20 the two — are not able to free us from them. It is only the third kind, namely, True Knowledge, that emancipates from them. And without this it is impossible that we should ever be set free from them, as will be shown subsequently (page 133). Might not this well be that about which, though under different designations, others say and write so much? For who does not see how conveniently we can interpret opinion as sin; belief, as the law which makes sin known • and true knowledge, as grace which redeems us from sin? ft Can do very easily; that is to say, when we have a thorough knowledge of good and evil: for then it is impossible to be subject 30 to that from which the passions arise: because when we know and enjoy what is best, that which is worst has no power over us.
ON OUR HAPPINESS 119 criterion of truth and falsity), we shall never fall into i them.
But what we have now to prove is that they have no other causes; for this, methinks, it is required that we should study ourselves in our entirety, having regard to the body as well as to the spirit.
And first [we have] to show that in Nature there is a body through whose form and activities we are affected, and thus become aware of it. And the reason why we do this is, because when we get an insight into the activities of the 10 body and the effects which they produce, then we shall also discover the first and foremost cause of all those passions; and, at the same time, also that through which all those passions might be annihilated. From this we shall then also be able to see whether it is possible to do such a thing by the aid of Reason. And then we shall also proceed to speak about our Love of God.
Now to prove that there is a body in Nature, can be no difficult task for us, now that we already know that God is, and what God is; whom we have defined as a being of 20 infinite attributes, each of which is infinite and perfect. And since extension is an attribute which we have shown to be infinite in its kind, it must therefore also necessarily be an attribute of that infinite being. And as we have also already demonstrated that this infinite being exists, it follows at once that this attribute also exists.
Moreover, since we have also proved that outside Nature, which is infinite, there is, and can be, no being, it is clearly manifest that this effect of body through which we become aware [of it] can proceed from nothing else than 30 from extension itself, and by no means from something else which (as some will have it) has extension in an eminent degree [eminenter] t: for (as we have already shown in the first chapter) there is no such thing.
J B: which is more excellent than extension.
120 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING i We have to remark, therefore, that all the effects which are seen to depend necessarily on extension must be attri buted to this attribute; such as Motion and Rest. For if the power to produce these did not exist in Nature, then (even though it [Nature] might have many other attributes) it would be impossible that these should exist For if a thing is to produce something then there must be that in it through which it, rather than another, can produce that something.
What we have just said here about extension, the same 10 we also wish to be regarded as though it had been said about thought, and * further * about all that is.
It is to be observed further, that there is nothing what ever in us, but we have the power to become aware of it: so that if we find that there is nothing else in us except the effects of the thinking thing and those of extension, then we may say with certainty that there is nothing else in us.
In order that the workings of both these may be clearly understood, we shall take them up first each by itself only, and afterwards both together; as also the effects of both 20 the one and the other.
Now when we consider extension alone, then we become aware of nothing else in it except Motion and Rest, from which we then discover all the effects that result there from. And these two t modes of body are such that it is impossible for any other thing to change them, except only themselves. Thus, for example, when a stone lies still, then it is impossible that it should be moved by the power of thought or anything else, but [it may] well [be moved] by motion, J as when another stone, having greater motion 30 than this has rest, makes it move. Likewise also the moving stone will not be made to rest except through something else which has less motion. It follows, accordingly, that no mode of thought can bring motion or rest into a body. In f Two modes: because Rest is not Nothing. I B: by the motion of something else.
ON OUR HAPPINESS 121 accordance, however, with what we observe in ourselves, it i may well happen that a body which is moving now in one direction may nevertheless turn aside in another direction; as when I stretch out my arm and thereby bring it about that the [vital] spirits which were already moving in a different direction,! nevertheless move now in this direction, though not always, but according to the disposition of the [vital] spirits, as will be stated presently.
The cause of this can be none other than that the soul, being an Idea of this body, is united with it in such a way 10 that it and this body, thus constituted, together form a whole.
