Filmer; and, having thus cleared his ground, proceeds to obferve, enquiry. that " he, that will not give juft occafion to think that all go- vernment in the world is the produsfl only of force and violence, and that men live together by no other rules but that of beafts, muft 7S. PRINCIPLES BOOKir. niuft of neceflity find out another rife of government, and ^^ "— ^ another original of political power *." Accordingly he proceeds through the greater part of his treatife to reafon abftradedly •upon the probable hiftory of the early ages of mankind, and concludes that no legitimate government could be built upon Any other foundation than that of an original contract.
^ It is to be fufpeded that this great man, friend as he was to the liberty and the interefts of mankind, intrepid and fagacious in his fearch after truth, has been guilty of an overfight in the firft flep of the inveftigation.
Mode of pur- There are two modes, according to which we may enquire .fuingit. JO J n.
into the origin of fociety and government. We may either examine them hiftorically, that is, confider in what manner they -have or ought to have begun, as Mr. Locke has done; or we may examine them philofophically, that is, confider the moral principles upon which they depend. The firft of thefe fubjeds is not without its ufe; but the fecond is of a higher order and more efl'ential importance. The firft is a queftion of form; the fecond of fubftance. It would be of trivial confequence pradli- cally confidered, from what fource any form of fociety flowed, and by what mode its principles v^rere fanSioned, could we be always fecure of their conformity to the dictates of truth and juftice.
It OF SOCIETY.
It OF SOCIETY.
It Is farther rieceflary before we enter upon the fubjed care- fully to diftinguifh between fociety and government. Men af- fociated at firft for the fake of mutual affiftance. 1 hey did not forefee that any reftraint would be necefTary, to regulate the con- dudl of individual members of the fociety, tovvards each other, or towards the whole. The neceffity of reftraint grew out of the errors and perverfenefs of a few. An acute writer has expreffed this idea with peculiar felicity. " Society and government," fays he, " are different in themfelves, and have different origins. Society is produced by our wants, and government by our wick- ednefs. Society is in every ftate a bleffing; government even In its beft ftate but a necefTary evil *."
79 OF JUSTICE.
eONNECTION OF POLITICS AND MORALS. — EXTENT AND MEANING OF JUSTICE. SUBJECT OF JUSTICE: MAN- KIND. ITS DISTRIBUTION MEASURED BY THE CAPACITY OF ITS SUBJECT BY HIS USEFULNESS. — FAMILY AFFEC- TION CONSIDERED. GRATITUDE CONSIDERED. — OBJEC- TIONS: FROM IGNORANCE — FROM UTILITY. AN EX- CEPTION STATED. DEGREES OF JUSTICE. APPLICA- TION.— IDEA OF POLITICAL JUSTICE.
'ROM what has been faid It appears, that the fubje£t of the prefent enquiry is ftridtly Ipeaking a department of ofpoliticsand ^j^g fcience of morals. MoraUty is the fource from which its morals, ^ fundamental axioms muft be drawn, and they will be made fomewhat clearer in the prefent inftance, if we aflume the term IB juftice as a general appellation for all moral duty. Extent and That this appellation is fufficiently expreffive of the fubje£l meaning of juftice. will appear, if we confider for a moment mercy, gratitude, temperance, or any of thofe duties which in loofer fpeaking are con- tradiftinguifhed from juftice. Why fhould I pardon this criminal, 2 remunerate OF JUSTICE. 8i remunerate tliis favour, abflain from this indulgence? If it ^-9?^ }]' partake of the nature of morality, it muil be either right or ' ^^ ^ wrong, juil or unjuft. It mufl: tend to the benefit of the in- dividual, either without intrenching upon, or with adual advan- tage to the mafs of individuals. Either way it benefits the whole, becaufe individuals arc parts of the whole. Therefore to do it is juft, and to forbear it is unjuft. If juftice have any meaning, it is juft that I fhould contribute every thing in my power to the benefit of the whole.
