Mr. Locke, according to the divifion before mentioned, I think, may be accounted a Con- ceptualift. He does not m.aintain that there are things that are univerfal; but that we have general or univerfal ideas which we form by abftraftion; and this power of forming abftraO: and general ideas, he conceives to be that which makes the chief diftinclion in point of underftanding between men and brutes.
Mr. Locke's doftrine about abftraftion has been combated by two very powerful antago- nifts, Bifhop Berkeley and Mr. Hume, who have taken up the opinion of the Nominalifts.
The OPINIONS ABOUT UNIVERSALS. 147 The former thinks, " That the opinion, thafCHAP.
** the mind hath a power of forming abftract ^^• " ideas, or notions of things, has had a chief " part in rendering fpeculation intricate and " perplexed, and has occafioned innumerable *' errors and difficulties in almoft all parts of *' knowledge.'* That, " abftraft ideas are " like a fine and fubtile net, which has mife- *' rably perplexed and entangled the minds of " men, with this peculiar circumftance, that " by how much the finer and more curious " was the wit of any man, by fo much the ** deeper was he like to be enfnared, and fafter " held therein." That " among all the falfe " principles that have obtained in the world, *' there is none hath a more wide, influence " over the thoughts of fpeculative men than *' this of abftraft general ideas.'* The good Bifhop therefore, in twenty-four pages of the Introduction to his Principles of Human Knowledge, encounters this principle with a zeal proportioned to his apprehenfion of its mahgnant and extenfive influence.
That the zeal of the fceptical Philofopher againft abftract ideas was almoft equal to that of the Bifliop, appears from his words, Trea- tife of Human Nature, book 1. part i. fed. 7. *' A very material queftion has been ftarted *' concerning abftra6t or general ideas, whe- " ther they be general or particular in the *' mind's conception of them? A great Philo- " fopher (he means Dr. Berkeley) has dif- *' puted the received opinion in this particular, '* and has aiferted, that all general ideas are *' nothing but particular ones annexed to a *' certain term, which gives them a more ex- *' tenfive fignification, and makes them recal La " upon ESSAY V.
ESSAY V.
" upon occafion other individuals, which are *' fimilar to them. As I look upon this to be " one of the greated and moll valuable difco- " veries that have been made of late years in " the republic of letters, I fnall here endea- " vour to confirm it by fame arguments, " wliich I hope will put it beyond all doubt " and controverfy."
I {hall make an end of this fubject, with fome reflections on what has been faid ujx>n it by thefe two eminent Philofophers.
i7>/'?, I apprehend that we cannot, with pro- priety, be faid to have abftratt and general ideas, either in the popular or in the philofo- phical fenfe of that word. In the popular fenfe an idea is a thought; it is the a<5t of the mind in thinking, or in conceiving any object. This act of the mind is always an individual act, and therefore there can be no general idea in this fenfe. In the philofophical fenfe, an idea is an image in the mind, or in the brain, which in Mr. Locke's fyllem is the immediate object of thought; in the fyftem of Berkeley and Hume the only object of thought. I believe there are no ideas of this kind, and therefore no abftract general ideas. Indeed, if there were really fuch images in the mind, or in the brain, they could not be general, becaufe every thing that really exifts is an individual. Univerfals are neither ads of the mind, nor images in the mind.
As therefore there are no general ideas in either of the fenfes in which the word idea is ufed by the moderns, Berkeley and Hume have in this queflion an advantage over Mr. Locke; and their arguments againft him are good ad homiimn. They faw farther than he did did OPINIONS ABorjT UNIVERSALS. 149 did into the juft ccnfequences of the hypothefisC H A P- concerning ideas, which was common to them and to him; and they reafoned juftly from this hypothefis, when they concluded from it, that there is neither a material world, nor any fuch power in the human mind as that of ab- ftradion.
A triangle, in general, or any other uni- Verfal, might be called an idea by a Platoniil;; but, in the ftyle of modern philofophy, it is not an idea, nor do we ever afcribe to ideas the properties of triangles. It is never faid of any idea, that it has three fides and three an- gles. We do not fpeak of equilateral, ifofce- les, or fcalene ideas, nor of right angled, aicute angled, or obtufe angled ideas. And if thefe attributes do not belong to ideas, it follows neceffarily, that a triangle is not an idea. The fame reafoning may be applied to every other univerfal.
