as when we fuppofed him to be punilhed for his own reformation. It is ftill an argmnent of the moft exceptionable nature employed to con-e£l the opinions of mankind. It is ftill a menace of vio- lence made ufe of to perfuade them of the truth or falfliood of a propofition. It has little chance of making them wife, and can fcarcely fail of maldng them timid, diflembling and corrupts Not with (landing all thefe objedtions, it would be difficult to Urgency of find a country, refpeding which we could fay, that the inhabi- tants might with fafety be difmiffed from the operation of punifh- ment. So mixed is human charadler, fo wild are its excurfions, fo calamitous and deteftable are the errors into which it occa- fionally falls, that fomething more than argument feems neceflary for their fuppreffion. Human beings are fuch tyros in the art of reafoning, that the wifeft of us often prove impotent in our attempts, where an inftant efFed: was moft powerfully wanted. While I ftand ftill to reafon with the thief, the aflliffin or the oppreflbr, they haften to new fcenes of devaftation, and with un- fparing violence confound all the principles of human fociety. I. Ihould obtain little fuccefs by the abolitior. of puniftiment, unlefs I could at the fame time abolifti thofe caufes that generate tempt- ation and make puniftiment neceflaiy. Meanwhile the argu- ments already adduced may be fufficient to flaew that punifti- ment: 135 OF THE EXERCISE rHAP^VT ^^^^ is always an evil, and to perfuade us never to recur to It ^ ^^ ' but from the moft evident heceffitv.
2. Rebellion. Thg remaining cafes in which it may feera requiiite to have 3. War. recourfe to the general will of the fociety, and to fuperfede the private judgment of individuals, are, when we are called upon to counteract the hoftilities of an internal enemy, or to re- Objeaions. pel the attacks of a foreign invader. Here as in the former in- ftance the evils that arife from an ufurpatlon upon private judg- ment are many and various. It is wrong that I fhould contribute in any mode to a proceeding, a war for example, that I believe to be unjuft. Ought I to draw my fword, when the adverfary appears to me to be employed in repelling a wanton aggreflion? The cafe feems not to be at all different, if I contribute my property, the produce it may be of my perfonal labour; though cuftom has reconciled us to the one rather than the other.
The confequences are a degradation of character and a relaxa- tion of principle, in the perfon who is thus made the inftrument of a tranfadlion, which his judgment difapproves. In this cafe, as has been already ftated generally, the human mind is <;om- preffed and unnerved, -dll it affords us fcarcely the femblance of what it might otherwife have been. And, in addition to the general confi derations in limilar cafes, it may be obferved, that the frequent and obftinate wars which at prefent defolate the human OF PRIVATE JUDGMENT. 137 human race would be nearly extirpated, if they were funported,ri?P^/J; CHAP. VI.
only by the voluntary contributions of thofe by whom their prin- *• ^ ' ciple was approved.
The objection, which has hitherto been permitted pradlically Reply. to fuperfede thefe reafonings, is the difficulty of conducing an affair, in the fuccefs of which millions may be interefted, upon fo precarious a fupport as that of private judgment. The men, with whom we are ufually concerned in human fociety, are of fo mixed a character, and a felf-love of the narroweft kind is fo deeply rooted in many of them, that it feems nearly unavoidable upon the fcheme of voluntary contribution, that the moll gene- rous would pay a very ample proportion, while the mean and avaricious, though they contributed nothing, would come in for their full (hare of the benefit. He that would reconcile a perfed freedom in this refpedt with the interell of the whole, ought to propofe at the fame time the means of extirpating felfifhnefs and vice. How far fuch a propofal is feafible will come hereafter to be confidered.
AN A N ENQUIRY CONCERNING POLITICAL JUSTICE, BOOK III.
PRINCIPLES OF GO FERN ME NT.
SYSTEMS OF POLITICAL WRITERS.
THE (QUESTION STATED. FIRST HYPOTHESIS: GOVER>7- MENT FOUNDED IN SUPERIOR STRENGTH. — SECOND HY- POTHESIS;■ GOVERNMENT JVRE DIFINO. THIRD HYPO- THESIS: THE SOCIAL CONTRACT. — THE FIRST HYPOTHE- SIS EXAMINED. — THE SECOND — CRITERION OF DIVINE right; I. PATRIARCHAL DESCENT — 2. JUSTICE.
