SigPhi · William Godwin

An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, Vol. I

Page 15 of 21

How far is this mifi:ake compatible with real virtue? If I de- fire the benefit of intelligent beings, not from a clear and dift:ind perception of what it is in wliich their benefit confifts, but from the unexamined leffons of education, from the phyfical effed of Sympathy, or from any fpecies of zeal unallied to and incom- jnenfurate with knowledge, can this defire be admitted for vir- tuous?

UNDERSTANDING AND VIRTUE. 255 tnous? Nothing feems more inconfiftent with our ideas of virtue. A virtuous preference is the preference of an obje£l for the fake of certain beneficial qualities which really belong to that obje£t. To attribute virtue to any other fpecies of preference would be the fame as to fuppofe that an accidental eifedl of my condud;^- which was altogether out of my view at the time of adopting it,, might entitle, me to the appellation of virtuous.

Hence It appears, firft, that ' virtue confifts in a defire -of the Tt JstheofF- benefit of the fpecies: and, fecondly, that that defire only can be dcritanding. denominated virtuous, which flows from a diftindt perception of the value, and confequently of the nature, of the thing defired. But how extenfi ve muft be^ the capacity that comprehends tlie full value of that benefit which is the objed: of virtue! It muft begin with a colle£live idea of the human fpecies. It. muft difcriminate, among all the different caufes that produce a pleafurable ftate of mind, that which produces the moft exqui- fite and durable pleafure. Eminent virtue requires that I fhould have a grand view of the tendency of knowledge to produce happinefs, and of juft political inftitution to favour the progrcfa of knowledge. It demands that I fhould perceive in what man- ner fecial intercourfe may be made conducive to virtue and fe- licity, and imagine the unfpeakable advantages that may arife from a. coincidence and fucceflion of generous efforts. Thefe things are neceflary, not merely for the purpofe of enabling me to employ my -virtuous difpofition in the beft- manner, but alfo 2 for CONNEXION BETWEEN CONNEXION BETWEEN BOOK IV. for the purpofe of giving to that difpofition a juft animation and vigour. God, according to the ideas ufually conceived of that Appendix, No. I. being, is more benevolent than man, becaufe he has a conftant and clear perception of the nature of that end which his pro- vidence purfues.

It generates A farther proof that a powerful underftanding is infeparable ftanding. from eminent virtue will fuggeft itfelf, if we recoiled that earneft defire never fails to generate capacity.

Illuftration from other puifuits: love: This propofition has been beautifully illuftrated by the poets, when they have reprefented the paflion of love as immediately leading in the bread of the lover to the attainment of many arduous accompllfhments. It unlocks his tongue, and enables him to plead the caufe of his paffion with Infmuating eloquence. It renders his converfation pleafmg and his manners graceful. Does he defire to exprefs his feelings in the language of verfe? It dictates to him the moft natural and pathetic ftrains, and fup- plieshim with a juft and Intereftlng language which the man of mere refledion and fcience has often fought for in vain.

iimbJtion iimbJtion No pidure can be more truly founded in a knowledge of human nature than this. The hiftory of all eminent talents is of a fnnilar kind. Did Themiftocles defire to eclipfe the trophies of the battle of Marathon? The uneafmefs of this defire would not let him fleep, and all his thoughts were occupied with the 2 invention UNDERSTANDING AND VIRTUE. 257 mvention of means to accomplifh the purpofe he had chofcn. It BOOK iv...CHAP. IV. is- a well known maxim in the forming of juvenile minds, that ^^ ^ ' the inftrudion, which is communicated by mere conftraint;j No.. L makes a flow and feeble impreffion; but that, when once you have infpired the mind with a love for its objed, the fcene and the progrefs are entirely altered. The uneafinefs of mind which eameft defire produces, doubles our intelledlual a£tivity; and as furely carries us forward with increafed velocity towards our goal, as the expedation of a reward of ten thoufand pounds would prompt me to walk from London to York with firmer refolution and in a fhorter time.

Let the obje£l be for a perfon uninftruded in the rudiments of drawing to make a copy of fome celebrated ftatue. At firft, wewill fuppofe, his attempt fhall be mean.and unfuccefsful. If his defire be feeble, he will be deterred by the mifcarriage of this effay. If his defire be ardent and invincible, he will return to the attack. He will derive inftrudion from his failure. He will examine where and why he mifcarried. He will ftudy his model with a more. curious eye. He will perceive that he failed principally from the loofe and undigefted idea he had formed of the objed before him. It will no longer ftand in his ^ mind' as one general mafs^ but he will analyfe it, befto wing upon. each part infucceflion a feparate confideration.

