the body remains, though the head is changed; and, as we have said, authority exercised by the king the people. the treaty was peculiar Exception is to be made, if it to the republican state, as if free cities make a league in defense of their liberty.
does not cease to be the authority of appears that the cause of 2 Even if the compact be made with the king, it is not necessarily personal: for inserted in the compact, that it may appear on the face of it with if it be added to the treaty, that it is to be for the good of the kingdom, or with him and or for a definite time, commonly added in treaties, as Pedius and Ulpian say, commonly the person is not that it may be a personal compact, but whom it was made. And perpetual, that it is made his suecessors, as is it is plainly real.
Such appears to have been the treaty of the Romans with king - Car. XVI.] DE INTERPRETATIONE. ITI eum Philippo Macedonum rege, quod cum Perseus ejus filius ad se pertinere negaret, bellum eo nomine exortum est. Sed et alia verba, et ipsa interdum materia conjecturam suppedi- tabunt non improbabilem.
93 Quod si pares sint in utrumque conjecturz, supererit, $ut favorabilia credantur esse realia, odiosa vero personalia. F'dera pacis causa facta, aut commerciorum, favorabilia sunt. Qus belli eausa, non odiosa omnia, ut quidam censent, sed ἐπιμαχίαι, id est, federa tuendi se causa, propius ad favorem accedunt, ξυμμαχίαι magis ad onera. Ad quz accedit quod in federe ad bellum quodvis, przsumitur ratio habita "pru- denti? et pietatis ejus quicum agitur, αὖ qui non modo non injuste, sed nec temere bellum suscepturus videretur.
4 Quod vero dici solet, societates morte finiri, huc non pec. Lib. i. adfero: pertinet enim hoc ad societates privatas, et juris est ^^ — civilis. Jure ergo an injuria?Fidenates, íLatini, Etrusci, Sabini a federe discesserint mortuis Romulo, Tullo, Anco, sarum rex manus Armeniis injectabat, eos ad. suam ditionem ez integro vocare vi nimia properans, sed injuste; cau- sando quod. post Joviani excessum, cum quo fedus firmaverat et pacem, nihil οὗ - stare debeat, quo minus ea, recuperaret que ante ad majores suos pertinuisse tiniani pactis cum Saracenis vide apud JMenandrum Protectorem. (Cap. 12.) Adde quz» Helvetii causantur post mor- tem Henrici III. apud 'Thuanum libro xcvir. in anno cIo Io rxxxrizx. Vide et insignem locum apud Camdenum in an- no cIo Io rxxir. ubi de federe antiquo monstrabat. (Cap. 4.) Similia de Jus- — Gallorum eum Scotis.
Philip, which, when Perseus his son refused to acknowledge as per- taining to him, war arose on that ground, But other words also, and the matter itself, sometimes supply probable conjecture on this sub- 76οὐ.
3 If there be equal conjectures each way (for a real and ἃ per- sonal pact), the result must be that favourable pacts are to be be- lieved real, odious ones, personal. Treaties of peace or commerce are favourable: those made with a view to war, not all odious, as some think, since epimachies, engagements of support in defensive war, are nearer to favour, symmachies, engagements to war in general, nearer to burthens. Add to which, that in a treaty looking to any war, it is presumed that account is had of the prudence and piety of the person treated with, as one who will not undertake a war unjustly, nor even rashly.
4 The maxim, that partnerships are separated by death, I do not here adduce: for that belongs to private partnerships, and is a maxim of Civil Law. — Whether the Fidenates, Latins, Etruscans, Sabines, were right or wrong in renouncing their league with the Romans Lib. i. 7.
Lib. v. c. vlt.
Lib. iii. 20.
172 DE INTERPRETATIONE. [118. II. Prisco, Servio, dijudicari a nobis recte non potest, cum non extent federum verba. Cui non dissimilis est illa apud Jus- ünum controversia, an civitates, que Medorum tributarie fuerant, mutato imperio conditionem mutassent. Spectandum enim an in conventione fidem Medorum elegissent. Minime vero admittenda est Dodini argumentatio, federa ad regum suecessores non transire, quia juramenti vis personam non exeat. Potest quippe juramenti obligatio personam tantum obstringere, et ipsa promissio obligare heredem.