IT has appeared in the courfe of our reafonlngs upon the na- BOOK III. CHAP I ture of fociety, that there are occafions in w^hich it may be ^ ^ ' i neceiTary, to fuperfede private judgment for the fake of public ftated.
T 2 good, I40 SYSTEMS OF BOOK III. crood, and to cftntrol the a£hs of the Individual by an ad to be "" ' performed in the name of the whole. It is therefore an interefting enquiry to afcertain in what manner fuch ads are to be originated, or in other words to afcertain the foundation of po- litical government.
FIrft hypo- There are three hypothefes that have been principally mainthefis: go- vernment tained upon this fubjed. Firft, the fyftem of force, according founded in fupeiior to which it is affirmed, " that, inafmuch as it is neceflary that the great mafs of mankind fhould be held under the fubjedion of compulfory reftraint, there can be no other criterion of that re- ftraint, than the power of the individuals who lay claim to its exercife, the foundation of which power exifts in the unequal degrees, in which corporal ftrength and intelledual fagacity are diftributed among mankind."
Second hypo- There Is a fecond clafs of reafoners, who deduce the origin of theiis: go- vernment 2A. government from divine right, and affirm, " that, as men de- jure d'mno, rived their exiftence from an infinite creator at firft, fo are they ftill fubjed to his providential care, and of confequence owe alle- giance to their civil governors, as to a power which he has thought fit to fet over them."
Third hypo- The third fyftem Is that which has been moft ufually mainthefis: the focial con- tained by the friends of equality and juftice; the fyftem Accord- ing to which the Individuals of any foclety are fuppofed to have entered POLITICAL WRITERS. 141 entered into a contrad; with their governors or with each other, BOOK ill.
_ CHAP. I.
and which founds the rights of government in the confent of *«— v ' the governed.
The two firft of thefe hypothefes may eafily be difmifled. Tlie fiift hy.
potheiis exa- That of force appears to proceed upon the total negation of ab- '"i""!. ftradl and immutable juftice, affirming every government to be right, that is poflefTed of power fufficient to inforce its decrees. It puts a violent termination upon all political fcience; and feems intended to perfuade men, to fit down quietly under their prefent difadvantages, whatever they may be, and not exert them- felves to difcover a remedy for the evils they fufFer. The fecond The fecond. hypothefis is of an equivocal nature. It either coincides with the firft, and affirms all exifting power to be alike of divine de- rivation; or it muft remain totally ufelefs till a criterion can be found, to diftinguifh thofe governments which are approved by God, from thofe which cannot lay claim to that fan£lion. The Critoiion of divine right.
divine right.
criterion of patriarchal defcent will be of no avail, till the true i. Patriarchal dcfccnt* claimant and rightful heir can be difcovered. If we make utility ^ yuftice. and juftice the teft of God's approbation, this hypothefis will be liable to little objection; but then on the other hand little will be gained by it, fince thofe who have not introduced divine right into the argument, will yet readily grant, that a government which can be fliewn to be agreeable to utility and juftice, is a rightful government.
The 142 SYSTEMS OF POLITICAL WRITERS.
The third hypothefis demands a more careful examination. If any error have infmuated itfelf into the fupport of truth, it be- comes of particular confequence to detedt it. Nothing can be of more importance, than to feparate prejudice and miftake on the one hand, from reafon and demonftration on the other. Where- ever they have been confounded, the caufe of truth muft necef- farily be a fufferer. That caufe, fo far from being injured by the diifolution of the imnatural alliance, may be expected to derive from that difTolution an eminent degree of profperity and luftre.
CHAP.
OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT.
QUERIES PROPOSED. — WHO ARE THE CONTRACTING PAR- TIES? — WHAT IS THE FORM OF ENGAGEMENT? — OVER HOW LONG A PERIOD DOES THE CONTRACT EXTEND?
TO HOW GREAT A VARIETY OF PROPOSITIONS? — CAN IT EXTEND TO LAWS HEREAFTER TO BE MADE? ADDRESSES OF ADHESION CONSIDERED. POWER OF A MAJORITY.
UPON the firft ftatement of the fyftem of a fecial contract BOOK ill. CHAP II various difficulties prefent themfelves. Who are the parties ^ ^ -» Qiienes proto this contrad? For whom did they confent, for themfelves puled. only or for others? For how long a time is this contrad to be confidered as binding? If the confent of every individual be neceffary, in what manner is that confent to be given? Is it to be tacit, or declared in exprefs terms?