The. cafe, is fxmikr in virtue as in fcience. If Lhave con- applied.

L 1 ceived sjS CONNEXION BETWEEN BOOK IV. ceived an earneft defire of beine;:a benefactor of my fpecies, T fhall no doubt find out a channel in which for my defire to operate, and fhall be quick-fighted in difcovering the defedts or comparative littlenefs of the plan 1 have ch fen. But the choice iOf an excellent plan for the accomplifhmr-nt of an important purpofe, and the.exertion of a mind perpetually watchful to re- move its defeats, imply confiderable underfcanding. The far- ther I am engaged in the purfuit of this plan the more will my :capacity increafe. If my mind flag and be difcouraged in the purfuit, it will not be merely want of underftanding, but want of defire. My defire and my virtue "will be lefs, than thofe of the man, who goes.on with unremitted conftancy in the fame .career.

-Can emment Thus far wc have Only teen confiderlng Iiow impoflible it is uriconnefted that eminent virtue fhould exift in a weak underftanding, and it 'with virtue?

is furprifing that fuch a propofition fhould ever have been con- tefted. It is a curious queftion to examine, how far the con_ verfe of this propofition is true, and in what degree eminent talents are compatible with the abfence of virtue.

Areument in Ffom the arguments already adduced it appears that virtuous ti'^efromara- ^^^''^ '^^ another name for a clear and diftind: perception of the °^^" nature and value of the objeft of virtue. Hence it feems moft natural to conclude, that, though underftanding, or ftrong perci- pient power is th^ indifpenfible prerequifite of virtue, yet it is 1 neceflary UNDERSTANDING AND VIRTUE. 255 neceflary that this power fhould be fixed upon this obieifl, in ^^OK IV.

order to its producing the defired effed. Thus it is in art. *^ ■. > ApTENDIXj Without genius no man ever was a poet; but it Is neceflary that No. I. general capacity fhould have been direfted to this particular channel, for poetical excellence to be th^ refult- There is however fome difference between the two cafes, (n the neg^- Poetry is the bufinefs of a few, virtue and vice are the affairs of univerfalltyof all men. To every uitellect that exilts one or other of thefe lation: qualities mufl properly belong. It mufl be granted that, where every other circumflance is equal, that man will be mol-l: virtuous, whofe underflanding has been moft actively employed in the fludy of virtue. But morality has been in a certain degree aa- objedl of attention to all men. No perfon ever failed more or lefs tc apply the flandard of juft and unjuft to his own a£tionS and thofe of others; and this has of courfe been generally done with mofl ingenuity by men of the greateft capacity.

It mufl farther be remembered that a vicious condud is always from the nathe refult us. nan'ow views. A man ot powerful capacity and foimded in extenfive obfer\Mtion is leaft likely to commit the mifl:ake, either of feeing himfelf as the only objed: of importance in the uni- verfe, or of conceiving that his own advantage may beft be pro" moted by trampling on that of others. Liberalaccomplirhments are furely in fome degree connected with liberal principles. He,, who takes into his view a whole nation as the fubjeds of his L 1 i ' operation: 25o CONNEXION BETWEEN BOOK IV. operation or the inftruments of his greatnefs, may naturally be *^;^ — ^ expected to entertain fome klndnefs for the whole. He, whofe ArPENDIS, '■ No. I. mind is habitually elevated to magnificent conceptions, is not likely to fmk without ftrong reludlance into thofe fordid pur- fuits, which engrofs fo large a portion of mankind.

Theargu- [g^f though thefe general maxims muft be admitted for true, ment ba- jo o laaeed. ^^^ would incline us to hope for a conftant union between em.inent talents and great virtues, there are other confiderations which prefent a ftrong drawback upon fo agreeable an expedta- tion. It is fufficiently evident that morality in fome degree enters into the refledions of all mankind. But it is equally evident, that it may enter for more or for lefs; and that there will be men -of the highefl talents, who have their attention diverted to other objects, and by whom it will be meditated upon with lefs earneftnefs, than it may fometimes be by other men who are in a general view their inferiors. The human mind is in fome cafes fo tenacious of its errors, and fo ingenious in the kivention of a fophiftry by which they may be vindicated, as to fruftrate expe6lations of virtue in other r^fpeds the beft founded.