5 Neque enim verum est quod sumit, federa jurejurando veluti firmamento inniti, eum plerumque in ipsa promissione satis sit efficacize, cui majoris religionis causa jusjurandum ad- ditur. P. Valerio Consule juraverat plebs Romana conven- turos se jussu Consulis. Mortuo ill succedit L. Quintius Cincinnatus. Cavillantur Tribuni quidam, quasi non tene- retur religione populus. Sequitur Livii judicium: Z/Vomuum hec que hoc tenet seculum negligentia, Deum venerat: nec interpretando sibi quisque jusjurandum et leges aptas fa- ciebant; sed suos potius mores ad. ea accommodabant.
XVII. Sane cum rege initum fedus manet, etiamsi Rex 7 Confer PvrENDoRrIUM, De Jure Nat. et Gent. Lib. 1v. cap. 2. 8 17. cum nostris Notis, alterius Editionis. J. B.
" Hi possessionem habent, jus non habent] Sic Valens non accepit excusa- tionem Gotthorum regis, qui Procopio purpurz invasori auxilia se misisse di- cebat: excusationem vanissimam dicit Ammianus libro xxvir. (c. 5.) Apud Graecos scriptores eadem historia, sed sub Scytharum nomine: ita enim Got- thos vocabant. Sic Justinianus negabat when Romulus, Tullus, Ancus, Priscus and Servius were dead, we can- notjudge, not having the words of the treaties extant. Not unlike this is the controversy in Justin, whether the cities which had been tributaries of the Medes, when the empire was changed, had changed their condition. For the argument of Bodinus is by no means to be accepted, that treaties do not pass to the successors of kings, be- cause the force of an oath does not go beyond the person. For the obligation of the oath may bind the person only, while the obliga- tion of the promise may bind the heir.
5 Nor isit true, as he assumes, that treaties depend entirely upon oaths; for the promise of itself gives force to the treaty, and the oath is added only for the sake of religious reverence. So when the Roman people had sworn that they would make a treaty under direction of the Consul, and Valerius the Consul died, some of the Tribunes held that the people was not bound: but Livy judges other- wise: As yet, he says, men had not become, as now, careless of oaths.
XVII. Ifatreaty be made with a king, and he or his successor Car. XVI.] DE INTERPRETATIONE. 178 idem aut successor regno a subditis sit pulsus. Jus enim regni penes ipsum manet, uteunque possessionem amiserit: quo pertinet Lucani illud de Senatu Romano (Lib. v. vers. 29), Non unquam perdidit ordo Mutato sua jura loco.
XVIII. Contra, si alieni regni invasor volente vero rege, aut oppressor populi liberi, antequam sufficiens populi consen- sus accedat, bello impetatur, nihil eo fiet conira fedus: quia "hi possessionem habent, jus non habent. Et hoc est quod Nabidi dicebat T. Quintius: Amicitia et societas nobis nulla tecum, sed cum Pelope rege LLacedemoniorum justo ac legitimo facta est. Qualitates autem istze in federibus regis, successoris, et similes, jus proprie significant, et odiosa est invasorum causa.
XIX. Tractaverat olim Chrysippus hane qusestionem, an premium promissum ei, qui primus ad metam pervenisset, debeatur utrique si simul pervenerint, an neutri Et sane *vox primi ambigua est, nam aut eum significat qui omnes antecedit, aut quem nemo. Sed quia virtutum prsemia favo- rabilia sunt, 5verius est coneursuros ad przemium, quanquam fedus se rupturum cum Gizericho fac- ^ Cacheranum decis. rxxix. num. 35. tum, si Gelimerem bello impeteret, qui χ Vor primi ambigua est] Vide A1- justo regi Ildericho cum regno liberta- ^ bericum de Rosato de Statutis qu. 106. tem eripuerat. [Apud PRocoPivM, Van- ^ et 107.
dalic.1.9.] Vide Cardinalem Tuschum, 8 Heie potius mihi videtur distin- pp. verbo Tyrannus concl, 909, num. 6. — guendum, an actus, cujus prestationi be expelled by his subjects, the treaty remains valid: for the right of the kingdom remains with him, though he have lost possession. So Lucan, speaking of the Roman Senate in exile.
XVIII (On the other hand, if an Usurper of the kingdom be attacked by its ally with the consent of the true king; or if the oppressor of a free people be so attacked, before the sufficient consent of the people can be obtained; nothing is done against the treaty: for such persons have possession, but not right. As Quintius said to Nabis, We made no alliance with τοις, but with Pelops, the just and legitimate king of the Lacedemonians. | And these qualities, (just and legitimate,) in treaties, refer to the right of the king and his succes- sors: the cause of Usurpers is an odious cause.
