There is, therefore, in general, no ground for feeling elevated or for lamenting or repenting: all that sort of thing arises from a reflection which imagines another content and another inner nature than is to be found in the original nature of the individual and the actual carrying of it out into reality. Whatever it is that the individual does, and whatever happens to him, that the individual has done, and is that himself. He can only have the consciousness of the mere transfer- ence of his self from the darkness of possibihty to the dayhght of the present, from a state abstract and im- pHcit to the significance of actual being, and can have only the certainty that what seems to him in the second state is nothing else than what lay dormant in the former. The consciousness of this imity is no doubt likewise a comparison, but what is compared is just a mere appearance of opposition, a formal appearance which for reason, qua self-conscious and aware that individuality is inherently actuahty, is nothing more than seeming. The individual, therefore, knowing that he can find in his objective actuahty nothing but its unity with himself or can find only the certainty of himself in its very truth, and knowing that he thus always attains his purpose — can experience only a sense of joy in himself.
Society as a Herd of Individuals 395 "That, then, is the conception consciousness has of itself when it is sure of its being an absolute identifica- tion, a complete permeation, of individuahty and exist- ence. Let us see whether this notion is confirmed and supported by its experience, and whether its reality agrees with this notion.
The work produced is the reahty which consciousness gives itself. It is there that the individual becomes consciously what he is implicitly, and in such wise that the consciousness which becomes aware of the individual in the work performed is not the particular conscious- ness but universal consciousness. He has placed himself by his work quite outside in the element of univer- sality, in the characterless, qualityless region of exist- ence. The consciousness which withdraws from its work is in point of fact universal, — because it becomes, in this opposition between work and consciousness, absolute negativity, the process of action — and stands over against its work, which is determinate and particular. It thus goes beyond itself qtca work, and is itself the indeterminate region which its work still leaves void and unfilled. If their unity was in the above notion still preserved, this took place just through the work being cancelled qua objectively existing pro- duct. But it has to be, and we have to see how indi- viduahty will retain its universahty in the existence of the work, and will know how to get satisfaction.
To begin with we have to consider by itself the work which has come into being. It has carried with it the entire nature of the individual. Its existence is therefore itself an action, in which all distinctions interpenetrate and are resolved. The work is thus thrown out into a subsisting form where the specific character S96 Phenomenology of Mind of the original nature does in fact come out as against other determinate natures, encroaches on them, just as these do in their turn, and is lost as a vanishing moment in this general process. Although in the con- ception of individuality as here dealt with, the various moments (circumstances, purpose, means, and realisa- tion,) are all alike, and the original specific nature stands for no more than a universal element, on the other hand, when this element takes on an objective existence, its determinate character as such comes to light in the work done, and preserves its truth in its dissolution. Looked at more closely, this dissolution is such that in this specific character the individual, as a particular individual, has become consciously real; but the specific character is not merely the content of reality, but form as well; or reality as such is as a whole just this determinateness of being opposed to self-conscious- ness. On this view it is seen to be an alien reality Avhich has disappeared out of the notion, and is merely found given. The work is, i.e. it is for other individuals, and for them it is an external, an alien reality, in whose place they have to put their own, in order to get by their action consciousness of their unity with reality.
In other words, the interest which they take in that work owing to their original constitution is other than the peculiar interest of this work, which thereby is turned into something different. The work is, thus, in general something transitory, which is extinguished by the counter-action of other powers and interests, and displays the reality of individuality in a transitory form rather than as fulfilled and accompHshed.
Consciousness, then, by doing work becomes aware of that contrast between being and acting, which in the Society as a Herd of Individuals 397 earlier forms of consciousness was at the same time the beginning of action, and is here merely a result. This contrast, however, was in fact likewise the ulti- mate principle involved when consciousness proceeded to act as an implicitly real individuality; for action presupposed the determinate original nature as the ultimate implicit element, and the mere process of per- forming the act for the sake of this performance took that nature as its content. Mere action is, however, the self-identical form, with which, consequently, the specific determinateness of the original nature does not agree. It is matter of indifference here, as else- where, which of the two is called notion and which reality. The original nature is the thought element, the implicit factor as against the action, in which it first gets its reahty; or, again, the original nature is the existence both of individuahty as such and of individuahty in the form of work; while action is the original notion as pure and simple transition, as the process of becoming. This lack of correspondence between idea and reahty, which lies in its essence, con- sciousness learns in its work; in work consciousness becomes aware of itself as it in truth is, and its empty notion of itself disappears.