The most important effect of the other * or thinking * attribute is an Idea of things, which is such that, accord ing to the manner in which it apprehends them, there arises either Love or Hatred, &c. This effect, then, as it implies no extension, can also not be attributed to the same, but only to thought; so that, whatever the changes which happen to arise in this mode, their cause must on no account be sought for in extension, but only in the thinking thing. We can see this, for instance, in the case of Love, which, 20 whether it is to be suppressed or whether it is to be awakened, can only be thus affected through the idea it self, and this happens, as we have already remarked, either because something bad is perceived to be in the object, or because something better comes to be known.!! Now when ever these attributes happen to act the one on the other, there results a passivity which one suffers from the other; namely [in the case of extension], through the determination of movements which we have the power to direct in what ever direction we please. The process, then, whereby the 3° one comes to be passively affected by the other, is this: J B: which were already moving, though not in this direction.
H B: either because something good is perceived in the loved object, or because something bad is perceived in the hated object.
122 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING i namely, the soul in I the body, as has already been remarked, can well bring it about that the [vital] spirits, which would otherwise move in the one direction, should nevertheless move in the other direction; and since these [vital] spirits can also be made to move, and therefore directed, by the body, it may frequently happen that, when the body directs their movements towards one place, while the soul directs them towards another place, they bring about and occasion in us those peculiar fits of depression which we sometimes 10 feel without knowing the reasons why we have them. For otherwise the reasons are generally well known to us.
Furthermore, the power which the soul has to move the [vital] spirits may well be hindered also either because the motion of the [vital] spirits is much diminished, or because it is much increased. Diminished, as when, having run much, we bring it about that the [vital] spirits, owing to this running, impart to the body much more than the usual amount of motion,!! and by losing this [motion] they are necessarily that much weakened; this may also happen 20 through taking all too little food. Increased, as when, by drinking too much wine or other strong drink, we thereby become either merry or drunk, and bring it about that the soul has no power to control the body.
Having said thus much about the influences which the soul exercises on the body, let us now consider the influences of the body on the soul. The most important of these, we maintain, is that it causes the soul to become aware of it, and through it also of other bodies. This is effected by Motion and Rest conjointly, and by nothing else: for the 30 body has nothing else than these wherewith to operate; so that whatever else comes to the soul, besides this aware ness, cannot be caused through the body. And as the first t A and B: the soul and the body.
H B continues thus: in which they had a strong in — and through — flow which weakened them.
ON OUR HAPPINESS 123 thing \vhich the soul gets to know is the body, the result is i that the soul loves it so, and becomes united with it. But since, as we have already said before, the cause of Love, Hatred, and Sorrow must not be sought for in the body but only in the soul (because all the activities of the body must proceed from motion and rest), and since we see clearly and distinctly that one love comes to an end as soon as we come to know something else that is better, it follows clearly from all this that, // once we get to know God, at least with a know ledge as clear as that with which we also know our body, then 10 we must become united with him even more closely than we are with our body, and be, as it were, released from the body. I say more closely, because we have already proved before that without him we can neither be, nor be known; and this is so because we know and must know him, not through some thing else, as is the case with all other things, but only through himself, as we have already said before. Indeed, we know him better even than we know ourselves, because without him we could not know ourselves at all.
From what we have said so far it is easily gathered which 2o are the chief causes of the passions. For, as regards the Body with its effects, Motion and Rest, t these cannot affect the soul otherwise except so as to make themselves known to it as objects; and according to the appearances which they present to it, that is according as they appear good or bad,t so also is the soul affected by them, and that t B adds: or their effects.
f But * if it be asked * whence comes it that we know that the one is good, the other bad? Answer: Since it is the objects which cause us to become aware of them, we are affected by the one 30 differently, in proportion than by the other. JJ Now these by which we are affected most harmoniously (as regards the proportion of motion and rest, of which they consist) are most agreeable to us,JJI and as they depart more and more from this [harmonious propor- H These six words are crossed out in A. Jit B omits the rest of this sentence.