Importance From the wholc of the fubje£t it feems to appear, that men of a fenfc of uftice. of talents, even when they are erroneous, are not deftitute of virtue, and that there is a degree of guilt of which they are incapable. There is no ingredient that fo eifentially contributes to a virtuous charadler as a fenfe of juftice. Philanthropy, as UNDERSTANDING AND VIRTUE. 261 contradiftineuifhed to jnftice, is rather an unrefleaine feelinfr. r.OOK iv.

than a rational principle. It leads to an abfurd indulgence, which is frequently more injurious than beneficial even to the individual it propofes to favour. It leads to a blind partiality, infliding calamity without remorfe upon many perhaps, in order to promote the imagined intereft of a few. But juftice meafures by one inflexible ftandard the claims of all, weighs their oppofite pretenfions, and feeks to difFufe happinefs, becaufe happinefs is the fit and reafonable adjunct of a confcious being.

"Wherever therefore a ilrong fenfe of juftice exifts, it is common and reafonable to fay, that in that mind exifts confiderable virtue, though the individual from an unfortunate concurrence of circumftances may with all his great qualities be the inftrument of a very fmall portion of benefit. Can great intellectual energy exift without a ftrong fenfe of juftice?

It has no doubt refultcd from a train of fpeculation fimllar to its con- this, that poetical readers have commonly remarked Milton's taklus."^' devil to be a being of confiderable virtue. It muft be admitted that his energies centered too much In perfonal regards. But wliy did he rebel againft his maker? It was, as he himfelf informs us, becaufe lie fav/ no fufficient reafon for that extreme inequality of rank and power which the creator afllimed. It was becaufe prefcription and precedent form no adequate ground for "implicit faith. After "his fall, why did he ftill cherifh the fpifit of oppofition? Prom a perfuafion that he was hardly and injurioufly 36». CONNEXION BETWEEN BOOK IV. injuiioufly treated. He was not difcouraged by the apparent' inequality of the conteft;- becaufe a fenfe of reafon and juftice Appendix, No.. I. ^as ftronger in his mind, than a fenfe of brute force:. becaufe he had much of the feelings of an; Epi(3:etus or a Cato, and little of thofe of a flave.. He bore his torments with fortitude, becaufe- he difdained to be fubdued by defpotic power.. He fought re-- venge, becaufe he could not think with tamenefs of the unex-- poftulating authority that aiTumed to difpofe of him. How bene- ficial and illuftrious might the temper from which thefe qualities; flowed have proved with a fmall. diver fity of fituation!

Let us defcend from thefe imaginary exiftences to real hlf- tory. We flialf find that even Casfar and Alexander had their virtues. There is great reafon to believe, that, however miflaken was their fyftem of conduct, they imagined it reconcileable and even conducive to the general good. If they had defired the general good more earneftly, they would have underftood betterv^ how to promote it..

Upon the whole it appears, tKat great talents are great ener- gies, and that great energies cannot flow but from a powerfitl' fenfe of fitnefs and jufl:ice. A man of uncommon genius Is a. man of high pafllons and lofty defign; and our pafllons will be found in the lall analyfiS to have their fureft foundation in a - fentiment of jullice. If a man be of an afpiring and ambitious ^mper, it is becaufe at prefent he finds himfelf out of his place^, and UNDERSTANDING AND VIRTUE. 265 and willies to be in it. Even the lover imagines that his qua- ^O*-*^^ ^^' Jities or his paflion eive Li'i a title fuperior to that of other men, ^; ' * ^ ^ Appendix, If I accumulate wealth, it i^ becaufe I think that the moft rational ^°' ^' plan of life cannot be fecured without it; and, if I dedicate my energies to feiifual pleafures, it is that I regard other purfuits as irrational and vifionary. All our paflions would die in the mo- ment they were conceived, were it not for this reinforcement. A man of quick refentment, of ftrong feelings, and who per- tinacioufly refifts eveiy thing that he regards as an unjuft affumption, may be confidered as having In him the feeds of eminence. Nor is it eafily to be conceived that fuch a man ihould not proceed from a fenfe of juftice to fome degree of benevolence; as Milton's hero felt real compaffion and fympathy for his partners in misfortune.

If thefe reafonings are to be admitted, what judgment fhall iliiberalitf with which •we form of the decifion of dodtor Johnfon, who, fpeaking of a men of ta- lents are -certain obfcure tranflator of the odes of Pindar, fays, that he ufually treated.

