Retórica
- Idioma:
- inglés
- Traducción:
- Theodore Buckley
- Estado:
- Obra completa
- Autoría:
- Escrita por el autor
- Estado del texto:
- Sin ruido de escaneo detectado (medición automática sobre todo el texto, no revisada a mano)
- Extensión:
- ~210.000 palabras · 1012 pasajes
Cita esta obra
- APAAristóteles. (n.d.). Rhetoric (Treatise on Rhetoric) [Retórica] (Theodore Buckley, Trans.). Digital reproduction: SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/es/works/aristotle/rhetoric-treatise-on-rhetoric
- MLAAristóteles. Rhetoric (Treatise on Rhetoric) [Retórica]. Translated by Theodore Buckley. Digital reproduction, SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/es/works/aristotle/rhetoric-treatise-on-rhetoric.
- ChicagoAristóteles. Rhetoric (Treatise on Rhetoric) [Retórica]. Translated by Theodore Buckley. Digital reproduction, SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/es/works/aristotle/rhetoric-treatise-on-rhetoric.
Referencia de la edición que reproduce SigPhi: SigPhi es su reproducción digital, no el editor. El año de la edición no consta en los metadatos (por eso «n.d.») y el traductor solo aparece cuando consta.
De qué trata
La Retórica: qué es persuadir, con qué medios y por qué no es lo mismo que engañar.
Contexto e historia
Aristóteles distingue tres fuentes de persuasión —el carácter de quien habla, el ánimo de quien escucha y el argumento mismo— y define el entimema, el razonamiento que deja una premisa sin decir porque el auditorio ya la tiene. El segundo libro es, de hecho, el primer tratado sistemático de las emociones que se ha conservado: examina la ira, el miedo, la vergüenza, la envidia, no como pasiones sino como estados que pueden producirse y deshacerse con palabras. Se lee mejor junto a la Poética y los Tópicos.
Contexto editorial, no una fuente citable: a diferencia de los pasajes de la obra, estos datos no se pueden comprobar contra el corpus.
9 Κριτὴς τοῦ νόμου κάνων. Aristotle employs the same metaphor in his Ethics :---τοὺ γὰρ αὐὀρίστου, αὔριστος καὶ 6 κακών ἐστιν, ὥσπε; καὶ τῆς Λεσβίας οἰκοδομῆς, ὁ μολύβδινος κανών" πρὸς γὰρ τὸ σχῆμω τοῦ λίθον μετακινεῖται, καὶ οὐ μένει ὁ κα-ώ Lib. y. c. 10. See Lucretius, iv. 516.— Denique ut in fabrica, si prava est regula prima, Normague si fallax rectis regionibus exit, Omnia mendose fieri atque obstipa necesse est, etc. 7. Rea sons why as little as possible should be left to the judge. Ist. 2nd. 3rd. Sabi L etal Seay: ARISTOTLE’S ~y. unjust, whatever questions of this nature the legislator has not determined ; on these the judge must somehow or other make up his mind of himself, and not take instructions on them from the parties at issue. It would then be most admirably adapted to the purposes of justice, if laws properly enacted were, as far as circumstances admitted, of themselves to mark out all cases, and to abandon as few as possible to the discretion of the judge. And this because, in the first place, it is easier to get one or a few of good sense, and of ability to legislate and adjudge, than to get many 9 : and next to this, legislative enactments proceed from men carrying their views a long time back; [or, from men who have reflected on the subject for a long time ;] while judicial decisions are made off hand ; so that it is difficult for persons deciding under these circumstances to assign what is just and expedient: and, what is most of all to the point, is this, that the award of the legislator is not particular nor about present circumstances, but about what is future and general ; whereas the member of a popular assembly and the judge decide on points actually present and definite ; and under their circumstances, feelings of partiality, and dislike, and personal expediency, will, in…