Aurora. Reflexiones sobre los prejuicios morales
- Idioma:
- inglés
- Estado:
- Obra completa
- Autoría:
- Escrita por el autor
- Estado del texto:
- Sin ruido de escaneo detectado (medición automática sobre todo el texto, no revisada a mano)
- Extensión:
- ~100.000 palabras · 477 pasajes
Cita esta obra
- APANietzsche. (n.d.). The Dawn of Day [Aurora. Reflexiones sobre los prejuicios morales]. Digital reproduction: SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/es/works/nietzsche/the-dawn-of-day
- MLANietzsche. The Dawn of Day [Aurora. Reflexiones sobre los prejuicios morales]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/es/works/nietzsche/the-dawn-of-day.
- ChicagoNietzsche. The Dawn of Day [Aurora. Reflexiones sobre los prejuicios morales]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/es/works/nietzsche/the-dawn-of-day.
Referencia de la edición reproducida. SigPhi es la reproducción digital. Se incluyen año, editorial y traductor cuando constan; «n.d.» indica que no consta el año.
De qué trata
Aurora (1881): la campaña contra la moral, hecha despacio y sin gritar.
Contexto e historia
Nietzsche lo llamaba el libro del «sí» anterior a los grandes «no». Aquí no destruye la moral, la socava: enseña que los sentimientos que tenemos por más puros llevan detrás una historia y unos intereses. El más infravalorado de sus libros. Es una traducción inglesa de la edición completa dirigida por Oscar Levy (1909-1913), la que está en dominio público. Tiene más de un siglo y se le nota. El original es ALEMÁN y al citar hay que seguir el original, pero de esta obra aquí solo está la traducción.
Contexto editorial, no una fuente citable: a diferencia de los pasajes de la obra, estos datos no se pueden comprobar contra el corpus.
already laid in ruins? Oh, how wrong is the answer which, even in our own day, rolls glibly off the tongue when this question is asked: “Because they have all neglected the prerequisite, the examination of the foundation, a critique of all reason”—that fatal answer made by Kant, who has certainly not thereby attracted us modern philosophers to firmer and less treacherous ground! (and, one may ask apropos of this, was it not rather strange to demand that an instrument should criticise its own value and effectiveness? that the intellect itself should “recognise” its own worth, power, and limits? was it not even just a little ridiculous?) The right answer would rather have been, that all philosophers, including Kant himself were building under the seductive influence of morality—that they aimed at certainty and “truth” only in appearance; but that in reality their attention was directed towards “_majestic moral edifices_,” to use once more Kant’s innocent mode of expression, who deems it his “less brilliant, but not undeserving” task and work “to level the ground and prepare a solid foundation for the erection of those majestic moral edifices” (_Critique of Pure Reason_, ii. 257). Alas! He did not succeed in his aim, quite the contrary—as we must acknowledge to-day. With this exalted aim, Kant was merely a true son of his century, which more than any other may justly be called the century of exaltation: and this he fortunately continued to be in respect to the more valuable side of this century (with that solid piece of sensuality, for example, which he introduced into his theory of knowledge). He, too, had been bitten by the moral tarantula, Rousseau; he, too, felt weighing on his soul that moral fanaticism of which another disciple of Rousseau’s, Robespierre, felt and proclaimed himself to be the executor: _de fonder sur la terre l’empire de la sagesse, de la justice, et de la vertu_. (Speech of June 4th, 1794.…