ftate of political government, m which many of thole actions which moral duty mofi: ftridly enjoins us are In no degree brought within the fphere of legiflative fanftion. Men uninfluenced by comprehenfive principles of juftice, commit every fpecies of in- temperance, are felfifh, hard-hearted, licentious and cruel, and maintain their right to all thefe caprices, becaufe the laws of their country are filent with regard to them. Philofophers and political enquirers have too frequently adopted the fame princi- ples with a certain degree of accommodation; though in fadt men have no more right to thefe erroneous propenfities in their moft qualified fenfe, than they had to them originally in all their extravagance. It is true, that, under the forms of fociety now exifting in the world, intemperance and the caprices of perfonal intercourfe too frequently efcape without animadverfion. But in a more perfect form, though they may not fall under the cognifance of law, the offender will probably be fo unequivocally reminded by the fincerity of his neighbours of the error he has 6 com- RIGHTSOFMAN. 117 RIGHTSOFMAN. 117 committed, as to be in no danger of running away with the pu^^p v' opinion that he had a right to commit it. ^ * v ' A fecond and more important obje£lion to the dodi-ine I am 2. Rights of private jiidgmaintaining is derived from the rights as they are called of pri- ment and of vate judgment, and the liberty of the prefs. But it may eafily be fhewn, that thefe, no more than the articles already mentioned, are rights of difcretion. If they were, they would prove, that a man was ftridtly juftifiable in publifhing what he believed to be pernicious or falfe, and that it was a matter of perfedt moral in- difference whether he conformed to the religious rites of Con- fucius, of Mahomet, or of Chrift. The political freedom of Explanation. confcience and of the prefs, fo far from being as it is commonly fuppofed an extenlion, is a new cafe of the limitation of rights and difcretion. Confcience and the prefs ought to he unreftrained, not becaufe men have a right to deviate from the exadl line that duty prefcribes, but becaufe fociety, the aggregate of individuals, has no right to afllime the prerogative of an infallible judge, and to undertake authoritatively to prefcribe to its members in mat- ters of pure fpeculation.
One obvious reafon againfl this affumption on the part of the Rraionaof fociety is the impoifibility by any compulfatory method of bring- tion upon' the mg men to unitormity 01 opmion. 1 he judgment we form upon the commutopics of general truth, is or is imagined to be founded upon i. The inu- tility of at- evidence: and, however it may be foothed by gentle applications tempting re- Ihaiiit.
to ii8 RIGHTS OF MAN.
BOOK IT. to the betraying its impartiality, it is apt to repel with no little * ^ ' pertinacity whatever comes under the form of compulfion. Per- Tecution cannot perfuade the underftanding, even when it fub- dues our refolution. It may make us hypocrites; but cannot make us converts. The government therefore, which is anxious above all things to imbue its fubjedls with integrity and virtue, will be the fartheft in the world from difcouraging them in the explicit avowal of their fentiments.
3. Its perni- cious ten- dency.
But there is another reafon of a higher order. Man is not, as has been already fhewn, a perfect being, but perfectible. No government, that has yet exifted, or is likely prcfently to exift upon the face of the earth, is faultlefs. No government ought therefore pertinacioufly to refift the change of its own inftitu- tions; and ftill lefs ought it to fet up a ftandard upon the vari- ous topics of human fpeculation, to reftrain the excurfions of an inventive mind. It is only by giving a free fcope to thefe ex- curfions, that fcience, philofophy and morals have arrived at their prefent degree of perfection, or are capable of going on to that ftill greater perfection, in comparifon of which all that has been already done will perhaps appear childifh. But a pro- ceeding, abfolutely necefTary for the purpofe of exciting the mind to thefe falutary excurfions, and ftill more necefTary in order to, give them their proper operation, confifts in the unreftrained communication of men's thoughts and dijloveries to each other. If every man have to begin again at the point from which his neigh- RIGHTS OF MAN.
neighbour fet out, the labour will be endlefs, and the progrefs in BOOK IT.
an unvarying circle. There is nothing that more eminently con- * v— — ' tributes to intellectual energy, than for every man to be habi- tuated to follow without alarm the train of his fpeculations, and to utter without fear the conclufions that have fuggefted them- ConcluGoi. felves to him. — But does all this imply that men have a right to adt any thing but virtue, and to utter any thing but truth? Certainly not. It implies indeed that there are points with which fociety has no right to interfere, not that difcretion and caprice are more free, or duty lefs flrid upon thefe points, than upoa any others with which huinaa adtion is converfant* CHAP, I20 • OF THE EXERCISE OF THE EXEPvCISE OF PRIVATE JUDGMENT.
