Analytica posteriora, Buch II

Evidently then there is neither entirely demonstration of what there is definition, nor entirely definition of what there is demonstration; hence in short it is impossible to have both of the same thing, so that it is also evident that definition and demonstration will neither be the same, nor the one contained in the other, otherwise their subjects would subsist similarly. Chapter 4 Let then so far these things be matters of doubt, but as to what a thing is whether is there, or is there not, a syllogism and a demonstration of it, as the present discussion supposed? for a syllogism shows something in respect of somewhat through a medium, but the (definition) what a thing is, is both peculiar and is predicated in respect of what it is. Now it is necessary that these should reciprocate: for if A is the property of C, it is evidently also that of B, and that of C, so that all reciprocate with each other. Nevertheless, if A is present with every B in respect of what it is, and universally B is predicated of every C in respect of what it is, it is also necessary that A should be predicated of C in the question what it is. Still if some one should assume without this reduplication, it will not be necessary that A should be predicated of C in the question what a thing is, though A should be predicated of B in the same question, but not of those of which B is predicated in this question. Now both these will signify what a thing (C) is, wherefore B will also be the definition of C, hence if both signify what a thing is, and what the very nature of it is, there will be the very nature of a thing prior in the middle term. Universally also, if it is possible to show what man is, let C be man, but A what he is, whether biped animal, or any thing else; in order then that a conclusion should be drawn, A must necessarily be predicated of every B, and of this there will