Ideas are faid to have a real exiftence in the mind, at leaft, while we think of them; but univerfals have no real exiftence. V/hen we afcribe exiftence to them, it is not an exif- fence in time or place, but exiftence in fome individual fubjeft; and this exiftence means no more but that they are truly attributes of fuch a fubjett. Their exiftence is nothing but predicability, or the capacity of being attribu- ted to a fubje£l. The name of predicables, which was given them in ancient philofophy, is that which moft properly exprefles their na- ture.
2. I think it muft be granted, in the fccond place, that univerfals cannot be the objeds of imagination, when we take that word in its ftrid and proper fenfe. '* I find, fays Ber- *• KELEY, ISO E S S A Y V.
CHAP." KELEY, " I have a faculty of imagining or " reprefenting to myfelf the ideas of thofe particular things I have perceived, and of " varioully compounding and dividing them. *' I can imagine a man with two heads, or the " upper parts of a man joined to the body of *' a horfe. I can imagine the hand, the eye, *' the nofe, each by itfelf, abftraded or fepa- '' rated from the reft of the body. But then, " whatever hand or eye I imagine, it mufl *' have fome particular fliape or colour. *' Likewife, the idea of a man that I frame to ^' myfelf mud be either of a white, or a black, " or a tawny, a ftraight or a crooked, a tall, " or a low, or a middle-fized man."
I believe every man will find in himfelf what this ingenious author found, that he cannot imagine a man without colour, or flature, or fhape.
Imagination, as we before obferved, proi- perly fignifies a conception of the appearance an object would make to the eye, if actually feen. An univerfal is not an object of any external fenfe, and therefore cannot be ima- gined; but it may be diftinctly conceived. When Mr. Pope fays, " the proper iludy of *' mankind is man," I conceive his meaning diflincllv, thouc^h I neither imagine a black or a white, a crooked or a ftraight man. The diftin£tion between conception and imaginati- on is real, though it be too often overlooked, and the words taken to be fynonimous. I can conceive a thing that is impoflible, but I can- not diftinftly imagine a thing that is impofli- ble. I can conceive a propofition or a demon- Itration, but I cannot imagine either. I can ponceive underftanding and will, virtue and vice.
OPINIONS ABOUT UNIVERSALS. 151 vice, and other attributes of mind, but I can- ^ ^J^ ^* not imagine them. In like manner, I can diftinftly conceive univerlals, but I cannot imagine them.
As to the manner how we conceiv'^e univer- fals, I confefs my ignorance. I know not how I hear, or fee, or remember, and as little do I know how I conceive things that have no ex- iftence. In all our original faculties, the fa- bric and manner of operation is, I apprehend, beyond our comprehenfion, and perhaps is perfedly underflood by him only who made them.
But we ought not to deny a facl of which we are confcious, though we know not how it is brought about. And I think we may be certain that univerfals are not conceived by means of images of them in our minds, be- caufe there can be no image of an univerfal.
3. It feems to me, that on this queftionMr. Locke and his two antagonifts have divided the truth between them. He faw very clearly, that the power of forming abftrad and general conceptions is one of the mod diftinguifhing powers of the human mind, and puts a fpecific difference between man and the brute creati- on. But he did not fee that this power is per- fectly irreconcileable to his dodrine concern- ing ideas.
His opponents faw this inconfiftency; but inflead of rejecting the hypothefis of ideas, they explain away the power of abftraction, and leave no fpecific diflinclion between the human underftanding and that of brutes.
4. Berkeley, in his reafoning againft ab- ftraft general ideas, feems unwillingly or un- warily CHAP, warily to grant all that is neceffary to fupport ^- abftracl and general conceptions.
^-^^""^^ " A man, he fays, may confider a figure '* merely as triangular, without attending to " the particular qualities of the angles, or re- " lations of the fides. So far he may abflraft. " But this will never prove that he can frame ^' an abftratf. general inGonfiftent idea of a " triangle."
If a man may confider a figure merely a$ triangular, he muft have fome conception of this objed of his confidcration: For no man can confider a thing which he does not con- ceive. He has a conception, therefore, of a triangular fi.,ure, merely as fuch. I know no more that is meant by an abftracl general con- ception of a triangle.
