N n Before 274 SUBJECT OF f,9,'j^p \Y; Before we enter upon their diredt examination, It may be pro- *7 — " ' per to premife fome general obfervatlons. In the firft place, let Appendix, a r d i j No. III. yg calmly enquire whether the inftance here ftated be of the nax^revious •' '■ queition: Is ^.^J.g p£ ^^ exceptlon Or a rule. " Ought I univerfally to tell neral to be ^j^j ^ fmall part of the truth at a time, careful not to fhock the municated? prejudices of my hearers, and thus lead them imperceptibly to conclufions which would have revolted them at firft; or am I to pradife this method only, where the rilk Is great, and my life may be the forfeit?" It would feem as if truth were a facred depofit, which I had no right to deal out in fhreds to my fellow men, juft as my temper or my prudence fhould didate. It would feem as if it were an unworthy artifice, by an ingenious an-angement of my materials to trick men into a conclufion, to which franknefs, ingenuity and fincerity would never have con- duced them. It would feem as if the fhock I am fo careful to avoid were favourable to the health and robuft conftitution of mind; and that, though I might in this way produce kaft tenv- porary effed, the ultimate refult would afford a balance greatly in favour of undifguifed fincerity.
Cuftomary A fecond preliminary proper to be Introduced in- this place efFefts of fin- cerity: confifts in a recolledion of the general effeds of fincerity and infincerlty, the reafons for which the one is commonly laudable and the other to be blamed, independently of the fubjeds about which they may be employed. Sincerity Is laudable, on account of the firmnefs and energy of charader it never fails to produce.
« An SINCERITY RESUMED. 275 " An uprig-ht man," it has fometimes been faid, " ousrlit to r.OOK IV.
carry his heart in his hand." He ought to have an ingenuouf- nefs which flirinks from no examination. The commerce be- tween his tongue and his heart is uniform. Whatever he fpeaks you can depend upon to be the truth and the whole truth. The defigns he has formed he employs no artifice to conceal. He tells you in the firil inftance: " This is the propofition I mean to demonftrate. I put you upon your guard. I will not take you by furprife. If what I affirm be the truth, it will bear your fcrutiny. If it were error, I could have recourfe to no means more equivocal, than that of concealing in every ftep of the procefs the objed: in which my exertions were intended to terminate."
Infincerity is to be blamed, becaufe it has an immediate ofinfincerity; upon tendency to vitiate the integrity of charader. " I muft conceal „pon |„^ ^he opinions I entertain," fuppofe, " from the holy father in- ^^^k2_PI5h>^ quifitor." What method fliall I employ for this purpofe? Shall I i.thefufpen- hide them as an impenetrable fecretfrom all the world? If this be provement: the fyftem I adopt, the confequence is an inftant and immediate end to the improvement of my mind. It is by the efforts of a daring temper that improvements and difcoveries are made. The feeds of difcovery are fcattered in every thinking mind, but they are too frequently flarved by the ungenial foil upon which they fall. Every man fufpeds the abfurdity of kings and lords, and the injuflice of that glaring and opprefTive inequality which iubfifts in mofl civilifed countries. But he dares not let his N n 2 mind 276 SUBJECTOF BOOK IV. jnlnd loofe In fo adventurous a fubjed. If I tell my thoughts, ^; >^ ^ I derive from the ad: of communication encouragement to Appendix, No. III. proceed. I perceive in what manner they are received by others, and this perception ads by rebound upon my own progrefs. If •they be received cordially, I derive new encouragement from the approbation of others. If they be received with oppofition and diftruft, I am induced to revife them. I deted their errors, cr^ I ftrengthen my arguments, and add new truths to thofe ■which I had previoufly accumulated. What can excite me to the purfuit of difcovery, if I know that I am never to commu- nicate my difcoveries? It is in the nature of things impoffible, that the man, who has determined with himfelf never to utter the truths he knows, fhould be an intrepid and indefatigable thinker. The link which binds together the inward and the outward man is indiflbluble; and he, that is not bold in fpeech, 2. mifan- will never be ardent and unprejudiced in enquiry. Add to this, that confcious difguife has the worft eiFed upon the temper, and converts virtue, which ought to be frank, fecial and ingenuous, into a folitary, morofe and mifanthropical principle.
jjj5n J But let us conceive that the method I employ to proted mynuity: ^-^j£ ^^^^ perfecution is different from that above ftated. Let us fuppofe that I communicate my fentiments, but with caution and referve. This fyftem involves with it an endlefs train of falfhood, duplicity and tergiverfation. When I communicate my fentiments, it is under the inviolable feal of fecrecy. If my zeal SINCE RI TY R ES UMED. 277 zeal carry me any ^reat leno-ths, and my love of trut'i be ardent, BOOK iv.