Little will be gained for the caufe of equality and juftice, if Who are the coiitrafting our anceftors, at the firft inftitution of government, had a right parties? indeed of choofmg the fyftem of regulations under which they thought proper to live, but at the fame time could barter away the underftandings and independence of all that came after them 3 to 144 OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, ^9PA W- 1^0 the lateft pofterity. But, if the contradl mull be renewed la *^.— — ' each fucceflive generation, what periods muft be fixed on for that purpofe^ And if I be obliged to fubmit to the eftabUflied government till my turn comes to aflent to it, upon what prin- ciple is that obligation founded? Surely not upon the contrail into which my father entered before I was born?
What Js the Secondly, what is the nature of the confent, in confequence form of engagement? of which I am to be reckoned the fubjeit of any particular go- vernment? It is ufually faid, " that acquiefcence is fufficient; and that this acquiefcence is to be inferred from my living quietly under the protedlion of the laws." But if this be true, an end is as effedlually put to all political fcience, all difcrimina- tion of better and worfe, as by any fyftem invented by the moil flavifh fycophant that ever exifled. Upon this hypothefis every government that is quietly fubmitted to is a lawful government,, whether it be the ufurpation of Cromwel or the tyranny of Cali- gula. Acquiefcence is frequently nothing more than a choice on the part of the individual of what he deems the leall evil. In many cafes it is not fo much as this, fince the peafant and the artifan, who form the bulk of a nation, however diffatisfied with, the government of their country, feldom have it in their power to itranfport themfelves to another. It is alfo to be obferved upon the fyftem of acquiefcence, that it is in little agreement with the eftablilhed opinions and practices of mankind. Thus what has been called the law of nations, lays leafl: ftrefa upon the allegiance 5 of tjF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT. 145 of a foreigner fettling among us, though his acquiefcence Is cer- p9R^^U* tainly mod complete; while natives removing into an unin- *■ >' ' feabited region are claimed by the mother country, and removing into a neighbouring territory are punifhed by municipal law, if they take arms againft the country in which they were born. Now furely acquiefcence can fcarcely be conftrued into confent, while the individuals concerned are wholly unapprifed of the authority intended to be refted upon it. * Mr. Locke, the great champion of the dodrine of an original contradl, has been aware of this difficulty, and therefore obferves, that " a tacit confent indeed obliges a man to obey the laws of any government, as long asiie has any pofleffions, or enjoyment of any part of the dominions of that government; but nothing can make a man a member of the commonwealth, but his adlually entering into it by pofitive engagement, and exprefs promife and compadt. f" A fingular diftinftion; implying upon the face of it, that an acquiefcence, fuch as has juft been de- fcribed, is fufficient to render a man amenable to the penal re- gulations of fociety; but that his own confent is neceffary to entitle him to its privileges.
A third objedion to -the focial contrail will fuggeft Itfelf, as Over how foon as we attempt to afcertain the extent of the obligation, even does the cintraft extend? * See Hume's Eflays. Part II. Eflay x'ri. t Treatife of Government. Boole II. Ch. viii. §. no, 122.
U fuppofing 14$ OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT.
BOOK TIT. fuppofing: It to have been, entered into in the moft folemn man- ' w ' ner by every member of the community. Allowing that I am^ called upon, at the period of ray coming of age for example, to declare my afTent or diflent to any fyftem of opinions or any code of pradlical inilitutes; for how long a period does this de- claration bind me? Am I precluded from better information for the whole courfe of my life? And, if not for my whole life, why for a year, a week or even an hour? If my deliberate judgment or my real fentiment be of no avail in the cafe, in. what fenfe can it be afBrmed that all lawful government is. founded in my confent t I°^Aet^^ot ^^^^ *^^ queftion of time is not the only difficulty. If you.
propoiitions. jj^-^^^j^j ^j affent to any proportion, it is necelTary that the propofition fliould be ftated fimply and clearly. So numerous are the varieties of humian underftanding, in all cafes where its independence and integrity are fufficiently preferved, that there is little chance of any two men coming to a precife agreement: about ten fucceffive propofitions that are in their own nature open to debate. What then can be more abfurd than to prefent to me the laws of England in fifty volumes folio, and call upoa; me to give an honeft and uninfluenced vote upon their whole, contents at once?.
Cankextend But the focial contradl, confidered as the foundation of civil' to laws here- after to be government, requires more of me than this. I am not only made?
obliged; OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT. 147 obliged to confent to all the laws that are adually upon record. BOOK 11^.
