we combine any number of fuch attributes into one whole, and give a general name to that combination, I fhall offer fome obfervations relating to our general notions, whether fimple or complex.
I apprehend that the names given to them by modern Philofophers have contributed to darken our fpeculations about them, and to render them difficult and abflrufe.
We call them general notions, conceptions, ideas. The words notion and conception, in their proper and mod common fenfe, fignify the atl or operation of the mind in conceiving an obje6l. In a figurative fenfe, they are fometimes put for the object conceived. And I think they are rarely, if ever, ufed in this figurative fenfe, except when we fpeak of what we call general notions or general conceptions. The word idea, as it is ufed in modern times, has the fame ambiguity.
Now, it is only in the lafl of thefe fenfes, and not in the firft, that we can be faid to have general notions or conceptions. The genera- lity is in the objcft conceived, and not in the aft of the mind by which it is conceived. Every act of the mind is an individual aft, which CHAP, which does or did exift. But we have power to conceive things which neither do nor ever did exift. We have power to conceive attri- butes without regard to their exiftence. The conception of fuch an attribute is a real and individual aft of the mind; but the attribute conceived is common to many individuals that do or may exift. We are too apt to confound an objeS; of conception with the con.eption of that object. But the danger of doing.i-'s niuft be much greater when the object of conception is called a conception.
The Peripatetics gave to fuch objects of conception the names of univerfals, and of predicables. Thofe names had no ambiguity, and I think were much more fit to exprefs what was meant by them than the names we ufe.
It is for this reafon that I have fo often ufed the word attribute, which has the fame mean- ing with predicable. And for the fame reafon, I have thought it neceflary repeatedly to warn the reader, that when, in compliance with cuftom, I fpeak of general notions or general conceptions, I always mean things conceived, and not the aft of the mind in conceiving them.
The Pythagoreans and Piatonifts gave the name of ideas to fuch general objefts of con- ception, and to nothing elfe. As we borrow- ed the word idea from them, fo that it is now familiar in all the languages of Europe, I think it would have been happy if we had alfo bor- rowed their meaning, and had ufed it only to fignify what they meant by it. I apprehend we want an unambiguous word to diftinguifti things barely conceived from things that exift.
If Of NAMES given to general NOTIONS. 139 If the word idea was ufed for this purpofe only, CHAP, it would be reftored to its original meaning, '^• and fuppiy that want.
We may furely agree with the Platonifts in the meaning of the v/ord idea^ without adopt- ing their theory concerning ideas. We need not believe, with them, that ideas are eternal and fclf-exiflent, and that they have a more real exiftence than the things we fee and feel. They were led to give exiftence to ideas, from the common prejudice that every thing which is an object of conception muPc really exift; and having once given exiftence to ideas, the reft of their myfterious fyftem about ideas followed of courfe; for things merely conceived, have neither beginning nor end, time nor place; they are fubject to no change; they are the patterns and exemplars according to which the Deity made every thing that he made; for the work muft be conceived by the artificer before it is made.
Thefe are undeniable attributes of the ideas of Plato, and if w^ add to them that of real exiftence, we have the whole myfterious fyftem of Platonic ideas. Take away the attribute of exiftence, and fuppofe them not to be things that exift, but things that are barely conceived, and all the myftery is removed; all that re- mains is level to the human underftanding.
The word ejfcnce came to be much ufed among the fchoolmen, and what the Platonifts called the idea of a fpecies, they called its eftence. The word ejfentia is faid to have been made by Cicero; but even his authority could not give it currency, until long after his time. It came at laft to be ufed, and the fchoolmen fell into much the fame opinions concerning elfencQS, CHAP, eflences, as the Platonifts held concerning y- ideas. The elTences of things were held to be ^''^'^^ uncreated, eternal, and immutable.
Mr. Locke diftinguifhes two kinds of eflence, the real and the nominal. By the real effence he means the conftitution of an indivi- dual, which makes it to be what it is. This efience muft begin and end with the individual to which it belongs. It is not therefore a Platonic idea. But what Mr. Locke calls the nominal effence, is the conftitution of a fpecies, or that which makes an individual to be of fuch a fpecies; and this is nothing but that combi- nation of attributes which is fignified by the name of the fpecies, and which we conceive without regard to exiflence.
