CHAP.
A DIFFICULTY STATED. — OF ABSOLUTE AND PRACTICAL. VIRTUE. — IMPROPRIETY OF THIS DISTINCTION. — UNI- VERSALITY OF WHAT IS CALLED PRACTICAL VIRTUE — INSTANCED IN ROBBERY — IN RELIGIOUS FANATICISM.
THE QUALITY OF AN ACTION DISTINCT FROM THE DIS- POSITION WITH WHICH IT IS PERFORMED — FARTHER DIFFICULTY. — MEANING OF THE TERM, DUTY. — APPLI- CATION.— INFERENCES.
THERE is a difliculty of confiderable magnitude as to the BOOK II. r 1 • rL r 1 I- 1 r,, CHAP. III", lubject or the preceding chapter, lounded upon the dif- ^, ' . A difficulty ference which may exift between abltraa: juftice and my appre- ftated. henfions of juftice. When I do an adl, wrong in itfelf, but which as to all the materials of judging extant to my under- ftanding appears to be right, is my condiid virtuous or vicious?
Certain moralifts have introduced a dIftin61:ion upon this head of abfolute between ablblute and pradical virtue. " There is one fpecies of v"rtu^"^"" virtue," they fay, " which rifes out of the nature of things and is immutable, and another which rifes out of the views extant to my underftanding. Thus for example fuppofe, I ought to O worfliip ^9??^^* worfliip Tefus Chrlft; but, having been bred in the reIie;ion of *^ ^ ' Mahomet, L ought to adhere to that religion, as long as its evi- dences fhall appear to me conclufive. I am irapannelled upon 'a jury to try a man arraigned for murder, and who is really in- nocent. Abflractedly confidered, I ought to acquit him. But I am unacquainted with his innocence, and evidence is adduced fuch as to form the ftrongefl prefumption of his guilt, De- monftration in fuch cafes is not to be attained; I am obliged in every concern of human life to adl upon prefumption j I ought therefore to convldt him."
Impropriety It may be doubtcd however whether any good purpofe is of this diftiudion. likely to be anfwered by employing the terms of abftra£l fcience in this verfatile and uncertain manner. Morahty Is, if any thing can be, fixed and immutable; and there muft furely be fome ftrange deception that fhould induce us to give to an a(flion eternally and unchangeably wrong, the epithets of reditude^ duty and virtue.
Unlverfaiity JsJor have tliefe morallfts been thoroughly aware to what exof what is called praai- tcut this admiffion would carry them. The human mind is incal virtue: credibly fubtle in inventing an apology for that to which its inclination leads. Nothing is fo rare as pure and unmingled hypocrify. There is no action of our lives which we were not ready at the time of adopting it to juftify, unlefs fo far as we were prevented by mere indolence and unconcern. There Is fcarcely fcarcely any juftiiicadon which we endeavour to pals upon others, BOOKir.
which we do not with tolerable fuccefs pals upon ourfelves. *"- — ^ '* The diftinftion therefore which is here fet up would go near to prove that every adtion of every human being is entitled to the appellation of virtuous.
There is perhaps no man that cannot recollctS the time when -inttanced \n robbery: he fecretly called in queftion the arbitrary divifion of property eftablilhed in human fociety, and felt inclined to appropriate to his ufe any thing the poffeffion of which appeared to him de- firable. It is probably in Ibme fuch way that men are ufually influenced in the perpetration of robbery. They perluade them-- felves of the comparative inutility of the property to its prefent pofleflbr, and the ineftimable advantage that would attend it in their hands. They believe that the transfer ought to be made. It is of no confequence that they are not confiftent in thefe views, that the impreflions of education fpeedily recur to their minds, and that in a feafon of adverfity they readily confefs the wickednefs of their proceeding. It is not lefs true that they did what at the moment they thought to be right.
