Ética — parte 4
- Idioma:
- inglés
- Estado:
- Obra completa
- Autoría:
- Escrita por el autor
- Estado del texto:
- Sin ruido de escaneo detectado (medición automática sobre todo el texto, no revisada a mano)
- Extensión:
- ~22.500 palabras · 107 pasajes
Cita esta obra
- APABaruch Spinoza. (n.d.). Ethics — Part 4 [Ética — parte 4]. Digital reproduction: SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/es/works/baruch-spinoza/ethics-part-4
- MLABaruch Spinoza. Ethics — Part 4 [Ética — parte 4]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/es/works/baruch-spinoza/ethics-part-4.
- ChicagoBaruch Spinoza. Ethics — Part 4 [Ética — parte 4]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/es/works/baruch-spinoza/ethics-part-4.
Referencia de la edición reproducida. SigPhi es la reproducción digital. Se incluyen año, editorial y traductor cuando constan; «n.d.» indica que no consta el año.
De qué trata
Un sistema completo — Dios, la mente, los afectos, la libertad — demostrado como si fuera geometría: definiciones, axiomas y proposiciones que culminan en la idea de que la libertad es entender la necesidad.
Contexto e historia
Spinoza terminó la Ética hacia 1675 y renunció a publicarla en vida: el escándalo de su 'Deus sive Natura' — Dios y la Naturaleza como una sola cosa — lo habría enterrado. Apareció en 1677, meses después de su muerte, dentro de las Opera Posthuma, y fue prohibida casi de inmediato. El autor vivía en La Haya puliendo lentes, excomulgado de la comunidad judía de Ámsterdam a los veintitrés años con un anatema de una dureza jamás revocada. Durante un siglo 'spinozista' fue un insulto; después, para el idealismo alemán y para tantos más, la montaña con la que toda filosofía debe medirse.
Contexto editorial, no una fuente citable: a diferencia de los pasajes de la obra, estos datos no se pueden comprobar contra el corpus.
sees that it is carried through to the end, which its author had purposed for it. But if a man sees a work, the like whereof he has never seen before, and if he knows not the intention of the artificer, he plainly cannot know, whether that work be perfect or imperfect. Such seems to be the primary meaning of these terms. But, after men began to form general ideas, to think out types of houses, buildings, towers, &c., and to prefer certain types to others, it came about, that each man called perfect that which he saw agree with the general idea he had formed of the thing in question, and called imperfect that which he saw agree less with his own preconceived type, even though it had evidently been completed in accordance with the idea of its artificer. This seems to be the only reason for calling natural phenomena, which, indeed, are not made with human hands, perfect or imperfect: for men are wont to form general ideas of things natural, no less than of things artificial, and such ideas they hold as types, believing that Nature (who they think does nothing without an object) has them in view, and has set them as types before herself. Therefore, when they behold something in Nature, which does not wholly conform to the preconceived type which they have formed of the thing in question, they say that Nature has fallen short or has blundered, and has left her work incomplete. Thus we see that men are wont to style natural phenomena perfect or imperfect rather from their own prejudices, than from true knowledge of what they pronounce upon. Now we showed in the Appendix to Part I., that Nature does not work with an end in view. For the eternal and infinite Being, which we call God or Nature, acts by the same necessity as that whereby it exists. For we have shown, that by the same necessity of its nature, whereby it exists, it likewise works (I:xvi.).…