Fifthly, God is a principal cause of his works which he has created immediately, such as movement in matter, &c.; in which there is no place for a subsidiary [instrumental] cause, since this is confined to particular things; as when he dries the sea by means of a strong wind, and so forth in the case of all particular things t in Nature. 10 The subsidiary provoking cause is not [found] in God, because there is nothing outside him to incite him. The predisposing It cause, on the other hand, is his perfection itself; through it he is a cause of himself, and, consequently, of all other things.
Sixthly, God alone is the first or Initial cause, as is evident from our foregoing proof.
Seventhly, God is also a Universal cause, but only in so far as he produces various things; otherwise this can never be predicated of him, as he needs no one in order 20 to produce any results.
Eighthly, God is the proximate cause of the things that are infinite, and immutable, and which we assert to have been created immediately by him, but, in one sense, he is the remote cause of all particular things.
J B omits the semi-colon before " as," in the preceding line, and gives the words " as when...particular things " in a note, instead of in the text.
tt A and B: voorgaande.
CHAPTER IV i ON GOD'S NECESSARY ACTIVITY WE deny that God can omit to do what he does, and we shall also prove it when we treat of Predestination; when we will show that all things necessarily depend on their causes. But, in the second place, this conclusion also follows from the perfection of God; for it is true, beyond a doubt, that God can make everything just as perfect as it is conceived in his Idea; and just as things' that are conceived by him cannot be conceived by him more perfectly than he conceives them, 10 so all things can be made by him so perfect that they can not come from him in a more perfect condition. Again, t when we conclude that God could not have omitted to do what he has done, we deduce this from his perfection; because, in God, it would be an imperfection to be able to omit to do what he does; we do not, however, suppose that there is a subsidiary provoking cause in God that might have moved him to action, for then he were no God.
But now, again, there is the controversy whether, namely, of all that is in his Idea, and which he can realise so 20 perfectly, whether, I say, he could omit to realise anything, and whether such an omission would be a perfection in him. Now, we maintain that, since all that happens is done by God, it must therefore necessarily be predetermined by him, otherwise he would be mutable, which would be a great imperfection in him. And as this predetermination by him must be from eternity, in which eternity there is no before or after, it follows irresistibly that God could never have predetermined things in any other way than that in which 43 44 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING 1 they are determined now, and have been from eternity, and that God could not have been either before or without these determinations. Further, if God should omit to do anything, then he must either have some cause for it, or not; if he has, then it is necessary that he should omit doing it; if he has not, then it is necessary that he should not omit to da it; this is self-evident. Moreover, in a created thing it is a perfection to exist and to have been produced by God, for, of all imperfection, non-existence is the greatest imper- 10 fection; and since God desires the welfare and perfection of all things, it would follow that if God desired that a certain thing should not exist, then the welfare and perfec tion of this thing must be supposed to consist in its non- existence, which is self-contradictory. That is why we deny that God can omit to do what he does. Some regard this as blasphemy, and as a belittling of God; but such an assertion results from a misapprehension of what constitutes hue freedom; this is by no means what they think it is, namely, the ability to do or to omit to do something good or evil; 20 but true freedom is only, or no other than [the status of being] the first cause, which is in no way constrained or coerced by anything else, and which through its perfection alone is the cause of all perfection; t consequently, if God could omit to do this, he would not be perfect: for the ability to omit doing some good, or accomplishing some perfection in what he does, can have no place in him, except through defect, tt That God alone is the only free cause is, therefore, clear not only from what has just been said, but also from this, 30 namely, that there is no external cause outside him to force or constrain him; all this is not the case with created things. Against this it is argued thus: The good is only good J B: but true freedom consists in this, that the first cause, con strained or coerced by nothing else, through its perfection alone is the cause of all perfection. JJ B: because it implies defect.