The effence of a fpecies therefore, is what the Platonifls called the idea of the fpecies.
If the word idea be reftrided to the meaning which it bore among the Platonifts and Pytha- goreans, many things which Mr. Locke has faid with regard to ideas will be juft and true, and others will not.
It will be true, that moft words, (indeed all general words,) are the figns of ideas; but proper names are not; they fignify individual things, and not ideas. It will be true not only that there are general and abftract ideas, but that all ideas are general and abftracl:. It will be fo far from the truth, that all our fmiple ideas are got immediately, either from fenfa- tion, or from confcioufnefs; that no fimple idea is got by either, v.'ithout the co-operation of other powers. The objeds of fenfe, ot me- mory, and of confcioufnefs, are not ideas but individuals; they muft be analyfed by the un- derftanding into their fimple ingredients, be- fore Of NAMES given to general NOTIONS. 141 fore we can have fimple ideas; and thofe fimple CHAP, ideas muft be again combined by the under- Y- {landing, in diftin6t parcels with names annex-*" — ^""^ ed, in order to give us complex ideas: It will be probable not only that brutes have no ab- ftraft ideas, but that they have no ideas at all.
I fhall only add, that the learned author of the origin and progrefs of language, and per- haps his learned friend Mr. Harrjs, are the only modern authors I have met with, who re- flridl the word idea to this meaning. Their acquaintance with ancient philofophy led them to this. What pity is it that a word, which in ancient philofophy had a diftinft meaning, and which, if kept to that meaning, would have been a real acquifiticn to our language, fhould be ufed by the moderns in fo vague and am- biguous a manner, that it is more apt to per- plex and darken our fpeculations, than to convey ufeful knowledge.
From all that has been faid about abflraft and general conceptions, I think we may draw the following conclufions concerning them.
Firji^ That it is by abflradion that the mind is furnifhed with all its mofl fmiple, and mod diftin£t notions: The hmplefl; objeds of fenfe appear both complex and indiftinct, until by abftradion they are analyfed into their more fimple elements; and the fame may be faid of the objects of memory and of confcioufnefs.
Secondly, Our mofl diftinct complex notions are thofe that are formed by compounding the fimple notions got by abftraclion.
Thirdly, Without the powers of abflradling and generalifing, it would be impolTible to re- duce things into any order and method, by di- viding them into genera and fpecies.
Fourthly^ C HA P. Fourthly, Without thofe powers there could ^- be no definition j for definition can only be ap- ^ plied to univerfals, and no individual can be defined.
Fifthly, Without abftradl and general notions there can neither be reafoning nor language.
Sixthly, As brute animals Ihew no figns of being able to diftinguifh the various attri- butes of the fame fubjeft; of being able to clafs things into genera and fpecies; to define, to reafon, or to communicate their thoughts by artificial figns, as men do; I muft think -with Mr. Locke, that they have not the powers of abfl:rai9:ing and generalifing; and that in this particular Nature has made afpecific difference between them and the human fpecies.
CHAP.
OPINIONS ABOUT UNIVERSALS. 143 CHAP. VL Opinions of Fhilofophers about Univerfah* IN the ancient philofophy, the doftrine of univerfals, that is, of things which we ex- prefs by general terms, makes a great figure. The ideas of the Pythagoreans and Platoniils, of which fo much has been already faid, were univerfals. All fcience is employed about uni- verfals as its objeft. It was thought that there can be no fcience unlefs its objeft be fomething real and immutable; and therefore thofe who paid homage to truth and fcience, maintained that ideas or univerfals have a real and immu- table exiftence.
The fceptics, on the contrary, (for there were fceptical Philofophers in thofe early days) maintained, that all things are mutable, and in a perpetual flud;uation; and from this prin- ciple inferred, that there is no fcience, no truth; that all is uncertain opinion.
Plato, and his mafters of the Pythagorean fchool, yielded this with regard to objefts of fenfe, and acknowledged that there could be no fcience or certain knowledge concerning them: But they held, that there are objeds of intelleft of a fuperior order and nature, which are permanent and immutable. Thefe are ideas, or univerfal natures, of which the ob- jefts of fenfe are only the images and fliadows.