FOUNDATION OF VIRTUE. — HUMAN ACTIONS REGULATED*. I. BY THE NATURE OF THINGS. — 2. BY POSITIVE INSTI- TUTION.— TENDENCY OF THE LATTER: I. TO EXCITE VIRTUE. ITS EQUIVOCAL CHARACTER IN THIS RESPECT.
— ■2. TO INFORM THE JUDGMENT. — ITS INAPTITUDE FOR THAT PURPOSE. PROVINCE OF CONSCIENCE CONSIDERED.
TENDENCY OF AN INTERFERENCE WITH THAT PROVINCE. — RECAPITULATION. — ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF POSI- TIVE INSTITUTION: I. THE NECESSITY OF REPELLING PRI- VATE INJUSTICE. OBJECTIONS: THE UNCERTAINTY OF EVIDENCE. — THE DIVERSITY OF MOTIVES. THE UNSUIT- ABLENESS OF THE MEANS OF CORRECTION EITHER TO IMPRESS NEW SENTIMENTS — OR TO STRENGTHEN OLD ONES. PUNISHMENT FOR THE SAKE OF EXAMPLE CON- SIDERED. URGENCY OF THE CASE. — 2. REBELLION.— 3. WAR. — OBJECTIONS. — REPLY.
BOOK IL f 's ^ O a rational beins; there can be but one rule of condud, ":: — y~. — ' -^ juflice, and one mode of afcertaining that rule, the exer- Foundation of Virtue, ^-.fQ Qf j^-.g underftandlng. If in any inflance I be made the me- chanical inftrument of abfolute violence, in that inftance I fall under OF PRIVATE JUDGMENT. ' 121 under no defcription of moral conduit either eood or bad. But, BOOK ir.
if, not being operated upon by abfolute compulfion, I be wholly "^ v ' prompted by fomething that is frequently called by that name, and adl from the hope of reward or the fear of punifhment, my conduct is pofitively wrong.
Here however a diftindlion is to be made. Juflice, as it was defined in a preceding chapter, is coincident with utility. I am myfelf a part of the great whole, and my happinefs is a pait of that complex view of things by which juftice is regulated. The hope of reward therefore and the fear of punifhment, confined within certain ftrid limits, are motives that ought to have in- fluence with my mind.
things: things: There are two defcriptions of tendency that may belong to Human ac- any adion, the tendency which it poffefles by the neceflary and gulated, univerfal laws of exiftence, and the tendency which refults from tureof the pofitive interference of fome intelligent being. The nature of happinefs and mifery, pleafure and pain, is independent of all pofitive inftitution: that is, it is immutably true that whatever tends to procure a balance of the former is to be defired, and whatever tends to procure a balance of the latter is to be re- je£led. In like manner the promulgation of virtue, truth and political juflice muft always be right. There is perhaps no adtion of a rational being that has not fome tendency to promote thefe objedts, and confequently that has not a moral character founded in the abflrad nature of things.
R The i^^ OF THE EXERCISE • CUAF. vi '^^^ tendency of pofitive inftitution is of two forfs, to fur- a^TBTpoJi^ ^^^ "^^ "^'^^^ ^^ additional motive to the pradice of virtue or tion.'" ' "" ^^g^^ ^"^^ ^'^ inform my underftanding as to what adtions are the"ktte7°^ right and what adlions are wrong. Much cannot be faid in com- mendation of either of thefe tendencies.