XIX. Chrysippus had treated this question, Whether a prize pro- posed to him who reaches the goal first should, if both arrive there at the same time, be given to both or to neither. And in fact, the word first is ambiguous: it means either him who gets before all others, or whom none gets before, But because the prizes of excellence are Liv. xxxiv.
Apud Plut. De Stoic. Repug. p- Everh. in loc. a rat. leg.
ad restrict. et in loc. à rat. leg. ad eatension.
DE INTERPRETATIONE. [118. II.
liberalius *Seipio, Cesar, Julianus his, qui pariter muros as- cenderant, solida przmia tribuerunt. Et hzc quidem dicta sunto de interpretatione ea, quie verborum significationi pro- prie vel impropriz aptatur.
XX. 1 Estet aliud interpretandi genus, ex conjecturis, extra significationem verborum, eorum scilicet, quibus promissio continetur: idque duplex, vel extendens vel coarctans. Sed qu: extendit interpretatio diffelllus procedit, facilius quse arctat. Nam sieut in rebus omnibus, ut effectus non sequatur, satis est unam deesse causarum, ut nascatur, omnes convenire oportet; ita et in obligatione conjectura extendens obligationem non temere admittenda est: multoque hic difficilius quam in casu, de quo supra dicebamus, ubi verba largam aliquam sig- nificationem, etsi minus receptam, admittunt. Nam hic extra verba promittentia conjecturam quzerimus, quse valde certa esse debet, ut obligationem inducat, nec ratio similis sufficit, dum; vel,Zn commune possideri, et ita premium promissum est, possit iferari, possidebitur; vel neutrum feri potest, autmon. Si prius, jubendi sunt illi, qui premium ambiunt, iterum e. g. cursum instituere. Si posterius, vel ipsum pr«e- mium sine incommodo aut onere nimio multiplicari potest, vel non potest. Si potest, utrique solidum premium dan- dum, quum uterque meritus sit. /Sin minus, przemium vel dividi potest, et tunc inter illos:equis partibus dividenet tunc vel ex soríe, vel ex pacto, res uni adjudicanda. Quze omnia fusius de- duximus et probavimus in Notis nostris Gallicis. J. B.
Y Scipio] Capta Carthagine nova in Hispania, [Refert id Livius, xxv1. 48. Adde Excerpta ex Dione Cassio, pag. 602, inter Exc. Vales. J..B.]
matters of favour; the sounder opinion is, that the two should share the prize: though Scipio, Csesar, Julian, more liberally gave a full prize to both of those who had mounted the walls at the same time.
And so much of the interpretation which is adapted to the proper or improper signification of words.
XX. 1 There is also another kind of interpretation, from Con- jectures, extraneous to the signification of the words in which the promise is made: and this interpretation is twofold, either extending or restricting the meaning. But the interpretation which extends, proceeds more difficultly, that which restricts, more easily. Foras in all things, in order that the effect may not follow, it is enough if one of the causes be wanting; and in order that it may take place, it is necessary that all conspire; so in obligation also, a conjecture extending the obligation is not lightly to be admitted; and in this case it is much more difficult than in the case which we spoke of before, to assign to words some large but unusual signification. For here, besides the words of promise, we have to look for some conjecture, which ought T Car. XVI.] DE INTERPRETATIONE. 175 sed oportet eadem sit; nec id semper satis est, ut dicamus ex ratione faciendam extensionem: quia, ut modo dicebamus, sspe ratio ita movet, ut voluntas tamen sit causa per se suffi- ciens, etiam sine ratione illa.
2 Ut ergo talis extensio recte fiat, opus est ut constet rationem, sub quam venit casus quem volumus comprehendere, esse causam unicam et efficacem, qus promittentem moverit, eamque rationem ab eo consideratam in sua gcneralitate, quia alioqui promissio futura fuisset iniqua aut inutilis. Hee quo- que pars tractari solet ἃ rhetoribus in loco περὶ ῥητοῦ καὶ διανοίας, eujus speciem unam ponunt, quoties semper eandem sententiam dicimus: sed et alter locus κατὰ συλλογισμὸν, per vatiocinationem huc pertinet: nimirum ubi ex scripto ducimus quod scriptum non est, ut loquitur Quinülianus. Et quze a jurisconsultis traduntur ^de his, qu: in fraudem fiunt.