Confiderable light will probably be thrown upon our invefti- Subjeft of ji'.flfce: mangation, if, quitting for the prefent the political view, we examine '^'"d. juftice merely as it exifts among individuals. Juftice is a rule of condu£l originating in the connedlion of one percipient being with another. A comprehenfive maxim which has been laid down upon the fubjed is, " that we fhould love our neighbour as ourfelves." But this maxim, though poflefling confiderable merit as a popular principle, is not modelled with the ftridncfs of philofophical accuracy.
In a loofe and general view I and my neighbour are both of ^}^ dlftribu* tion meaus men 3 and of confequence entitled to equal attention. But in f"rcd by the capacity of reality it is probable that one of us is a being of more worth "sfubjta; and importance than the other. A man is of more worth than a beaft; becaufe, being pofTeffed of higher faculties, he is capable of a more refined and genuine happinefs. In th-e fame manner M the 82 OF JUSTICE.
BOOK IT, the illuftriotis archbifhop of Cambray was of more worth thaia- '^. ' his chambermaid, and thei"e are few of us that would hefitate, to pronounce, if his palace were in flames, and the life of only one of them could be preferved, which of the two ought to be preferred.
by Ills ufeful- g^jj- t^e^g jg another ground of preference, befide the private- coniideration of one of them being farther removed from the flate of a mere animal. We are not connected with one or two^ percipient beings, but with a fociety, a nation, and in fome fenfe v,^ith the whole family of mankind. Of confequeiice that life ought to be preferred which will be moft conducive to the. general good. In faving the life of Fenelon, fuppofe at the mo- ment when he was conceiving the projedl of his immortal Te- lemachus, I fhould be promoting the benefit of thoufands, who have been cured by the perufal of it of fome error, vice and con- fequent unhappinefs. Nay, my benefit would extend farther than this, for every individual thus cured has become a better member of fociety, and has contributed in his turn to the hap- pinefs, the infonnation and improvement of others.
Suppoiing I had been myfelf the chambermaid, I ought to. have chofen to die, rather than that Fenelon fhould have died,. The life of Fenelon was really preferable to that of the chamber- maid. But underftanding is the faculty that perceives the truth, of this and fimilar propofitions j and juftice is the principle that 1 regulates OF JUSTICE. §3 reeulates my condufl accordinp;ly. It would have been jufl: in BOOK IT.
, CHAP. II.
the chambermaid to have preferred the archbifhop to herfelf. ^- — ^ ^ To have done otherwife would have been a breach of jufticc.
Suppofing the chambermaid had been my wife, my mother ramiif afT^rction coniior my benefadlor. This would not alter the truth of the pro- deicd. pofition. The life of Fenelon would ftill be more valuable than that of the chambermaid; and juftice, pure, unadulterated juftice, would ftill have preferred that which was moft valuable. Juftice would have taught me to fave the life of Fenelon at the expence of the other. What magic is there in the pronoun " my," to overturn the decifions of everlafting truth? My wife or my mother may be a fool or a proftitute, malicious, lying or dllhoneft. If they be, of what confequence is it that they are mine?
" But my mother endured for me the pains of child bearings Gratkuae confidered.
and nouriihed me in the helpleffhefs of infancy." When flie firft fubjedled herfelf to the neceffity of thefe cares, ftie was probably influenced by no particular motives of benevolence to her future ■offspring. Every voluntary benefit however entitles the beftower to fome kindnefs and retribution. But why fo? Becaufe a voluntary benefit is an evidence of benevolent intention, that is, of virtue. It is the difpofition of the mind, not the external adion, that entitles to refpedt. But the merit of this difpofition is equal, whether the benefit was conferred upon me or upon another, I and another man cannot both be right in preferring our own individual benefador, for no man can be at the fame time both better and worfe than his neighbour. My benefactor ought to be efleemed, not becaufe he bellowed a benefit upoa me, but becaufe he beftowed it upon a human being. His de- fert will be in exadt proportion to the degree, in which that human being was worthy of the diftindlion conferred. Thus. every view of the fubjedl brings us back to the confideration of my- neighbour's moral worth and his, importajice to the general weal^ as the only ftandard to datermine the treatmentto which he i& entitled. Gratitude therefore, a principle which has fo often beea the theme of the moralift and the poet, is no part either of juftice. ©r virtue.. By gratitude I underftand a fentiment, which would, lead me to prefer one m.an to another, from fome other con* fideration than, that of his fuperior ufefulnefs ox worth: that is, which would make fomething true to me (for example this pre-- ferablenefs), which cannot be, true to another man, and is not: true in itfelf *..