He that confiders a figure merely as trian- gular, mufl underftand what is meant by the word triangular. If to the conception he joins to this word, he adds any particular quality of angles or relation of fides, he mifunderftands it, and does not confider the figure merely a$ triangular. Whence I think it is evident, that he who confiders a figure merely as tri- angular muft have the conception of a trian- gle, abftrading from any quality of angles or relation of fides.
The Biftiop, in like manner, grants, " That " we may confider Plter fo far forth as man, " or fo far forth as animal, without framing " the forementioned abftracl idea, in as much " as all that is perceived is not confidered." It m.ay here be obferved, that he who confiders Peter fo far forth as man^ or fo far forth as a;nimail, muft conceive the meaning of thofe abftrad general words man and onimal^ and he OPINIONS ABOUT UNI VERS ALS. 153 he who conceives the meaning of them, hasC H A P. an abftract general conception. ^^^• From thefe conceflions, one would be apt to conclude that the Bifhop thinks that we can iibilraci:, but that we cannot frame abflract ideas; and in this I fliould agree with him. But I cannot reconcile his concellions with the general principle he lays down before. " To '" be plain," fays he, "• I deny that I can ab- " ftracl one fron\ another, or conceive fepa- " rately thofe qualities which it is impofTible " fliould exift fo feparated.'* This appears to me inconfiftent with the concellions above mentioned, and inconfident with experience.
If we can confider a figure merely as trian- gular, without attending to the particular qua- lity of the angles or relation of the fides, this, I think, is conceiving feparately things which cannot exifh fo feparated: For furely a triangle cannot exift without a particular quality of an- gles and relation of fides. And it is well known from experience, that a man may have a diftin6t conception of a triangle, without having any conception or knowledge of many of the properties without which a triangle can- not exift.
Let us next ccnfider the Bifliop's notion of generalifing. He does not abfolutely deny that there are general ideas, but only that there are abftrad general ideas. " An idea,** he fays, " which, confidered in itfelf, is par- " ticular, becomes general, by being made to " reprefent or ftand for all other particular " ideas of the fame fort. To make this plain " by an example, Suppofe a Geometrician is '* demonftrating the method of cutting a line " in two equal parts. He draws, for inftance, '• a black 154 E S S A Y V.
CHAP." a black line of an inch in length. This, ^*- " which is in itfelf a particular line, is never- thelefs, with regard to its fignification, ge- " neral; fmce, as it is there ufed, it repre- " fents all particular lines whatfoever; fo that " what is demonllrated of it, is demon- " ftrated of all lines, or, in other words, " of a line in general. And as that par- " ticular line becomes general by be- " ing made a fign, fo the name Ime, which, " taken abiolutely, is particular, by being a " fign, is made general."
Here I obferve, that when a particular idea is made a fign to reprefent and ftand for all of a fort, this fuppofes a diftindlion of things into forts or fpecies. To be of a fort implies hav- ing thofe attributes which characterife the fort, and are common to all the individuals that be- long to it. There cannot, therefore, be a fort without general attributes, nor can there be any conception of a fort without a conception of thofe general attributes which diftinguilh it. The conception of a fort, therefore, is an ab- flracl general conception.
The particular idea cannot furely be made a fign of a thing of which we have no concepti- on. 1 do not fay that you mud have an idea of the fort, but furely you ought to under- fiand or conceive what it means, when you make a particular idea a reprefsntative of it, othervvife your particular idea reprefents, you know not what.
When I demonflrate any general property of a triangle, fuch as, that the three angles are equal to two right angles, I muft underftand or conceive diltinclly what is common to all triangles. I mufl: diftinguiOa the common at- tributes OPINIONS ABOUT UNIVERSALS. 155 tributes of all triangles from thofe wherein par- CHAP, ticular triangles may differ. And if I conceive '^^• diflinftly what is common to all triangles, without confounding it with w^hat is not fo, this is to form a general conception of a trian- gle. And without this, it is impollible to know that the demonftration extends to all triangles.