i24 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING i [happens] not inasmuch as it is a body (for then the body would be the principal cause of the passions), but inasmuch as it is an object like all other things, which would also act in the same way if they happened to reveal themselves to the soul in the same way. (By this, however, I do not mean to say that the Love, Hatred, and Sorrow which proceed from the contemplation of incorporeal things produce the same effects as those which arise from the contemplation of corporeal things; for, as we shall presently say, these have yet other 10 effects according to the nature of the thing through the apprehension of which Love, Hatred, and Sorrow, &c., are awakened in the soul which contemplates the incorporeal things.) So that, to return to our previous subject, if some thing else should appear to the soul to be more glorious than the body really is, it is certain that the body would then have no power to produce such effects as it certainly does now. Whence it follows,! not alone that the body is not the principal cause of the passions, but also that even if there were in us something else besides what we have just stated to be capable, 20 in our opinion, of producing the passions, such a thing, even if there were such, could likewise affect the soul neither more nor differently than the body does in fact now. For it could never be anything else than such an object as would tion, they tend to be] most disagreeable. And hence arises every kind of feeling of which we become aware, and which, when it acts on our body, as it often does, through material objects, we call impulses; for instance, a man who is sorrowing can be made to laugh, or be made merry, by being tickled, or by drinking wine, &c., which [impulses] the soul becomes indeed aware of, but does not 30 produce. For, when it operates, the merriments are real and of another kind; because then it is no body that operates, but the intelligent soul uses the body as a tool, and, consequently, as the soul is more active in this case, so is the feeling more perfect.
t A continues thus: not that the body alone is the principal cause of the passions...; B: that the body alone is not the principal cause of the passions...ON OUR HAPPINESS 125 once for all be different from the soul, and would conse quently show itself to be such and no other, as we have like wise stated also of the body. So that we may, with truth, conclude that Love, Hatred, Sorrow, and other passions are produced in the soul in various forms according to the kind of knowledge which, from time to time, it happens to have of the thing; and consequently, if once it can come to know the most glorious of all, it should be impossible for any of these passions to succeed in causing it the least perturbation.
i CHAPTER XX CONFIRMATION OF THE FOREGOING Now, as regards what we have said in the preceding chapter, the following difficulties might be raised by way of objection. I First, if motion is not the cause of the passions then why is it possible, nevertheless, to banish sorrow by the aid of certain II means, as is often done by means of wine? To this it serves [as an answer] that a distinction must be 10 made between the soul's awareness, when it first be comes aware of the body, and the judgment which it presently comes to form as to whether it is good or bad for it.t Now the soul, being such as just lit stated, has, as we have already shown before, the power to move the [vital] spirits whithersoever it pleases; but this power may, never theless, be taken away from it, as when, owing to other causes [arising out] of the body generally, their form, con stituted by certain proportions [of motion and rest], dis- 20 appears or is changed; and when it becomes aware of this [change] in it, there arises sorrow, which varies with the I B inserts here a preliminary statement of the three objections which follow, and then repeats them each in its place, as in the text.
H A has geene [no] but this was crossed out by Monnikhoff and replaced by eenige [some, or certain].
f That is, between understanding considered generally, and understanding having special regard to the good or evil of the thing.
3o III A: nu mediate, possibly a slip for immediate, that is, " im mediately [above]." B: nu onmiddelijk [immediately].
CONFIRMATION OF THE FOREGOING 127 change which the [vital] spirits undergo. This sorrow i results from its love for, and union with, the body.t That this is so may be easily deduced from the fact that this sorrow can be alleviated in one of these two ways; either by restoring the [vital] spirits to their original form that is by relieving him of the pain, or by being persuaded by good reasons to make no ado about this body. The first is temporary, and [the sorrow] is liable to return; but the second is eternal, permanent, and unchangeable.
The second objection may be this: as we see that the 10 soul, although it has nothing in common with the body, can yet bring it about that the [vital] spirits, although they were about to move in one direction, nevertheless move now in the other direction, why should it not also be able to effect that a body which is perfectly still and at rest should begin to move itself? ft likewise, why should it not also be able to move in whatever direction it pleases all other bodies which are already in motion?
f Man's sorrow is caused by the thought that some evil is befalling him, namely, through the loss of some good; when such 20 a thought is entertained, the result is, that the [vital] spirits gather about the heart, and, with the help of other parts, press it together and enclose it, just the reverse of what happens in the case of joy. Then the soul becomes aware of this pressure, and is pained. Now what is it that medicines or wine effect? This, namely, that by their action they drive away the [vital] spirits from the heart, and make room again, and when the soul becomes aware of this, it receives new animation, which consists in this, that the thought of evil is diverted by the change in the proportion of motion and rest, which the wine has caused, and it turns to something else in which the 30 understanding finds more satisfaction. But this cannot be the immediate effect of the wine on the soul, but only of the wine on the [vital] spirits.