Objeftions: It may be obje<Sed, " that my relation, my companion, or mybenefadlpr will of cpurfe in many inftances obtain an uncommon ■■ fromlgno- portion of my regard: for, not being univerfally capable of difcriminatifig the comparative worth of different men, I Ihall in-.
eyitably judge moll favourably of him, of whofe virtues I have.
received, the moft unqueftionable proofs; and thus fhall be coni- * This -argument -refpefting gratitude is flated with great clearnefs in anEflay* sm the Nature of True Virtue, by the Rev. Jonathan Edwards. lamo. Dilly..
6 pelled Tapce OF JUSTICE 85 pelled to prefer the man of moral worth whom I know, to COOK 11.
another who may pofTefs, unknown to me, an effential fupe- * — -' liority."
This compulfiott however is founded only in the prefent im* perfedtion of human nature. It may ferve as an apology for my error, but can never turn error into truth. It will always remain contrary to the ftridt and inflexible decifions of juftice. The difficulty of conceiving this is owing merely to our con- founding the difpofition from which an adion is chofen, with the adlion itfelf. The difpolltion, that would prefer virtue to vice and a greater degree of virtue to a lefs, is undoubtedly a fubje<3: of approbation; the erroneous exercife of this difpofition by which a wrong objedl is feleited, if unavoidable, is to be de- plored, but can by no colouring and under no denomination be converted into right*..
It may in the fecond place be objeded, " that a mutual from utility,. commerce of benefits tends to increafe the mafs of benevolent action, and that to increafe the mafs of benevolent adion is to contribute to the general good." Indeed! Is the general good promoted^ by flUfhood, by treating a man of one degree of worth, as if he had ten times that worth? or as if he were in any de- gree different from what he really is? Would not the moft beneficial confequences refult from a different plan; from my * See this fubjeft more copioufly treated in the following chapter.
BOOK IT. conftantly and carefully enquiring into the deferts of all tliofe ' ^ ' with whom I am connefted, and from their being fure, after a certain allowance for the fallibility of human judgment, of being •treated by me exadlly as they deferved? Who can tell what would be the effefts of fuch a plan of condud univerfally adopted.?
An exception There feems to be moretruth in the argument, derived chiefly ibted.
from the unequal diftribution of property, in favour of my pro- viding in ordinary cafes for my wife and children, my brothers and relations, before I provide for ftrangers. As long as pro- ividing for individuals belongs to individuals, it feems as if there muft be a certain diftribution of the clafs needing fuperintendence ;and fupply among the clafs affording it, that each man may have his claim and refource. But this argument, if admitted at all, is to be admitted with great caution. It belongs only to or- idinary cSfes; and cafes of a higher order or a more urgent meceflity will perpetually occur, in competition with which thefe •will be altogether impotent. We muft be feverely fcrupulous in meafuring out the quantity of fupply; and, with refped to money in particular, muft remember how little is yet underftood -of the true mode of employing it for the public benefit.
