Time and free will, an essay on the immediate data of consciousness
- Idioma:
- inglés
- Estado:
- Obra completa
- Autoría:
- Escrita por el autor
- Estado del texto:
- Texto limpio
- Extensión:
- ~89.500 palabras · 425 pasajes
Cita esta obra
- APAHenri Bergson. (n.d.). Time and free will, an essay on the immediate data of consciousness. SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/es/works/henri-bergson/time-and-free-will-an-essay-on-the-immediate-data-of-consciousness
- MLAHenri Bergson. "Time and free will, an essay on the immediate data of consciousness." SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/es/works/henri-bergson/time-and-free-will-an-essay-on-the-immediate-data-of-consciousness.
- ChicagoHenri Bergson. Time and free will, an essay on the immediate data of consciousness. SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/es/works/henri-bergson/time-and-free-will-an-essay-on-the-immediate-data-of-consciousness.
De qué trata
La tesis doctoral de Bergson, de 1889, y el libro donde aparece su idea central: el tiempo que vivimos no es el tiempo que medimos.
Contexto e historia
El título francés es «Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience»; el inglés, «Time and Free Will», es del traductor y promete más de lo que el libro dice. La distinción es entre el tiempo de los relojes —homogéneo, divisible, en realidad una línea en el espacio— y la «duración», que es como el tiempo se da a la conciencia: continuo, sin partes separables, donde cada momento lleva todos los anteriores. Bergson muestra que casi todos los problemas clásicos sobre la libertad nacen de confundirlos: si se representa una decisión como un punto en una línea, ya se ha destruido aquello que había que explicar. El libro hizo famoso a Bergson y le dio una influencia enorme hasta los años treinta, cuando desapareció casi del todo; ahora vuelve a leerse.
Contexto editorial, no una fuente citable: a diferencia de los pasajes de la obra, estos datos no se pueden comprobar contra el corpus.
This latter thesis, which is maintained by psychophysicists, we shall examine later ; but even the opponents of psychophysics do not see any harm in speaking of one sensation as being more intense than another, of one effort as being greater than another, and in thus setting up differences of quantity between purely internal states. Com mon sense, moreover, has not the slightest hesita tion in giving its verdict on this point ; people say they are more or less warm, or more or less sad, and this distinction of more and less, even when it is carried over to the region of subjec tive facts and un extended objects, surprises nobody. But this involves a very obscure point and a much more important problem than is usually supposed. When we assert that one number is greater than another number or one body greater than another body, we know very well what we mean. SS'ca-For in both cases we allude to unequal Statob!Hlt spaces, as shall be shown in detail a to Intensities. ^^ further on> and we call that Space the greater which contains the other. But how can a more intense sensation contain one of less intensity ? Shall we say that the first implies the second, that we reach the sensation of higher intensity only on condition of having first passed through the less intense stages of the same sensa tion, and that in a certain sense we are concerned, here also, with the relation of container to con tained ? This conception of intensive magnitude seems, indeed, to be that of common sense, but we cannot advance it as a philosophical explanation without becoming involved in a vicious circle.…