■^ ^ ' CHAP. II. but to all the laws that fhall hereafter be made. It was under ^^ ^^ ^ this view of the fubjeft, that Roufleau, in tracing the con- fequences of the fecial contract, was led to aflert, that " the great body of the people, in whom the fovereign authority refides, can neither delegate nor refign ir. The effence of that autho- rity," he adds, " is the general will; and will cannot be repre- fented. It muft either be the fame or another; there is no alternative. The deputies of the people cannot be its reprefen- tatives; they are merely its attorneys. The laws, that the com- munity does not ratify in perfon, are no laws, are nullities.*" The difficulty here ftated has been endeavoured to be provided AddrefTes of againft by fome late advocates for liberty, in the way of addrefles fidered. of adhefion; addreffes, originating in the various diftrid;s and departments of a nation, and without which no regulation of •conftitutional importance is to be deemed valid. But this is a very inadequate and fuperficial remedy. The addreflers of courfe liave feldom any other remedy than that above defcribed, of in- * " La fouyerainete ne pcut etre reprefentee,par la tn^me rat/on qu'clle ne pent lire .alienee; elie conjijle ejfentielleinent dans la volonte gene rale, et la volant e ne fe repre- fente point: elk ejl la meme,ou elle eft autre; il n^y a point de milieu. Lcs deputes du peuple tie ford done point fes reprefenians, ils ne font que fes commiffaires; ils ne peuvent rien conclure definitivcment. Toute loi que le peuple en peifofme n'a pas ratifiee, eft aiulle; ce n' eft point unc lei" Du Contrail Social. Liv. 111. Chap. xv-.
U 2 difcriminate 148 OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: BOOK III. difcrlmlnate admifTion or rejection. There is an infinite differ-- CHAP. II. -^ ^ ' ence between the firft deliberation, and the fubfequent exercife of a negative. The former is a real power, the latter is feldonx more than the fhadow of a power. Not to add, that addreffes are a moft precarious and equivocal mode of collecting the fenfe ef a nation.. They are ufually voted; in a- tumultuous and fum- mary manner; they are carried along by the tide of party; and the fignaturcs annexed to them are obtained by indiredt and ac-r cidental methods, while multitudes of byftanders, unlefs upoa fome extraordinary occafion, remain ignorant of or indifferent to the tranfadion..
Power of a Laftlv, if government be founded in the"confent of the peoplei.
it can have no power over any individual by whom that confent is refufed. If a tacit confent be not fufhcient^ ftill lefs can I be deemed to have confented to a meafure upon wiiich T put an. exprefs negative. This immediately follows from the obferva- tions of Rouffeau. If the people, or the individuals of whom the people is conftituted, cannot delegate their authority to a rC'^ prefentative; neither can any individual delegate his authority to a majority, in an affembly of which he is himfelf a member.. The rules by which my actions IBall be directed are matters of a confideration entirely perfonal; and no man can transfer tO' another the keeping of his confcience and the judging of his duties. But this brings us back to the point from which we fet out*.
OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, >49 out. No confent of ours can diveft us of our moral capacity, ^^r^^ m* This is a fpecies of property which we can neither barter nor *— — v-— » refign; and of confequence it is impoffible for any government to derive its authority from an original contract..
CHAP.
OF PROMISES.
■THE VALIDITY OF PROMISES EXAMINED. SHEWN TO BE IN- CONSISTENT WITH JUSTICE. TO BE FOREIGN TO THE GENERAL GOOD. OF THE EXPECTATION EXCITED. THE FULFILLING EXPECTATION DOES NOT IMPLY THE VALI^- DITY OF A PROMISE. CONCLUSION.
BOOK III. r~|~^HE whole principle of an original contract proceeds upon ' " ^ -"- the obligation under which we are placed to obferve our The validity °...ofpromif-s promifes. The reafoning upon which it is founded is, " that we ■examined.
have promifed obedience to government, and therefore are bound to obey." It may confequently be proper to enquire into the na- ture of this obligation to obferve our promifes.
Shewn to be We have alvcady eftablifhed juftice as the fum of moral and linconfiftent Avith juftice: political duty. Is juftice then in its own nature precarious or immutable? Surely immutable. As long as men are men, the condud: I am bound to obferve refpeding them muft remain the fame. A good man muft always be the proper objedl of my fupport and cooperation; vice of my cenfure; and the vicious jnan of iaftruftion and reform.
