It seems, then, that by participation in this quality, that is, justness, the supremely good Substance is called just. But, if this is so, it is just through an- other, and not through itself. But this is contrary to the truth already established, that it is good, or great, or whatever it is at all, through itself and not through another. So, if it is not just, except through just- ness, and cannot be just, except through itself, what can be more clear than that this Nature is itself just- ness? And, when it is said to be just through just- ness, it is the same as saying that it is just through itself. And, when it is said to be just through itself, nothing else is understood than that it is just through justness. Hence, if it is inquired what the supreme Nature, which is in question, is in itself, what truer answer can be given, than Justness?
We must observe, then, how we are to understand the statement, that the Nature which is itself justness s just. For, since a man cannot be justness, but can Possess justness, we do not conceive of a just man as being justness, but as possessing justness. Since, on the other hand, it cannot properly be said of the su- preme Nature that it possesses justness, but that it is justness, when it is called just it is properly conceived °f as being justness, but not as possessing justness. Hence, if, when it is said to be justness, it is not said °f what character it is, but what it is, it follows that, when it is called just, it is not said of what character it is, but what it is.
66 ANSELM.
Therefore, seeing that it is the same to say of the supreme Being, that it is just and that it is justness; and, when it is said that it is justness, it is nothing else than saying that it is just; it makes no difference whether it is said to be justness or to be just. Hence, when one is asked regarding the supreme Nature, what it is, the answer, Just, is not less fitting than the answer, Justness. Moreover, what we see to have been proved in the case of justness, the intellect is compelled to acknowledge as true of all attributes which are similarly predicated of this supreme Na- ture. Whatever such attribute is predicated of it, then, it is shown, not of what character, or how great, but what it is.
But it is obvious that whatever good thing the supreme Nature is, it is in the highest degree. It is, therefore, supreme Being, supreme Justness, supreme Wisdom, supreme Truth, supreme Goodness, supreme Greatness, supreme Beauty, supreme Immortality, supreme Incorruptibility, supreme Immutability, su- preme Blessedness, supreme Eternity, supreme Power, supreme Unity; which is nothing else than supremely being, supremely living, etc.
CHAPTER XVII.
It is simple in such a way that all things that can be said of its essence are one and the same in it: and nothing can be said % of its substance except in terms of what it is.
Is it to be inferred, then, that if the supreme Na- ture is so many goods, it will therefore be compounded of more goods than one? Or is it true, rather, that there are not more goods than one, but a single good \ I MONOLOGIUM. 67 described by many names? For, everything which is composite requires for its subsistence the things of which it is compounded, and, indeed, owes to them the fact of its existence, because, whatever it is, it is through these things; and they are not what they are through it, and therefore it is not at all supreme. If, then, that Nature is compounded of more goods than one, all these facts that are true of every composite must be applicable to it. But this impious falsehood the whole cogency of the truth that was shown above refutes and overthrows, through a clear argument.
Since, then, that Nature is by no means composite, and yet is by all means those so many goods, neces- sarily all these are not more than one, but are one. A.ny one of them is, therefore, the same as all, whether ta.ien all at once or separately. Therefore, just as whatever is attributed to the essence of the supreme Substance is one; so this substance is whatever it is Essentially in one way, and by virtue of one consider- ation. For, when a man is said to be a material body, a»nd rational, and human, these three things are not said in one way, or in virtue of one consideration. For, in accordance with one fact, he is a material body; and in accordance with another, rational; and no one of these, taken by itself, is the whole of what man is.
That supreme Being, however, is by no means anything in such a way that it is not this same thing, according to another way, or another consideration; because, whatever it is essentially in any way, this is all of what it is. Therefore, nothing that is truly said of the supreme Being is accepted in terms of quality or quantity, but only in terms of what it is. For, whatever it is in terms of either quality or quantity i 68 ANSELM.
would constitute still another element, in terms of what it is; hence, it would not be simple, but com- posite.
CHAPTER XVIII. It is without beginning and without end.