I fhall wiih to communicate it as far as the bounds of prudence ' <- ' Al-PEMMX, will pofTibly admit, and it will be flrange if in a courfe of ye^rs ^■">' l-^^- I do net com.Tait one miflake in my calculation. My grand fecret is betrayed, and fufpicion is excited in the breafl of the father inquifitor. What fhall I do now? I muH:, I fuppofe, ftoutly deny the fad:. I mufl: coaipofe my features into a con- fiftent expreflion of the mod natural ignoran-ce and farprife,, happy if I have made fuch progrefs in the arts of hypocrify and fal.Tiood, as to put the change upon the wild bcafl who is ready to devour me. The moft confummate impoftor is upon this hypothelis the man of moft perfevSt virtue.
But this is not all. My character for benevolence being well '• known, I am likely to be furrounded by perfons of good ^ humoured indifcretion rather than by inveterate enemies. Of every man who queftions me about my real fentiments I muft determine firft, whether he fimply wifh t be informed, or whether his defign be to betray me. The charader of virtue feems in its own nature to be that of firm and unalterable reio- - lution, confident in its own integrity. But the character that refults from this fyftem begins in hefitation, and ends in difgrace. • I am queftioned whether fuch be my real fentiments. I deny it. My queftioner returns to the charge with an, " Oh, but I heard it from fuch a one, and he was prefent when you delivered them." What am I to do now? Am I to afperfe the character of the 278 SUBJECT OF the honefl reporter of my words? Am I to make an Impotent effort to get rid of the charge; and, inftead of ellablifhing my chara£ter for orthodoxy, aftonifh my informer with my cool and intrepid effrontery?
upon tlie Infmcerity has the worft effect both upon him who pra£bifes, fpedators. •' r r J and upon them who behold it. It deprives virtue of that eonfcious magnanimity and eafe, which ought ever to be ranked among its nobleft «ffe£l:s. It requires the perpetual exercife of prefence of mind, not for the purpofe of telling the moft ufeful truths in the beft manner, but in order to invent a confiftent catalogue of lies, and to utter them with a countenance at war with every thing that is pafling in my heart. It deftroys that confidence on the part of my hearers, which ought to be infe- parable from virtue. They cannot all of them be expected to underftand the deep plan of benevolence and the total negledt of all felfiih and timid confi derations by which I am fuppofmg my condudt to be regulated. But they can all fee my duplicity and tergiverfation. They all know that I excel the moft confum- mate impoftor in the coolnefs with which I can utter fallhood, and the craft with which I can fupport it.
Sincerity de- Sincerity has fometimes been brought into difrepute by the .liueated.
abfurd fyftem according to which it has been purfued, and ftill oftener by the whimfical pidure which the adverfaries of undif- ti-nguifliing fincerity have made of it. It is not neceffary that I fhould fiiould flop every perfon that I meet in the ftreet to inform him BOOK IV. ^. CHAP. IV. of my fentiments. It is not neceflary that I fhould perpetually '^ v * talk to the vulgar and illiterate of the deepeft and fublimeft ^^* ^^^' truths. All that is neceflary is, that I lliould pradife no con- cealment, that I fhould preferve my difpofition and charader untainted. Whoever queftions me, it is neceffajy that I fhould have no fecrets or referves, but be always ready to return a frank and explicit anfwer. When I undertake by argu- ment to eftablilh any principle, it is neceflary that I fliould employ no circuitous methods, but clearly fl:ate in the firft inftance the objed I have in view. Having fatisfied this origi- nal duty, I may fairly call upon my hearer for the exercife of his patience. " It is true," I may fay, " that the opinion I deliver w^ill appear fhocking to your prejudices, but I will now deli- berately and minutely afllgn the reafons upon which it is founded. If they appear fatisfadory, receive; if they be Inconclufive, rejed it." This is the ground work of fmcerity. The fuperftrudure is the propagation of every important truth, becaufe it conduces to the improvement of man whether individually or collec- tively; and the telling all I know of myfelf and of my neigh- bour, becaufe ftrid juftice and unequivocal publicity are the befl fecurity for every virtue.
