Discourse on Metaphysics, Correspondence with Arnauld, and Monadology (1902)

stance’’ and if there is no other principle of identity in bodies than that which has just been referred to a body would not subsist more than for a moment. The souls and the substance-forms of other bodies are entirely different from intelligent souls which alone know their actions, and not only do not perish through natural means but indeed always retain the knowledge of what they are; a fact which makes them alone open to chastisement or recompense, and makes them citizens of the republic of the uni- verse whose monarch is God. Henceit follows that all the other creatures should serve them, a point which we shall discuss more amply later. XIII. As the individual concept of each person includes once for all everything which can ever happen to him, in it can be seen, a prioré the evidences or the reasons for the reality of each event, and why one happened sooner than the other. But these events, however certain, are nevertheless contingent, being based on the free choice of God and of his creatures. It is true that their choices always have their reasons, but they incline to the choices under no compulsion of necessity. But before going further it is necessary to meet a difficulty which may arise regarding the principles which we have set forth in the preceding. We have said that the concept of an individual substance includes once for all everything which can ever hap- pen to it and that in considering this concept one will be able to see everything which can truly be said concerning the individual, just as we are able to see in the nature of a circle all the properties which 20 LEIBNIZ.