SigPhiSigPhi

Epistemología (ed. 2)

Johann Fichte

Idioma:
inglés
Estado:
Obra completa
Autoría:
Escrita por el autor
Estado del texto:
Sin ruido de escaneo detectado (medición automática sobre todo el texto, no revisada a mano)
Extensión:
~15.200 palabras · 72 pasajes
Cita esta obra
  • APAJohann Fichte. (n.d.). Concerning the Conception of the Science of Knowledge Generally [Epistemología (ed. 2)]. Digital reproduction: SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/es/works/johann-fichte/concerning-the-conception-of-the-science-of-knowledge-generally
  • MLAJohann Fichte. Concerning the Conception of the Science of Knowledge Generally [Epistemología (ed. 2)]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/es/works/johann-fichte/concerning-the-conception-of-the-science-of-knowledge-generally.
  • ChicagoJohann Fichte. Concerning the Conception of the Science of Knowledge Generally [Epistemología (ed. 2)]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/es/works/johann-fichte/concerning-the-conception-of-the-science-of-knowledge-generally.

Referencia de la edición reproducida. SigPhi es la reproducción digital. Se incluyen año, editorial y traductor cuando constan; «n.d.» indica que no consta el año.

De qué trata

Sobre el concepto de la Doctrina de la ciencia (1794): el programa del sistema, antes del sistema.

Contexto e historia

Fichte publicó este texto breve para anunciar lo que se proponía: una filosofía deducida entera de un solo principio, la actividad del yo. Es la puerta de entrada a la Wissenschaftslehre, que reescribió una docena de veces y nunca dio por acabada. Es una traducción inglesa antigua. En el catálogo hay también Fichte en alemán; el original es lo que hay que citar.

Contexto editorial, no una fuente citable: a diferencia de los pasajes de la obra, estos datos no se pueden comprobar contra el corpus.

Extracto de la edición disponible
No proposition is possible without content or without form. It must contain something whereof we know, and something which is known thereof. Hence, the first principle of the science of knowledge must have both content and form. Now, this first principle is to be immediately and of itself certain, and this can only signify: its content must determine its form, and its form its content. Its form can only fit its content, and its content can only fit its form; every other form connected with that content, or every other content connected with that form, would cancel that principle itself, and thus annihilate all knowledge. Hence, the form of the absolute first principle of the science of knowledge is not only contained in that principle itself, but is also presented as absolutely valid for the content of that principle. Again: if there should be, besides this absolute first principle, still other fundamental principles of the science of knowledge—which in that case can only be partly absolute, and must be partly derived from the first principle, since otherwise in the first case they would not be fundamental principles, and in the latter case not connected with the first and highest principle—then the absolute part of these other fundamental principles could only be either the content or the form; and, likewise, the conditioned or derived part of these principles could only be either the content or the form. If the content of these other fundamental principles be their absolute or unconditioned part, then the absolute first principle of the science of knowledge must condition the form of those contents; or if the form of those other principles be the unconditioned part, then their content must be conditioned by the first principle of the science of knowledge; and thus indirectly also their form, that is, in so far as the form is to be form of the content.…

Lee esta edición →

← Volver a Johann Fichte