tf Now, there is no difficulty here as to how the one mode, which is infinitely different from the other, yet acts on the other: for it is a part of the whole, since the soul never existed without the body, 128 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING 1 But if we recall what we have already said before con cerning the thinking thing, it can remove this difficulty for us quite easily. Namely, we then said that although Nature has various attributes, it is, all the same, but one only Being, of which all these attributes are predicated. Be sides this we have also said that the thinking thing, too, was but one only thing in Nature, and is expressed in infinite Ideas, in accordance with the infinite things which exist in Nature; for if the body receives such a mode as, Jo nor the body without the soul.J We arrive at this [conclusion] as follows: i. There is a perfect being, page — 4t 2. There cannot be two substances, page —. 3. No substance can have a beginning, page —. 4. Each is infinite in its kind, page —. 5. There must also be an attribute of thought, page —. 6. There is no thing in Nature, but there is an Idea of it in the thinking thing, resulting from its essence and existence in conjunction, page —. 7. Conse quently, now: 8. Since their essence, without their existence, is implied in the designations of things, therefore the Idea of the 20 essence cannot be regarded as something separate; this can only be done when there is both existence and essence, because then there is an object, which before was not. For example, when the whole wall is white, there is no this or that in, &c. 9. Now, this Idea, considered by itselt, and apart from all other Ideas, can be no more than a mere Idea of such a thing, and it cannot be that it has an Idea of such a thing; [add] moreover, that such an Idea, thus regarded, since it is only a part, can have no very clear and very distinct conception of itselt and its object, but only the thinking thing, which is the whole of Nature, can have this; for, a part con- 30 sidered without its whole, cannot, &c. 10. Between the Idea and the object there must necessarily be a union, because the one can not exist without the other: for there is no thing whose Idea is not in the thinking thing, and no Idea can exist unless the thing also exists. Furthermore the object cannot change without the Idea J B omits the rest of this note, but adds here the next note: * For; * it JJ The number of the page (in notes 1-6) is not given in the MSS. See Commentary.
CONFIRMATION OF THE FOREGOING 129 for example, the body of Peter, and again another such as i is the body of Paul, the result of this is that there are in the thinking thing two different Ideas: namely, one idea of the body of Peter, which constitutes the Soul of Peter, and another of [the body of] Paul, which constitutes the Soul of Paul. Now the thinking thing can well move the body of Peter by means of the Idea of the body of Peter, but not by means of the Idea of the body of Paul; so that the soul of Paul can well move its own body, but by no means that of another, such as that of Peter. f And for this reason I0 changing also, and vice versa, so that there is here no need for a third thing that should bring about the union of soul and body. It is to be remarked, however, that we are speaking here of such Ideas which necessarily arise from the existence of the things together with their essence in God; but not of the Ideas which the things now actually present to us, [or] produce in us. There is a great difference between these: for the Ideas in God do not arise as they do in us by way of one or more of the senses, which are therefore almost always only imperfectly affected by them; but from their existence and their essence, just as they are. My idea, however, is 20 not yours, although one and the same thing produces them in us.
t It is clear that in man, because he had a beginning, there is to be found no other attribute than such as existed in Nature already before. — And since he consists of such a body of which there must necessarily be an Idea in the thinking thing, and the Idea must necessarily be united with the body, therefore we assert without fear that his Soul is nothing else than this Idea of his body in the think ing thing. And as this body has a J motion and rest (which has its proportion determined, and JJ is usually altered, through external 30 objects), and as no alteration can take place in the object without occurring also immediately in the Idea, the result is that people feel (idea reflexiva).Hl Now I say, as it has *a certain measure or* proportion of motion and rest, because no process can take place in the body without these two concurring.
B: has a certain measure of...I B omits these five words. H B: that people have " reflexive " ideas.
130 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING j also it cannot move a stone which rests or lies still: because the stone, again, makes another Idea in the Soul. Hence also it is no less clear that it is impossible that a stone, which is perfectly at rest and still, should be made to move by any mode of thought, for the same reasons as above.
