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Sobre la adivinación por los sueños

Aristóteles

Idioma:
inglés
Estado:
Obra completa
Autoría:
Escrita por el autor
Estado del texto:
Texto limpio
Extensión:
~2530 palabras · 12 pasajes
Cita esta obra
  • APAAristóteles. (n.d.). Sobre la adivinación por los sueños. SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/es/works/aristotle/on-prophesying-by-dreams
  • MLAAristóteles. "Sobre la adivinación por los sueños." SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/es/works/aristotle/on-prophesying-by-dreams.
  • ChicagoAristóteles. Sobre la adivinación por los sueños. SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/es/works/aristotle/on-prophesying-by-dreams.

De qué trata

¿Anuncian los sueños el futuro? Aristóteles responde que no, y explica por qué lo parece.

Contexto e historia

El texto más escéptico de la Antigüedad sobre la adivinación por sueños: si uno de cada mil se cumple, recordamos ese y olvidamos los novecientos noventa y nueve restantes. El argumento de la coincidencia, formulado en el siglo IV a. C. Forma parte de los Parva naturalia, los ocho textos breves que continúan el De anima aplicando su teoría a fenómenos concretos del cuerpo vivo. Se han transmitido como grupo y se leen mejor juntos.

Contexto editorial, no una fuente citable: a diferencia de los pasajes de la obra, estos datos no se pueden comprobar contra el corpus.

Cómo empieza
As to the divination which takes place in sleep, and is said to be based on dreams, we cannot lightly either dismiss it with contempt or give it implicit confidence. The fact that all persons, or many, suppose dreams to possess a special significance, tends to inspire us with belief in it [such divination], as founded on the testimony of experience; and indeed that divination in dreams should, as regards some subjects, be genuine, is not incredible, for it has a show of reason; from which one might form a like opinion also respecting all other dreams. Yet the fact of our seeing no probable cause to account for such divination tends to inspire us with distrust. For, in addition to its further unreasonableness, it is absurd to combine the idea that the sender of such dreams should be God with the fact that those to whom he sends them are not the best and wisest, but merely commonplace persons. If, however, we abstract from the causality of God, none of the other causes assigned appears probable. For that certain persons should have foresight in dreams concerning things destined to take place at the Pillars of Hercules, or on the banks of the Borysthenes, seems to be something to discover the explanation of which surpasses the wit of man. Well then, the dreams in question must be regarded either as causes, or as tokens, of the events, or else as coincidences; either as all, or some, of these, or as one only. I use the word 'cause' in the sense in which the moon is [the cause]

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