©egrees of Having confidercd the perfons with v/hom juftice is conver- •jjuilice.
fant, let us next enquire into the degree in which we are obliged to confult the good of others. And here I fay, that it is juft that OFJUS'^ICE. ^j thaX I iliould do all the good in my power. Does any perfon E<^OK ir.
in diftrefs apply to me foi- relief? It is my duty to grant it, '" ' and I commit a breach of duty in refufing. If this principle be not of univerfal application, it is becaufe, in conferring a benefit upon an individual, I may in fome inftances infli(Sl an injury of fuperior magnitude upon myfelf or fociety. Now the fame juftice, that binds me to any individual of my fellow men, binds me to the whole. If, while I confer a benefit upon one man, it appear, in ftriking an equitable balance, that I am injuring the whole, my adlion ceafes to be right and becomes abfolutely wrong. But how much am I bound to do for the general weal, that is, for the benefit of the individuals of whom the whole is compofed? Every thing in my power. What to the negledl of the means of my own exiftence? No; for I am myfelf a part of the Avhole. Befide, it will rarely happen but that the pi-o- jedl of doing for others every thing in my power, will demand for its execution the prefervation of my own exiftence; or in other words, it will rarely happen but that I can do more good in twenty years than in one. If the extraordinary cafe fhould occur in which I can promote the general good by my death, more than by my life, juftice requires that I fhould be content to die. In all other cafes, it is juft that I fhould be careful tomaintain my body and my mind in the utmoft vigour, and irt the beft condition for fervice *.
■ * Vide Appendix to this chapter, No. I.
I will OF JUSTICE.
1 will fuppofe for example that it is right for one man to .poffefs a greater portion of property than another, either as the 'fruit of his iaduftry, or the inheritance of his anceftors. Juftice •obliges him to regard this property as a truft, and calls upon him maturely to confider in what manner it may beft be em- ployed for the increafe of liberty, knowledge and virtue. He has no right to difpofe of a (lulling of it at the will of his caprice. So far from being entitled to well earned applaufe for having employed fome fcanty pittance in the fervice of philanthropy, he is in the eye of juftice a delinquent if he withhold any portion from that fervice. Nothing can be more incontrovertible. Could that portion have been better or more worthily employed? That it could is implied in the very terms of the proportion. Then it was juft it fhould have been fo employed. — In the fame manner as my property, I hold my perfon as a truft in behalf of man- kind. I am bound to employ my talents, my underftanding, my ftrength and my time for the produdion of the greateft quantity of general good. Such are the declarations of juftice, fo great is the extent of my duty.
But juftice is reciprocal. If it be juft that I fhould confer a benefit, it is juft that another man. fhould receive it, and, if I withhold from him that to which he is entitled, he may juftly complain. My neighbour is in want of ten pounds that I can fpare. There is no law of political inftitution that has been made to reach this cafe, and to transfer this property from me to him.
But OF JUSTICE. 89 Cut in the eye of fimple juftice, unlefs it can be fhewn that the BOOK II.
CHAP. II. money can be more beneficently employed, his claim is as com- ^ ^^ ' plete, as if he had my bond in his pofleflion, or had fupplied me with goods to the amount *.
To this it has fometimes been anfwered, " that there is more than one perfon, that ftands in need of the money I have to fpare, and of confequence I rauft be at liberty to beftow it as I pleafe." I anfwer, if only one perfon offer himfelf to my know- ledge or fearch, to me there is but one. Thofe others that I cannot find belong to ether rich men to aflift (rich men, I fay, for every ■ man is rich, who has more money than his juft occafions de- mand), and not to me. If more than one perfon offer, I am obliged to balance their fitnefs, and condu£l myfelf accordingly. It is fcarcely poffible to happen that two men fhall be of exactly equal fitnefs, or that I fhall be equally certain of the fitnefs of the one as of the other. * It is therefore impoffible for me to ' confer upon any man a favour, I can only do him a right. Whatever deviates from the law of juflice, even I will fuppofe in the too much done in favour of fome individual or fome part of the general whole, is fo much fubtraded from the general flock, is fo much of abfolute injuflice.
* A fphited outline of thefe principles is flcetched in Swift's Sermon on Mutual Subjection.
N The 90 OFJUSTICE.
PHA p tt' The inference moft clearly afforded by the preceding reafon- V prT"^ '^^b^i is the competence of juftice as a principle of deduftion in all cafes of moral enquiry. The reafonings themfelves are rather of the nature of illuftration and example, and any error that may be imputed to them in particulars, will not invalidate the general conclufion, the propriety of applying moral juftice as a criterion in the inveftigation of political truth.