From what time, then, has this so simple Nature which creates and animates all things existed, or until what time is it to exist? Or rather, let us ask neither from what time, nor to what time, it exists; but is it without beginning and without end? For, if it has a beginning, it has this either from or through itself, or from or through another, or from or through nothing.
But it is certain, according to truths already made plain, that in no wise does it derive existence from another, or from nothing; or exist through another, or through nothing. In no wise, therefore, has it had inception through or from another, or through or from nothing.
Moreover, it cannot have inception from or through itself, although it exists from and through itself. For it so exists from and through itself, that by no means is there one essence which exists from and through itself, and another through which, and from which, it exists. But, whatever begins to exist from or through something, is by no means identical with that from or through which it begins to exist. Therefore, the su- preme Nature does not begin through or from, itself.
Seeing, then, that it has a beginning neither through nor from itself, and neither through nor from nothing, it assuredly has no beginning at all. But neither will it have an end. For, if it is to have end, it is not supremely immortal and supremely incorrupt- MONOLOGIUM. 69 ible. But we have proved that it is supremely immor- tal and supremely incorruptible. Therefore, it will not have an end.
Furthermore, if it is to have an end, it will perish either willingly or against its will. But certainly that is not a simple, unmixed good, at whose will the su- preme good perishes. But this Being is itself the true and simple, unmixed good. Therefore, that very Being, which is certainly the supreme good, will not die of its own will. If, however, it is to perish against its will, it is not supremely powerful, or all-powerful. But cogent reasoning has asserted it to be powerful and all-powerful. Therefore, it will not die against its will. Hence, if neither with nor against its will the supreme Nature is to have an end, in no way will it have an end.
Again, if the supreme nature has an end or a be- ginning, it is not true eternity, which it has been irrefutably proved to be above.
Then, let him who can conceive of a time when this began to be true, or when it was not true, namely, that something was destined to be; or when this shall cease to be true, and shall not be true, namely, that something has existed. But, if neither of these sup- positions is conceivable, and both these facts cannot exist without truth, it is impossible even to conceive that truth has either beginning or end. And then, if truth had a beginning, or shall have an end; before it began it was true that truth did not exist, and after it shall be ended it will be true that truth will not exist. Yet, anything that is true cannot exist without truth. Therefore, truth existed before truth existed, and truth will exist after truth shall be ended, which is a most contradictory conclusion. Whether, then, 70 ANSELM.
truth is said to have, or understood not to have, be- ginning or end, it cannot be limited by any beginning or end. Hence, the same follows as regards the su- preme Nature, since it is itself the supreme Truth.
CHAPTER XIX. In what sense nothing existed before or will exist after this Being.
But here we are again confronted by the term nothing, and whatever our reasoning thus far, with the concordant attestation of truth and necessity, has concluded nothing to be. For, if the propositions duly set forth above have been confirmed by the for- tification of logically necessary truth, not anything existed before the supreme Being, nor will anything exist after it. Hence, nothing existed before, and nothing will exist after, it. For, either something or nothing must have preceded it; and either something or nothing must be destined to follow it.
But, he who says that nothing existed before it appears to make this statement, "that there was be- fore it a time when nothing existed, and that there will be after it a time when nothing will exist." There- fore, when nothing existed, that Being did not exist, and when nothing shall exist, that Being will not ex- ist. How is it, then, that it does not take inception from nothing or how is it that it will not come to noth- ing? — if that Being did not yet exist, when nothing already existed; and the same Being shall no longer exist, when nothing shall still exist. Of what avail is so weighty a mass of arguments, if this nothing so easily demolishes their structure? For, if it is estab- lished that the supreme Being succeeds nothing, 1 which 1 Nothing is here treated as an entity, supposed actually to precede the supreme Being in existence. The fallacy involved is shown below. — TV.
MONOLOGIUM. 7 1 precedes it, and yields its place to nothing, which fol- lows it, whatever has been posited as true above is necessarily unsettled by empty nothing.