But there is another confideration that feems ftill more decifive '" rellgi'ous fanaticifm.
of the fubjedl before us. The worft adions, the moft contrary to abftradl juftice and utility, have frequently been done from the moft confcientious motives. Clement, Ravaillac, Damiens and Gerard had their minds deeply penetrated with anxiety for the O 2 eternal eternal welfare of mankind. For thefe obje£ls they facrifieed their eafe, and chearfully expofed themfelves to tortures and death. It v/as benevolence probably that contributed to light the fires of Smithfield, and point the daggers of Saint Bartholomew. The inventors of the Gunpowder Treafon were in general men re- markable for the fandity of their lives and the feverity of their manners. It is probable indeed, that fome ambitious views, and fome fentiments of hatred and abhorrence mixed with the benevo- lence and integrity of thefe perfons. It is probable that no wrong adion was ever committed from views entirely pure. But the de- ception they put upon themfelves might neverthelefs be com- plete. At all events their opinions upon the fubjetS could not alter the real nature of the adtion..
The quality The true folutlon of the queftion lies In obferving, that the of an aftion diftind from difpofitiou with which an adtion is adopted is one thing, and the the difpofition with adtion itfelf another. A right adion may be done from a wrong which it is performed. difpofition; in that cafe we approve the adlion, but condemn the ador. A wrong adion may be done from a right difpofition; in that cafe we condemn the adion, but approve the ador. If the difpofition by which a man is governed have a fyllematical tendency to the benefit of his fpecies, he cannot fail to obtain our efteem, however miftaken he may be in his condud.
Farther dif- Eut what fhall we fay to the duty of a man under thefe cirficulty.
cumftances? Calvin, we will fuppofe, was clearly and confcientioufly OF DUTY. loi tioully perfuaded that he ousht to burn Servetus. Oueht he to r^OOK II.
have burned him or not? " If he burned him, he did an action '^ v ' deteftable in its own nature; if he refrained, he afted in oppolition to the befl judgment of his own underftanding as to a point of moral obUgation." It is abfurd however to fay, that it was in any fenfe his duty to burn him. The moft that can be admitted is, that his difpofition was virtuous, and that in the circumftances in which he was placed an action greatly to be deplored flowed from that difpofition by invincible neceffity.
Shall we fay then that it was the duty of Calvin, who did not underftand the principles of toleration, to a£l upon a truth of which he was ignorant? Suppofe that a perfon is to be tried at York next week for murder, and that my evidence would ac- quit him. Shall we fay that it was my duty to go to York, though I knew nothing of the matter? Upon the fame prin- ciples we might affii-m that it is my duty to go from London to York in half an hour, as the trial will come on within that time; the impoifibility not being more real in one cafe than in the other. Upon the fame principles we might affirm, that it is my duty to be impeccable, omnifcient and almighty^ Duty is a term the ufe of which feems to be to defcribe the mode Meaning of in which any being may bell be employed for the general good. duty. It is limited in its extent by the extent of the capacity of that being. Now capacity varies in its idea in proportion as we rHAP^TH varjT our view of the fubjed to which it belongs. What I am '^ •" — ^ capable of, if you connder me merely as a man, is one thing; what I am capable of as a man of a deformed figure, of weak imderftandlng, of fuperftitious prejudices, or as the cafe may hap- pen, is another.. So much cannot be expedted of me under thefe difadvantages, as if they were abfent. But, if this be the true de- finition of duty, it is abfurd to fuppofe in any cafe that an adion injurious to the general welfare can be clafTed in the rank of Application. To apply thefe obfervations to the cafes that have been Hated. Ignorance, fo far as it goes, completely annihilates capacity. As I was uninformed of the trial at York, I could not be influenced by any confideration refpeiling it. But it is abfurd to fay that it was my duty to negledl a motive with which I was unacquainted. If you alledge, " that Calvin was ignoi"ant of the principles of tole- ration, and had no proper opportunity to learn them," it follows that in burning Servetus he did not violate his duty, but it does not follow that it was his duty to burn him. Upon the fup- pofition here ftated duty is filent. Calvin was unacquainted with the principles of juftice, and therefore could not pradtife them. The duty of no man can exceed his capacity; but then neither can in any cafe an a£t of injuftice be of the nature of duty.
Inferences. There are certain Inferences that flow from this view of the fubjedt, which it may be proper to mention. Nothing is more 4. common common than for Individuals and ibcietles of men to alledge that -^'i^'^J^ ^^- they have adled to the befh of their judgment, that they have " ' done their duty, and therefore that their condudt, even fliould it prove to be miil;aken, Is neverthelefs virtuous. This appears to be an error. An adlon, though done with the befl: intention in the world, may have nothing in it of the nature of virtue. In reality the moft efTentlal part of virtue confifts in the incef- fantly feeking to inform ourfelves more accurately upon the fub- je£l of utility and right. Whoever is greatly mlfmformed re- fpedling them, is Indebted for his error to a defedl in his philan- thropy and zeal.
