El concepto de la angustia
- Idioma:
- inglés
- Estado:
- Obra completa
- Autoría:
- Escrita por el autor
- Estado del texto:
- Sin ruido de escaneo detectado (medición automática sobre todo el texto, no revisada a mano)
- Extensión:
- ~76.400 palabras · 363 pasajes
Cita esta obra
- APASøren Kierkegaard. (n.d.). the concept of dread [El concepto de la angustia]. Digital reproduction: SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/es/works/kierkegaard/the-concept-of-dread
- MLASøren Kierkegaard. the concept of dread [El concepto de la angustia]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/es/works/kierkegaard/the-concept-of-dread.
- ChicagoSøren Kierkegaard. the concept of dread [El concepto de la angustia]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/es/works/kierkegaard/the-concept-of-dread.
Referencia de la edición que reproduce SigPhi: SigPhi es su reproducción digital, no el editor. El año de la edición no consta en los metadatos (por eso «n.d.») y el traductor solo aparece cuando consta.
De qué trata
La angustia examinada como concepto: qué es exactamente ese miedo que no tiene objeto, y qué tiene que ver con el pecado original.
Contexto e historia
Publicado en 1844 bajo el seudónimo de Vigilius Haufniensis. La definición que se cita es que la angustia es el vértigo de la libertad: no temes algo concreto, temes que podrías hacer cualquier cosa. El libro pasa por psicológico y a ratos lo es, pero está escrito contra Hegel y contra la idea de que el pecado pueda explicarse dentro de un sistema; por eso insiste en que llega siempre por un salto, no por una deducción.
Contexto editorial, no una fuente citable: a diferencia de los pasajes de la obra, estos datos no se pueden comprobar contra el corpus.
Thus when sometimes in the course of investigations which are hardly more than propaedeutic 4 one finds the word "reconciliation" used to designate speculative knowledge, or the identity of the knowing subject and the thing known, the subjective-objective, etc., then one easily sees that the author is brilliant and that by the aid of his esprit he has explained all riddles, especially for those who do not even scientifically take the precaution, which yet one takes in everyday life, to listen carefully to the words of the riddle before guessing it. Otherwise one acquires the incomparable merit of having by one's explanation propounded a new riddle, namely, how it could occur to any man that this might be the explanation. That thought possesses reality was the assumption of all ancient philosophy as well as of the philosophy of the Middle Ages. With Kant this assumption became doubtful. Suppose now that the Hegelian school had really thought through Kant's scepticism (however, this ought always to remain a big question, in spite of all Hegel and his school 5 have done, by the help of the catchwords "Method and Manifestation," to hide what Schelling 8 recognized more openly by the cue "intellectual intuition and construction," the fact, namely, that this was a new point of departure) and then reconstructed the earlier view in a higher form, in such wise that thought does not possess reality by virtue INTRODUCTION 11 of a presupposition — is then this consciously produced reality of thought a reconciliation ? In fact philosophy is merely brought back to the point where in old days one began, in the old days when precisely the word "reconciliation" had immense significance. We have an old and respectable philosophical terminology: thesis, antithesis, synthesis. They invent a newer one in which mediation occupies the third place. Is this to be considered such an extraordinary step in advance?…