Sincerity then, in ordinary cafes at l^leaft, feems to be of fo its general much importance, that it is my duty firft to confider how to ' ^°' '""'*^' preferva iSo SUBJECT OF preferve my fincerlty untainted, and afterwa means in my power in each particular fituation, of benefiting BOOK IV. preferve my fmcerity untainted, and afterwards to feled the befl ApPENDiy, No. IIJ. mankind. Sincerity is one of thofe paramount and general rules* ^ which is ncA'^er to give way to the affair of the day. I may imagine perhaps that falfhood and deceit may be moft beneficial in fome particHgar inftances, as I might imagine upon the fubjedt of a preceding chapter, that it would be virtuous to plant my dagger in the heart of a tyrant. But we fhould be cautious of indulging our", imaginations in thefe inftances. The great law of always employing ingenuous and honourable means feems to be of more importance than the exterminating any local and tem- porary evils. I well know in the^^^prefent cafe what good will refult from a frank and undifguifed principle of aftion, and what evil from deceit, duplicity and falfhood. But I am much lefs certain of the good that will arife under particular circum- ftances from a negled of thefe principles.
Application. Having thus unfolded the true ground of reafonlng upon this fubjedt, we will return to the queftion refpedting the condudt to be obferved by the reformer in Portugal.
Duty re- And here the true anfwer will perhaps be found to be that fpefting the choice of a which has been above delivered, that a perfon fo far enlightened refideoce.
upon thefe fubjedls, ought by no confideration to be prevailed upon to fettle in Portugal; and, if he were there already, ought 4 to SINCERITY RESUMED. 281 IV. V.
to quit the country with all convenient fpeed. His efForts In For- BOOK iv tugal would probahly be vain; but there is fome other country in '^ v Appendix, which they will be attended with the happieft confequences. No. ill.
' It may be objeded, " that fome perfon mull begin the work of reformation in Portugal, and why fliould it not be the indi- vidual of whom we are treating?" But the anfwer is, that, in the fenfe fuppofed in this objection, it is not neceffary that any body fhould begin. Thefe great and daring truths ought to be publifhed in England, France and other countries; and the d'lC- femination that will attend them here, will produce a report and afford an example, which after fome time may prepare them a favourable reception there.
The great chain of caufes from which every event In the uni- verfe takes its rife, has fufficiently provided for the gradual in- ftrudion of mankind, without its being neceffary that indivi- duals fhould violate their principles and facrifice their integrity to accomplifh it. Perhaps there never was a mind that fo far outran the refl of the fpecies, but that there was fome country in which the man that poffeffed it might fafely tell all he knew. The fame caufes that ripen the mind of the individual are ading generally, ripening fimilar minds, and giving a certain depree of fimilar imprefTion to whole ages and countries. There exifl perhaps at this very moment in Portugal, or foon will exifl, minds, which, though mere children in fcience compared with O o their 282 SUBJECT OF SINCERITY RESUMED.
CHAP IV* ^^^^^' S^S^^^^'^ neighbours in a more favoured foil, are yet accu- ^ ^ ' rately adapted to the improvement of their countrymen. If by any No. Ill, fport of nature an exotic fhould fpring up, let him be tranfplant- ed to a climate that will prove more favourable to -his vigour and utility. Add to this, that, when we are inclined to fet an inordinate value upon our own importance, it may be reafonable to fufpe£t that we are influenced by fome lurking principle of timidity or vanity. It is by no means certain that the individual ever yet exifted, whofe life was of fo much value to the community, as to be worth preferving at fo great an expence, as that of his fincerlty.
CHAP.
CHAP. V. OF FREE WILL AND NECESSITY.