τ De his, que in fraudem fiunt] Bene Seneca excerptis controversiarum v1. 9. Circumscriptio semper crimen sub specie legis involvit: quod apparet in illa, legitimum est: quod latet, insidiosum. Quintilianus controversia (immo.De- clamat.) cccxriu. AINeque enim unquam decurritur ad hanc legem (nempe de circumsceriptione) nisi cum rectum jus nequitia exclusum est. Exemplum habes xvi: Quippe etiam lege Stolonis Li- cinii incluso modo Io jugerum, et ipso sua lege damnato, cum substituta filii persona amplius possideret. (Cap. 3.) Est eadem historia apud Valerium Max- imum ὙἼ11. c. vi. 8. Vide aliud exem- plum apud Tacitum Annalium xv. (Cap. 19) de fictis adoptionibus. Aliud in novella Emanuelis Comneni, quz est in jure Grzeco-Romano, apud Plinium ZZistorie Naturalis libro to be very certain, which may induce an obligation; nor does analogy sufhce, we must have identity of reason: nor is it always enough that we can say the words are to be extended for existing reasons: for, as we have said, reason often so operates, that nevertheless, the will may be a sufficient cause, without any reason, 2 "Therefore, in order that such an extension may be rightly made, it is necessary that it should be apparent that the reason under which the case comes which we wish to comprehend, should be the sole and efficacious cause which moves the promiser; and that that reason was considered by him in its generality; because otherwise the promise would have been unjust or useless. This is also treated by Rhetori- cians in their sections on What is said and what is ineant; of which one kind which they mention is, when we always utter the same sentence. But also another section, O» reasoning, belongs to the subject: namely, when from what is written we deduce what is not written, as Quintilian says: and also what is delivered by the Jurists as to what is done fraudulently.
Lib. i. 39. et ii. 32. de Orat. Bruto. c. 52, 176 DE INTERPRETATIONE. [Lir. II.
3 Exemplum sit *in pactione, ne quis locus muris cingatur, facta eo tempore cum non aliud esset muniendi genus. Is locus ne àggere quidem cingi poterit, si satis constet prohibendi mu- ros unicam fuisse causam ne muniretur is locus. Vulgo solet exemplum adferri de conditione, si posthumus sit mortuus, ab eo scripta qui posthumum omnino exspectabat, ut sententia dispositionis producatur ad eum casum, si is posthumus natus non esset, quia constet voluntatem loquentis motam fuisse con- sideratione non exstiturze prolis: quod ipsum non apud juris- consultos tantum, sed et "apud Ciceronem, et Valerium? Maxi- mum invenire est.
4 Cicero causam hane adfert oratione pro Cecina: Quid? verbis satis hoc cautum erat? minime. Quo res igitur va- luit? voluntas: qua si tacitis nobis intelligi posset, verbis omnino non uteremur: quia, non potest, verba reperta sunt, non qu& impedirent, sed quc indicarent voluntatem. | Mox in eadem oratione dicit idem jus esse, ubi perspicitur ^una atἃ In pactione, ne quis locus muris cingatur, facta, eo tempore cum non aliud esset muniendi genus] Fuscus Arellius in controversia, quz? est apud Senecam decima libro ir. J7unc enim animum fuisse sine dubio jurantium, ut vi non di- ducerentur, cum illud quoque caverint, ne morte dividerentur.
b Apud Ciceronem] Etiam de Inven- 9 Nihil hac de re exstat apud Vale- rium Maximum, nec in Capite De ratis Testamentis et insperatis, ubi locus esset aptus, nec alibi, quod sciam. $ed in Cap. przced. Lib. vrr. cap. 7. n. 1. ex- emplum legitur, quod ad hanc regulam potest referri, quamquam contrario mo- do: nimirum Patris, qui, quum Filium suum in bello occubuisse falso crederet, alios instituerat heredes, Hoc, ut vide- tur, ansam dedit errori Auctoris nostri, memoria vitio duo diversa confundentis. J. B.
€ Una atque eadem causa equitatis] Sic in sponsam alterius adulterium com- mitti probat Philo de specialibus legi- bus, addita causa: ai ydp ὁμολογίαι τοῖς γάμοις ἰσοδυναμοῦσι" ( Pag. 788 A.)
3 Take an example in an agreement made that no place shall be walled round, made at a time when there was no other way of fortifi- cation. "That place cannot even have an earth-work made round it, if it appear that the only cause for prohibiting walls was that the place might not be fortified. An example is often taken in the conditions introduced in the will of a testator in case his posthumous child die, the testament being made by one who fully expected a posthumous child; and the rule is used to extend the dispositions of the testament to the case in which the posthumous child is not born: because it is evident that the will of the testator was moved by the consideration of a pro- geny which never came into existence: which example we find not only in the Jurists, but also in Cieero and Valerius Maximus.