Secondly, fince abfolute virtue may be out of the power of a human being, it becomes us in the mean time to lay the greateft ftrefs upon a virtuous difpofition, which is not attended with the fame ambiguity. A virtuous difpofition is of the utmofl: con- fequence, fince it will In the majority of inftances be productive of virtuous adllons; fince it tends, in exail proportion to the quantity of virtue, to increafe our difcernment and improve our underftanding; and' fince, if it were unlverfally propagated, It would immediately lead to the great end of virtuous adllons, the pureft and moft exqulfite happlnefs of intelligent beings. But a virtuous difpofition is principally generated by the uncontrolled exercife of private judgment, and the rigid conformity of every man to the didlates of his confcience.
CHAP.
I04 OF THE EQUALITY CHAP. IV.
OF THE EQUALITY OF MANKIND.
PHYSICAL EQUALITY. — OBJECTION. ANSWERS. MORAL EQUALITY. — HOW LIMITED. PROVINCE OF POLITICAL JUSTICE.
BOOK II. / B "^HE equality of mankind Is either pliyfical or moral.
•^ V > -»- Their phyfical equality may be confidered either as it Phyfical equality. relates to the ftrength of the body or the faculties of the mind.
Objeaion. This part of the fubjed: has been expofed to cavil and objedlion. It has been faid, " that the reverfe of this equality Is the refult of our expeiience. Among the individuals of our fpecies we adually find that there are not two alike. One man ' is ftrong and another weak. One man is wife and another foolifh. All that exifts in the world of the inequality of con- ditions is to be traced to this as their fource. The ftrong man poflefles power to fubdue, and the weak ftands in need of an ally to protedl. The confequence is inevitable: the equality of conditions is a chimerical affumption, neither poffible to be re- duced into practice, nor defirable if it could be fo reduced."
3 Upon OF MANKIND. 105 Upon this ftatement two obfervations are to be made. Firft, BOOK ii.
' CHAP. IV. this inequality was in its origin infinitely lefs than it is at pre- * ^^ ' Anfwers.
fent. In the uncultivated ftate of man difeafes, efFeminacy and luxury were little known, and of confequence the ftrength cf every one much more nearly approached to the ftrength of his neighbour. In the uncultivated ftate of man the underftandings of all were limited, their wants, their ideas and their viev.'s nearly upon a level. It was to be expected that in their firft departure from this ftate great irregularities would introduce themfelves; and it is the objedt of fubfequent wifdom and improvement to mitigate thefe irregularities.
Secondly, notwithftanding the incroachments that have been made upon the equality of mankind, a great and fubftantial. equality remains. There is no fuch difparity among the human race as to enable one man to hold fevei-al other men in fub- jiedion, except fo far as they are willing to be fubjedl. All go- vernment is founded in opinion. Men at prefent live under any particular form, becaufe they conceive it their intereft to do fo. One part indeed of a community or empire may be held in fub- je£lion by force; but this cannot be the perfonal force of their defpot; it muft be the force of another part of the community, who are of opinion that it is their intereft to fupport his au- thority. Deftroy this opinion, and the fabric vs^hich is built upon it falls to the ground. It follows therefore that all men are effentially independent. — So much for the phyfical equality.
P The io5 OF THE EQ^UALITY The moral equality is ftill lefs open to reafonable exception. By moral equality I underftand the propriety of applying one unalterable rule of juftice.to every -cafe that may arife. This cannot be queftioned but upon arguments that would fubvert th^e very nature of virtue. " Equality," it has been affirmed, " v^^ill always be an unintelligible fidion, fo long as the capacities of men fhall be unequal, and their pretended claims have neither guarantee nor fan£tIon by which they can be inforced *." But furely juftice is fufficiently intelligible in its own nature, ab- ftradled from the confideration whether it be or be not reduced into practice. Juftice has relation to beings endowed with per- ception, and capable of pleafure and pain. Now it immediately refults from the nature of fuch beings, independently of any arbi- trary conftitution, that pleafure is agreeable and pain odious, plea- fure to be defired and pain to be obviated. It is therefore juft and reafonable that fuch beings fhould contribute, fo far as it lies in their power, to the pleafure and benefit of each other. Among pleafures fome are more exquifite, more unalloyed and lefs pre- carious than others. It is juft that thefe fhould be preferred.