IMPORTANCE OF THE QUESTION. DEFINITION OF NECES- SITY.— WHY SUPPOSED TO EXIST IN THE OPERATIONS OF THE MATERIAL UNIVERSE. — THE CASE OF THE OPE- RATIONS OF MIND IS PARALLEL. — INDICATIONS OF NE- CESSITY— IN HISTORY IN OUR JUDGMENTS OF CHA- RACTER— IN OUR SCHEMES OF POLICY — IN OUR IDEAS OF MORAL DISCIPLINE. OBJECTION FROM THE FALLI- BILITY OF OUR EXPECTATIONS IIM HUMAN CONDUCT. — • ANSWER. — ORIGIN AND UNIVERSALITY OF THE SENTI- MENT OF FREE WILL. — THE SENTIMENT OF NECESSITY ALSO UNIVERSAL. THE TRUTH OF THIS SENTIMENT ARGUED FROM THE NATURE OF VOLITION. — HYPOTHE- SIS OF FREE WILL EXAMINED. — SELF-DETERMINATION. — - INDIFFERENCE. — THE WILL NOT A DISTINCT FACULTY.
FREE WILL DISADVANTAGEOUS TO ITS POSSESSOR.
OF NO SERVICE TO MORALITY, AVING now finlfhed the theoretical part of our enquiry, gQOK IV . fo far as appeared to be necefTary to afford a foundation ^^"'^^'^^y for our reafoning refpeding the different provifions of political O o 2 inftitution, 284 ' OFFREEWILL BOOK IV. inftitution, we mieht dire(£lly proceed to the confideration of *^ V ' thofe provifions. It will not however be ufelefs to paufe in this place, in order to confider thofe general principles of the hu- man mind, which are moft intimately conneded with the topics of political reafoning *, None of thefe principles feems to be of greater importance than that which affirms that all adtions are neceffary.
Importance Moft of the rcafonings upon which we have hitherto been tion.^*^"^' employed, though perhaps conftantly built upon this dodrine as a poftulate, wilf yet by their intrinfic evidence, however in- confiftently with his opinion upon this primary topic, be admit- ted by the advocate of free will. But it ought not to be the prefent defign of political enquirers to treat the queftions that may prefent themfelves fuperficially. It will be found upon maturer reflection that this do£trine of moral neceffity includes in it confequences of the highell moment, and leads to a bold and comprehenfive view of man in fociety, which cannot poffibly be entertained by him who has embraced the oppofite opinion. Severe method would have required that this propofition fhould have been eftablilhed in the firft inflance, as an indifpenfible * The reader, who is indifpofed to abflrufe fpeculations, will find the other niembers of the enquiry fufficiently connefled, without an exprefs reference to the remaining part of the prefent book.
foundation foundation of moral reafoning of every fort. But there are well BOOK iv.
difpofed perfons, who notwithftanding the evidence with which *^ ^ * it is attended, have been alarmed at its confequences; and it was perhaps proper, in compliance with their miftake, to fliew that the moral reafonings of this work did not ftand in need of this fupport, in any other fenfe than moral reafonings do upon every ether fubjed;.
To the right underftanding of any arguments that may be Definition of neceffity.
adduced under this head, it is requifite that we fhould have a clear idea of the meaning of the term neceffity. He who affirms that all actions are neceffary, means, that, if we form a juft and complete view of all the circumftances in which a living or in- telligent being is placed, we fhall find that he could not in any moment of his exiftence have adled otherwife than he has a£ted. According to this affertion there is in the tranfadlions of mind nothing loofe, precarious and uncertain. Upon this queftion the advocate of liberty in the philofcphical fenfe muft join ifllie. He muft, if he mean any thing, deny this certainty of conjunc- tion between moral antecedents and confequents. Where all is conftant and invariable, and the events that arife uniformly flow from the circumftances in which they originate, there can be no liberty.