The third objection may be this: We seem to be able to see clearly that we can, nevertheless, produce a certain stillness in the body. For, after we have kept moving our [vital] spirits for a long time, we find that we are tired; which, assuredly, is nothing else than a certain stillness in the [vital] spirits brought about by ourselves. We answer, however, that it is quite true that the soul is a cause of this stillness, but only indirectly; for it puts a stop to the movement not directly, but only through other bodies which it has moved, and which must then necessarily have lost as much as they had imparted to the [vital] spirits.! It is therefore clear on all sides that in Nature there is *only * one and the same kind of motion.
t B: The Answer is that, although it may be true that the Soul is a cause of this rest, still it does not bring it about imme diately, but only through other bodies, which necessarily impart to the moving [vital] spirits just as much rest as they receive motion from them.
CHAPTER XXI i ON REASON AT present we have to inquire why it happens that some times, although we see that a certain thing is good or bad, we nevertheless do not find in us the power either to do the good or to abstain from the bad, and sometimes, however, we do indeed [find this power in us]. This we can easily understand if we consider the causes that we assigned to opinions, which we stated to be the causes of all affects. These, we then said, [arise] either from hearsay, or from 10 experience. And since all that we find in ourselves has greater power over us than that which comes to us from outside, it certainly follows that Reason can be the cause of the extinction of opinions f which we have got from hear say only (and this is so because reason has not *like these* f It is all the same whether we use here the word opinion or passion; and so it is clear why we cannot conquer by means of Reason those that have come to us through experience; for these are nothing else than an enjoyment of, or immediate union with, something that we judge to be good, and Reason, though it teaches 20 us what is better, does not make us enjoy it. Now that which we enjoy in us cannot be conquered by that which we do not enjoy, and is outside us, as that is which Reason suggests. But if these are to be overcome then there must be something that is more powerful; in this way there will be an enjoyment or immediate union with something that is better known and enjoyed than this first; and when this exists victory is always assured; or, indeed, *this victory comes* also through tasting an evil which is recognised to be greater than the good that was enjoyed, and upon which it follows immediately. Still, experience teaches us that this evil does 30 not necessarily always follow thus, for, &c. See pages 78, 118.
132 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING i come to us from outside), but by no means of those which we have got from experience. For the power which the thing itself gives us is always greater than that which we obtain by way of consequence through a second thing; we noted this difference when speaking of reasoning and of clear understanding, page 67, and we did so with the rule of three as an illustration. For more power comes to us from the understanding of proportion t itself, than from the understanding of the rule of proportion. And it is for 10 this reason that we have said so often that one love may be extinguished by another which is greater, because in saying this we did not, by any means, intend to refer to desire which *does not, like love, come from true knowledge, but* comes from reasoning.
I A and B: the rule.
CHAPTER XXII ON TRUE KNOWLEDGE, REGENERATION, &c.
SINCE, then, Reason has no power to lead us to the attain ment of our well-being, it remains for us to inquire whether we can attain it through the fourth, and last, kind of know ledge. Now we have said that this kind of knowledge does not result from something else, but from a direct revelation of the object itself to the understanding. And if that object is glorious and good, then the soul becomes necessarily united with it, as we have also remarked with 10 reference to our body. Hence it follows incontrovertibly that it is this knowledge which evokes love. So that when we get to know God after this manner then (as he cannot reveal himself, nor become known to us otherwise than as the most glorious and best of all) we must necessarily become united with him. And only in this * union,* as we have already remarked, does our blessedness consist.
I do not say that we must know him just as he is, *or adequately,* for it is sufficient for us to know him to some extent, in order to be united with him. For even the 20 knowledge that we have of the body is not such that we know it just as it is, or perfectly; and yet, what a union! what a love!
That this fourth [kind of] knowledge, which is the knowledge of God, is not the consequence of something else, but immediate, is evident from what we have proved before, [namely,] that he is the cause of all knowledge that is acquired through itself alone, and through no other thing; moreover, also from this, that we are so united with him by nature that without him we can neither be, nor be 30 134 GOD; MAN> AND HIS WELL-BEING i known. And for this reason, since there is such a close union between God and us, it is evident that we cannot know him except directly.
We shall endeavour to explain, next, this union of ours with him through nature and love.