In this fundamental contradiction characteristic of work — which contains the truth of this individuahty that takes itself to be inherently real — all the aspects of individuality thus appear again as contradictory. In other words, work, being the content of the entire individu- ality put forth by action, which is the negative unity and holds in its grasp all the elements, now sets them free, when it is given existence. As subsisting, they stand in- differently over against each other. The notion and its 398 Phenomenology of Mind reality are thus separated into purpose and the original essential nature (Wesenheit). It is an accident that the purpose should have a true being, or that the im- plicit inherent nature should be made a purpose. Similarly, again, notion and reality fall apart as transi- tion to actuaUty and as purpose; in other words, it is an accident that the means expressing the purpose should actually be chosen. While, finally, should these inner moments taken together have some intrinsic unity or not, the action of the individual is once more an accident so far as actuahty in general is concerned: fortune decides in favour of a badly determined pur- pose, and badly selected means, just as much as against them.
If, now, consciousness hereby becomes aware in its work of the opposition between willing and performance, be- tween purpose and means, and again between this inward nature, taken all together, and actual reality — an oppo- sition which as a whole shows the fortuitous character of the action of consciousness — still the unity and the necessity of this action are just as much present too. This latter aspect transcends the former, and experience of the fortuitousness of the action is itself only a fortuitous kind of experience. The necessity of the action consists in this, that purpose is directly re- lated to actuality, and the unity of these is the very notion of action: the act takes place because action is fer se and of itself the essence of actuality. In work there no doubt comes out the fortuitousness which characterises accomplishment when contrasted with willing and the process of performing; and this ex- perience, which seems as if it must be the truth, contradicts that notion of the act. Still if we look Society as a Herd of Individuals 399 at the content of this experience taken in its com- pleteness, that content is seen to be the transitory work. What persists is not the transitoriness; rather this is itself actual and is bound up with the work, and van- ishes with it; the negative falls away along with the positive whose negation it is.
The very notion of substantially and inherently real individuality contains within it this transience of transitoriness {Verschwinden des V erschwindens). For that wherein the work disappears, or what disappears in the work, is the objective reality; and this was to give experience, as it was called, its supremacy over the notion which individuality has about itself. Objec- tive reality, however, is a moment which itself has no longer independent truth in this mode of con- sciousness; it consists solely in the unity of this consciousness with action, and the real work is only that unity of action and existence, of willing and performance. On account of the certainty fundamental to its action, consciousness takes the actual reahty contrasted with that conscious certainty, to be some- thing which is only jor consciousness. The oppo- sition cannot any longer stand before consciousness where this is for itself and independent as against the actual reality; for consciousness here is self-conscious- ness returned into itself and with all opposition gone. On the contrary, the opposition and the negativity manifested in the case of work, thus affect not only the content of the work, or, again, the content of con- sciousness, but actual reahty as such, and hence affect both the opposition present merely in virtue of that reality and in it, and the disappearance of the work. In this way consciousness turns from its transient work 400 Phenomenology of Mind back upon itself, and asserts its own notion and its certainty to be the permanent and abiding fact as against the experience of the fortuitousness of action. In point of fact it comes to know its essential principle or notion, in which actuality is only a moment, something for consciousness, not something in and for itself; it finds that reality to be a passing moment, of significance therefore merely as being in general, whose universality is one and the same as action. This unity, this identity is the true work; it is the " real fact," the " actual fact " itself {die Sache selbst), which absolutely asserts itself, and is experienced as the lasting element, independent of that " fact " which is the accident of individual action as such, the accident of circumstances, means, and actuality.