4 fee Cicero in the oration pro Cccina. And hence the form of Car. XVI.] DE INTERPRETATIONE. 177 que eadem causa zquitatis, id est, rationis quz» sola moverat: lta interdictum, «nde tu me vi dejeceris hominibus coactis armatisve, locum habere adversus omnem vim quze ad caput et vitam pertineat. Ea enim, inquit, plerumque fit per homines coactos armatosque: quc si alio consilio, eodem | periculo facta, sit, eodem jure esse voluerunt. In declamatione patris Quintiliani exemplum hoc est: C«des videtur significare san- guinem et ferrum: si quis alio genere homo fuerit occisus, «d, illam legem revertemur.,ϑ'ὲ inciderit in latrones, aut in aquas praecipitatus, si in aliquam immensam altitudinem dejectus fuerit, eadem lege vindicabitur qua ille qui ferro percussus sit. Similis est, argumentatio Isei oratione de Pyrrhi hereditate, cum ex eo quod testamentum Attica lege vetitum esset fieri filia invita, infert, ne adoptionem ^quidem ea invita permitti.
XXI. Atque hine solvenda est celebris illa quzestio, quse et apud Gellium est de mandato, an impleri possit non per Jdem valent sponsalia quod nuptie. Sic in lege per Mosem data sub bovis no- mine inteliguntur omnia animantia mansueta: sub nomine putei fossa quze- vis, Exodi xxi. 28. et 35. Chassansus Catalogo glorie mundi v. parte, consid.
Editio Obrechti habet: δὲ occide- rit in latrinas aut &c. quod omnino rec- tius est. J. B.
? Locus est pag. 400. Edit. Wech. sed ubi hoc tantum dicitur, Patrem qui solas filias, ex justo matrimonio natas, relinquit, neminem posse adoptare, heredemque scribere, nisi cui prius filiam in matrimonium collocaverit, juxta Le- gem Athenis constitutam. Deceptus est Auctor ab Interprete Latino infeli- cissimo, qui ἐπὶ ταύταις vertit, in illa- rum [filiarum] arbitrio: et ἄνευ τῶν θυγατέρων, insciis filiabus, non consul- lis: quum hze significent, non sine illis uxoribus ductis ab eo, qui testamento heres instituitur. Adde Viri Eruditis- simi Jac. Perizonii Dissert. Triad. Diss. 11. pag. 60, et segq. ubi recte locum ex- ponit; ut dudum post hzc scripta ani- madverti, J. BH.
interdict, Inde tu me wi dejeceris hominibus coactis armatisve, will hold against all force endangering life, though there may not be a body of armed men. As Cicero says, the legal effect is the same. So Quintilian says, Murder seems to imply steel weapons and blood; but if any one is killed in any other way, we still recur to that law: for instance, if the man be thrown from a precipice. So Issus, because by the Attic Law a testament could not be made [by a father having no son]against the will of a daughter, infers that an adoption could not be made without her consent.
XXI. And on these principles is to be solved that celebrated question which we have in Gellius, about a commission; whether it may be fulfilled, not by the identical thing directed, but by another equally vseful or more useful than that which was enjoined by him [ποτὶ m.] i Decl. 250.
L. uit. D. Mandat.
178 DE INTERPRETATIONE. [Lrx. II.
idem, sed per aliud s:que utile, aut, utilius quam erat id quod mandator przseripserat.?Id enim ita demum licet, si constet quod prescriptum erat, non prescriptum fuisse sub- speciali sua forma, "sed sub consideratione generaliore, quz aliter quoque obtineri possit: quomodo eum qui fide jubere erat jus- sus, mandare posse creditori ut tertio pecuniam numeret, à Sezvola responsum est. Ceterum ubi de eo non satis constat, retinendum est quod apud Gellium eo loco legitur, dissolvi imperantis officium, siquis ad id, quod facere jussus est, non obsequio debito, sed consilio non desiderato respondeat.
XXII. Restringens interpretatio extra significationem verborum quae promissionem continent, aut ex defectu petitur originario voluntatis, aut ex casus emergentis repugnantia cum voluntate. Defectus voluntatis originarius intelligitur ex absurdo, quod alioqui evidenter sequeretur; ex cessatione ra- tionis *quze sola plene et efficaciter movit voluntatem; et ex materie defectu. Primum in eo fundamentum habet, quod nemo credendus est velle absurda.