The Bifhop takes particular notice of this argument, and makes this anfwer to it. " Though the idea 1 have in view, whilft I " make the demonftration, be, for inftance, *' that of an ifofceles rectangular triangle, " whofe fides are of a determinate length, I *' may neverthelefs be certain that it extends " to all other redilinear triangles, of what " fort or bignefs foever; and that becaufe " neither the right angle, nor the equality or " determinate length of the fides, are at all " concerned in the demonftration."
But if he do not, in the idea he has in view, clearly diftinguifh what is common to all tri- angles from what is not, it would be impoffi- ble to difcern whether fomething that is not common be concerned in the demonftration or not. In order, therefore, to perceive that the demonftration extends to all triangles, it is neceifary to have a diftinft conception of what is common to all triangles, excluding from that conception all that is not common. And this is all I underftand by an abftract general con- ception of a triangle.
Berkeley catches an advantage to his fide of the queftion, from what Mr. Locke ex- preffes (too ftrongly indeed) of the difficulty of framing abftract general ideas, and the pains and (kill neceflary for that purpofe. From which the Bifhop infers, that a thing fo diffi- cult I C HA P. cult cannot be neceflary for communkation by ^'- language, which is fo eafy and familiar to all There may be fome abftraft and general conceptions that are difficult, or even beyond the reach of perfons of weak undtrrtanding; but there are innumerable, which are not be- yond the reach of children. It is impoffible to learn language without acquiring general con- ceptions; for there cannot be a fmgle fentence without them, I believe the forming thefe, and being able to articulate the founds of lan- guage^ make up the whole diincuky that chil- dren find in learning language at firlfc.
But this difficulty, we fee, they are able to overcome fo early as not to remember the pains it cou them. They have the ftrongeft induce- ment to exert all their labour and fkill, in or- der to underftand, and to be underftaod j and they no doubt do fo.
The labour of forming abllracl notions, is the labour of learning to fpeak, and to under- ftand what is fpoken. As the words of every language, excepting a few proper names, are general words, the minds of children are fur- nifhed with general conceptions, in proportion as they learn the meaning of general words. I believe mofl men have hardly any general no- tions but thofe which are expreiTed by the ge- neral words they hear and ufe in converfation. The meaning of fome of thefe is learned by a definition, vvhich at once conveys a diflincb and accurate general conception. The mean- ing of other general words we collect, by a kind of induction, from the way in which we fee them ufed on various cccafions by thofe who underftand the language. Of thefe our concep- OPINIONS ABOUT UNIVERSALS. 157 conception is often lefs diRind, and in diffe-C HA P. rent perfons is perhaps not perteftly the fame. ' ' ^' Is it not a hard thing, fays the Bifiiop, ** that a couple of children cannot prate toge- " ther of their fugar plumbs and rattles, and '* the reft of their little trinkets, till they '^ have firft tacked together numberlefs incon- " fiftencies, and fo formed in their minds ab- " draft general ideas, and annexed them to " every common name they make ufe of."
However hard a thing it may be, it is an evident truth, that a couple of children, even about their fugar-plumbs and their rattles, cannot prate fo as to underftand, and be un- derftood, until they have learned to conceive the meaning of many general words, and this, I think, is to have general conceptions.
5. Having confidered the fentiments of Bi- fhop Berkeley on this fubjedl, let us next at- tend to thofe of Mr. Hume, as thev are ex- preffed, part i. fett. 7. Treatife of Human Nature. He agrees perfeftly with the Bifhop, " That all general ideas are nothing but par- " ticular ones annexed to a certain term, " which gives them a more extenfive fignifi- " cation, and makes them recal upon occafion " other individuals which are fimilar to them. " A particular idea becomes general, by " being annexed to a general term; that is, '* to a term, which, from a cuftomary con- " jundion, has a relation to many other par- " ticular ideas, and readily recals them in the *' imagination. Abftrad: ideas are therefore '' in themfclves individual, however they m.ay " become general in their reprefentation. The " image in the mind is only that of a particu- " lar objetl, though the application of it in " our isS ESSAY V.
" our isS ESSAY V.
C H A P. «' our reafoning be the fame as if it was uni- ^'J " verfal.'^ *"'*"'"**' Although Mr. Hume looks upon this to be one of the greateft and moft valuable difcove- ries that has been made of late years in the republic of letters, it appears to be no other than the opinion of the Nominalifts, about which fo much difpute was held from the be- ginning of the twelfth century down to the re- formation, and which was afterwards fupport- ed by Mr. Hobbes. I fliall briefly confider the arguments, by which Mr. Hume hopes to have put it beyond all doubt and controverfy.