Idea of poll- Society is nothing more than an aggregation of individuals.
tical juilice.
Its claims and its duties muft be the aggregate of their claims and duties, the one no more precarious and arbitrary than the other. What has the fociety a right to require from me? The queftion is already anfwered: every thing that it is my duty to do. Any thing more? Certainly not. Can they change eternal truth, or fubvert the nature of men and their adions ^ Can they make it my duty to commit intemperance, to maltreat or affaflinate my neighbour? — Again. What is it that the fociety is bound to do for its members? Every thing that can contri- bute to their welfare. But the nature of their welfare is defined by the nature of mind. That will moft contribute to it, which enlarges the underftanding, fupplies incitements to virtue, fills us with a generous confcioufnefs of our independence, and carefully removes whatever can impede our exertions.
Should it be affirmed, " that it is not in the power of any po- litical fyftem to fecure to us thefe advantages," the conclufion I am OF JUSTICE. 9, am drawing will ftlll be incontrovertible. It is bound to contribute ^^OK ir.
every thing it is able to thefe purpofes, and no man was ever *^ ■^ ' yet found hardy enough to affirm that it could do nothing. Suppofe its influence in the utmoft degree limited, there muft be one method approaching nearer than any other to the defired objed, and that method ought to be univerfally adopted. There is one thing that political inftitutions can alTuredly do, they can avoid pofitively counterafting the true interefts of their fubjeds. But all capricious rules and arbitrary diftindions do pofitively counteradt them. There is fcarcely any modification of fociety but has in it fome degree of moral tendency. So far as it pro- duces neither mifchief nor benefit, it is good for nothing. So far as it tends to the improvement of the community, it ought to be univerfally adopted.
N 2 APPENDIX, 92 OF SUICIDE.
MOTIVES OF SUICIDE: I. ESCAPE FROM PAIN. — 2. BENEVO- LENCE. MARTYRDOM CONSIDERED.
BOOK II. T^HIS reafonine; will explain to -us the long difputed cafe * V ^ -*- of fuicide. " Have I a right under any circumftances Appendix.
Motivts of to deftroy myfelf in order to efcape from pain or difgrace?'
filicide.
I. Efcape Probably not. It is perhaps impoflible to imagi.ne a fituation, that fhall exclude the poflibility of future life, vigour and ufeful- nefs. The motive alligned for efcape is eminently trivial, to avoid pain, which is a fmall inconvenience; or difgrace, which is an imaginary evil. The example of fortitude in enduring them, if there were no other coniideration, would probably afford a better motive for continuing to live.
2. Benevo- lence.
2. Benevo- lence.
" Is there then no cafe in which fuicide is a virtue?" What fhall we think of the reafoning of Lycurgus, who, when he deter- mined upon a voluntary death, remarked, " that all the faculties a rational being poffeffed were capable of a moral ufe, and that, after having fpent his life in the fervice of his country, a man ought, if poffible, to render his death a fource of additional benefit?" This was the motive of the fuicide of Codrus, Leonidas and Decius. If the fame motive prevailed in the much admired 7 ' fuicide fuicide of Cato, if he were inftigated by reafons purely benevo- BOOK n. lent, it is impoilible not to applaud his intention, even if he ^ ^ were miftaken in the application.
The difficulty is to decide in any inftance whether the re- courfe to a voluntary death can overbalance the ufefulnefs i may exert in twenty or thirty years of additional life. But furely it would be precipitate to decide that there is no fuch inftance. There is a proverb which affirms, " that the blood of the martyrs is the feed of the church." It is commonly fuppofed that Junius Brutus did right in putting his fons to death in the firft year of the Roman republic, and that this adion contributed more than any other caufe, to generate that energy and virtue for which his counfry was afterwards fo eminently diftinguifhed. The death of Cato produced an effedl fomewhat fmiilar to this. It was dwelt on with admiration by all the lovers of virtue under the fubfequent tyrants of Rome. It feemed to be the ramp from which they caught the facred flame. Who can tell how much it has contributed to revive that flame in after ages, when it feemed to have been fo long extinit?