The "real fact "itself stands opposed to these mo- ments only so far as they claim to have a value in isolation, but is essentially their unity, because identi- fying, fusing, actuaUty with individuality. It is, too, an action, and, qua doing, pure action in general, and thereby just as much action of this particular indi- vidual; and this action, because still appertaining to the individual in opposition to actuality, has the sense of a purpose. Similarly it is the transition from this specific character to the opposite: and finally it is a reality which is present objectively for consciousness. The "actual fact" thus expresses the essential spiritual substance in which all these moments as independently valid are cancelled and transcended, and so hold good only as universal, and in which the certainty conscious- ness has regarding itself is a " fact," a real object before consciousness, an object born of self-con- sciousness as its own, without ceasing to be a free Society as a Herd of Individuals 401 independent object in the proper sense. Tlie " thing," found at the stage of sense-certainty and perception, now gets its significance through self-consciousness, and through it alone. On this rests the distinction between a thing {Ding) and a fact (Sache). A process is gone through here corresponding to what we find in the case of sense-experience and perception.
Self-consciousness, then, has attained its true concep- tion of itself when this stage of " real fact " is reached; fact is the interpenetration of individuality and objec- tivity. In it self-consciousness has arrived at a con- sciousness of its own substance. At the same time, as we find self-consciousness here, it is a consciousness which has just arisen, and hence is immediate; and this is the specific way in which we find spirit at the present stage: it has not yet reached its truly real substance. The " fact itself " takes in this immediate consciousness the form of bare and simple essence {einfachen Wesens), which, being universal, contains all its various moments in itself and belongs to them, but, again, is also indifierent towards them taken as specific moments, and is independent by itself; and, as this free and independent simple abstract " fact," passes for the essentially real (Wesen). The various moments of the oric^inal determinateness, the moments of the " fact " of tJiis particular individual, his purpose, means, action, and actual reality, are, on the one hand, particular moments for this consciousness, which it can abandon and give up for the " fact itself "; on the other hand, however, they all have the " fact itself " as their essential nature, but only in such a way that it, being their abstract universal, can find itself in each of them and be their predicate. The " fact itself " is not yet subject; VOL. I. — 2 D 402 Phenomenology of Mind but those moments stand for subject, because they belong to the aspect of particularity, while " fact itself " is only at this stage bare universahty. "Fact" is the genus which finds all these moments to be species of itself, and in that way is independent of them.
Consciousness is called " honest," when it has on the one hand attained this idealisation (Idealismus), which " fact " expresses, and on the other possesses the truth in the " fact " qua this formal universality. Con- sciousness when so characterised takes to do solely with " fact," and hence occupies itself with its various moments or species. And when it does not reach, the '•■ fact " in one of these moments, does not find the " real fact " in one meaning, it just on that account lays hold of the " fact " in another; and consequently always really secures that satisfaction which should belong to this mode of consciousness by its very nature {seinem Begriffe nacli). However things turn out, it achieves and secures the " fact itself," for the latter, being this universal genus of those moments, is the predicate of all.
Should it not bring a purpose into reality, it may have at least willed the purpose, i.e. may turn purpose qua purpose, mere doing which does nothing, into the " fact itself," and can therefore maintain and feel satisfied that at least there has always been something attempted, something done. Since the universal contains within it even the negative or the transitoriness, this too, the nothingness of work, is itself its doing. It has stimulated others towards this, and still finds satisfaction in the disappearance of its reahty, just as bad boys enjoy a personal pleasure in getting their ears boxed be- cause they are the cause of its being done. Or, again, Society as a Herd of Individuals 403 suppose it has not so much as tried to carry out the " fact itself," and done nothing at all, then it has not even cared; the "fact itself" is for it just the unity of its decision with reahty; it asserts that the reality was nothing else than its own wish in the matter {sein Mogen). Finally, suppose something of interest has come its way entirely without its help, then for it this reahty is the " fact itself " just by the interest which it finds in the "fact," although that reahty was not brought about by its doing. If it is a piece of luck, which has befallen the individual personally, he reckons it his own act and his own desert; if it is, on the other hand, a mere event, which does not con- cern him further, he makes it likewise his own, and an interest where he has done nothing, is held as a party interest which he has taken up and defended or main- tained, for or against.