3 Confer PurENDonr. De Jure Nat, — ex bona mente faciunt, et aliquando indiet Gent. Lib. v. cap. 4. ὃ ὅ. J. B. cium fidei putant pretio emta, mancipia, 4 Sed sub consideratione generaliore] ^ non paruisse. Exemplum habes in ex- Quintilianus Controvers. [Immo.De- cerptis legationum in illa parte, quoclam.] convi. Servi quedam liberius ^ modolegationes obeundze accipiendzeque who gave the commission. For it is lawful to do so, if it be clear that what was prescribed was not prescribed under its special form, but under a more general purpose, which might also be obtained in some other way: thus, he who was ordered to give security for a loan to be made to a third person, might, instead, give an order to the lender to make the payment to the third person; as Sezvola held. [Dig. xvi. 1.1 But when that is not clear, we must hold, as Crassus says, in Gellius in that place, that the demand of the superior is disregarded, if any one, in place of discharging his commission as directed, respond by advice which was never asked for. | XXII. An interpretation restricting a promise, extraneously to the signification of the words which contain the promise, is derived either from original limitation of the will [of the promiser], or from the repugnanee with such will which comes to view in some occurring case. A limitation of the original will is understood—from the ab- surdity which would evidently follow, if it were not so limited;—from the cessation of the reason which alone fully and efficaciously moved the will;——and from the defect of the matter.
The first restriction has its ground in the consideration, that no one is supposed to intend what is absurd.
Car. XVI.] DE INTERPRETATIONE. 179 XXIII — Secundum, ex eo quod contentum in promissione, ubi ratio talis additur, aut de ea constat, non consideratur nude, sed quatenus sub ea ratione venit.
XXIV. Tertium, in eo quod materia de qua agitur sem- per intelligenda est observari animo loquentis, etiamsi verba latius pateant. Hsec quoque interpretandi ratio ἃ Rhetoribus tractatur in loeo περὶ ῥητοῦ καὶ διανοίας, et titulum habet, cum dicitur non semper eadem sententia.
XXV. 1 Sed de ratione notandum est, sub ea compre- hendi szpe quasdam res non secundum existentiam, sed secun- dum potentiam moraliter consideratam, quz ubi locum habet, restrietio facienda non est. Sie si cautum sit, ne exercitus aut classis aliquo ducatur, non poterit duci, etiam animo non no- cendi. Quia in pactione non certum damnum, sed periculum qualecunque spectatum est.
2 Solet et hoc disputari, an promissa in se habeant taci- tam conditionem, si res maneant quo sunt loco: quod negan- dum est, nisi apertissime pateat statum rerum prssentem in orum ducum unus fecit contra Belisarii € Que sola plene et efficaciter movit verba, Gothicorum τι. et rv. [Scilicet ^ voluntatem] Exemplum in 1. Adigere 6, apud Pnocor. Lib. rr. c. 10. οὐ Hist. — S quamvis. 2. D. de jure patronatus.
XXII. The second in this, that what is contained in the pro. mise, when such a reason is added, or the reason is certain, is not considered nakedly, but so far as it comes under that reason.
XXIV. The third in this, that the matter which is dealt with is always supposed to be present to the mind of the speaker (the pro- miser) although the words have a wider signification. "This way of interpretation also is treated by writers on Rhetoric in the Section, Of what is said and what is meant; and has for its Title, When the same words are used, but not in the same sense.
XXV. 1 But with regard to the reasons [of promisers, as here applied], it is to be noted that there are comprehended therein many things, not as to whether they exist, but as to their power morally considered; and when this holds, the restriction is not to be intro- duced. Thus if it be stipulated that an army or a fleet is not to be moved into a certain place, it must not be moved thither, though it be done with no purpose of attack. For in the compact, it was not à certain damage, but a danger of any kind which was considered.
2 'Dhis also is often disputed, whether promises have in them- selves this tacit condition, If things remain in their present state. And this is to be denied, except it be quite clear that the present Pascal. 7eg.
180 DE INTERPRETATIONE. [Lrs. II.
unica illa quam diximus ratione inclusum esse. Sie passim in historiis legimus legatos a suscepto itinere domum rediisse deserta legatione, quod res ita mutatas inteligerent, ut tota legationis materia aut causa cessaret.
