New Essays Concerning Human Understanding
- Sprache:
- Englisch
- Status:
- Vollständiges Werk
- Autorschaft:
- Vom Autor verfasst
- Zustand des Textes:
- Mit Scanfehlern (automatische Messung über den ganzen Text, nicht von Hand geprüft) · 4 unlesbare Passagen, von den Antworten ausgeschlossen
- Umfang:
- ~520.000 Wörter · 2.477 Passagen
Dieses Werk zitieren
- APAGottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. (n.d.). New Essays Concerning Human Understanding. Digital reproduction: SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/de/works/leibniz/new-essays-concerning-human-understanding
- MLAGottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. New Essays Concerning Human Understanding. Digital reproduction, SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/de/works/leibniz/new-essays-concerning-human-understanding.
- ChicagoGottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. New Essays Concerning Human Understanding. Digital reproduction, SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/de/works/leibniz/new-essays-concerning-human-understanding.
Nachweis der wiedergegebenen Ausgabe. SigPhi ist die digitale Reproduktion. Jahr, Verlag und Übersetzer werden angegeben, soweit bekannt; „n.d.“ bedeutet unbekanntes Jahr.
Wovon es handelt
Leibniz' Antwort auf Lockes Essay, Kapitel für Kapitel, als Dialog zwischen Philalethes, der für Locke spricht, und Theophilus, der für ihn spricht.
Kontext und Geschichte
Er stellte sie um 1704 fertig, im Todesjahr Lockes, und hielt sie dann zurück: mit einem Toten zu streiten, der nicht mehr antworten konnte, schien ihm unwürdig. Erschienen ist das Werk 1765, fast fünfzig Jahre nach Leibniz' eigenem Tod, und veränderte schlagartig die Lektüre beider — Kant hatte es zur Hand, während er die Kritik dachte.
Redaktioneller Kontext, keine zitierfähige Quelle: anders als die Passagen des Werks lassen sich diese Angaben nicht am Korpus überprüfen.
ence are not exempt (from error) when they depend too much upon their past experience, as has happened to many in civil and military affairs ; because they do not consider sufficiently that the world changes, and that men become more skilful by finding a thousand new dexterities, while the deer and hares of the present do not become more cunning than those of the past. The consecutions of the brutes are only a shadow of reasoning, i.e. are only connections of the imagination and passages from one image to another, because in a new juncture which appears similar to the preceding they expect anew that connection which they formerly met with, as if things were united in fact because their images are united in the memory. It is true that reason also counsels us to expect ordinarily to see that happen in the future which is conformed to a long past experience, but it is not on this account a necessary and infalli ble truth, and success may cease when least expected, when the reasons change which have sustained it. Therefore the wisest men do not so commit themselves to it as not to try to discover, if possible, something of the reason of this fact in order to judge when it is necessary to make exceptions. For reason is alone capable of establishing sure rules, and supply ing what is wanting to those which were not such by inserting their exceptions ; and of finding at length certain connections in the force of necessary consequences, which often furnish the means of foreseeing the result without the necessity of experiencing the sense-connections of images, to which the brutes are reduced, so that that which justifies the internal