But, rather ought this nothing to be resisted, lest so many structures of cogent reasoning be stormed by nothing; and the supreme good, which has been sought and found by the light of truth, be lost for nothing. Let it rather be declared, then, that nothing did not exist before the supreme Being, and that nothing will not exist after it, rather than that, when a place is given before or after it to nothing, that Being which through itself brought into existence what was noth- ing, should be reduced through nothing to nothing.
For this one assertion, namely, that nothing ex- isted before the supreme Being, carries two meanings. X^or, one sense of this statement is that, before the supreme Being, there was a time when nothing was. UBut another understanding of the same statement is *hat, before the supreme Being, not anything existed. Just as, supposing I should say, "Nothing has taught *ne to fly," I could explain this assertion either in this way, that nothing, as an entity in itself, which signifies not anything, has taught me actually to fly — ^which would be false; or in this way, that not any- thing has taught me to fly, which would be true.
The former interpretation, therefore, which is fol- lowed by the inconsistency discussed above, is re- jected by all reasoning as false. But there remains the other interpretation, which unites in perfect con- sistency with the foregoing arguments, and which, from the force of their whole correlation, must be true.
Hence, the statement that nothing existed before that Being must be received in the latter sense. Nor 72 ABSWLM.
should it be so explained, that it shall be understood that there was any time when that Being did not ex- ist, and nothing did exist; but,, so that it shall be understood that, before that Being, there was not anything. The same sort of double signification is found in the statement that nothing will exist aftei that Being.
If, then, this interpretation of the term nothing. that has been given, is carefully analysed, most trul] neither something nor nothing preceded or will follov the supreme Being, and the conclusion is reached that nothing existed before or will exist after it. Yet the solidity of the truths already established is in n< wise impaired by the emptiness of nothing.
CHAPTER XX. It exists in every place and at every time.
But, although it has been concluded above tha this creative Nature exists everywhere, and in a] things, and through all; and from the fact that i neither began, nor will cease to be, it follows that i always has been, and is, and will be; yet, I perceiv* a certain secret murmur of contradiction which com pels me to inquire more carefully where and whei that Nature exists.
The supreme Being, then, exists either everywhere and always, or merely at some place and time, or no where and never: or, as I express it, either in every place and at every time, or finitely, in some place and at some time, or in no place and at no time.
But what can be more obviously contradictory, than that what exists most really and supremely exists nowhere and never? It is, therefore, false that it ex- MONOLOGIUM. 73 ists nowhere and never. Again, since there is no good, nor anything at all without it; if this Being it- self exists nowhere or never, then nowhere or never is there any good, and nowhere and never is there anything at all. But there is no need to state that this is false. Hence, the former proposition is also false, that that Being exists nowhere and never.
It therefore exists finitely, at some time and place, or everywhere and always. But, if it exists finitely, at some place or time, there and then only, where and ^when it exists, can anything exist. Where and when it does not exist, moreover, there is no existence at all, because, without it, nothing exists. Whence it "will follow, that there is some place and time where and when nothing at all exists. But seeing that this is false — for place and time themselves are existing things — the supreme Nature cannot exist finitely, at some place or time. But, if it is said that it of itself exists finitely,' at some place and time, but that, through its power, it is wherever and whenever any- thing is, this is not true. For, since it is manifest that its power is nothing else than itself, by no means does its power exist without it.
Since, then, it does not exist finitely, at some place or time, it must exist everywhere and always, that is, in every place and at every time.
CHAPTER XXI. It exists in no place or time.
But, if this is true, either it exists in every place and at every time, or else only a part of it so exists, the other part transcending every place and time.
But, if in part it exists, and in part does not exist, 74 ANSELM.
in every place and at every time, it has parts; which is false. It does not, therefore, exist everywhere and always in part.
But how does it exist as a whole, everywhere and always? For, either it is to be understood that it ex- ists as a whole at once, in all places or at all times, and by parts in individual places and times; or, that it exists as a whole, in individual places and times as well.