ON GOD'S NECESSARY ACTIVITY 45 because God wills it, and this being so, he can always bring i it about that evil should be good. But such reasoning is about as conclusive as if I said: It is because God wills to be God that he is God; therefore it is in his power not to be God, which is absurdity itself. Furthermore, when people do anything, and they are asked why they do it, their answer is, because it is what justice demands. If the question is then put, why justice, or rather the first cause of all that is just, *makes such a demand,* then the answer must be, because justice wills it so. But, dear me, I think to myself, 10 could Justice really be other than just? By no means, for then it could not be Justice. Those, however, who say that God does all that he does because it is good in itself, these, I say, may possibly think that they do not differ from us. But that is far from being the case, since they suppose that there is something before God I to which he has duties or obligations, namely, a cause [through] which [God] desires that this shall be good, and, again, that that shall be just.H Then comes the further controversy, namely, whether God, supposing all things had been created by him in some 20 other way from eternity, or had been ordered and pre determined to be otherwise than they now are, whether, I say, he would then be just as perfect *as he is now.* To this it may serve as an answer, that if Nature had, from all eternity, been made different from what it is now, then, from the standpoint of those who ascribe to God will and under standing, it would necessarily follow that God had a different will and a different understanding then, lit in consequence of which he would have made it different; and so we should be compelled to think that God tttt has a different character 30 I B: Goodness (Goed instead of God).
It B:...obligations, because of a desire that this shall be good, and that, again, just.
: " than now " (als nu) instead of " then " (als doen). B omits the eleven words which follow (" has...and ").
D 46 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING i now from what he had then, and had a different character then from what he has now; so that, if we assume he is most perfect now, we are compelled to say that he would not have been so had he created all things differently. All these things, involving as they do palpable absurdities, can in no way be attributed to God, who now, in the past, and unto all eternity, is, has been, and will remain immutable. We prove this also from the definition that we have given of a free cause, which is not one that can do or omit to do 10 anything, but is only such as is not dependent on anything else, so that whatever God does is done and carried into effect by him as the freest I cause. If, therefore, he had formerly made things different from what they are now, it would needs follow that he was at one time imperfect, which is falsest For, since God is the first cause of all things, there must be something in him, through which he does what he does, and omits not to do it. Since we say that Freedom does not consist in [having the choice of] doing or not doing something, and since we have also shown that 20 that which makes him [God] do anything can be nothing else than his own perfection, we conclude that, had it not been that his perfection made him do all this, then the things would not exist, and could not come into existence, in order to be what they are now. This is just like saying: if God were imperfect then things would be different from what they are now.H So much as regards the first [attribute]; we shall now pass on to the second attribute, which we call a proprium of God, and see what we have to say about it, and so on to 3o the end.
J A: wisest (alderwijste instead of aldervrijste; corrected in B). JJ B omits this sentence.
CHAPTER V i ON DIVINE PROVIDENCE THE second attribute, which we call a proprium [of God] is his Providence, which to us is nothing else than the striving which we find in the whole of Nature and in individual things to maintain and preserve their own existence. For it is manifest that no thing could, through its own nature, seek its own annihilation, but, on the contrary, that every thing has in itself a striving to preserve its condition, and to improve itself. Following these definitions of ours we, 10 therefore, posit a general and a special providence. The general [providence] is that through which all things are produced and sustained in so far as they are parts of the whole of Nature. The special providence is the striving of each thing separately to preserve its existence [each thing, that is to say], considered not as a part of Nature, but as a whole [by itself]. This is explained by the following example: All the limbs of man are provided for, and cared for, in so far as they are parts of man, this is general providence; while special [providence] is the striving of each separate 20 limb (as a whole in itself, and not as a part of man) to preserve and maintain its own well-being.
47 , CHAPTER VI ON DIVINE PREDESTINATION THE third attribute, we say, is divine predestination.
1. We proved before that God cannot omit to do what he does; that he has, namely, made everything so perfect that it cannot be more perfect.
2. And, at the same time, that without him no thing can be, or be conceived.
It remains to be seen now whether there are in Nature 10 any accidental things, that is to say, whether there are any things which may happen and may also not happen.
Secondly, whether there is any thing concerning which we cannot ask why it is.
Now that there are no accidental things we prove thus: That which has no cause to exist cannot possibly exist; that which is accidental has no cause: therefore...The first is beyond all dispute; the second we prove thus: If any thing that is accidental has a definite and certain cause why it should exist, then it must necessarily 20 exist; but that it should be both accidental and necessary at the same time, is self-contradictory; Therefore...
Perhaps some one will say, that an accidental thing has indeed no definite and certain cause, but an accidental one. If this should be so, it must be so either in sensu diviso or in sensu composite, that is to say, either the existence of the cause is accidental, and not its being a cause; or it is accidental that a certain thing (which indeed must neces sarily exist in Nature) should be the cause of the occurrence of that accidental thing. However, both the one and the 30 other are false.