The "Honesty," or " Honour ableness " of this mode of consciousness, as well as the satisfaction which it meets with at every point, really consists, as the above makes clear, in this, that it does not bring together its ideas regarding the " fact itself." " Fact itself" is just as much its own affair {seine Sadie) as no work at all, or mere action and bare purpose, or again a reahty involving no action at all: it makes one meaning after another the subject of this predicate, and forgets one after the other. By its having merely " willed " or, again, in not having " wanted," " fact itself " has now the meaning of empty purpose, and of the merely ideal thought-imity of wilhng and performance. The con- solation for the annihilation of the purpose, which was at all events ' ' willed " or at all events simply done, as well as the satisfaction of having given others something to 404 Phenomenology of Mind do, makes the simple doing, or the entirely bad work, the essential reality; for that must be called a bad work which is no work at all. Finally, in the case of finding through good luck the reahty at hand, this existence without any act becomes the " fact itself."
The true meaning of this " Honesty," however, lies in not being so honest as it seems. For it cannot be so unintelligent as to let these various moments fall apart in that way; it must have an immediate consciousness regarding their opposition, because they are absolutely related to one another. Bare action is essentially action of this individual, and this action is likewise essentiallyan actuaUty or a ''fact." Conversely, actuality essentially is only as his own action, and as action in general as well; and just as his own action is action in general, so it is only reality in general. While, then, he thinks he has only to do with the " fact itself " as abstract reality, there is also present this idea that he has to do with it as his ov/n doing. But precisely so far as it is only a matter of being busy about doing something, he is not really in earnest on the point, but rather is dealing with a " fact," and with " fact " as his own. Since finally, he seems to will merely his own " fact " and his own action, it is again a matter of deal- ing with " fact " in general or actuality substantial and abiding (an und fiir sich hleihende).
Just as " fact " and its moments appear at this stage as content, they are likewise necessary also as forms in consciousness. They come forward as content merely to pass away again, each making room for the other. They have therefore to be present in the determinate result as cancelled and sublated forms: so taken, how- ever, they are aspects of consciousness. " Fact itself " Society as a Herd of Individuals 405 is present as the inherent nature or its reflection into self; the ousting of the moments by each other there finds expression, however, in their being estabhshed in consciousness, not per se, but only for another conscious- ness. One of the moments of the content is exposed by it to the light, and presented as an object for others. Consciousness, however, is at the same time re- flected therefrom back upon itself, and the opposite is thus equally present within it, is retained for itself as its own. There is, too, not one of them which could be merely and solely put outside, and another merely retained within; rather, consciousness operates alternately with them, for it has to make one as well as another essential for itself and for others. The whole is the moving process of permeating individuality with the universal. In that this consciousness finds this whole, however, to be merely the simple ultimate nature (Wesen) and thus the abstraction of " fact itself," the moments of this whole appear as distinct outside the " fact " and outside one another. As a single whole it is only exhaustively exhibited by the process of alternately exposing its elements to view and keeping them within itself. Since in this alternation consciousness has in its process of reflection one moment for itself and keeps it as essential, while another is merely ex- ternally implied or is for others, there thus enters a play of individuahties with one another, where they both deceive and find deceived themselves and one another reciprocally.
An individuality, then, sets to work to carry out something; by so doing it seems to have made something into an " actual fact." It acts; by so doing it comes out before others, and thinks it is occupied with reality.
406 Phenomenology of Mind Others, therefore, take its action to be an interest in the " fact " as such, and take the end of the act to be the carrying out of the " fact " fer se, regardless of whether this is done by the former individuahty or by them. When on this account they point out that this " fact " has been abeady brought about by themselves, or, if not, offer and actually furnish their assistance, then they see that consciousness has rather left the position where they think it to be; it is its own action and effort, which arouses its interest in the " fact," and when they come to know that this was the " fact itself" they feel them- selves deceived. In reahty, however, their haste to render assistance was itself nothing else than their desire to see and manifest their own action and not the " fact itself," i.e. they wanted to deceive the other individual just in the way they complain of having been deceived. Since there has now been brought to hght that its own action and effort, the play of its powers, is taken for the " fact itself," consciousness seems to be occupied in its own way on its own ac- count and not on that of others, and only troubles about action qua its own action, and not about action qua an action of others, and hence seems to let the others in their turn keep to their own " fact." But they go wrong again; that consciousness has already left the point where they thought it was. It does not take the matter in hand to be " fact " in the sense of this its own f ar- ticular fact, but fact qua fact, qua something universal, which is for all. Hence it interferes in the action and work of ethers; and if consciousness can no longer take their work out of their hands, it is at least interested in the matter, and shows this by its concern to pass judgment. When it stamps the