It is acknowledged that In the events of the material unlverfe why fuppofc'd to exift every XOOKiy. thing is fiibjeded to this neceflity. The tendency of inveftiga- ' ' tion and enquiry relatively to this topic of human knowledge tionsofthe has been, more efFedually to exclude chance, as our improvematerial uuiverfe. ments extended. Let us confider what is the fpecies of evidence that has fatisfied philofophers upon this point. Their only folid "■round of reafoning has been from experience. The argument which has induced mankind to conceive of the univerfe as go- verned by certain laws, and to entertain the idea of neceffary connexion between fucceffive events, has been an obferved fimi- larity in the order of fucceflion. If, when we had once remark- ed two events fucceeding each other, we had never had occafion to fee that individual fuccefTion repeated; if we faw innumerable events in perpetual progreffion without any apparent order, fo that all our obfervation would not enable us, when we beheld one, to pronounce that another of fuch a particular clafs might be expeded to follow; we fhould never have conceived of the exiftence of necefiary connexion, or have had an idea corre- fponding to the term caufe.
Hence it follows that all that ftridly fpeaking we know of the material univerfe is this fucceflion of events. Uniform fucceflion irrefiftibly forces upon the mind the idea of abflrad: connexion. When we fee the fun confl:antly rife in the morning and fet at night, and have had occafion to obferve this pheno- menon invariably taking place through the whole period of our exiftence, AND NECESSITY. 2S7 exigence, we cannot avoid believinp; that there is feme caufe pre- EOOK I v.
ducing this uniformity of event. But the principle or virtue by '^ v ' which one event is conjoined to another we never fee.
Let us take fome familiar ilhiftrations of this truth. Can it be imagined that any man by the infpedtion and analyfis of gun- powder would have been enabled, previoufly to experience, to predidl its explofion? Would he previoufly to experience have been enabled to predi£t, that one piece of marble having a flat and polifhed furface might with facility be protruded along another In a horizontal, but would with confiderable pertinacity refift reparation in a perpendicular direction? The fimpleft pheno- mena of the mofl hourly occurrence were originally placed at an equal diftance from human fagacity..
There is a certain degree of obfcurity incident to this fubjeft arifing from the following circumflance. All human knowledge Is the refult of perception. We know nothing of any fubfl:ance but by experience. If it produced no e£fe£ts, it would be no fubjedl of human intelligence. We collect a confiderable num- ber of thefe efFeds, and, by their perceived uniformity having reduced them into general clafl^es, form a general idea annexed to the fubjedl that produces them. It muft be admitted, that a definition of any fubfl:ance, that is, any thing that deferves to be ^alled knowledge refpeding it, will enable us to predidl fome of its future poflible effei^s, and that for this plain reafon, that defi- - nitlon 1 nition is prcdlclion under another name. But, though, when we have gained the idea of impenetrability as a general pheno- menon of matter, we can predi£t fome of its effects, there are others which v.^e cannot predift: or in other words, we know none of its effe£ls but fuch as we have adually remarked, added to an expeiflation that fimilar events will arife under fimilar cir- cumftances, proportioned to the conftancy with which they have been obferved to take place in our pafl: experience. Finding as we do by repeated experiments, that material fubftances have the property of refulance, and that one fubftance in a Hate of reft, when impelled by another, paffes into a ftate of motion, we are ftill in want of more particular obfervation to enable us to pre- didl the fpecific efFefts that will follow from this impulfe in each of the bodies. Enquire of a man who knows nothing more of matter than its general property of impenetrability, what will be the refult of one ball of matter impinging upon another, and you will foon find how little this general property can inform him of the particular laws of motion. We fuppofe him to know that it will commimicate motion to the fecoad ball. But what quantity of motion will it communicate? What effeds will the impulfe produce upon the impelling ball? Will it continue to move in the fame diredlion? will it recoil in the oppofite direc- tion? will it fly off obliquely, or will it fubfide into a ftate of reft? All thefe events will appear equally probable to him whom a feries of obfervations upon the paft has not inftrudted as to what he is to exped from the future.