Let it be obferved that all martyrs [iu(.ap%p;i] are fuicides by the Martyrdorr very fignification of the term. They diefor a teftimony [^apWs ]; that is, they have a motive for dying. But motives refpedl only our own voluntary adls, not the violence put upon us by another.
APPENDIX, OF DUELLING.
OF DUELLING.
MOTIVES OF duelling: I. REVENGE. — 2. REPUTATION FOR COURAGE. FALLACY OF THIS MOTIVE. — OBJECTION AN- SWERED. ILLUSTRATION.
I CHAP. II.
deration upon the trite, but very important cafe of duelling;.
Motives of ^ very fhort reliedion will fufEce to fet it in its true lieht.
duelling. ' ° I. Revenge. This deteftable pradlice was originally invented by barbarians for the gratification of revenge. It- was probably at that time thought a very happy projedt for reconciling the odioufnefs of mallgnil|Pwith the gallantry of courage.
2.Reputat'on gm [^ tj^jg [irrht it is now generally given up. Men of the beft underftanding who lend it their fan£tion, are unwillingly induced to do fo, and engage in fingle combat merely that their reputation may fuftain no flander.
Fallacy of Which of thefe two actions is the trueft teft of courage: the this motive.
engaging in a practice which our judgment difapproves, becaufe we cannot fubmit to the confequences of following that judg- ment; or the doing what we believe to be right, and chearfully encounencountering all the confequences that may be annexed to the ^^^p 11" nradice of virtue? With what patience can a man of virtue "-; — » ' think of cutting off the life of a fellov^r mortal, or of putting an abrupt clofe to all the generous projedls he may himfelf conceive for the beneht of others, merely becaufe he has not firmnefs enough to awe impertinence and falfhood into filence?
" But the refufing a duel is an ambiguous adion. Cowards Obj^aion. may pretend principle to fhelter themfelves from a danger they dare not meet."
This is partly true and partly falfe. There are few adions Anfwered. indeed that are not ambiguous, or that with the fame general outline may not proceed from different motives. But the man- ner of doing them will fufficiently fhew the principle from which they fpring.
He, that would break through an unlverfally received cuftom IlIuflratloB. becaufe he believes it to be wrong, muft no doubt arm himfelf with fortitude. The point in which we chiefly fliil, is in not accurately underftanding our own intentions, and taking care beforehand to free ourfelves from any alloy of weaknefs and error. He, who comes forward with no other idea in his mind but that of rectitude, and who expreffes, with the funplicity and firmnefs which full convidtion never fails to infpire, the views with which he is imprefled, is in no danger of being miflaken for a 3 coward.
96 OF DUELLING.
rS AP u' coward. If he hefitate, it is becaufe he has not an idea perfedlly ^T — ^' ' clear of the fentiment he intends to convey. If he be in any Appendix. ' ' degree embarrafled, it is becaufe he has not a feeling fufficlently generous and intrepid of the guilt of the action in which he is preffed to engage.
If there be any meaning in courage, its firfl; ingredient muflbe the daring to fpeak the truth at all times, to all perfons, and in every ppffible fituation. What is it but the want of courage that fliould prevent me from faying, " Sir, I ought to refufe your challenge. What I ought to do, that I dare do. Have I injured you? I will readily and v/ithout coffipulfion repair my injuftice to the uttermoft mite..Have you mifconftrued me? State to me the particulars, and doubt not that what is true I Mall make appear to be true. Thus far I will go. But, though I fhould be branded for a coward by all mankind, I will not repair to a fcene of de- liberate i#urder. I will not do an a£t that I know to be flagitious. I will exercife my judgment upon every proportion that comes before me; the dictates of that judgment I will fpeak; and upon them I will form my condud." He that holds this language wuth a countenance in unifon with his w^ords, will never be fuf- peded of ading from the impulfe of fear.
CHAP.