From thefe fimple principles we may deduce the moral equality of mankind. We are partakers of a common nature, * " 0» fl dit — que nous avians tons les memes droits. J'igfiore ce que c'ejt que les tnemes droits, oil il y a inegalite de talens ou de force, iS nulle garantie, niille fanElion." Rayjial, Revolution d'/lmeriqiie, p. 34.
7 and OF MANKIND. 107 and the fame caufes that contribute to the benefit of one con- tribute to the benefit of another. Our fenfes and faculties are of the fame denomination. Our pleafures and pains will therefore be the fame. We are all of us endowed with reafon, able to com- pare, to judge and to infer. The improvement therefore which is to be defired for the one is to be defired for the other. We fhall be provident for ourfelves and ufeful to each other, in pro- portion as we rife above the atmofphere of prejudice. The fame independence, the fame freedom from any fuch reflraint, as fhould prevent us -from giving the reins to our own underftanding, or from uttering upon all occafions whatever we think to be true, will conduce to the improvement of all. There are certain op- portunities and a certain fituation moft advantageous to every human being, and it is juft that thefe fhould be communicated to all, as nearly at leaft as the general economy will permit.
There is indeed one fpecies of moral inequality parallel to the How limited. phyfical inequality that has been already defcribed. The treat- ment to which men are entitled is to be meafured by their merits and their virtues. That country would not be the feat of wifdom and reafon, where the benefaftor of his fpecies was confidered in the fame point of view as their enemy. But in reality this diftindlion, fo far from being adverfe to equality in any tenable fenfe, is friendly to it, and is accordingly known by the appellation of equity, a term derived from thd fame origin. Though in fome fenfe an exception, it tends to the fame purpo'e io8 OF THE EQUALITY OF MANKIND.
BOOK IT. purpofe to which the principle itfelf is indebted for its value, ' « ' It is calculated to infufe into every bofom an emulation of ex- Province of cellence. The thing really to be defired is the removing as much tice. as pouible arbitrary diumdlions, and leavmg to talents and virtue the field of exertion unimpaired. We fliould endeavour to afford to all the fame opportunities and the fame encourage- ment, and to render juftice the common intereft and choice.
CHAP.
RIGHTS OF MAN.
THE QUESTION STATED. FOUNDATION OF SOCIETY. — OP- POSITE RIGHTS IMPOSSIBLE. — CONCLUSION FROM THESE I'REMISES. DISCRETION CONSIDERED. RIGHTS OF KINGS. — IMMORAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE DOCTRINE OF RIGHTS. RIGHTS OF COMMUNITIES. — OBJECTIONS: I. THE RIGHT OF MUTUAL AID. — EXPLANATION. — ORI- GIN OF THE TERM, RIGHT. 2. RIGHTS OF PRIVATE JUDG- MENT AND OF THE PRESS. — EXPLANATION. — REASONS OF THIS LIMITATION UPON THE FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMUNITY: I. THE INUTILITY OF ATTEMPTING RE- STRAINT. 2. ITS PERNICIOUS TENDENCY. — CONCLU- SION.
THERE is no fubjed that has been difcufled with more BOOK ii. CHAP. V. eagernefs and pertinacity than the rights of man. Has he * v * , The quellion any rights, or has he none? Much may plaufibly be alledged on ftated. both fides of this queftion; and in the conchifion thofe reafoners appear to exprefs themfelves with the greateft accuracy who em- brace the negative. There is nothing that has been of greater differvice to the caufe of truth, than the hafty and unguarded manner in which its advocates have fometimes defended it: and it :iIO RIGHTS OF MAN.