But, if it exists by parts in individual places or times, it is not exempt from composition and division of parts; which has been found to be in a high degree alien to the supreme Nature. Hence, it does not so exist, as a whole, in all places and at all times that it exists by parts in individual places and times.
We are confronted, then, by the former alterna- tive, that is, how the supreme Nature can exist, as a whole, in every individual place and time. This is doubtless impossible, unless it either exists at once or at different times in individual places or times. But, since the law of place and the law of time, the inves- tigation of which it has hitherto been possible to pros- ecute in a single discussion, because they advanced on exactly the same lines, here separate one from an- other and seem to avoid debate, as if by evasion in diverse directions, let each be investigated indepen- dently in discussion directed on itself alone.
First, then, let us see whether the supreme Nature can exist, as a whole, in individual places, either at once in all, or at different times, in different places. Then, let us make the same inquiry regarding the times at which it can exist.
If, then, it exists as a whole in each individual place, then, for each individual place there is an indi- MONOLOGIUM. 75 vidual whole. For, just as place is so distinguished from place that there are individual places, so that which exists as a whole, in one place, is so distinct from that which exists as a whole at the same time, in another place, that there are individual wholes. For, of what exists as a whole, in any place, there is no part that does not exist in that place. And that of "which there is no part that does not exist in a given place, is no part of what exists at the same time out- side this place.
What exists as a whole, then, in any place, is no X>art of what exists at the same time outside that jplace. But, of that of which no part exists outside siny given place, no part exists, at the same time, in smother place. How, then, can what exists as a -"whole, in any place, exist simultaneously, as a whole, 5n another place, if no part of it can at that time exist Sn another place?
Since, then, one whole cannot exist as a whole in different places at the same time, it follows that, for individual places, there are individual wholes, if any- thing is to exist as a whole in different individual places at once. Hence, if the supreme Nature exists as a whole, at one time, in every individual place, there are as many supreme Natures as there can be individual places; which it would be irrational to be- lieve. Therefore, it does not exist, as a whole, at one time in individual places.
If, however, at different times it exists, as a whole, in individual places, then, when it is in one place, there is in the meantime no good and no existence in other places, since without it absolutely nothing ex- ists. But the absurdity of this supposition is proved by the existence of places themselves, which are not 76 ANSELM.
nothing, but something. Therefore, the supreme Na- ture does not exist, as a whole, in individual places at different times.
But, if neither at the same time nor at different times does it exist, as a whole, in individual places, it is evident that it does not at all exist, as a whole, in each individual place. We must now examine, then, whether this supreme Nature exists, as a whole, at individual times, either simultaneously or at dis- tinct times for individual times.
But, how can anything exist, as a whole, simul- taneously, at individual times, if these times are not themselves simultaneous? But, if this Being exists, as a whole, separately and at distinct times for indi- vidual times, just as a man exists as a whole yester- day, to-day, and to-morrrow; it is properly said that it was and is and will be. Its age, then, which is no other than its eternity, does not exist, as a whole, simultaneously, but it is distributed in parts accord- ing to the parts of time.
But its eternity is nothing else than itself. The supreme Being, then, will be divided into parts, ac- cording to the divisions of time. For, if its age is prolonged through periods of time, it has with this time present, past, and future. But what else is its age than its duration of existence, than its eternity? Since, then, its eternity is nothing else than its essence, as considerations set forth above irrefutably prove; if its eternity has past, present, and future, its essence also has, in consequence, past, present, and future.
But what is past is not present or future; and what is present is not past or future; and what is fu- ture is not past or present. How, then, shall that MONOLOGIUM. 77 proposition be valid, which was proved with clear and logical cogency above, namely, that that supreme Na- ture i s; n no w j se composite, but is supremely simple, su P*emely immutable? — how shall this be so, if that Nature is one thing, at one time, and another, at an- other, and has parts distributed according to times? Or rather, if these earlier propositions are true, how ca & these latter be possible? By no means, then, is Past or future attributable to the creative Being, either rts age or its eternity. For why has it not a present, tfit truly is? But was means past, and will be future, therefore that Being never was, nor will be. Hence, Jt does not exist at distinct times, just as it does not ex *st, as a whole, simultaneously in different indi- vidual times.