.1 What OF PROMISES. ijr What Is It then to which the obhgation of a promife applies? il^^p l\\- What I have promifed is either right, or wrong, or indifferent. ' « ' There are few articles of human condudt that fall under the latter clafs; and the greater fhall be our improvements in moral fcience the fewer ftill will they appear. Omitting thefe, let us then con- iider only the tvro preceding clafles. " I have promifed to do fomething juft and right." This certainly I ought to perform. Why? Not becaufe I promifed, but becaufe juftice prefcribes it. " I have promifed to beftow a fum of money upon fome good and refpedtable purpofe. In the interval between the promife and my fulfilling it, a greater and nobler purpofe offers itfelf, and calls with an imperious voice for my cooperation." Which. ought I to prefer? That which beft deferves my preference. A promife can make no alteration in the cafe. I ought to be guid- ed by the intrinfic merit of the objedts, and not by any external and foreign confideration. No engageiBents of mine caa change their intrinfic claims.- AU this muff be exceedingly plain to the readerwho has follow- ed me in my early reafonings upon the nature of juftice. If every fhilling of our property, every hour of our time and every faculty of our mind, have already received their deftination from the prin- ciples of immutable juftice, promifes have no department left up- on which for them to decide. Juftice it appears therefore ought to be done, whether we have promifed it or not. If we difcover any thing to be unjuft, we ought to abftain from it, with what- ever IJ2 OF PROMISES.
i|^^^'' 1^^- ever folemnky we have engaged for its perpetration. We were " V '.erroneous and vicious when the promife was made; but this affords no fufEcient reafon for its performance.
.to be fo- But it -^vill be fald, " if promifes be not made, or when made vreign to ge- ,ijeial good, be not fulfilled, how can the affairs of the world be carried on?" By rational and intelligent beings ading as if they v.-ere rational and intelligent. A promife would perhaps be fufEciently inno- cent, if it were unda'ftood merely as declaratory of intention, and not as precluding farther information. Even in -this reftrained fenfe however it is far from being •generally neceffary. Why Ihould it be fuppofed that the affairs of the world would not go on fufficiently well, though my neighbour could no farther de- pend upon my afliftance than it appeared rational to grant it? This would be a fufEcient dependence if I were honeft, nor ^ would he if he were honeft delire any thing more. If I were difhonefl, if I could not be bound by the reafon and juflice of the cafe, it would afford him a flender additional dependence to call in the aid of a principle founded in prejudice and miftake: not to fay, that, let it afford ever fo great advantage in any par- ticular cafe, the evil of the immoral precedent would outweigh the individual advantage.
It may be farther objected, " that this principle might be fuf- ficiently fuited to a better and more perfedl flate of fociety, but that at prefent there are difhonefl: members of the community, who •who will not f erform their duty, if they be not bound to it by ^^^p ^u fome grofler motive, than the mere moral confideration." Be ' ^ ' it fo. This I3 a queftlon altogether different from that we have been examining. We are not now enquiring whether the com- munity ought to animadvert upon the errors of its members. This animadverfion the upright man is not backward to encoun- ter, and willingly rifks the penalty, which the' fociety (for the fociety is more competent to afcertain the juft amount of the penalty than the preceding caprice of the parties) has awarded in cafes apparently fimilar, if he conceive that his duty requires from him that riik.
tation esci- But to return to the cafe of promifes. I fhall be told, that, Oftheexpec tatio: *' in choofing between two purpofes about which to employ my ted. money, my time or my talents, my promife may make an effen- tlal difference, and therefore having once been given ought to be fulfilled. The party to whom it was made has had expe£la- dons excited in him, which I ought not to difappoint; the party to whom I am under no engagement has no fuch difappoint- ment to encounter." What is this tendernefs to which I am bound, this expectation I muft not dare to difappoint? An ex- peftation that I fhould do wrong, that I fhould prefer a lefs good ■to a greater, that I fhould commit abfolute evil; for fuch muft b& the refult when the balance has been ftruck. " But his expefla- tion has altered the nature of his fituation, has engaged him in X under- 154 OF PROMISES.