I. To excite Firfl:, pofitive inftitution may furnifh me with an additional virtue. •' Its equivo. motive to the praftice of virtue. I have an opportunity of concal charafter in this re- tributiug Very eflentially to the advantage of twenty individuals; fpeft, they will be benefited, and no other perfons will fuftain a ma- terial injury. I ought to embrace this opportunity. Here let us fuppofe pofitive inftitution to interfere, and to annex fome great perfonal reward to myfelf to the performance of my duty. This immediately changes the nature of the adlion. Before I preferred it for its intrinfic excellence. Now, fo far as the po- - fitive inftitution operates, I prefer it, becaufe fome perfon has arbitrarily annexed to it a great weight of felf-intereft. But vir- tue, confidered as the quality of an intelligent being, depends upon the difpofition with which the adlion is accompanied. Under a pofitive inftitution then this very adlion, which is in- trinfically virtuous, may, fo far as relates to the agent, become vicious. The vicious man would before have negledied the ad- vantage of thefe twenty individuals, becaufe he would not bring a certain inconvenience or trouble upon himfelf. The fame man with the fame difpofition will now promote their advantage, be- caufe his own welfare is concerned in it. Twenty, other things equal,, equal,, OF PRIVATE JUDGMENT. 123 equal, is twenty times better than one. He that is not gOA'erned ^^2p' vi by the moral arithmetic of the cafe, or who ads from a difpo- * ' fition dlredly at war with that arithmetic, is unjuft. In other words, morahty requires that we fhould be attentive only to the tendency which belongs to any a£lion by the neceflary and uni- verfal laws of exiftence. This is what is meant by the princi- ple, " that we fhould do good, regardlefs of the confequences;" and by that other, " that we may not do evil, from the profped of STOod to refult from it." The cafe would have been rendered ftill more glaring, if, inftead of the welfare of twenty, we had fup- pofed the welfare of millions to have been concerned. In reality, whether the difparity be great or fmall, the inference ought to be the fame.
Secondly, pofitlve inftitution may inform my underftanding 2. To inform the judgas to what actions are right and what adlions are wrong. Here ment.
Its inaptitude it is proper for us to reflect upon the terms underftanding and for that purpofe.
information. Underftanding, particularly as it is concerned with moral fubjeds, is the percipient of truth. This is its proper fphere. Information, fo far as it is genuine, is a portion detached from the great body of truth. You inform me, " that Euclid aflerts the three angles of a plane triangle to be equal to two right angles." Still I am unacqviainted with the truth of this propo- fition. " But Euclid has demonftrated it; His demonftration has exifted for two thoufand years, and during that term has proved fatisfadtory to every man by whom it has been underftood."
124 OF THE EXERCISE 124 OF THE EXERCISE I am neverthelefs uninformed. The knowledge of truth lies In the perceived agreement or difagreement of the terms of a pro- pofition. So long as I am unacquainted -with the middle term by means of which they may be compared, fo long as they are incommenfurate to my underftanding, you may have furnifhed me with a principle from which I may reafon truly to farther confequences, but as to the principle itfelf I may llridily be faid to know nothing about it..
Every propofition has an intrinfic evidence of its own» Every eonfequence has premifes from which it flows; and upon them,, and not upon any thing elfe, Its validity depends. If you could work a miracle to prove, " that the three angles of a triangle were equal to two right angles," I fhouM ftill know, that the propofi- tion was either true or falfe previoully to the exhibition of that miracle; and that there was no neceffary connediion between, any one of its terms and the miracle exhibited. The miracle would take off my attention from the true queftion to a queftion altogether different, thfit of authority. By the authority ad- duced I might be prevailed on to yield an irregular affent to the propofition; but I could not properly be faid to perceive its truth.
But this Is not all. If it were, it might perhaps be regarded as a refinement foreign to the concerns of human life. Pofitive inftitutions do not content themfelves with requiring my affent to- OF PRIVATE JUDGMENT. 12^ to certala propofitions, in confideratlon of the refpecftable tefll- BOOK II.
iiioiiy by which they are inforced. This would amount to no *^ v * more, than advice flowing from a refpedable quarter, which after all I might reject, if it did not accord with the mature judg- ment of my own underftanding. But in the very nature of thefe inftitutions there is included a iandion, a motive either of punifh- ment or reward to induce me to obedience.
It is commonly faid, " that pofitive infl;itutions ought to leave Province of confcience me perfedlly free in matters of confcience, but may properly in- confidered- terfere with my condudl in civil concerns." But this diftindlion feems to have been very lightly taken up. What fort of moralift muft he be, who makes no confcience of what pafles in his in- tercourfe with other men? Such a diftindlion proceeds upon the fuppofition, " that it is of great confequence whether I bow to the eaft or the weft; whether I call the objedt of my worfhip Jehovah or Alia; whether I pay a priefl in a furplice or a black coat. Thefe are points in which an honeft man ought to be rigid and inflexible. But as to thofe other, whether he fhall be a tyrant, a flave or a free citizen; whether he fhall bind himfelf with multiplied oaths impofllble to be performed, or be a rigid obferver of truth; whether he fhall fwear allegiance to a king de jure or a king defaBo^ to the beft or the worft of all poffible governments; refpeding thefe points he may fafely commit his eonfcience to the keeping of the civil magiftrate." In reality there are perhaps no concerns of a rational being, over which 4 morality 126 OF THE EXERCISE 126 OF THE EXERCISE f?L??p^vf inordity does not extend its province, and refpeding wliich he "^ '' ' is not bound to a confcientious proceeding.
