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Azar, amor y lógica: ensayos filosóficos

Charles Peirce

Idioma:
inglés
Estado:
Obra completa
Autoría:
Escrita por el autor
Estado del texto:
Sin ruido de escaneo detectado (medición automática sobre todo el texto, no revisada a mano)
Extensión:
~92.800 palabras · 441 pasajes
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  • APACharles Peirce. (n.d.). Chance, Love, and Logic Philosophical Essays [Azar, amor y lógica: ensayos filosóficos]. Digital reproduction: SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/es/works/charles-peirce/chance-love-and-logic-philosophical-essays
  • MLACharles Peirce. Chance, Love, and Logic Philosophical Essays [Azar, amor y lógica: ensayos filosóficos]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/es/works/charles-peirce/chance-love-and-logic-philosophical-essays.
  • ChicagoCharles Peirce. Chance, Love, and Logic Philosophical Essays [Azar, amor y lógica: ensayos filosóficos]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/es/works/charles-peirce/chance-love-and-logic-philosophical-essays.

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De qué trata

Azar, amor y lógica: ensayos filosóficos.

Contexto e historia

La recopilación póstuma (1923) que puso a Peirce al alcance de un público. Contiene «La fijación de la creencia» y «Cómo esclarecer nuestras ideas», los dos artículos donde nace el pragmatismo, y los ensayos cosmológicos sobre el azar como rasgo real del universo. Peirce publicó poco en vida y murió pobre; el reconocimiento llegó después.

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Extracto de la edición disponible
regarding matters in different lights, gradually develop beliefs in harmony with natural causes. This method resembles that by which conceptions of art have been brought to maturity. The most perfect example of it is to be found in the history of metaphysical philosophy. Systems of this sort have not usually rested upon observed facts, at least not in any great degree. They have been chiefly adopted because their fundamental propositions seemed “agreeable to reason.” This is an apt expression; it does not mean that which agrees with experience, but that which we find ourselves inclined to believe. Plato, for example, finds it agreeable to reason that the distances of the celestial spheres from one another should be proportional to the different lengths of strings which produce harmonious chords. Many philosophers have been led to their main conclusions by considerations like this; but this is the lowest and least developed form which the method takes, for it is clear that another man might find Kepler’s [earlier] theory, that the celestial spheres are proportional to the inscribed and circumscribed spheres of the different regular solids, more agreeable to _his_ reason. But the shock of opinions will soon lead men to rest on preferences of a far more universal nature. Take, for example, the doctrine that man only acts selfishly—that is, from the consideration that acting in one way will afford him more pleasure than acting in another. This rests on no fact in the world, but it has had a wide acceptance as being the only reasonable theory. This method is far more intellectual and respectable from the point of view of reason than either of the others which we have noticed. But its failure has been the most manifest.…

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