To thefe ideas they afcribed, as I have al- ready obferved, the moft magnificent attri- butes. Of man, of a rofe, of a circle, and of every fpecies of things, they believed that there is C HA P. is one idea or form, which exifted from eter- nity, before any individual of the fpecies was formed: That this idea is the exemplar or pattern, according to which the Deity formed the individuals of the fpecies: That every in- dividual of the fpecies participates of this idea, which conftitutes its eflence; and that this idea is likewife an objed of the human intellect, when, by due abftraftion, we difcern it to be one in all the individuals of the fpecies.
Thus the idea of every fpecies, though one and immutable, might be confidered in three different views or refpecls; firjl.^ as having an eternal exiftence before there was any indivi- dual of the fpecies; fecondly', as exifting in every individual of that fpecies, without divi- fion or multiplication, and making the eifence of the fpecies; and, thirdly^ as an object of intellect and of fcience in man.
Such I take to be the do6trine of Plato, as far as I am able to comprehend it. His difciple Aristotle rejedted the firft of thefe views of ideas as vifionary, but ditfered Httle from his mafter with regard to the tv/o lad. He did not admit the exiftence of univerfal natures an- tecedent to the exiftence of individuals; but he held, that every individual confifts of matter and form: That the form (which I take to be what Plato calls the idea) is common to all the individuals of the fpecies, and that the hu- man intellect is fitted to receive the forms of things as objects of contemplation. Such pro- found fpeculations about the nature of univer- fals, we find even in the firft ages of philofophy. I wifh I could make them more intelligible to myfelf and to the reader.
The OPINIONS ABOUT UNIVERSALS. 145 The divifion of univerfals into five clalTes; C H A P. to wit, genus, fpecies, fp^c^fic difference, pro- ^^■ perties, and accidents, is likew'fe very ancient, ^^ ' and I conceive was borrowed by the Peripate- tics from the Pythagorean fchcoL Porphyry has given us a very diftinft trea- tife upon thefe, as an introduction to Aristo- tle's categories. But he has omitted the in- tricate metaphyfical queflions that were agita- ted about their nature; fuch as, Whether gene- ra and fpecies do really exifl in nature? Whether they are corporeal or incorporeal? And whe- ther they are inherent in the objects of fenfe^ or disjoined from them? Thefe queftions he tells us, for brevity's fake, he omits, becaufe they are very profound, and require accurate difcuffion. It is probable, that thefe queftions €xercifed the wits of the Philofophers till about the twelfth century.
About that time, Roscelinus or Rusceli- NUSi the mafter of the famous Abei-ard, in- troduced a new do£trine, that there is nothing univerfal but words or names. For this, and other herefies, he was much perfecuted. Howe- ver, by his eloquence and abilities, and thofe of his difciple Abelard, the dodrine fpread^ and thofe who followed it were called Nomi- nalifts. His antagonifts, who held that there are things that are really univerfal, were called Realifts. The fcholaftic Philofophers, from the beginning of the twelfth century, were di- vided into thefe two feds. Some few took a middle road between the contending parties. That univeifality, which the Realifts held to be in things themfelves, Nominalifls in name only. They held to be neither in things nor in names only, but in our conceptions. On this ac- VoL. II. L count C H A P. count they were called Conceptualifls: But ^^- being expofed to the batteries of both the op- 'pofite parties, they made no great figure.
When the fe£t: of Nominahfts was like to expire, it received new life and fpirit from Occam, the difciple of Scotus, in the four- teenth century. Then the difpute about uni- verfals, a parte ret, w-as revived with the great- eft animofity in the fchools of Britain, France, and Germany, and carried on, not by argu- ments only, but by bitter reproaches, blows, and bloody affrays, until the doctrines of Lu- ther and the other Reformers turned the at- tention of the learned word to more important fubjecls.
After the revival of learning, Mr. Hobbes adopted the opinion of the Nominalifts. Hu- man nature, chap. 5. fe6t. 6. "It is plain, " therefore, fays he, that there is nothing uni- *' verfal but names." And in his Leviathan, part I. chap. 4. " There being nothing uni- " verfal but names, proper names bring to *' mind one thing only 5 univerfals recal any " one of many."