•was " one of the few poets to whom <leath needed not to be terrible *i" Let it be remembered that the error is by no means peculiar to do£tor Johnfon, though there are few inftances in which it is carried to a more violent extreme, than in the general tenour of the work from which this quotation is taken. It was natural to expert that there would be a combination among the multitude to pull down intellectual eminence. Ambition is com- * Lives of the Poets: Life of Weft.

mon 264 CONNEXION, &c.

mon to all men; and thofe, who are unable to are at lead willing to reduce others to their own ftandard. Na BOOK iv. n^on to all men; and thofe, who are unable to rife to diftindionjp Appendix, No. I. jnan can completely underftand the character of him with whom; he has no fympathy of views, and. we may be allowed tO' revile what we do not underftand. But it is deeply to be re- g-retted that men of talents Ihould fo often have entered into this combination. Who does not recolle£t with pain the vulgar abufe that Swift has thrown upon Dryden, and the mutual jea- Ipufies and animofities of Roufleau and Voltaire, men wh©; QUght to have co-operated for the. falvation of the world?.

APPENDIX, APPENDIX, No. II, p. 242. - OF THE MODE OF EXCLUDING VISITORS.

ITS IMPROPRIETY ARGUED — FROM THE SITUATION IN WHICH IT PLACES, I. THE VISITOR — 2. THE SERVANT. — objections: — pretended necessity of THIS PRAC- TICE, I. TO PRESERVE US FROM INTRUSION — 2, TO FREE US FROM DISAGREEABLE ACQUAINTANCE. — CHARACTERS OF THE HONEST AND DISHONEST MAN IN THIS RESPECT COMPARED.

THIS principle refpeding the obfervation of truth in the boo k iv. r r,-r CHAP. IV. common mtercourles of hfe cannot perhaps be better ^ ^ .. Appendix, lliullrated, than from the famihar and trivial cafe, as it is com- No. ii.

Its inipromonly fuppofed to be, of a mafter direding his fervant to fay piiety argued: he is not at home, as a means of freeing him from the intruuon of impertinent guefts. No queftion of moraUty can be foreign to the fcience of politics; nor will thofe few pages of the prefent work be found perhaps the Icaft valuable, which here and in other places* are dedicated to the refutation of errors, that by their extenfive influence have perverted the foundation of moral and political juftice.

* Vide Appendices to Book II, Chap. II.

M m Let Let us firft, according to the well known axiom of moralitj^ put ourfelves in the place of the perfon whom this anfwer excludes. It feldom happens but that he is able, if he be in pofTeffion of any difcernment, to difcover with tolerable accuracy places, i.the -whether the anfwer he receives be true or falfe. There are a vilitor: vilitor: thoufand petty circumflances by which falfhood continually deteils itfelf. The countenance and the voice of the fervant, unlefs long pradtifed indeed in this leflbn of deceit, his cold and referved manner in the one cafe, and his free, ingenuous and unembarrafTed air in the other, will almoft always fpeak a language lefs ambiguous than his lips. But let us fuppofe only that we vehemently fufpedl the truth. It is not intended to keep us in ignorance of the exiftence of fuch a pradlice. He that adopts it, is willing to avow in general terms that fuch is his fyftem, or he makes out a cafe for himfelf much lefs favour- able than I was making out for him. The vifitor then who receives this anfwer, feels in fpite of himfelf a contempt for the prevarication of the perfon he vifits. I appeal to the feelings of every man in the fituation defcribed, and I have no doubt that he will find this to be their true ftate in the firft inftance, how- ever he may have a fet of fophiftical reafonings at hand by which he may in a few minutes reafon down the firft move- ments of indignation. He feels that the trouble he has taken and the civility he intended intitled him at leaft to truth in return.

Having EXCLUDING VISITORS. 2C7 Having put ourfelves in the place of the vifitor, let us next BOOK IV.

CHAP, IV.

put ourfelves in the place of the poor defpifed fervant. Let us fuppofe that we are ourfelves deftined as fons or hufbands to give this anfwer that our father or our vv^ife is not at home, when he or fhe is really in the houfe. Should we not feel our tongues contaminated with the bafe plebeian lie? Would it be a fufficient opiate to our confciences to fay that "fuch is the pradice, and it is well under flood?" It never can be underftood; its very intention is, not to be underflood. We fay that " wc have certain arguments that prove the practice to be innocent." Are fervants only competent to underfland thefe arguments J Surely we ought beft to be able to underftand our own argu- ments, and yet we Ihrink with abhorrence from the idea of pcr- fonally acting upon them.