Tendency of j fatisficd at prefent, that a certain condud, funpofe it be tharr'"; ^ ''^S^^ attention to the confidence of private converfation, is in- cumbent upon me. You tell me, " there are certain cafes of fuch peculiar emergency as to fuperfede this rule." Perhaps I think there are not. If I admit your propofition, a wide field of enquiry is opened, refpeiSling M'hat cafes do or do not deferve to be confidered as exceptions. It is little likely that we fhould agree refpe£ling all thefe cafes. How then does the law treat me, for my confcientious difcharge of what I conceive to be my duty? Becaufe I will not turn informer (which, it may be, I think an infamous character) againft my Tnoft valued friend, the law ac- cufes me of mifprifion of treafon, felony or murder,''and perhaps hangs me. I believe a certain individual to be a confirmed vil- lain, and a moft dangerous member of fociety, and feel it to be my duty to warn others, perhaps the public, againft the efFed: of his vices. Becaufe I publifli what I know to be true, the law convids me of libel, fcandalum magnatum^ and crimes of I know not what complicated denomination.
If the evil flopped here, it would be well. If I only fufFered a certain calamity, fuppofe death, I could endure it. Death has hithert© been the common lot of men, and I expe£t at fome time or other to fubmit to it. Human fociety muft fooner or later be OF PRIVATE JUDGMENT. 127 be deprived of its individual members, whether they be vahiable, BOOK II.
or whether they be inconfiderable. But the punifhment ad:s not *■ v ' only retrofpedlively upon me, but profped:ively upon my con- temporaries and countrymen. My neighbour entertains the fame, opinion refpedling the condudl he ought to hold as I did. But the executioner of public juftice interpofas with a powerful argu- ment, to convince him that he has miftaken the path of abftra£t- reditude..
What fort of converts- will be produced by this unfeeling- logic? " I have deeply refledled," fuppofe, " upon the nature o£ virtue, and am convinced that a certain proceeding is incumbent on me. But the hangman, fupported by an adl of parliament, aflures me I am miftaken." If I yield my opinion to his di£lum^ my a£lion becomes modified, and my charadler' too. An in- fluence like this is inconfiftent with all generous magnanimity of fpirit, all ardent impartiality in the difcovery of truth, and all ^ inflexible perfeverance in its aflertion. Countries, expofed to the perpetual interference of decrees inftead of arguments, exhibit within their boundaries the mere phantoms of men. We can never judge from an obfervation of their inhabitants what men would be, if they knew of no appeal from the tribunal of con- fcience, anJ if, whatever they thought, they dared to fpeak, and dared to aft., At prefent there will perhaps occur io the majority of readers but 128 OF THE EXERCISE BOOK II. but few inftances of laws, which may be fuppofed to interfere ^ V ' with the confcientious difcharge of duty. A confiderable num- ber will occur in the courfe of the prefent enquir)\ More would readily offer themfelves to a patient refearch. Men are fo fuc- cefsfuUy reduced to a common ftandard by the operation of po- fitive law, that in mofl countries they are capable of little more than like parrots repeating each other. This uniformity is ca- pable of being produced in two ways, by energy of mind and indefatigablenefs of enquiry, enabling a confiderable number to penetrate with equal fuccefs into the receffes of truth; and by pufillanimity of temper and a frigid indifference to right ajid wrong, produced by the penalties which are fufpended over fuch as fhall difmterefledly enquire, and communicate and adt upon the refult of their enquiries. It is eafy to perceive which of thefe is the caufe of the uniformity that prevails in the prefent inftance.
Recapitula- If there be any truth more unqueftlonable than the reft, it is, tion, that every man is bound to the exertion of his faculties in the difcovery of right, and to the carrying into effedt all the right with which he is acquainted. It may be granted that an infallible ftandard, if it could be difcovered, would be confiderably bene- ficial. But this infallible ftandard itfelf would be of little ufe in human affairs, unlefs it had the property of reafoning as well as deciding, of enlightening the mind as well as conftraining the body. If a man be in fome cafes obliged to prefer his own judg- OF PRIVATE JUDGMENT. 129 ]ud";ment, he is in all cafes obliged to confult that iudp-ment, BOOK ir.
before he can determine whether the matter in queftion be of "^ ^ ' the fort provided for or no. So that from this reafoning it ulti- mately appears, that no man is obliged to conform to any- rule of conduct, farther than the rule is confident with juftice.