BOOK III. undertakings from which he would otherwife have abftained.^ CHAP. III. ^ ■""^ — « ' Be it fo. He and all other men will be taught to depend more upon their own exertions, and lefs upon the afliftaace of others^ which caprice may refufe, or juftice oblige me to withhold. He and all others will be taught to acquire fuch merit, and to en- gage in fuch purfuits, as fliall oblige every honeft man to comer to their fuccour, if they fliould ftand in need of affiftance. Thc: refolute execution of juftice, without liftening to that falfe pity, which, to do imaginary kindnefs to one,, would, lead us to injure the whole, would in a thoufand ways increafe the independence,, the energies and the vutue of mankind;^ The fulfilling Let US howevcr fuppofe, "-that my condudt ought to be Inexpeftation does not im- fluenced by this previous expedtation of the individual." Let ply the validi- ty of a pro- US fuppofe, " that, in feleiting an individual for a. certain officCj^., aiife.
my choice ought not to be governed merely by the abftradl fitnefs. of the candidates, but that I ought to take into the account the extreme value of the appointment from certain circumftances to one of the candidates, and its comparative inutility to the other." Let US farther fuppofe, " that the expectation excited in one of them has led him into ftudies and purfuits to qualify himfelf for the office, which will be ufelefs if he do not fucceed to it; and; that this is one of the confiderations which ought to govern my determination."- — All this does not come up to what we have been; taught refpeding the obligation of a promife..
OF PROMISES. r^5 For, firft, it may be obferved, that It feems to be of little con- BOOK ill.
CHAP.III.
iequence in this ftatement, whether the expeilation were excited *- — - — -^ by a direct: promife or in fome other manner, whether it were excited by a declaration of mine or of a third perfon, or laftly, whether it arofe fmgly out of the reafon of the cafe and the pure deductions and reflections of the expedter's mind. Upon every one of thefe fuppofitions his condudl, and the injury he may fuftain from a difappointment, will remain the fame. Here then all that has been commonly underftood by the obligation of a promife is excluded. The motive to be attended to, flows from no folemn engagement of mine, but from an incidental confe- quence of my declaration, and which might juft as eafily have been the confequence of many other circumflances. The con- fideration by which it becomes me to be influenced is, not a re- gard for veracity, or a particular defire to preferve my integrity, both of which are in reality wholly unconcerned in the tranfac- tion, but an attention to the injury to be fuftalned by the lofmg candidate, whatever might be the original occafion of the condudl out of which the injury has proceeded.
Let us take an example of a fl:ill fmipler nature. " I live in Weftminfter; and I engage to meet the captain of a fliip from Blackwal at the Royal Exchange. My engagement is of the nature of information to him, that I ihall be at the Exchange at a certain hour. He accordingly lays afide his other bufmefs, and comes thither to meet me." This is a reafon why I fhoulJ X 2.not not fail him unlefs for fome very material caufe. But It would feem as if the reafon why I fhould not fail him would be equally cogent, if I knew from any other fource that he would be there, and that a quantity of convenience equal to the quantity upon the former fuppofition would accrue from my meeting him. It may be faid, " that it is effential to various circumftances of human in- tercourfe, that we fhould be able to depend on each other for a fteady adherence to engagements of this fort." The ftatement however would be fomewhat more accurate if we faid, " that it was effential to various circumftances of human intercourfe, that we fhould be known to beftow a fteady attention upon the quantities of convenience or inconvenience, of good or evil, that might arife to others from our conduct."
ConelnfioB. It is undoubtedly upon this hypothefis a part of our duty to make as few promifes or declarations exciting appropriate expectations as poffible. He who lightly gives to another the idea that he will govern himfelf in his future conduift, not by the views that fhall be prefent to his mind when the conduit fhall come to be determined on, but by the view he fhall be able to take of it at fome preceding period, is vicious in fo doing. But the obligation he is under refpedting his future condudt is, to adt juftly, and not, becaufe he has committed one error, for that reafon to become guilty of a fecond.
GHAP, CHAP. IV. OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY.
COMMON DELIBERATION THE TRUE FOUNDATION OF GO- VERNMENT— PROVED FROM THE EQUAL CLAIMS OF MANKIND — FROM THE NAlURE OF OUR FACULTIES FROM THE OBJECT OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE EF- FECTS OF COMMON DELIBERATION. — DELEGATION VIN- DICATED. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE DOCTRINE HERE MAINTAINED AND THAT OF A SOCIAL CONTRACT AP- PARENT FROM THE MERELY PROSPECTIVE NATURE OF THE FORMER FROM THE NULLITY OF PROMISES FROM THE FALLIBILITY OF DELIBERATION. — CONCLUSION.
AVING rejeded the hypothefes that have moft generally BOOK lir.