Whatever fophlftry we may have to excufe our error, nothing Is more certain than that our fervants underftand the leflon we teach them to be a lie. It is accompanied by all the retinue of falfliood. Before It can be gracefully pradlifed, the fervant muft be no m<?an proficient in the myfteries of hypocrify. By the eafy impudence with which it Is uttered, he beft anfwers the purpofe of his mafter, or in other words the purpofe of deceit. By the eafy impudence with which it is uttered, he beft ftlfles the upbraidings of his own mind, and conceals from others tl^e fhame impofed on him by his defpotic taik-mafter. Before this can be fufficiently done, he muft have difcarJed the ingenuous M m 2 franknefs 26S OF THE MODE OF ^OOK IV, fj-anknefs by means of which the thoughts find eafy commerce CJrlAl.IV.

^ ■ ' with the toneue, and the clear and undifguifed countenance No. II. which ought to be the faithful mirror of the mind. Do you think, when he has learned this degenerate leiTon in one " inftance, that it will produce no unfavourable efFeds upon his general condudt? Surely, if we will pra£tife vice, we ought at leafl to have the magnanimity to pradife it in perfon, not cowardlike corrupt the principles of another, and oblige him to do that which we have not the honefty to dare to do for ourfelves.

Objcftlons: ^ut it is faid, " that this lie is neceflary, and that the inter- Pretended courfe of human fociety cannot be carried on without it." What, thTs^praft^ce, is it uot as eafy to fay, " I am engaged," or " indifpofed," or as us fiom In- the cafe may happen, as " I am not at home? Are thele an- fwers more infulting, than the univerfally fufpedted anfwer, the notorious hypocrify of " I am not at home?"

The purpofe indeed for which this anfwer is ufually em- ployed is a deceit of another kind. Every man has in the ca- ' talogue of his acquaintance fome that he particularly loves, and others to whom he is indifferent, or perhaps worfe than indif- ferent. This anfwer leaves the latter to fuppofe, if they pleafe, that they are in the clafs of the former. And what is the bene- fit to refult from this indifcriminate, undiftinguiihing manner of treating our neighbours? Whatever benefit it be, it no doubt exifls t-rufion EXCLUDINGVISITORS. 269 exifts in confiderable vigour in the prefent ftate of pollflied fo- BOOK iv.

, CHAP. IV. ciety, where forms perpetually intrude to cut off all intercourfe ' v ' Appendix, Appendix, between the feelings of mankind; and I can fcarcely tell a man No. ii. on the one hand " that I efteem his charadler and honour his virtues," or on the other " that he is fallen into an error which will be of prejudicial confequence to him," without trampling upon all the barriers of politenefs. But is all this right? Is not the efteem or the difapprobation of others among the moft powerful incentives to virtue or punilhments of vice? Can we even underftand virtue and vice half fo well as we otherwife fhould, if we be unacquainted with the feelings of our neigh- bours refpedling them? If there be in the lift of our acquaintance > any perfon whom we particularly diflike, it ufually happens that it is for fome moral fault that we perceive or think we perceive in him. Why fhould he be kept in ignorance of our opinion refpeding him, and prevented from the opportunity either of amendment or vindication? If he be too wife or too foolifli, too virtiious or too vicious for us, why fhould he not be ingenu- oufly told of his miftake in his intended kindnefs to us, rather than be fuffered to find it out by fix months enquiry from our fervants?

This leads us to yet one more argument in favour of this dif- 2. to free us ingenuous pradlice. We are told, " there is no other by which agreeable we can rid ourfelves of difagreeable acquaintance." How long ^'^'^"^'" ^"^^* ihall this be one of the efFe<^s of polifhed fociety, to perfuade us that 270 OFTHEMODEOF BOOK IV, ti^j^t; ^ye are incapable of doing the moft trivial offices for our- * -^ ' felves? You may as well tell me, " that it is a matter of indif- ApPtNDIX, No. ir. penfible neceffity to have a valet to put on my flockings." In reality the exiftence of thefe troublefome vifitors is owing to the hypocrify of politenefs. It is that we wear the fame indifcri- minate fmile, the fame appearance of cordiality and complacence to all our acquaintance. Ought we to do thus? Are virtue and excellence entitled to no diftindions? For the trouble of thefe impertinent vifits we may thank ourfelves. If we pradifed no deceit, if we affumed no atom of cordiality and efteem we did not feel, we fhould be Httle peftered with thefe buzzing intruders. But one fpecies of falfhood involves us in another; and he, that pleads for thefe lying anfwers to our vifitors, in reality pleads the caufe of a cowardice, that dares not deny to vice the diilinc- tion and kindnefs that are exclufively due to virtue.