A From AND NECESSITY. 2S9 From thefe remarks we may fufficiently colle£t what is the BOOK iv.
ipecies of knowledge we poflefs refpe£ling the laws of the material * « ' univerfe. No experiments we are able to make, no reafonings we are able to deduce, can ever inftrudl us in the principle of caufa- tlon, or fhew us for what reafon it is that one event has, in every inftance in which it has been known to occur, been the precurfor of another event of a certain given defcription. Yet we reafonably believe that thefe events are bound together by a perfedl neceffity, and exclude from our ideas of matter and motion the fuppofition of chance or an uncaufed event. AfTo- ciation of ideas obliges us, after having feen two events perpetu- ally conjoined, to pafs, as foon as one of them occurs, to the re- colledion of the other: and, in cafes where this tranfition never deceives us, but the ideal fucceffion is always found to be an cxad copy of the future event, it is impoffible that this fpecies of forefight Ihould not convert into a general foundation of rea- foning. We cannot take a fmgle ftep upon this fubjed, which does not partake of the fpecies of operation we denominate ab- ftradion. Till we have been led to confider the rifmg of the fun to-morrow as an incident of the fame fpecies as its rifrng to- day, we cannot deduce from it fimilar confequences. It is the bufmefs of fcience to carry this tafk of generalifatlon to its fartheft extent, and to reduce the diverfified events of the uni- verfe to a fmall number of original principles.
Let us proceed to apply thefe reafonings concerning matter to Thecal of _ the opera P P the 2go ^ OF FREE WILL BOOK IV. tiie illuftratlon of the theory of mind. Is it poffible in this latter '; •< — — ' theory, as in the former fubjeft, to difcover any general prlnci- S6 parallel. pj^g? Q^j^ intelled: be made a topic of fcience? Are we able to reduce the multiplied phenomena of mind to any certain ftand- ard of reafoning? If the affirmative of thefe queftions be con- ceded, the inevitable confequence appears to be, that mind, as well as matter, exhibits a conftant conjundlion of events, and affords a reafonable prefumption to the neceffary connexion of thofe events. It is of no importance that we cannot fee the ground of that connexion, or imagine how propofitions and reafoning, when prefented to the mind of a percipient being, are able by neceffary confequence to generate volition and animal motion; for, if there be any truth in the above reafonings, we are equally incapable of perceiving the ground of conaexioa between any two events in the material univerfe, the common, and received opinion that we do perceive fuch ground of con- nexion being in reality nothing more than a vulgar prejudice..
indicatlonsof That mind is a topic of fcience may be argued from all thofe aeceflity: branches of literature and enquiry which have mind for their i'b luftory: fubje£t. What fpecies of amufement or inftru£tion would hif- tory afford us, if there were no ground of inference from moral caufes to effeds, if certain temptations and inducements did not in all ages and climates produce a certain feries of adtions, if we were unable to trace connexion and a principle of unity in men's tempers, propenfities and traufa^^ions? The amufement would be ANDNECESSITY. 291 be inferior to that which we derive from the perufal of a chro- BOOK iv.
nological table, where events have no order but that of time • * ^r—^ fmce, however the chronologift may negledt to mark the inter- nal connexion between fucceffive tranfadions, the mind of the reader is bufied in fupplying that connexion from memory or imagination: but the very idea of fuch connexion would never have fuggefted itfelf, if we had never found the fource of that Idea in experience. The inftrudlon arifing from the perufal of hiftory would be abfolutely none; fmce inftrudtion implies in its very nature the claffing and generalifing of objeds. But, upon the fuppofition on which we are arguing, all objedls would be unconneded and disjund, without the poffibility of afford- ing any grounds of reafoning or principles of fcience.
The idea correfpondent to the term charader inevitably in- Inourjudgeludes m it the allumption ot neceliary connexion. The cha- rafter: rader of any man is the refult of a long feries of impreflions communicated to his mind, and modifying it in a certain man- ner, fo as to enable us, from a number of thefe modifications and impreffions being given, to predid his condud. Hence arife his temper and habits, refpeding which we reafonably conclude, that they will not be abruptly fuperfeded and reverfed; and that, if they ever be reverfed, it will not be accidentally, but in con- fequence of fome ftrong reafon perfuading, or fome extraordinary event modifying his mind. If there were not this original and effential connexion between motives and adions, and, which P p 2 forms OF FREE WILL BOOK IV. forms one particular branch of this principle, between menu's.
CHAP.V. ^ * V ' paft and future adions, there could be no fuch thing as charader,, or as a ground of inference enabling us to predid what men.
■would be from what they have been..
inouifcliemes From the fame idea of neceflary connexion arife all the ef policy: