CHAP. XXL OF THE COMPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT.
Houses of assembly,— This institution unjust. — Delibei-ate proceeding the proper antidote. — Separation of legislative and executive power con- sidered.— Superior importance of the latter. — Functions of ministers.
One of the articles which has been most eagerly insisted on, by the advocates of complexity in political institutions, is that of " checks, by which a rash proceeding may be prevented, and the Revisions under which mankind have hitherto lived with txaneb OF THE COMX^OSITION OF GOVERNMENT.
qiiillity, may not be reversed without mature delileration." AVe ■will suppose that the evils of monarchy and aristocracy are, by this time, too notorious, to incline the speculative enquirer to seek for a remedy in either of these. " Yet it is possible, without the institution of privileged orders, to find means that may answer a similar purpose in this respect. The representatives of tlie people may be distributed, for example, into two assemblies; they may be chosen with this particular view, to constitute an upper and a lower house, and may be distinguished from each other, either by various qualifications of age or fortune, or by being chosen, by a greater or smaller number of electors, or for a shorter or longer term."
To every inconvenience, that experience can produce, or imagi- nation suggest, there is probably an appropriate remedy. This remedy may either be sought in a more strict prosecution of the principles of reason and justice, or in artificial combinations en- croaching upon those principles. Which are we to prefer? No doubt, the institution of two houses of assembly, is contrary to the primary dictates of reason and justice. How shall a nation be governed? Agreeably to the opinions of its inhabitants, or in opposition to them? Agreeably to them undoubtedly. Not, as we cannot too often repeat, because tlieir opinion is a standard of truth, but because, however erroneous that opinion may be, wc can do no better. There is no efi"ectual way of improving the institutions of any people, but by enlightening their understand- ings. He that endeavours to maintain the authority of any sentiment, not by argument, but by force, may intend a benefit, but really inflicts an extreme injury. To suppose that truth can be instilled, through any medium, but that of its intrinsic evidence, is a flagi-ant and pernicious error. He that believes the most fundamental proposition, through the influence of authority, does not believe a truth, but a falsehood. The proposition itself he does not understand, for thoroughly to understand it, is to per- ceive the degi-ee of evidence with w^hich it is accompanied; is tp know the full meaning of its terms, and, by necessary conse- quence, to perceive m what respects they agree or disagree with each other. All that he believes is, that it is very proper he should submit to usurpation and injustice.
It was imputed to the late government of France, that, when they called an assembly of notables in 1787, they contrived, by dividing the assembly into seven distinct corps, and not alloAving them to vote otherwise than in these corps, that the vote of fifty persons should be capable of operating, as if they were a majority, in an assembly of one hundred and forty-foiu*. It would have been still worse, if it had been ordained that no measure shoidd be considered as the measure of the assembly, unless it were adopted by the unanimous voice of all the corps: eleven persons might then, in voting a negative, have operated as a majority of one hundred and forty -four. This may serve as a specimen of tlie effects of distributing a representative national assembly into t>PTHE COMPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT. 89 two 01* thorc houses. Nor should we suffer ourselves to be de- ceived, xmdcr the pretence, of the innocence of a negative in comparison Avith an affirmative. In a country in which universal justice was already established, there would be little need of a representative assembly. lu a country into whoso institutions error has insinuated itself, a negative upon the repeal of those errors, is the real affirmative.
The institution of two houses of assembly, is the direct method ta divide a nation against itself. One of these houses will, in a ^eater or loss degree be the asylum of usurpation, monopoly, and privilege. Parties would expire, as soon as they were bom, in a country, where opposition of sentiments, and a struggle of interests, Avere not allowed to assume the formalities of distinct insti- tution.
Meanwhile, a species of check perfectly simple, and which appears sufficiently adequate to the purpose, suggests itself, in the idea of a slow and deliberate proceeding, which the representa- tive assembly should prescribe to itself. Perhaps no proceeding «>f this assembly should have the force of a general regulation, till it had undergone five or six successive discussions in the as- sembly, or till the expiration of one month from the period of its being proposed. Something like this is the order of the English house of commons, nor does it appear to be, by any means, among the worst features of our constitution. A system like this, would be sufficiently analogous to the proceedings of a wise in- dividual, who certainly would not wish to determine upon the most important concerns of his life, witliout a severe examina- tion; and still less would omit this examination, if his decision were destined to be a rule for the conduct, and a criterion to deteraiine upon the rectitude, of other men.
Perhaps, as we have said, this slow and gradual proceeding ought, in no instance, to be dispensed with, by the national representative assembly. This seems to be the true line of sepa- ration, between the functions of the assembly as such, and the executive power, whether we suppose the executive separate, or simply place it in a committee of the representative body. A plan of this sort, Avould produce a character of gravity and good sense, eminently calculated to fix the confidence of the citizens. The mere votes of the assembly, as distinguished from its acts and decrees, might seiTe as an encouragement to the public functionaries, and as affording a basis of expectation, respecting the speedy cure of those evils of which the public might complain; but they should never be allowed to be pleaded as the complete justification of any action. A precaution like this, would not only tend to pre- vent the fatal consequences of any precipitate judgment of the assembly within itself, but of tumult and disorder from without. An artful demagogue Avould fmd it more easy, to work up the people into a fit of momentary insanity, than to retain them in it for a month, iu opposition to the efforts of their real friends to undeceive them. Meanwhile, the consent of the assembly to take 90 OP THE COMPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT.
their demand into consideration, might reasonably be expectt^^ to moderate their impatience. '^^ Scarcely any plausible argument can be adduced, in favour iff* what has been denominated by political >vriters, a division of'-' powers. Nothing can seem less reasonable, than to prescribe any positive limits to the topics of deliberation in an assembly adequately representing the people; or peremptorily to forbid them the exercise of functions, the depositaries of which are placed under their inspection and censure. Perhaps, upon any emergence, totally unforeseen at the time of their election, and" uncommonly important, they would prove their wisdom, by call- ing upon the people to elect a new assembly, with a direct' view to that emergence. But the emergence, as we shall have occasion more fully to observe in the sequel, cannot with any propriety be prejudged, and a rule laid down for their conduct, by a body prior to, or distinct from, themselves. The distinction'' of legislative and executive powers, however intelligible in theory^ will by no means authorise their separation and practice.
Legislation, that is, the authoritative enunciation of abstract- or general propositions, is a function of equivocal nature, and will never be exercised in a pure state of society or a state approaching to purity, but with great caution and unwillingness. It is the most absolute of the functions of government, and government itself is a remedy that inevitably brings its own evils along with it. Administration, on the other hand, is a principle of perpetual application. So long as men shall see reason to act in a corporate capacity, they will always have occasions of tem- porary emergency for which to provide. In proportion as they advance iu social improvement, executive power will, compa- ratively speaking, become everything, and legislative nothing. Even at present, can there be any articles of greater importance than those of peace and war, taxation, and the selection of proper periods for the meeting of deliberative assemblies, which, as was observed in the commencement of Oie present book, are articles of temporary regulation?* Is it decent, can it be just, that these prerogatives should be exercised by any power less than the supreme, or be decided by any authority, but that which most adequately represents the voice of the nation? This principle ought, beyond question, to be extended universally. There can be no just reason for excluding the national representative from the exercise of any function, the exercise of which, on the part of the society, is, in any case, necessary.
The functions therefore of ministers and magistrates, com- monly so called, do not relate to any particular topic, respecting which they have a right exclusive of the representative assembly. They do not relate to any supposed necessity for secrecy; for secrecy, in political affairs, as we have had occasion to perceive,t is rarely salutary or wise; and secrets of state, will commonly OF THE FUTURE HISTORY, ETC. 91 be found to consist of that species of information relative to the interests of a society, respecting which the chief anxiety of its depositaries is, that it should be concealed from the members of that society. It is the duty of the assembly to desire informa- tion without reserve, for themselves and the public, upon every subject of general importance; and it is the duty of ministers and others to communicate such information, though it should not be expressly desired. The utility therefore of ministerial functions being, in a majority of instances, less than nothing in these respects, there are only two classes of utility that remain to them; particular functions, such as tliose of financial detail or minute superintendence, which cannot be exercised unless by one or a small number of persons;* and measures, proportioned to the demand of those necessities which will not admit of delay, and subject to the revision and censure of the deliberative assem- bly. The latter of these classes will perpetually diminish as men advance in improvement; nor can anything politically be of greater importance, than the reduction of that discretionary^ power in an individual, which may greatly affect the interests, ^r fetter the deliberations of the many. ' "-'"—,,,i *^ "-'"—,,,i *^ CHAP. XXII.
OF THE FUTURE HISTORY OF POLITICAL SOCIETIES.
Quantity of administration necessary to be maintained. — Objects of administration: national glory — rivalship of nations. — Inferences: 1, complication of governmettt unnecessary — 2, extensive territory superfluous — 3, constraint, its limitations, — Project of government.: police — defence,, ■ Thus we have endeavoured to imfold and establish certain generaSl principles, upon the subject of legislative and executive power. But there is one interesting topic that remains to bo discussed. How much of either of &ese powers does the public benefit require us to maintain?
We have already scen,t that the only legitimate object of political institution, is the advantage of individuals. All that cannot be brought home to them, national wealth, prosperity and glory, can be advantageous only to those self-interested impos* tors, who, from the earliest accounts of time, have confoimded the imderstandings of mankind, the more securely to sink them iil^ debasement and misery.
The desire to gain a more extensive territory, to conquer or to hold in awe our neighbouring states, to surpass them in arts • 02 OF THE FUTURE HISTORY or arms, is a desire founded in prejudice and error. Usurped authority is a spurious and unsubstantial medium of happiness. Security and peace are more to be desired, than a national splendour that should terrify the world. Mankind are brethren. We associate in a particular district, or under a particular climate, because association is necessary to our internal tranquillity, or to defend us against the wanton attacks of a common enemy. But the rivalship of nations is a creature of the imagination. If riches be our objectj riches can only be created by commerce; and the greater is our neighbour's capacity to buy, the greater will be our opportunity to sell. The prosperity of all is the interest of all.
The more accurately we understand our own advantage, the less shall we be disposed to disturb the peace of our neiglibour. The same principle is applicable to him in return. It becomes us therefore to desire that he may be wise. But wisdom is the growth of equality and independence, not of injury and oppres- sion. If oppression had been the school of wisdom, the improva- ment of mankind would have been inestimable, for they have been in that school for many thousand years. We ought there- fore to desire that our neighbour should be independent. We ought to desire that he should be free; for wars do not originate in the unbiassed pi'opcnsities of nations, biit in the cabals of government and the propensities that governments inspire into the people at large.* If our neighbour invade our territory, all we should desire is to repel him from it;t and, for that purpose, it is not necessary we should surpass him in prowess, since upon our own ground his match is unequal. J Not to say that to con- ceive a nation attacked by another, so long as its own conduct is sober, equitable and moderate, is an exceedingly improbable sup- position.
Where nations are not brought into avowed hostility, all jealousy between them is an unintelligible chimera. I reside upon a certain spot, because that residence is most conducive to my happiness or usefulness. I am interested in the political justice and virtue of my species, because they are men, that is, creatures eminently capable of justice and virtue; and I have perhaps additional reason to interest myself for those who live under the same government as myself, because I am better quali- fied to understand their claims, and more capable of exerting myself in their behalf. But I can certainly have no interest in tlie infliction of pain upon otliers, unless so far as they are ex- pressly engaged in acts of injustice. The object of soimd polic}' and morality is to draw men nearer to each other, not to separate them; to unite their interests, not to oppose them.
Individuals ought, no doubt, to cultivate a more frequent and confidential intercourse with each otlier than at present subsists; but political societies of men, as such, have no interests to oxplaiH and adjust, except so far as error and violence may render ex- • Chap. XVI. i Chap. XVII. t Chap. XVIII.
OF POLITICAL SOCIETIES. 93 planatwn necessary. This consideration annihilates, at once, the j»riBcipal objects of that mysterious and crooked policy, which has hitherto occupied the attention of governments. Before this principle, officers of the army and the navy, ambassadors and negociators, all the train of artifices that has been invented to hold other nations at bay, to penetrate their secrets, to traverse their machination?, to form alliances and counter-alliances, sink into nothing. The expence of government is annihilated, and, together with its expence, the means of subduing and undermin- ing the virtues of its subjects.* Another of the great opprobriums of political science, is, at the same time, completely removed, that extent of territory, subject to one head, respecting -which philosophers and moralists have alternately dis^puted, whether it be most unfit for a monarchy, or for a democratical government. The appearance which mankind, in a future state of improvement, may be expected to assume, is a policy that, in different countries, will wear a similar form, because we have all the same faculties and the same wants; but a policy, the independent branches of which will extend their authority over a small territory, because neighbours are best in- formed of each other's concerns, and are perfectly equal to their adjustment. No recommendation can bo imagined of an exten- sive, rather than a limited territory, except that of external security.
Whatever evils are included in the abstract idea of government, they are all of them extremely aggravated by the extensiveness of its jurisdiction, and softened under circumstances of an opposite nature. Ambition, which may be no less formidable than a pes- tilence in the former, has no room to unfold itself in the latter. Popular commotion is like the waters of the earth, capable, where the surface is large, of producing the most tragical efiects, but mild and innocuous, when confined within the circuit of an humble lake. Sobriety and equity are the obvious characteristics of a limited circle.
It may indeed be objected, "that great talents are the offspring of great passions, and that, in the quiet mediocrity of a petty re- public, the powers of intellect may be expected to subside into inactivity." This objection, if true, would be entitled to the most serious consideration. But it is to be considered that, upon the hypothesis here advanced, the whole human species would conr stitute, in some sense, one great republic, and the prospects of him who desired to act beneficially upon a great surface of mind, would become more animating than ever. During the period, in which this state was growing, but not yet complete, the com- parison of the blessings we enjoyed, with the iniquities practising among ova neighbours, would afford an additional stimulus to exertion, t t This objection will be fully discussed in the eighth book of the preaeat ^ OF THE FUTURE HISTOBY Ambition and tumult, arc evils that arise out of government, in an indirect manner, in consequence of tlie habits, which govern- ment introduces, of concert and combination extending themaelves over multitudes of men. There are other evils inseparable from its existence. The object of government, is the suppression of such violence, as well external as internal, as might destroy, or bring into jeopardy, the well being of the community or its members; and the means it employs, are constraint and violence of a more regulated kind. For this purpose the concentration of individual forces becomes necessary, and the method in which this concentration is usually obtained, is also constraint. The evils of constraint have been considered on a former occasion.* Constraint, emploj^ed against delinquents, or persons to whom delinquency is imputed, is by no means without its mischiefs. Constraint, employed by the majority of a society, against the minority, who may differ from them upon some question of public good, is calculated, at first sight at least, to excite a still greater disapprobation.
Both these exertions may indeed appear to rest upon the same principle. Vice is unquestionably no more, in the first instance, than en-or of judgment, and nothing can justify an attempt to correct it by force, but the extreme necessity of the case.f The minority, if erroneous, fall under precisely the same general de- scription, though their error may not be of equal magnitude. But the necessity of the case can seldom be equally impressive. If the idea of secession, for example, were somewhat more familiar- ised to the conceptions of mankind, it could seldom happen, that the secession of the minority from difference of opinion, could in any degree compare, in mischievous tendency, with the hostility of a criminal, offending against the most obvious principles of social justice. The cases are parallel to those of offensive and defensive war. In putting constraint upon a minority, we yield to a suspicious temper, 3iat tells us the opposing party may hereafter, in some way, injure us, and ^^^e will anticipate his injury. In putting constraint upon a criminal, we seem to repel an enemy, who has entered our territory, and refuses to quit it.
Government can have no more than two legitimate purposes, the suppression of injustice against individuals within the com- munity, and the common defence against external invasion. The first of these purposes, which alone can have an uninterrupted claim upon us, is sufficiently answered, by an association, of such an extent, as to afford room for the institution of a jury, to decide upon the offences of individuals within the community, and upon the questions and controversies, respecting property, which may chance to arise. It might be easy indeed for an offender, to escape from the limits of so petty a jurisdiction; and it might 'X^i^^ i^P * BooJiTT., Chap. VI.
' ♦ Book n.. Chap. VI.; Book IV., Chap. VHI.
OF POLITICAL SOCIETIES. 95 seem necessary, at first, that the neighbouring parishes,* or jurisdictions, should be governed in a similar manner, or at least should be willing, whatever was their form of government, to co-operate with us, in the removal or reformation of an offender, whose present habits were alike injurious to us and to them. But there will be no need of any express compact, and still less of any common centre of authority, for this purpose. General justice, and mutual interest, are found more capable of binding men, than signatures and seals. In the mean time, all necessity for causing the punishment of the crime to pursue the criminal, would soon, at least, cease, if it ever existed. The motives to offence w^ould become rare: its aggravations few: and rigour superfluous. The principal object of punishment, is restraint upon a dangerous member of the community; and the end of this restraint would be answered, by the general inspection, that is exercised by the members of a limited circle, over the conduct of each other, and by the gravity and good sense that would cha- racterise the censures of men, from whom all mystery and empi- ricism were banished. No individual would be hardy enough in the cause of vice, to defy the general consent of sober judgment that would surround him. It would carry despair to his mind, or, which is better, it would carry conviction. He would be obliged, by a force not less irresistible than whips and chains, to reform his conduct.
In this sketch is contained the rude outline of political govern- ment. Controversies between parish and parish, would be, in an eminent degree, unreasonable, since, if any question arose, about limits, for example, the obvious principles of convenience could scarcely fail to teach us, to w'hat district any portion of land should belong. No association of men, so long as they adhered to the principles of reason, coiUd possibly have an interest in ex- tending their territory. If we would produce attachment in our associates, we can adopt no surer method, than that of practising the dictates of equity and moderation; and, if this failed in any instance, it could only fail with him who, to whatever society he belonged, would prove an unworthy member. The duty of any society to punish offenders, is not dependent, upon the hypo- thetical consent of the offender to be punished, but upon tlie duty of necessary defence.
But however irrational might be the controversy of parish with parish in such a state of society, it would not be the less possible. For such extraordinary emergencies therefore, provision ought to be made. These emergencies are similar in their nature, to those of foreign invasion. They can only be provided against by the concert of several distiicts, declaring and, if needful, enforcing the dictates of justice.
• The word parish, is here used, without regard to its origin, and merely in consideration of its being a word, descriptive of a certain small P^^j*'^ territory, whether in population or extent, which cuBtom has '-'"-- to Ui.
faouiiar I.
06 OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLIES.
One of the most obvious remarks tliat suggests itseif, upon these two cases, of hostility between district and district, and of foreign invasion which the interest of all calls upon them jointly to repel, is, that it is their nature to be only of occasional recurrence, and that therefore the provisions to be made respecting them, need not be, in the strictest sense, of perpetual operation. In other words, the permanence of a national assembly, as it has hitherto been practised in France, cannot be necessary in a period of tran- quillity, and may perhaps be pernicious. That we may form a more accurate judgment of this, let us recollect some of the principal features that enter into the constitution of a national assembly.
CHAPTER XXIII.
OF NATIONiiX ASSEMBLIES.
They produce a fictitious unanimity — an unnatural uniformity of opinion. — Causes of this uniformity. — Consequences of the mode of decision by vote — 1, perversion of reason — 2, contentions disputes — 3, the triumph of ignorance and vice, — Society incapable of acting from itself — of being well-conducted by others. — Conclusion. — Modification of democracy that results from these considerations.
In the first place, the existence of a national assembly introduces the evils of a fictitious unanimity. The public, guided by such an assembly, must act with concert, or the assembly is a nugatory excrescence. But it is impossible that this unanimity can really exist. The individuals who constitute a nation, cannot take into consideration a variety of important questions, without forming different sentiments respecting them. In reality, all questions that are brought before such an assembly, are decided by a majority of votes, and the minority, after having exposed, with all the power of eloquence and force of reasoning of which they are capable, the injustice and follies of the measures adopted, are obliged, in a certain sense, to assist in carrying them into execu- tion. Nothing can more directly contribute to the depravation of the human understanding and character. It inevitably renders mankind timid, dissembling, and corrupt. He that is not accus- tomed, exclusively to act upon the dictates of his own imder- standing, must fall inexpressibly short of that energy and simplicity of which our nature is capable. He that contributes his personal exertions, or his property, to the support of a cause ■which he believes to be xmjust, will quickly lose that accurate