XXVI. 1 Repugnantia casus emergentis cum voluntate solet et ipsa ab oratoriz artis magistris referri ad eum, quem dixi locum περὶ ῥητοῦ kai διανοίας. Est autem duplex: nam aut voluntas colligitur ex naturali ratione, aut ex alio signo voluntatis. Dijudiceandz voluntati ex naturali ratione Aristo- teles, qui hanc partem accuratissime tractavit, propriam virtu- tem tribuit in intellectu γνώμην, sive εὐγνωμοσύνην, id est, equiprudentiam, in voluntate vero ἐπιείκειαν, id est, cqui- tatem, quam sapienter definit, correctionem ejus fin quo lex deficit ob universalitatem: quod ad testamenta quoque et pacta suo modo referri debet. — Nam quia casus nec preevideri omnes possunt nec exprimi, ideo libertate quadam opus est eximendi easus, quos qui loeutus est 51 adesset eximeret: non tamen temere; id enim esset dominum se facere actus alieni; sed ex sufficientibus indiciis.
f In quo lex deficit ob universalita- — lege, inquis, nihil excipitur, sed multa tem] Seneca 1v. controversia 27. In — quamvis non excipiantur intelliguntur: state of things was included in that sole reason of which we have spoken. Thus we constantly read in history of ambassadors who gave up their commission and returned home, because they under- stood that the state of things was changed, so that the whole matter or cause of the embassy ceased.
XXVI. 1 The repugnance of an occurring case with the will [of the promiser] is commonly, in writers on oratory, referred to the Section of which I have spoken, Of what is said and what is meant. It is twofold: for the will is either collected from natural reasons, or from some other sign of the will. Aristotle, who has most cor- rectly treated this part, ascribes to the intellect a peculiar power for judging of the will, which he calls γνώμη, or εὐγνωμοσύνη, that is equitable insight; and to the will he ascribes a corresponding power, ἐπιείκεια, equity, which he ably defines, The correction of the law, when it is defective from the universality of its expression *. And this equity is also to be applied to testaments and compacts in an appropriate manner. For since all cases can neither be foreseen nor expressed, there is a necessity for some liberty for excepting cases which he who has spoken would except if he were present. But this is not to be done rashly; (for that would be for the interpreter Car. XVI.] DE INTERPRETATIONE. 1S1 2 Certissimum indicium est, si quo casu sequi verba illi- citum esset, id est, pugnans cum naturalibus aut divinis prze- ceptis. Talia enim, cum obligationis capacia non sint, eximenda sunt necessario. Quedam, ait Quintilianus pater, etiamsi nulla significatione legis comprehensa sint, natura tamen excipiuntur. lta qui promisit depositum gladium reddere, non reddet furenti, ne aut ipsi perieulum creet, aut aliis in- nocentibus. Sic nec reddetur res deposita ei, qui deposuit: si dominus eam repetat. Probo, inquit Tryphoninus, anc esse justitiam, qua suum cuique ita, tribuit, ut non distrahatur ab ullius persone justiore repetitione. Ratio est, quia, ut alibi notavimus, introducti semel dominii ea vis est, ut rem domino cognito non reddere omnino injustum sit.
XXVII. 1 Secundum erit indicium, si verba sequi non quidem per se et omnino illicitum sit, sed zeque rem sestimanti nimis grave atque intolerabile: sive absolute spectata condi- tione humana naturz, sive comparando personam et rem, de qua agitur, cum ipso fine actus. Sic qui rem ad dies aliquot commodavit, intra eos dies repetere eam poterit, si ipse valde et scriptum legis angustum est, inlerpre- — festa sunt ut nullam cautionem deside- tatio diffusa: quedam vero tam mani- — rent.
to determine the acts of another); but on sufficient indications.
9 'The most certain indication is, if in any case to follow the words would be unlawful, that is, at variance with the precepts of Natural or Divine Law. — For such cases, since they cannot impose an obligation, must necessarily be excepted. Some things, says Quin. tilian the father, though they are not comprehended in any terms of the law, are by their nature ezcepted. — 'Thus he who has received a sword as a deposit, promising to give it up on demand, is not to give it up to a madman, in order that he may not create danger to himself or to other innocent persons. Tryphoninus says, 7 agree that it is justice to give to each his own, but in. such a way that it may mot be again demanded on a better claim, by some other person. "The reason is, because, as we have elsewhere noted, the force of ownership once introduced, is such that not to restore a thing to the owner, when known, is altogether unjust.
XXVIL 1 A second indication of a reason for deviating from the words of the promiser, in our interpretation, is, if to follow the words will be, not indeed quite unlawful, but to a person fairly esti- mating the matter, grievous and intolerable: either looking absolutely at the condition of human nature, or comparing the person and thing in question with the end of the act. "Thus he who has lent a Decl. 315.
L. bon. fid. 32. D. depot.
Molin. disp.
Sylv. Verb. commod. n.
Vasq. contr.