Such are the genuine principles of human fociety. Such Ai-gumeius in favour of would be the unconftrained concord of its members, in a ftate pofitiye in- Ititution: where every individual within the fociety, and every neighbour without, was capable of liftening with fobriety to the didlates of reafon. We fhall not fail to be imprefl'ed with confiderable re- gret, if, when we defcend to the prefent mixed chara£lers of mankind, we find ourfelves obliged in any degree to depart from fo fimple and grand a principle. The univerfal exercife of pri- vate judgment is a doftrine fo unfpeakably beautiful, that the true politician will certainly refolve to interfere with it as fpar- ingly and in as few inftances as poffible. Let us confider what are the emergencies that may be thought to demand an ex- ception. They can only be briefly flated in this place, each of them requiring to be minutely examined in the fubfequent ftages of the enquiry.
In the firfl: place then it feems neceflary for fome powerful i.Thenecef- arbitrator to interfere, where the proceedings of the individual ling private threaten the moil injurious confequences to his neighbours, and where the infiant nature of the cafe will not accord with the S uncertain I30 OF THE EXERCISE BOOK ri. uncertain prosirefs of argument and convidion addrefled to the * — -V ' mind of the offender. A man, fuppofe, has committed murder, or, to make the cafe more aggravated, feveral murders; and, having thus far over-ftepped all thofe boundaries of innocence and guilt which reftrain the generality of men. It is to be pre- fumed from analogy that he may be led to the commiffion of other murders. At firft it may appear to be no great infringe- ment upon the exercife of private judgment, to put it under fome degree of reftraint, when it leads to the commiffion of atrocious crimes. There are however certain difficulties in the cafe which are worthy to be confidered.
Objeaions: Firft, as foon as we admit the propriety of a rule fuch as that above ftated, our next concern will be with the evidence, which fhall lead to the acquittal or convi<£tion of the perfon accufed,, the uncer- Now it is wcU known, that no principles of evidence have yet.
tainty of evi- dence: been laid down that are infallible. Human affairs univerfally proceed upon prefumption and probability. An eye-witnefs muft identify the perfon of the offender, and in this he may be miftaken. We muft neceffarily be contented with prefumptive proofs of his intention j and often are or imagine ourfelves to be obliged to admit prefumptive evidence of the fa£l itfelf. The confequence is inevitable. And furely it is no trivial evil, to fubjedt an innocent man eventually, to the public award and the eftablifhed puniihiiient aonexed to the moft atrocious crimes.
Secondly, OF PRIVATE JUDGMENT. 131 Secondly, the fame external adion will aditiit of every pof- BOOK ir.
fible fhade of virtue or vice. One man fhall commit murder, to ^ — i^^ ' the diverfity remove a troublefome obferver of his depraved difpofitions, who of motives.- will otherwife counteract and expofe him to the world. A fe- cond, becaufe he cannot bear the ingenuous fmcerity with which he is told of his vices. A third, from his intolerable envy of fuperior merit. A fourth, becaufe he knows his adverfary me- ditates an ad: pregnant with extenfive mifchief, and he perceives no other mode by which its perpetration can be prevented. A fifth, in the adlual defence of his father's life or his daughter's chaftity. Each of thefe men, except perhaps the lafi:, may adt either from momentary impulfe, or from any of the infinite fnades and degrees of deliberation. Would you award one in- dividual punifliment to all thefe varieties of adion? Can you pretend in each inftance to afcertain the exadl quantity of wrong, equivalent to each? Stridly fpeaking no tv/o men were ever guilty of the fame crime; but here comes in pofitive law with its Procruftes's bed, and levels all charaders, and tramples upon all diftindions.