Fir/i, He endeavours to prove, by three ar- guments, that it is utterly impoffible to con- ceive any quantity or quality, without forming a precife notion of its degrees.
This is indeed a great undertaking; but if he could prove it, it is not fuflicient for his purpofe; for two reafons.
Fity^, Becaufe there are many attributes of things, befides quantity and quality; and it is incumbent upon him to prove, that it is im- poffible to conceive any attribute, without forming a precife notion of its degree. Each of the ten categories of Aristotle is a genus, and mav be an attribute: And if he ihculd prove of two of them, to wit, quantity and quality, that there can be no general concep- tion of them; there remain eight behind, of which this mull: be proved. The other reafon is, becaufe, though it were im- poffibleto conceive any quantity or quality, with- out forming a precife notion of its degree, it does not follow that it is impoffible to have a general conception even of quantity and qua- lity. The conception of a pound troy is th?
conception OPINIONS ABOUT UNIVERSALS.,^g conception of a quantity, and of the precife de-C H A P. gree of that quantity; but it is- an abflra6t ge- VI. neral conception notwithflanding, becaufe it ' ^^ may be the attribute of many individual bodies, and of many kinds of bodies. He ought there- fore to have proved, that we cannot conceive quantity or quahty, or any other attribute, without joining it infeparably to fome indivi- dual fubjeft.
This remains to be proved, which will be found no eafy matter. For inftance, I con- ceive what is meant by a Japancfe as diflinclly as what is meant by an Englifhman or a Frenchman. It is true, a Japanefe is neither quantity nor quality, but it is an attribute common to every individual of a populous na- tion. I never faw an individual of that nation, and, if I can truft my confcioufnefs, the gene- ral term does not lead me to imagine one in- dividual of the fort as a reprefentative of all others.
Though Mr. Hume, therefore, undertakes much, yet, if he could prove all he undertakes to prove, it would by no means be fufficient to fliew that we have no abftratt general con- ceptions.
Faffing this, let us attend to his arguments for proving this extraordinary pofition, that it is impoffible to conceive any quantity or qua- lity, without forming a precife notion of its degree.
The firfl: argument is, that it is impoffible to diftinguifh things that are not aclually fepara- ble. " The precife length of a line is not •different or diftinguifhable from the line.
I have before endeavoured to fhew, that things infeparable in their nature may be diftinguifhed tGo ESSAY V.- C H A P. guifhed In our conception. And we need go ^ no farther to b^ convinced of this, than the in- flance here brought to prove the contrary,- The precife length of a line, he fays, is not diitinguiihable from the line. When I fay, ibis is a line, I fay and meaii one thing. When I fay it is a line of three inches, I fay and mean another thing. If this be not to diltinguifh the precife length of the line from the line, I know not u'hat it is to diftinguifii.
Second argument. ^' Every objeft of fenfe, " that is, every impreifion, is an individual, " having its determinate degrees of quantity *' and quality: But whatever is true of the " impreffion is true of the idea, as they dlfl'er *' in nothing but their ftrength and vivacity.''
The conchifion in this argument is indeed juftly drawn from the premifes. If it be true that ideas difi'er in nothing from objefts of fenfe but in ftrength and vivacity, as it muft be granted that all the objefls of fenfe are indivi- duals, it will certainly follow that all ideas are individuals. Granting therefore the juftnefs of this conclufion, I beg leave to draw two other conciufions from the fame premifes^ which will follow no lefs neceffarily.
Firji, If ideas differ from the objefls of fenfe only in flrength and vivacity, it will follow, that the idea of a Hon is a lion of lefs ftrength and vivacity. And hence may arife a very im- portant queftion, Vv-'hether the idea of a lion raay not tear in pieces, and devour the ideas of fljeep, oxen, and horfes, and even of men, women, and children?
Secondly^ If ideas differ only in ftrength and vivacity from the objeds of fenfe, it will fol- low.
