Thomas Reid
- Idioma:
- inglés
- Estado:
- Obra completa
- Autoría:
- Escrita por el autor
- Estado del texto:
- Sin ruido de escaneo detectado (medición automática sobre todo el texto, no revisada a mano)
- Extensión:
- ~130.000 palabras · 612 pasajes
Cita esta obra
- APAThomas Reid. (n.d.). An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense [Thomas Reid]. Digital reproduction: SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/es/works/thomas-reid/an-inquiry-into-the-human-mind-on-the-principles-of-common-sense
- MLAThomas Reid. An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense [Thomas Reid]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/es/works/thomas-reid/an-inquiry-into-the-human-mind-on-the-principles-of-common-sense.
- ChicagoThomas Reid. An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense [Thomas Reid]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/es/works/thomas-reid/an-inquiry-into-the-human-mind-on-the-principles-of-common-sense.
Referencia de la edición reproducida. SigPhi es la reproducción digital. Se incluyen año, editorial y traductor cuando constan; «n.d.» indica que no consta el año.
De qué trata
El primer libro de Reid, de 1764, y el más directo: un examen de los cinco sentidos para mostrar que la percepción no funciona como decía la filosofía recibida.
Contexto e historia
Reid explica al principio que leyendo a Hume vio que sus conclusiones se seguían correctamente de una premisa que todos aceptaban, y que por tanto la premisa debía ser falsa. Este libro es la demostración del caso por casos concretos: dedica un capítulo al olfato, uno al gusto, uno al oído, uno al tacto y cuatro a la vista, y en cada uno muestra que la sensación y la percepción no son lo mismo, y que lo que percibimos no son ideas sino objetos. El análisis de la vista y de la percepción de la distancia influyó en la psicología experimental posterior. Las dos obras más extensas de Reid —los «Poderes intelectuales» y los «Poderes activos»— están en el corpus y vienen después.
Contexto editorial, no una fuente citable: a diferencia de los pasajes de la obra, estos datos no se pueden comprobar contra el corpus.
The language of philosophers, with regard to the original faculties of the mind, is so adapted to the prevailing system that it cannot fit any other ; like a coat that fits the man for whom it was made, and shows him to advantage, which yet will sit very awkward upon one of a different make, although perhaps as handsome and as well proportioned. It is hardly possible to make any innovation in our philosophy concerning the mind and its operations, without using new words and phrases, or giving a different meaning to those that are received ; a liberty which, even when necessary, creates prejudice and misconstruction, and which must wait the sanction of time to authorize it. For, innovations in language, like those in religion and government, are always suspected and disliked by the many, till use hath made them familiar and prescription have given them a title. If the original perceptions and motions of the mind were to make their appearance single and unmixed, as we first received them from the hand of nature, one accustomed to reflection would have less difficulty in tracing them ; but before we are capable of reflection, they are so mixed, compounded, and decompounded by habits, associations, and abstractions, that it is hard to know what they were originally. The mind may in this respect be compared to an apothecary or a chemist, whose materials indeed are furnished by nature; but for the purposes of his art, he mixes, compounds, dissolves, evaporates, and sublimes them, till they put on a quite different appearance ; so that it is very difficult to know what they were 6 OF THE HUMAN MIND. [CHAP. I. at first, and much more to bring them back to their original and natural form.…