48 ON DIVINE PREDESTINATION 49 For, as regards the first, if the accidental something is i accidental because [the existence of] its cause is accidental, then that cause must also be accidental, because the cause which has produced it is also accidental, etsic in infinitum.
And since it has already been proved, that all things depend on one single cause, this cause would therefore also have to be accidental: which is manifestly false.
As regards the second: if the cause were no more com pelled to produce one thing than another, that is, [if the cause were no more compelled] to produce this something 10 than not to produce it, then it would be impossible at once both that it should produce it and that it should not produce it, which is quite contradictory.
Concerning the second [question raised] above, whether there is no thing in Nature about which one cannot ask why it is, this remark of ours shows that we have to inquire through what cause a thing is real; for if this [cause] did not exist it were impossible that the thing should exist. Now, we must look for this cause either in the thing or outside the thing. If, however, any one should ask for a rule whereby 20 to conduct this inquiry, we say that none whatever seems necessary. For if existence pertains to the nature of a thing, then it is certain that we must not look outside it for its cause; but if such is not the case, then we must always look outside the thing for its cause. Since, however, the first pertains to God alone, it is thereby proved (as we have already also proved before) that God alone is the first cause of all things. From this it is also evident that this or that will of man (since the existence of the will does not pertain to its essence) must also have an external cause, by which it is necessarily 3° caused; that this is so is also evident from all that we have said in this chapter; and it will be still more evident when, in the second part, we come to consider and discuss the freedom of man.
Against all this others object: how is it possible that 50 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING i God, who is said to be supremely perfect, and the sole cause, disposer, and provider of all, nevertheless permits such confusion to be seen everywhere in Nature? Also, why has he not made man so as not to be able to sin?
Now, in the first place, it cannot be rightly said that there is confusion in Nature, since nobody knows all the causes of things so as to be able to judge accordingly. This objection, however, originates in this kind of ignorance, namely, that they have set up general Ideas, with which, 10 they think, particular things must agree if they are to be perfect. These Ideas, they state, are in the understanding of God, as many of Plato's followers have said, namely, that these general Ideas (such as Rational, Animal,! and the like) have been created by God; and although those who follow Aristotle say, indeed, that these things are not real things, only things of Reason, they nevertheless regard them frequently as [real] things, since they have clearly said that his providence does not extend to particular things, but only to kinds; for example, God has never exercised his 20 providence over Bucephalus, &c., but only over the whole genus Horse. They say also that God has no knowledge of particular and transient things, but only of the general, which, in their opinion, are imperishable. We have, how ever, rightly considered Jt this to be due to their ignorance. For it is precisely the particular things, and they alone, that have a cause, and not the general, because they are nothing.
God then is the cause of, and providence over, particular things only. If particular things had to conform to some 3o other Nature, then they could not conform to their own, and consequently could not be what they truly are. For example, if God had made all human beings like Adam before the fall, then indeed he would only have created Adam, and no Paul nor Peter; but no, it is just perfection \ B: Rational- Animal. tt B: to consider.
ON DIVINE PREDESTINATION 51 in God, that he gives to all things, from the greatest to the i least, their essence, or, to express it better, that he has all things perfectly in himself.
As regards the other [objection], why God has not made mankind so that they should not sin, to this it may serve [as an answer], that whatever is said about sin is only said with reference to us, that is, as when we compare two things with each other, or [consider one thing] from different points of view. For instance, if some one has made a clock precisely in order to strike and to show the hours, and the 10 mechanism quite fulfils the aims of its maker, then we say that it is good, but if it does not do so, then we say that it is bad, notwithstanding that even then it might still be good if only it had been his intention to make it irregular and to strike at wrong times.
We say then, in conclusion, that Peter must, as is necessary, conform to the Idea of Peter, and not to the Idea of Man; good and evil, or sin, these are only modes of thought, and by no means things, or any thing that has reality, as we shall very likely show yet more fully in what 20 follows. For all things and works which are in Nature are perfect.
CHAPTER VII CHAPTER VII ON THE ATTRIBUTES WHICH DO NOT PERTAIN TO GOD HERE we shall take up the consideration of those attributes f which are commonly attributed to God, but which, never theless, do not pertain to him; as also of those through which it is sought to prove the existence of God, though in vain; and also of the rules of accurate definition.