Thirdly, punifhment is not the appropriate mode of corred- the unfm'tc ablenefs of mg the en-ors ol mankmd. It will probably be admitted, that the means of the only true end of punifhment is corredion. That queflion will be difcuffed in another part of the prefent enquiry. " I have done fomething, which though wrong in itfelf, I i)elieve to be right; or I have done fomething which I ufually admit to be S 2 wrong; 132 OFTHEEXERCISE wrong; but my conviiflion upon the fubjedl is not fo clear and forcible, as to prevent my yielding to a powerful temptation." There can.be no doubt, that the proper way of conveying to my underftanding a truth of which I am ignorant, or of irnpreffing - upon me a firmer perfuafion of a truth with which I am ac- quainted, is by an appeal to my reafon. Even an angry expof- tulation with me upon my condudl will but excite fimilarpaf- fions in me, and cloud inftead of illuminate my underftanding. There is certainly a way of expreffing truth, with fuch benevo- lence as to command attention, and fuch evidence as to inforce convidtion in all cafes whatevei", cithei- to im- Punifhment inevitably excites In the fufferer, and ought to prefs new feutiments: cxcItc, a fenfe of Injuftlce. Let its purpofe be to convince me of the truth of a propofition, which I at prefent believe to be falfe. It is not abftradtedly confidered of the nature of an argu- ment, and therefore It cannot begin with producing convidion. Punifhment is a fpecious name, but is in reality nothing more than force put upon one being by another who happens to be ftronger. Now ftrength apparently does not conftitute juftice, nor ought " might," according to a trite proverb, to " overcome right." The cafe of punifhment, which we are uovn' confidering, is the cafe of you and I differing In opinion, and your telling me that you muft be right, fmce you have a more brawny arm, or have applied your mind more to the acquiring fkill in your- weapons than I have.
But OF PRIVATE JUDGMENT. i>3 But let us fuppole, " that I am convinced of my error, but ^5*?J^ -t that my convid;ion is fuperficid and fluftuatins;, and the object * — r^^ — -f you propofe is to render it durable and profound." Ought it to ^" old ones, be thus durable and profound? There are no doubt arguments and reafons calculated to render it fo. Is it in reality problema_ tical, and do you wifh by the weight of your blows to make up for the deficiency of your logic? This can never be de- fended. An appeal to force muft appear to both parties, in pro- portion to the foundnefs of their underftanding, to be a coa- feffion of imbecility. He that has recourfe to it, would have no occafion for this expedient, if he were fufficiently acquainted with the powers of that truth it is his office to communicate. If there be any man, who, in fuffering punifliment, is not confcious of injuftice, he muft have had his mind previoufly debafed by llavery, and his fenfe of moral right and wrong blunted by a feries of oppreffion.
The cafe is not altered for the better, if I fuffer punirnment, punlfli ment not for my own corredion, but for an example to others. Upon of'exampl7 this fuppofition a new difficulty is introduced, refpedting the pro- priety of one man's being fubjeded to pain, for the fake of im- proving the charadler and eradicating the vices of another. The fuffering is here alfo involuntary. Now, though will cannot alter the nature of juftice, it muft be admitted that the voluntary fufferer has at leaft one advantage over the involuntary, in the confcious liberality of his purpofe. He that fuffers, not for his confidered,; ■134 OF THE EXERCISE ^OOK II. ov/n correftion, but for the advantage of others, Hands, fo far ''— — >-^ ' as relates to that fufFering, in the fituation of an innocent perfon.
If the fufFering had relation to him perfonally as a vicious or imperfeft charadlei-, it mufl have relation to him in refped: either to the pall or the future. It cannot have relation to him as to the paft, for that is concluded and beyond the reach of altera- tion or remedy. By the fuppofition it has not relation to him but to others as to the future.
It ought to be obferved in this place, that by innocence I do not underftand virtue. Innocence is a fort of neutral character, and flands in the mid way between good and harm. Undoubtedly it were better, that a perfon ufelefs to fociety fhould be deftroyed than a man of eminent worth, and a perfon likely to prove in- jurious than either. I fay likely to prove injurious; for the fault already committed, being irrevocable, ought not to enter into the account, and we have nothing to do but with the probability of its repetition. It is in this fenfe that the fufFerer ftands upon a level with many of thofe perfons, who are ufually denomi- nated innocent.
It muft alfo be allowed, that there are cafes in which it is proper that innocent men fhould fuffer for the public good. Bul| this is a queftion of a very delicate nature, and the fevere moralift will be very reludant to condemn that man to die for the be- nefit of others, who is defirous to live.
7 As OF PRIVATE JUDGMENT. 135 As to every other circuinftance in the cafe of him who is I^OOK II...CHAP. VI. punifked for an example to others, it remains precifely the fame •■ v '