If, then, as our discussion has proved, it neither so Exists, as a whole, in allplaces or times that it ex- 1S *^» as a whole, at one time in all, or by parts in in- "^idual places and times; nor so that it exists, as a w **ole, in individual times and places, it is manifest tfl ^.t it does not in any way exist, as a whole, in every t ll x*e or place.
And, since, in like manner, it has been demon- seated that it neither so exists in every time or place, tr *^.t a part exists in every, and a part transcends ev ^ry, place and time, it is impossible that it exists ev *^ry where and always.
For, in no way can it be conceived to exist every- ^l*ere and always, except either as a whole or in part. f^Ht if it does not at all exist everywhere and always, ^ "will exist either finitely in some place or time, or in 11 One. But it has already been proved, that it cannot ^cist finitely, in any place or time. In no place or ***ne, that is, nowhere and never does it exist. For 78 ANSBLM.
it cannot exist, except in every or in some place or time.
But, on the other hand, since it is irrefutably established, not only that it exists through itself, and without beginning and without end, but that without it nothing anywhere or ever exists, it must exist every- where and always.
CHAPTER XXII. How it exists in every place and time, and in none.
How, then, shall these propositions, that are so necessary according to our exposition, and so neces- sary according to our proof, be reconciled? Perhaps the supreme Nature exists in place and time in some such way, that it is not prevented from so existing simultaneously, as a whole, in different places or times, that there are not more wholes than one; and that its age, which does not exist, except as true eternity, is not distributed among past, present, and future.
For, to this law of space and time, nothing seems to be subject, except the beings which so exist in space or time that they do not transcend extent of space or duration of time. Hence, though of beings of this class it is with all truth asserted that one and the same whole cannot exist simultaneously, as a whole, in different places or times; in the case of those beings which are not of this class, no such con- clusion is necessarily reached.
For it seems to be rightly said, that place is pre- dicable only of objects whose magnitude place con- tains by including it, and includes by containing it; and that time is predicable only of objects whose durafe.
MONOLOGIUM. 79 tion time ends by measuring it, and measures by end iag it. Hence, to any being, to whose spatial extent or duration no bound can be set, either by space or time, no place or time is properly attributed. For, seeing that place does not act upon it as place, nor time as time, it is not irrational to say, that no place is its place, and no time its time.
But, what evidently has no place or time is doubt- less by no means compelled to submit to the law of place or time. No law of place or time, then, in any way governs any nature, which no place or time limits by some kind of restraint. But what rational con- sideration can by any course of reasoning fail to reach the conclusion, that the Substance which creates and is supreme among all beings, which must be alien to, and free from, the nature and law of all things which itself created from nothing, is limited by no re- straint of space or time; since, more truly, its power, which is nothing else than its essence, contains and deludes under itself all these things which it created? Is it not impudently foolish, too, to say either, *hat space circumscribes the magnitude of truth, or, *hat time measures its duration — truth, which regards n o greatness or smallness of spatial or temporal ex- tent at all?
Seeing, then, that this is the condition of place or time; that only whatever is limited by their bounds either escapes the law of parts — such as place fol- lows, according to magnitude, or such as time sub- mits to, according to duration — nor can in any way he contained, as a whole, simultaneously by different Places or times; but whatever is in no wise confined hy the restraint of place or time, is not compelled by an y law of places or times to multiplicity of parts, 80 ANSKLM.
nor is it prevented from being present, as a whole and simultaneously, in more places or times than one — seeing, I say, that this is the condition governing place or time, no doubt the supreme Substance, which is encompassed by no restraint of place or time, is bound by none of their laws.
Hence, since inevitable necessity requires that the supreme Being, as a whole, be lacking to no place or time, and no law of place or time prevents it from be- ing simultaneously in every place or time; it must be simultaneously present in every individual place or time. For, because it is present in one place, it is not therefore prevented from being present at the same time, and in like manner in this, or that other, place or time.