For this purpose, we shall not trouble ourselves very 10 much about the ideas that people commonly have of God, but we shall only inquire briefly into what the Philosophers can tell us about it. Now these have defined God as a being existing through or of himself, cause of all things. Omniscient, Almighty, eternal, simple, infinite, the highest good, of infinite compassion, &c. But before we approach this inquiry, let us just see what admissions they make to us.
f As regards the attributes of which God consists, they are only infinite substances, each of which must of itself be infinitely perfect.
20 That this must necessarily be so, we are convinced by clear and distinct reasons. It is true, however, that up to the present only two of all these infinites are known to us through their own essence; and these are thought and extension. All else that is commonly ascribed to God is not any attribute of his, but only certain modes which may be attributed to him either in consideration of all, that is, all his attributes, or in consideration of one attribute. In con sideration of all [it is said], for instance, that he is eternal, self- subsisting, infinite, cause of all things, immutable. In consideration of one [it is said], for instance, that he is omniscient, wise, &c., 30 which pertains to thought, and, again, that he is omnipresent, fills all, &c., which pertains to extension.
52 ATTRIBUTES NOT PERTAINING TO GOD 53 In the first place, they say that it is impossible to give i a true or right definition of God, because, according to their opinion, there can be no definition except per genus et differentiam, and as God is not a species of any genus, he cannot be defined rightly, or according to the rules.
In the second place, they say that God cannot be defined, because the definition must describe the thing itself and also positively; while, according to their standpoint, our knowledge of God cannot be of a positive, but only of a 10 negative kind; therefore no proper definition can be given of God.
They also say, besides, that God can never be proved a priori, because he has no cause, but only by way of probability, or from his effects.
Since by these assertions of theirs they admit sufficiently that their knowledge of God is very little and slight, let us now proceed to examine their definition.
In the first place, we do not see that they give us in it any attribute or attributes through which it can be known what 20 the thing (God) is,t but only some propria or properties which do, indeed, belong to a thing, but never explain what the thing is. For although self-subsisting, being the cause of all things, highest good, eternal and immutable, &c., are peculiar to God alone, nevertheless, from those properties we cannot know what that being, to whom these properties pertain, is, and what attributes he has.
It is now also time for us to consider the things which they ascribe to God, and which do not, however, pertain to him,t such as omniscient, merciful, wise, and so forth, which 30 things, since they are only certain modes of the thinking thing, and can by no means be, or be understood without t That is to say, when he is considered as all that he is, or with regard to all his attributes; see on this point page 5 2 n.
I B: through which the thing (namely God) can be known.
54 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING i the substances t whose modes II they are, can, con sequently, also not be attributed to him, who is a Being subsisting without the aid of anything, and solely through himself.
Lastly, they call him the highest good; but if they under stand by it something different from what they have already said, namely, that God is immutable, and a cause of all things, then they have become entangled in their own thought, or are unable to understand themselves. This is the outcome 10 of their misconception of good and evil, for they believe that man himself, and not God, is the cause of his sins and wickedness — which, according to what we have already proved, cannot be the case, else we should be compelled to assert that man is also the cause of himself. However, this will appear yet more evident when we come to consider the will of man.
It is necessary that we should now unravel their specious arguments wherewith they seek to excuse their ignorance in Theology.
20 First of all, then, they say that a correct definition must consist of a " genus " and " differentia." Now, although all the Logicians admit this, I do not know where they get it from. And, to be sure, if this must be true, then we can know nothing whatever. For if it is through a definition con sisting of genus and differentia that we can first get to know a thing perfectly, then we can never know perfectly the highest genus, which has no genus above it. Now then: If the highest genus, which is the cause of our knowledge of all other things, is not known, much less, then, can the 30 other things be understood or known which are explained by that genus. However, since we are free, and do not consider ourselves in any way tied to their assertions, we shall, in accordance with true logic, propose other rules J B: substance.
tt A: essences (wezens); B: modes (wijzeri).
ATTRIBUTES NOT PERTAINING TO GOD 55 of definition, namely, on the lines of our division of i Nature.
Now we have already seen that the attributes (or, as others call them, substances) are things, or, to express our selves better and more aptly, [constitute] a being which subsists through itself, and therefore makes itself known and reveals itself through itself.
As to the other things, we see that they are but modes of the attributes, without which also they can neither be, nor be understood. Consequently definitions must be of two 10 kinds (or sorts): 1. The first, namely, are those of attributes, which pertain to a self-subsisting being, these need no genus, or anything, through which they might be better understood or explained: for, since they exist as attributes of a self- subsisting being, they also become known through them selves.