BOOK ir. it ^111 be admitted to be peculiarly unfortunate, if the advocates ^ V— — ' on one fide of this queilion ihould be found to have the greateft quantity of truth, while their adverfaries have expreffed them- felves in a manner more confonant to reafon and the nature of things. Where the queftion has been fo extremely darkened by an ambiguous ufe of terms, it may at any rate be defirable to' try, whether, by a patient and fevere inveftigation of the firft principles of political fociety, it may be placed in a light confi- derably different from the views of both parties.
Toundatlon of fociety.
Political fociety, as has already been obferved, is founded in the principles of morality and jufxice. It is impoffible for intel- lectual beings to be brought into coalition and intercourfe, with out a certain mode of conduft, adapted to their nature and con- nexion, immediately becoming a duty inciimbent on the parties concerned. Men would never have aflbciated, if they had not imagined that in confequence of that affociatlon they would mu- tually conduce to the advantage and happinefs of each ether. This is the real purpofe, the genuine bafis of their intercourfe; and, as far as this purpofe is anfwered, fo far does fociety anfwer the end of its inftitution.
Oppofite lights im- pofilble.
There is only one poftulate more, that is neceffary to bring us to a conclufive mode of reafoning upon this fubjedt. What-' ever is meant by the term right, for it will prefently appear that the fenfe of the term itfelf has never been clearly underftood, there tliere can neither be oppofite rights, nor rights and duties hoftlle BOOKir.
to each other. The rights of one man cannot cla^Ti with or be ^^ v ■' deftrudive of the rights of another; for this, inftead of ren Jering the fubjedl an important branch of truth and morality, as the advocates of the rights of man certainly underfland it to be, would be to reduce it to a heap of unintelligible jargon and inconfiftency. If one man have a right to be free, another man cannot have a right to make him a flave; if one man have a right to infli(fl chaftifement upon me, I cannot have a right to.
withdraw myfelf from chaftifement; if my neighbour have a right to a fum of money in my poffeflion, I cannot have a right to retain it in my pocket. — It cannot be lefs incontrovertible, that I have no right to omit what my duty prefcribes.
From hence it inevitably follows that men have no rights,. Conclufion By right, as the word is employed in this fubjedl, has always p^cmifes. ' been imderftood difcretion, that is, a full and complete power of either doing a thing or omitting it, without the perfon's becoming liable to animadverfion or cenfure from another, that is, in other words, without his incurring any degree of turpitude or guilt. Now in this fenfe I affirm that man has no rights, no difcretionary power whatever.
coniidered.
It is commonly faid, " that a man has a right to the difpofal Difcretion of his fortune, a right to the employment of his time, a right to the uncontrolled choice of his profeffion or purfuits." But this can 114 RIGHTSOFMAN.
BOOK II. can never be confiftently affirmed till it can be fliewn that he CHAP.V. ^ * V ' has no duties, prefcribing and limiting his mode of proceeding in all thefe refpeds. My neighbour has juft as much right to put an end to my exiftence with dagger or poifon, as to deny me that pecuniary affi fiance without which I muft ftarve, or as to deny me that affiftance without which my intelledtual attain- ments or my moral exertions will be materially injured. He has juft as much right to amufe himfelf with burning my houfe or torturing my children upon the rack, as to fhut himfelf up in a cell carelefs about his fellow men, and to hide " his talent in a napkin."
If men have any rights, any difcretlonary powers, they muft be in things of total indifference, as whether I fit on the right or on the left fide of my fire, or dine on beef to day or to- morrow. Even thefe rights are much fewer than we are apt to imagine, fince before they can be completely eftabliihed, it muft be proved that my choice on one fide or the other can in no poffible way contribute to the benefit or injury of myfelf or of any other perfon in the world. Thofe muft indeed be rights well worth the contending for, the very effence of which con- fifts in their abfolute nugatorinefs and inutility.
In reality nothing can appear more wotfderful to a careful enquirer, than that two ideas fo incompatible as man and rights^ fliould ever have been affociated together. Certain it is, that one 4 of RIGHTS OF MAN. 113 of them mufl be utterly exclufive and annihilatory of the other. I'OOK 11.
Before we afcribe rights to man, we mijfl; conceive of him as a ' ^^ ' behig endowed with intelleiSt, and capable of difcerning the dif- ferences and tendencies of things. But a being endowed with intelleft, and capable of difcerning the differences and tendencies of things, inftantly becomes a moral being, and has duties in- cumbent on him to dlfcharge: and duties and rights, as has al- ready been fliewn, are abfolutely exclufive of each other.