Nor, because it was, or is, or shall be, has any part of its eternity therefore vanished from the pres- ent, with the past, which no longer is; nor does it pass with the present, which is, for an instant; nor is it to come with the future, which is not yet.
For, by no means is that Being compelled or for- bidden by a law of space or time to exist, or not to exist, at any place or time — the Being which, in no wise, includes its own existence in space or time. For, when the supreme Being is said to exist in space or time, although the form of expression regarding it, and regarding local and temporal natures, is the same, because of the usage of language, yet the sense is dif- ferent, because of the unlikeness of the objects of dis- cussion. For in the latter case the same expression has two meanings, namely: (i) that these objects are present in those places and times in which they are said to be, and (2) that they are contained by these places and times themselves.
MONOLOGIUM. 8 1 But in the case of the supreme Being, the first sense only is intended, namely, that it is present; not that it is also contained. If the usage of language permitted, it would, therefore, seem to be more fit- tingly said, that it exists with place or time, than that it exists in place or time. For the statement that a thing exists in another implies that it is contained, more than does the statement that it exists with an- other.
In no place or time, then, is this Being properly said to exist, since it is contained by no other at all. And yet it may be said, after a manner of its own, to be in every place or time, since whatever else exists is sustained by its presence, lest it lapse into nothing- ness. It exists in every place and time, because it is absent from none; and it exists in none, because it has no place or time, and has not taken to itself dis- tinctions of place or time, neither here nor there, nor anywhere, nor then, nor now, nor at any time; nor does it exist in terms of this fleeting present, in which we live, nor has it existed, nor will it exist, in terms of past or future, since these are restricted to things finite and mutable, which it is not.
And yet, these properties of time and place can, in some sort, be ascribed to it, since it is just as truly present in all finite and mutable beings as if it were circumscribed by the same places, and suffered change by the same times.
We have sufficient evidence, then, to dispel the contradiction that threatened us; as to how the high- est Being of all exists, everywhere and always, and nowhere and never, that is, in every place and time, and in no place or time, according to the consistent truth of different senses of the terms employed.
8a ANSELM.
CHAPTER XXIII. How it is better conceived to exist everywhere than in every place But, since it is plain that this supreme Nature is not more truly in all places than in all existing things, not as if it were contained by them, but as containing all, by permeating all, why should it not be said to be everywhere, in this sense, that it may be understood rather to be in all existing things, than merely in all places, since this sense is supported by the truth of the fact, and is not forbidden by the proper significa- tion of the word of place?
For we often quite properly apply terms of place to objects which are not places; as, when I say that the understanding is there in the soul, where rational- ity is. For, though there and where are adverbs of place, yet, by no local limitation, does the mind con- tain anything, nor is either rationality or understand- ing contained.
Hence, as regards the truth of the matter, the su- preme Nature is more appropriately said to be every- where, in this sense, that it is in all existing things, than in this sense, namely that it is merely in all places. And since, as the reasons set forth above show, it cannot exist otherwise, it must so be in all existing things, that it is one and the same perfect whole in every individual thing simultaneously.
CHAPTER XXIV How it is better understood to exist always than at every time.
It is also evident that this supreme Substance is without beginning and without end; that it has neither MONOLOGIUM. 83 P*st, nor future, nor the temporal, that is, transient Present in which we live; since its age, or eternity, which is nothing else than itself, is immutable and without parts. Is not, therefore, the term which seems to mean all time more properly understood, when applied to this Substance, to signify eternity, which is never unlike itself, rather than a changing succession of times, which is ever in some sort unlike itself?
Hence, if this Being is said to exist always; since, for it, it is the same to exist and to live, no better sense can be attached to this statement, than that it exists or lives eternally, that is, it possesses intermin- able life, as a perfect whole at once. For its eternity apparently is an interminable life, existing at once as a perfect whole.