2. The second [kind of definitions] are those [of things] which do not exist through themselves, but only through the attributes whose modes they are, and through which, 2o as their genus, they must be understood.
And this is [all that need be said] concerning their statement about definitions. As regards the other [assertion], namely, that God can [not] be known by us adequately, this has been sufficiently answered by D. des Cartes in his answers to the objections relating to these things, page 18.
And the third [assertion], namely, that God cannot be proved a priori, has also already been answered by us. Since God is the cause of himself, it is enough that we prove him through himself, and such a proof is also much more 30 conclusive than the a posteriori proof, which generally rests only on external causes.
i CHAPTER VIII ON NATURA NATURANS HERE, before we proceed to something else, we shall briefly divide the whole of Nature — namely, into Natura naturans and Natura naturata. By Natura naturans we understand a being that we conceive clearly and distinctly through itself, and without needing anything beside itself (like all the attributes which we have so far described), that is, God. The Thomists likewise understand God by it, but their 10 Natura naturans was a being (so they called it) beyond all substances.
The Natura naturata we shall divide into two, a general, and a particular. The general consists of all the modes which depend immediately on God, of which we shall treat in the following chapter; the particular consists of all the particular things which are produced by the general mode. So that the Natura naturata requires some substance J in order to be well understood.
CHAPTER IX * ON NATURA NATURATA Now, as regards the general Natura naturata, or the modes, or creations which depend on, or have been created by, God immediately, of these we know no more than two, namely, motion in matter,! and the understanding in the thinking thing. These, then, we say, have been from all eternity, and to all eternity will remain immutable. A work truly as great as becomes the greatness of the work- master. 10 All that specially concerns Motion, such as that it has been from all eternity, and to all eternity will remain immutable; that it is infinite in its kind; that it can neither be, nor be understood through itself, but only by means of Extension, — all this, I say, since it [Motion] more properly belongs to a treatise on Natural Science rather than here,! we shall not consider in this place, but we shall only say this about it, that it is a Son, Product, or Effect created immediately by God.
As regards the Understanding in the thinking thing, this, like the first, is also a Son, Product, or immediate Creation of 20 God, also created by him from all eternity, and remaining immutable to all eternity. It has but one function, It t Note. — What is here said about motion in matter is not said seriously. For the Author still intends to discover the cause thereof, as he has already done to some extent a posteriori. But it can stand just as it is, because nothing is based upon it, or dependent thereon. [B omits this note.]
J In A and B the words " since it...than here " follow immediately after " Motion," at the beginning of the sentence.
tl Literally: This its attribute is but one. 30 57 58 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING namely, to understand clearly and distinctly all things at all times; which produces invariably an infinite or most perfect satisfaction, which cannot omit to do what it does. Although what we have just said is sufficiently self-evident, still, we shall prove it more clearly afterwards in our account of the Affects of the Soul, and shall therefore say no more about it here.
CHAPTER X WHAT GOOD AND EVIL ARE IN order to explain briefly what good and evil are in them selves, we shall begin thus: Some things are in our understanding and not I in Nature, and so they are also only our own creation, and their pur pose is to understand things distinctly: among these we include all relations, which have reference to different things, and these we call Entia Rationis [things of reason]. Now the question is, whether good and evil belong to the Entia 10 Rationis or to the Entia Realia [real things]. But since good and evil are only relations, it is beyond doubt that they must be placed among the Entia Rationis; for we never say that something is good except with reference to something else which is not so good, or is not so useful to us as some other thing. Thus we say that a man is bad, only in comparison with one who is better, or also that an apple is bad, in com parison with another which is good or better.
All this could not possibly be said, if that which is better or good, in comparison with which it [the bad] is so called, 20 did not exist.
Therefore, when we say that something is good, we only mean that it conforms well to the general Idea which we have of such things. But,H as we have already said before, the things must agree with their particular Ideas, whose essence must be a perfect essence, and not with the general *[ Ideas]*, since in that case they would not exist.
As to confirming what we have just said, the thing is clear J B: not such.
II A: "And therefore"; B: « Nevertheless." 59 60 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING i to us; but still, to conclude our remarks, we will add yet the following proofs: All things which are in Nature, are either things or actions. Now good and evil are neither things nor actions. Therefore good and evil do not exist in Nature.
For, if good and evil are things or actions, then they must have their definitions. But good and evil (as, for example, the goodness of Peter and the wickedness of Judas) have no definitions apart from the essence of Judas