It has been affirmed by the zealous advocates of liberty, " that Rights of princes and magiftrates have no rights;" and no pofition can be more incontrovertible. There is no fituation of their lives that has not its correfpondent duties. There Is no power intruded to them that they are not bound to exercife exclufively for the public good. It is firange that perfons adopting this principle xiid not go a ftep farther, and perceive that the fame reftridions were applicable to fubjetSs and citizens.
Nor Is the fallacy of this language more confplcuous than Its immoral Immoral tendency. To this Inaccurate and unjuft ufe of the of the duc- rerm right we owe it, that the mifer, who accumulates to no end,,ghts. that which dlfFufed would have conduced to the welfare of thou- fands, that the luxurious man, who wallows In Indulgence and fises numerous families around him pining In beggary, never fail ■to tell us of their rights, and to filence animadverfion and quiet tJie cenfure of their own mind by reminding us, " that they Q_ came 114 RIGHTS OF MAN.
BOOK 11. came fairly into poffeffion of their wealth, that they owe no * « ' debts, and that of confequence no man has authority to enquire ^nto- their private manner of difpofmg of that which is their own." A great majority of mankind are confcious that they ftand in need of this fort of defence, and are therefore very ready to combine againft the infolent intruder, who ventures to en- quire into " things that do not concern him." They forget, that the wife man and. the Koneft man, the friend of his country andJ his kind, is concerned for every thing by which they may be . ' affeded, and qaxries about with^him a diploma, conftituting him inquifitor general of the moral conduit of his neighbours, with' a duty annexed to recal them to virtue, by every leffon that truth can enable him to read, and every punilhment that plaitt. fpeaking is competent to Inflid..
RiVhts of It Is. fcarcely necefFary to add, that, if individuals have no commum- j-Jg^ts, neither has fociety, which poffeffes aothing but what in- dividuals have brought into a common flock. The abfurdity of the common, opinion, as applied to this fubjefl, is: ftill more glaring, if poffible, than in the view in which we have already confidered it. According to the ufual fentiment every club aflem- bling for any ci-^^ purpofe, every congregation of religionifts aC fembling for "the worfliip of God, has a right to eftablifli any provifions or ceremonies,, na matter how ridiculous, or deteftable, provided they do not interfere with the freedom of others. Rea- fon lies' proftrate under their feet. They have a right to trample upofi RIGHTS OF MAN. u?
upon and infult her as they pleafe. It is in the fame fpirit wc pS9 p v* have been told- that every nation has a right to choofe its ' ^ ' form of government. A moft acute, original and ineftimable author was probably mifled by the vulgar phrafeology on this fubje£t, when he aflerted, that, " at a time when neither the peo- ple of France nor the national affembly were troubling themfelves about the affairs of England or the Englifli parliament, Mr. Burke's condudl was unpardonable in commencing an unpro- voked attack upon them *."
There are various objecflions that fuggeft themfelves to the Objeaiom. theory which fubverts the rights of men; and if the theory be true, they will probably appear in the refult to be fo far from really hoftile to it, as to be found more fairly deducible from and confiftent with its principles, than with any of thofe with which they have inadvertently been conneded.
In the firfl place it has fometlmes been alledged, and feems to i. The rights refult from the reafonings already adduced under the head of juf- tice, that " men have a right to the afliftance and co-operation of their fellows in every honeft purfuit," But, when we affert Explanation. this propofition, we mean fomething by the word right exceed- ingly different from what is commonly underftood by the term. We do not underftand fomething difcretionary, which, if not voluntarily fulfilled, cannot be confidered as a matter of claim.
* Rights of Man, page i.
Q^a On ii6 RIGHTS OF MAN.
BOOK ir. On the contrary every thing adduced upon that occafion was * « ' calculated to fhew that it was a matter of llrid; claim; and per- haps fomething would be gained with refpedl to perfpicuity, if we rather chofe to diftinguifh it by that appellation, than by a name fo much abufed, and fo ambiguous in its application, as the term right.
Orr^nofthe The true Origin of this latter term is relative ^to the prefent