Segundos analíticos, libro I

not, since it will not produce knowledge. It is necessary then that they should be true, since we cannot know that which does not subsist, for instance, that the diameter of a square is commensurate with its side. But it must be from things first and indemonstrable, or otherwise a man will not know them, because he does not possess the demonstration of them, for to know those things of which there is demonstration not accidentally is to possess demonstration. But they must be causes, and more known, and prior; causes indeed, because we then know scientifically when we know the cause; and prior, since they are causes; previously known also, not only according to the other mode by understanding (what they signify), but by knowing that they are. Moreover they are prior and more known in two ways, for what is prior in nature, is not the same as that which is prior in regard to us, nor what is more known (simply) the same as what is more known to us. Now I call things prior and more known to us, those which are nearer to sense, and things prior and more known simply, those which are more remote from sense; and those things are most remote which are especially universal, and those nearest which are singular, and these are mutually opposed. That again is from things first, which is from peculiar principles, and I mean by first, the same thing as the principle, but the principle of demonstration is an immediate proposition, and that is immediate to which there is no other prior. Now a proposition is one part of enunciation, one of one, dialectic indeed, which similarly assumes either (part of contradiction), but demonstrative which definitely (assumes) that one (part) is true. Enunciation is either part of contradiction, and contradiction is an opposition which has no medium in respect to itself. But that part of contradiction (which declares) something, of somewhat, is affirmation, and that (which signifies) something from somewhat is negation.…