Charafters of The man who afted upon this fyftem would be very far re- and diftioneft moved from a Cynic. The condudl of men formed upon the refpeft com- faihionablc fyftem is a perpetual contradidtion. At one moment pared.

they fawn upon us with a fervility that diflionours the dignity of man, and at another treat us with a negledl, a farcaftic info- lence, and a fupercilious difdain, that are felt as the fevereft cruelty, by him who has not the firmnefs to regard them with negle£l. The conduit of the genuine moralift is equable and uniform. He loves all mankind, he defires the benefit of all, and this love and this defire are legible in his condudl. Does EXCLUDING VISITORS. 271 he remind us of our faults '? It Is with no mixture of afoerltv. BOOK IV.

of felfifh difdain and infolent fuperiorlty. Of confequence it is * ' Appendix, fcarcely poffible he fhould wound. Few indeed are thofe effc- No. ii. minate valetudinarians, who recoil from the advice, when they dillinguifh the motive. But, were it otherwife, the injury Is no- thing. Thofe who feel themfelves incapable of fuffering the moft benevolent plain dealing, would derive leaft benefit from the prefcription, and they avoid the phyfician. Thus is he de- livered, without harfhnefs, hypocrify and deceit, from thofe whofe intercourfe he had leaft reafon to defire; and the more his cha- racter Is underftood, the more his acquaintance will be feled, his company being chiefly fought by the ingenuous, the well dif- pofed, and thofe who are defirous of improvement.

APPENDIX,, APPENDIX, No. Ill, p. 252, SUBJECT OF SINCERITY RESUMED.

A CASE PROPOSED. — ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF CONCEAL- MENT.— PREVIOUS QUESTION t IS TRUTH IN GENERAL TO BE PARTIALLY COMMUNICATED? — CUSTOMARY EF- FECTS OF SINCERITY — OF INSINCERITY — UPON HIM WHO PRACTISES IT — I. THE SUSPENSION OF IMPROVE- MENT 2, MISANTHROPY 3. DISINGENUITY — UPON THE SPECTATORS. — SINCERITY DELINEATED — ITS GENE- RAL IMPORTANCE. APPLICATION. DUTY RESPECTING THE CHOICE OF A RESIDENCE.

*0 enable us more accurately to judge of the extent of the obligation to be fincere, let us fuppofe, " that I am No. III. refident, as a native or otherwife, m the kmgdom of Portugal, pofed. and that I am of opinion rhat the enablifhment, civil and religious, of that country is in a high degree injurious to the wel- fare and improvement of the inhabitants." Ought I explicitly to declare the fentlments I entertain? To this queftion I an- fwer, that " my Immediate duty is to feek for myfelf a different refidence."

The SINCERITY RESUMED, 273 The arguments in favour of concealment in this cafe are ob- COOK IV. ° CHAP. IV.

vious. " That country is fubje£t to a high degree of defpotifm, ^- — v ' and, if I delivered my fentiments in this frank manner, efpe-, ^°- ^^^' ' •' '■ Arguments cially if alone; with this I were ardent and indefatigable in en- '" ^^^'°"'' °^ deavouring to profelyte the inhabitants, my fincerity would not be endured. In that country the inftitution of the holy inqui- fition ftill flourillies, and the fathers of this venerable court would find means effeitually to filence me, before I had well opened my commilfion. The inhabitants, wholly unaccuftomed to fuch bold affertions as thofe I uttered, would feel their pious ears inexpref- fibly fhocked, and the martyrdom I endured, inftead of pro- ducing the good efFe£ts with which martyrdom is fometimes at- tended, would foon be forgotten, and, as long as it was remem- bered, would be remembered only with execrations of my me- mory. If on the contrary I concealed my fentiments, I might fpend a long life in aOis of fubftantial benevolence. If I con- cealed them in part, I might perhaps by a prudent and gradual difclofure efFedl that revolution in the opinions of the inhabi- tants, which by my precipitation in the other cafe I defeated in the outfet. Thefe arguments in favour of concealment are not built upon cowardice and felfifhnefs, or upon a recolledion of the horrible tortures to which I fhould be fubjeded. They flow from confideraiions of philanthropy, and an endeavour fairly to eftimate in what mode my exertions may be rendered moll conducive to the general good."

N n Before