For, since it has already been shown that this Substance is nothing else than its own life and its own eternity, is in no wise terminable, and does not exist, except as at once and perfectly whole, what else is true eternity, which is consistent with the na- ture of that Substance alone, than an interminable life, existing as at once and perfectly whole?
For this truth is, at any rate, clearly perceived from the single fact that true eternity belongs only to that substance which alone, as we have proved, was not created, but is the creator, since true eternity is conceived to be free from the limitations of beginning and end; and this is proved to be consistent with the nature of no created being, from the very fact that *U such have been created from nothing.
84 ANSELM.
CHAPTER XXV. It cannot suffer change by any accidents. 1 But does not this Being, which has been shown -« to exist as in every way substantially identical with ~*3 itself, sometimes exist as different from itself, at any "^ rate, accidentally? But how is it supremely immutable, if it can, I will not say, be, but, be conceived of, «. > as variable by virtue of accidents? And, on the other "^ J hand, does it not partake of accident, since even this ^»! very fact that it is greater than all other natures and -B=^* that it is unlike them seems to be an accident in its ^^ -< case (Jilt accidere)? But what is the inconsistency be- — — tween susceptibility to certain facts, called accidents, « "* and natural immutability, if from the undergoing oft *° ] these accidents the substance undergoes no change?^5~?
For, of all the facts, called accidents, some are understood not to be present or absent without some variation in the subject of the accident — all colors* for instance — while others are known not to effect anj change in a thing either by occurring or not occurring — certain relations, for instance. For it is certainm that I am neither older nor younger than a man whc7 is not yet born, nor equal to him, nor like him. But I shall be able to sustain and to lose all these rela- tions toward him, as soon as he shall have been born, according as he shall grow, or undergo change through divers qualities.
It is made clear, then, that of all those facts, called accidents, a part bring some degree of mutability in their train, while a part do not impair at all the im- \ Accidents, as Anselm uses the term, are facts external to the essence of a being, which may yet be conceived to produce changes in a mutable being.
MONOLOGIUM. 85 mutability of that in whose case they occur. Hence, although the supreme Nature in its simplicity has never undergone such accidents as cause mutation, yet it does not disdain occasional expression in terms of those accidents which are in no wise inconsistent -with supreme immutability; and yet there is no acci- dent respecting its essence, whence it would be con- ceived of, as itself variable.
Whence this conclusion, also, may be reached, that it is susceptible of no accident; since, just as those accidents, which effect some change by their occurrence or non-occurrence, are by virtue of this very effect of theirs regarded as being true accidents, so those facts, which lack a like effect, are found to t>e improperly called accidents. Therefore, this Es- sence is always, in every way, substantially identical ^with itself; and it is never in any way different from itself, even accidentally. But, however it may be as to the proper signification of the term accident, this is -undoubtedly true, that of the supremely immutable ^Nature no statement can be made, whence it shall be conceived of as mutable.
CHAPTER XXVI.
How this Being is said to be substance: it transcends all substance and is individually whatever it is.
But, if what we have ascertained concerning the simplicity of this Nature is established, how is it sub- stance? For, though every substance is susceptible of admixture of difference, or, at any rate, susceptible of mutation by accidents, the immutable purity of this Being is inaccessible to admixture or mutation, in any form.
86 ANSELM.
86 ANSELM.
How, then, shall it be maintained that it is a sub- stance of any kind, except as it is called substance for being, and so transcends, as it is above, every sub- stance? For, as great as is the difference between that Being, which is through itself whatever it is, and which creates every other being from nothing, and a being, which is made whatever it is through another, from nothing; so much does the supreme Substance differ from these beings, which are not what it is. And, since it alone, of all natures, derives from itself, without the help of another nature, whatever exist- ence it has, is it not whatever it is individually and apart from association with its creatures?
Hence, if it ever shares any name with other be- ings, doubtless a very different signification of that name is to be understood in its case.
CHAPTER XXVII.
It is not included among substances as commonly treated, yet it is a substance and an indivisible spirit.