OPINIONS ABout UNIVERSALS. 16 1 low, that objeds, merely conceived, arenotCHAP. idea's; for fuch objefts differ from the objects '^• of fenfe in refpefts of a very different nature from ftrength and vivacity. Every objeft of fenfe muff have a real exiffence, and time and place: But things merely conceived may nei- ther have exiftence, nor time nor place; and therefore, though there fhould be no abffradt ideas, it does not follow, that things abftra£t and general may not be conceived.
The third argument is this: " It is a princi- " pie generally received in philofophy, that *' every thing in nature is individual; and *' that it is utterly abfurd to fuppofe a triangle *' really exiftent, which has no precife propor- '' tion of fides and angles. If this, therefore, *' be abfurd in fadl and reality, it muft be ab- *' furd in idea, fmce nothing of v/hich we can *' form a clear and diftinft idea is abfurd or «« impoffible.'* I acknowledge it to be impoffible, that a tri- angle fhould really exift which has no precife proportion of fides and angles; and impoffible that any being fhould exift which is not an indi- vidual being; for, I think, a being and ail individual being mean the fame thing: But that there can be ho attributes common to many individuals, I do not acknowledge. Thus, ta many figures that really exift, it may be com- mon that they are triangles; and to many bo- dies that exift, it may be common that they are fluid. Triangle and fluid are not beings, they are attributes of beings.
As to the principle here affurned, that no- thing of which we can form a clear and dillind idea is abfurd or impoffible, I refer to what Vol. II, M was CH A P. was faid upon it, chap. 3. Eflay 4. It is evi- ^yb_J dent, that in every mathematical demonflra- tion, ad abfurdu?n, of which kind almoft one half of mathematics confifts, we are required to fuppofe, and confequently to conceive a thing that is impollible. From that fuppofition we reafon, until wt come to a conclufion that is not only impoffible but abfurd. From this we infer, that the propofition fuppofed at firfl is impoffible, and therefore that its contradic- tory is true.
As this is the nature of all demonflrations, ad ahfurdum^ it is evident, (I do not fay that we can have a clear and diflinft idea,) but that we can clearly and diilinclly conceive things impoffible.
The reft of Mr. Hume's difcourfe upon this fubjecl is employed in explaining how an indi- vidual idea, annexed to a general term, may ferve all the purpofes in reafoning, which have been afcribed to abftracl general ideas.
" When we have found a refemblance *^^ among feveral objefts that often occur to us, *' we apply the fame to all of them, whatever *' differences we may obferve in the degree of " their quantity and quality, and whatever *' other differences may appear among them. " After we have acquired a cuftom of this *' kind, the hearing of that name revives the " idea of one of thefe objects, and makes the *' imagination conceive it, with all its circum- ** fiances and proportions." But along with this idea, there is a readinefs to furvey any other of the individuals to which the name be- longs, and to obferve, that no conclufion be formed contrary to any of them. If any fuch concluiioD OPINIONS ABOUT UNIVERSALS. 163 conclufion is formed, thofe Individual ideasCHAP. •which contradi£b it, immediately crowd in upon ^^* us, and make us perceive the falfehood of the' propofition. If the mind fuggefl not always thefe ideas upon occafion, it proceeds from fome imperfetlion in its faculties; and fuch a one as is often the fource of falfe reafoning and fophlftry.
This is in fubflance the way in which he ac- counts for what he calls " the foregoing para- dox, that fome ideas are particular in their nature, but general in their reprefentation." Upon this account I ihall make fome remarks. I. He allows that we find a refemblance among feveral objefts, and fuch a refemblance as leads us to apply the fame name to all of them. This conceffion is fufficient to fhew that we have general conceptions. There can be no refemblance in objeds that have no com- mon attribute; and if there be attributes be- longing in common to feveral objects, and in man a faculty to obferve and conceive thefe, and to give names to them, this is to have ge- neral conceptions.
I believe indeed we may have an indiftin£t perception of refemblance, without knowing wherein it lies. Thus, I may fee a refemblance between one face and another, when I cannot diftinclly fay in what feature they refemble: But by analyfmg the two faces, and comparing feature with feature, I may form a diifindt no- tion of that which is common to both. A painter, being accuftomed to an analyfis of this kind, would have formed a diftind notion of this refemblance at firfl fight; to another man it may require fome attention.
M 2 There-