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The Will to Believe, and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy

William James

Idioma:
inglés
Estado:
Obra completa
Autoría:
Escrita por el autor
Estado del texto:
Sin ruido de escaneo detectado (medición automática sobre todo el texto, no revisada a mano)
Extensión:
~110.000 palabras · 505 pasajes
Cita esta obra
  • APAWilliam James. (n.d.). The Will to Believe, and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy. Digital reproduction: SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/es/works/william-james/the-will-to-believe-and-other-essays-in-popular-philosophy
  • MLAWilliam James. The Will to Believe, and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy. Digital reproduction, SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/es/works/william-james/the-will-to-believe-and-other-essays-in-popular-philosophy.
  • ChicagoWilliam James. The Will to Believe, and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy. Digital reproduction, SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/es/works/william-james/the-will-to-believe-and-other-essays-in-popular-philosophy.

Referencia de la edición que reproduce SigPhi: SigPhi es su reproducción digital, no el editor. El año de la edición no consta en los metadatos (por eso «n.d.») y el traductor solo aparece cuando consta.

De qué trata

La recopilación de 1897 encabezada por su ensayo más discutido: ¿cuándo es legítimo creer algo que la evidencia no decide?

Contexto e historia

El argumento de James es más estrecho de lo que el título sugiere, y conviene saberlo porque se le ha atribuido lo contrario. Solo vale, dice él, cuando la opción es «viva» (las dos posibilidades te dicen algo), «forzosa» (no decidir ya es decidir) y «trascendental» (te juegas algo irreversible), y solo cuando la evidencia no basta por sí sola. En esos casos —y pone como ejemplos la fe religiosa y la confianza en otra persona— exigir pruebas antes de comprometerse no es neutralidad: es una manera de elegir. El resto del volumen contiene «Is Life Worth Living?» y «The Dilemma of Determinism», y el conjunto es la puerta de entrada más legible al pragmatismo americano.

Contexto editorial, no una fuente citable: a diferencia de los pasajes de la obra, estos datos no se pueden comprobar contra el corpus.

Cómo empieza
history proves that one hypothesis after another has worked ill, has crumbled at contact with a widening knowledge of the world, and has lapsed from the minds of men. Some articles of faith, however, have maintained themselves through every vicissitude, and possess even more vitality to-day than ever before: it is for the 'science of religions' to tell us just which hypotheses these are. Meanwhile the freest competition of the various faiths with one another, and their openest application to life by their several champions, are the most favorable conditions under which the survival of the fittest can proceed. They ought therefore not to lie hid each under its bushel, indulged-in quietly with friends. They ought to live in publicity, vying with each other; and it seems to me that (the régime of tolerance once granted, and a fair field shown) the scientist has nothing to fear for his own interests from the liveliest possible state of fermentation in the religious world of his time. Those faiths will best stand the test which adopt also his hypotheses, and make them integral elements of their own. He should welcome therefore every species of religious agitation and discussion, so long as he is willing to allow that some religious hypothesis _may_ be {xiii} true. Of course there are plenty of scientists who would deny that dogmatically, maintaining that science has already ruled all possible religious hypotheses out of court. Such scientists ought, I agree, to aim at imposing privacy on religious faiths, the public manifestation of which could only be a nuisance in their eyes. With all such scientists, as well as with their allies outside of science, my quarrel openly lies; and I hope that my book may do something to persuade the reader of their crudity, and range him on my side.…

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