De Offic. 1. 10.
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egeat: quia actus tam benefici ea est natura, ut non credendus sit quisquam ad magnum suum incommodum se voluisse obli- gare. Sie qui auxilium federato promisit, excusabitur quamdiu ipse domi periclitatur, in quantum copiis opus habet. Et con- cessio immunitatis vectigalium et tributorum intelligetur de quotidianis et anniversariis, non de iis, quse summa necessitas exigit, οὐ quibus carere respublica non potest.
2 Ex quibus apparet nimis laxe dietum a Cicerone, non servanda promissa quze sint iis quibus promiseris inutilia, nec 51 plus tibi noceant quam illi prosint cui promiseris. Nam an res utilis sit futura ei, cui promissa est, judicare promissor non debet, nisi forte in casu furoris, de quo supra diximus: et ut promissum promissorem non obliget, non satis est quodlibet nocumentum in promissorem, sed tale oportet sit, "quod pro natura actus eredi debeat exceptum. Sic qui operas vicino ad dies aliquot promisit, non tenebitur, si eum morbus sonticus € Concessio immunitatis] Vide Ro- senthalium de.Feudis cap. v. concl. LXXxxvI. num. 2. Heig. Zllustrium x viu. num. 16. parte 1. Gothmannum cons. Xr. 32. Clarum ὃ feudum. xxix. 2. Andream Knich de Vestitis Pactis, parte ir. 6. 2. num. 20. Henricum Bocer de Collectis cap. iv. 12.
h Quod pro matura actus credi de- beat exceptum] Vide Carolum Molinzum ad. Consuetudines Parisienses tit. 1. ὃ 2.
gl.iv. n. 3. Ferd. Vasquium de Suc- cessionum Creatione libro rr. ὃ xviii. num.S80. Antonium Fabrum rerum in Sabaudia judicatarum libro 1v. tit. 30. Zasium in l. stipulatio hoc modo. 61. num. 3. de verborum obligationibus. Adde c. quemadmodum. 25. de jureju- rando et Alciatum ad c. cum contingat, eodem titulo.
i Quod apud Senecam legimus] Ejus- dem hzc sunt, capite xxxix, Lib. 1v. de thing for a few days, may demand it back again within that time, if he himself have great need of it: because this [lending] is an act so beneficial in its nature, that it is not to be supposed that any one would thereby bind himself to his own great inconvenience. Thus he who has promised assistance to a federate ally, will be excused as long as he is in danger at home, so far as he has occasion for his powers. And a concession of immunity from tax and tribute must be un- derstood with reference to daily and yearly taxes, not to those which some extreme necessity requires, and which the State cannot do without.
2 Whence it appears that Cicero spoke too laxly, when he said that your promises are not to be kept which are useless to those to whom they are made; nor if they harm you more than they advantage them. For whether the thing will be useful to him to whom it is promised, the promiser is not the judge, except perhaps when the promisee is mad, of which ease we have spoken above: and in order Car. XVI.] DE INTERPRETATIONE. 183 patris aut filii detineat. Et hoe recte Cicero de Officiis primo: Car. x. Si constitueris te cuipiam advocatum in rem presentem esse venturum, atque interim graviter «grotare filius coperit, non sit contra officium non facere quod dixeris.
3 In eundem sensum accipiendum, nee ultra trahendum est, quod apud Senecam legimus: une fidem fallam, tunc De Bem. iv. inconstantice crimen audiam, δὲ cum omnia eadem sint, qua erant promittente me, non prestitero promissum, alioqui quicquid mutatur, libertatem facit de integro consulendi, et meam fidem liberat. |.Promisi advocationem: postea appa- ruit per illam causam prajudicium in patrem meum quari: promisi me peregre una iturum: sed. iter infestari latroci- niis nuntiatur. | In rem presentem venturus fui: sed «ger filius, sed. puerpera uvor tenet. Omnia esse debent. eadem qua fuerint cum promitterem, ut promittentis fidem teneas. Omnia intelige, pro actus ejus de quo qusritur natura, ut jàm modo exposuimus.
Beneficiis: Ad cenam quia promisi ibo, etiamsi frigus erit, non quidem si nives cadent. Surgam ad sponsalia, quia pro- misi, quamvis non concocerim, sed non si fébricitavero. Sponsum descendam, quia promisi: sed mon si spondere in incertum jubebis, si fisco obligabis. Sub- est, inquam, tacita exceptio, si potero, si dehebo, si h«c ita erunt..Effice ut idem status sit cum exigitur, qui fuit,