If, however, you look to the fonn of the recipro city, if you reflect on the occurring- of the inter change, and hence abstract from the propositions which are interchanged, then the question no long er is: With what right are these propositions inter changed? but simply: How is interchange effected at all? And then it is discovered, that there must be an intelligent being outside of the iron and mag net, which, observing both and uniting both in its consciousness, is compelled to give to the one the opposite predicate of the other; (to the one the predicate of attracting, to the other the predicate of being attracted.)
The first mode gives simply a reflection upon a, phenomenon; the second mode a reflection upon that reflection; the reflection of the philosopher upon the mode of observation.
APPLICATION UNDER THE CONCEPTION OF CAUSALITY.
In the reciprocity of causality, passivity in the Ego posits activity in the Non-Ego. The mere formal expression of this reciprocity is a positing THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 139 through a not-positing, that is, a transferring. Such is thefwma/ character of the reciprocity here; and, hence, such is the material character of the activity which establishes that reciprocity. This activity is independent of the reciprocity, since the latter only is possible by means of it; and is independent also of the two links of the reciprocity as such; for only through it do they become reciprocally inter changeable, since it is the activity which inter changes them. But all positing belongs to the Ego; hence this activity of transferring, to make possible a determination through the conception of causality, belongs to the Ego. The Ego carries over, transfers, activity from itself into the Non- Ego; and thus posits through activity passivity in itself. In so far as the Ego is active in carrying over this activity, in so far the Non-Ego is passive; activity is transferred into it (Of course, this contradicts our former conclu* sion establishing an independent activity of the Non-Ego; but we must wait and see how both will be reunited.) It must also be remembered that this activity is independent of the reciprocity which first becomes possible through it There might be another reciprocity which does not become possible through it. Our result, therefore, is this: Even in so far as the Ego is passive, it must also be active, though perJtaps not merely active; and this result may be important enough.
140 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
APPLICATION UNDER THE CONCEPTION* OF SUB STANTIALITY.
In the reciprocity of substantiality, activity is to "be posited as limited by means of absolute totality; that is to say, that part of the absolute totality -which is excluded by the limit is posited as not posited through the positing of the limited activity. Hence, the mere formal character of this recipro city is a not-positing by means of a positing. That which is wanting in the limited activity is posited in the absolute totality; is not posited in the limited activity; it is posited as not posited in the recipro city, (in the reciprocal determination of activity and passivity.) By this conception of substantiality we start, therefore, from an absolute positing, from a positing of the absolute totality.
Hence, the material character of that act, which itself posits this reciprocity, must also be a not- positing through a positing, and through an absolute positing. We abstract utterly from the question whence the not-positedness in the limited activity may come, and what may be its ground. The limit ed act is presupposed as existing, and the only ques tion is: How may it interchange with unlirnitedness?
All positing in general, and particularly absolute positing, belongs to the Ego; the act which posits the present reciprocity starts from absolute posit ing, and therefore belongs to the Ego. It is inde pendent of the reciprocity, for that becomes possible only through it This not positing through a posit- THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 14!
ing we may call an externalizing. A certain quan tum of the absolute totality is excluded, externalized, from the posited diminished activity, is posited as not contained in it, but as outside of it. The cha racteristic distinction between the externalizing and the previous transferring is this: in transferring something is certainly also excluded from the Ego; but this we do not reflect upon, looking merely to its being posited again in the opposite, the Non- Ego. It is a transferring to another. But in ex ternalizing we merely exclude from the Ego, and do not say whether the excluded be posited in an other, and if so in what To this activity of externalizing passivity must "be opposed; and it really is thus. For a part of the absolute totality is externalized, is posited, as not posited. The activity has an object; a part of the totality is this object. To what substrate of reality this passivity may be assigned, whether to the Ego or to the Non-Ego, is not the question "here; and it is very important that no other conclu sions should be drawn from our result than are contained in it, and that the form of the reciprocity "be comprehended in all its purity.
(Each thing is what it is; it has those realities which are posited when it is posited, (A = A.) To call something an accidence of a thing is to say that something is not included in the positing of the thing, does not belong to its real nature, and is to "be excluded from its original conception. It is this determination of the accidence which we have now 142 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
explained. Nevertheless, in another sense the acci dence is also ascribed to the thing and posited in it. How this is done we shall see hereafter.)
in.
BOTH THE RECIPROCITY AND THE ACTIVITY, INDE PENDENT THEREOF, MUTUALLY DETERMINE EACH OTHER.
Let us again, as heretofore, first try to get at the significance of this proposition, and then proceed to apply it As we have now, however, acquired a twofold reciprocity, ^form and a content of it, and also a twofold independent activity, which, on the one hand, determines the form, and, on the other hand, is (in reflection) determined by the content of the reciprocity; we must make more clear the above proposition by uniting these several links through the synthesis of reciprocal determination. Hence, that proposition involves the following three: (a.) The activity, independent of the jforw of the reciprocity, determines the activity, independent of its content, and vice versa; that is, both are syn thetically united and mutually determine each other.
(£.) The form of the reciprocity determines its content, and vice versa; that is, both are syntheti cally united and mutually determine each other.
(c.) The reciprocity (as synthetical unity) deter mines the independent activity, (as synthetical uni ty,) and vice versa; that is, both determine each other mutually and are synthetically united.
THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 143 (a.) The activity independent of tlie form, and the activity independent of the content cf the reciprocity, *arc mutually to determine each other.
That activity which is to determine the form of the reciprocity, or the reciprocity as such, but is to "be absolutely independent of it, is a going over from one of the links of the reciprocity to the other.
That activity which determines the content of the reciprocity is an activity which posits that into the links whereby it is made possible to go from the one to the other.
The latter activity gives the X which is in both Jinks, and can be contained only in both, but not in one of them merely; and which makes it impossible to remain content with the positing of the one link, but forces us to posit at the same time the other "Jink, because it shows up the incompleteness of the one without the other. This X is that to which the unity of consciousness clings, and must cling if no hiatus is to arise in it; it is, as it were, the con ductor of consciousness.
The former activity is consciousness itself, in so far as it floats over the interchanging links while •clinging to X, and in so far as it is a unit; although it changes its objects, these links, and necessarily, must change them if it is to be a unit The former determines the latter signifies, the going from the one link to the other is the ground of the content of the reciprocity; the latter deter mines the former signifies, the content of the reci procal links is the ground of the going from the one to the other as act. Both mutually determine 144 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE each other signifies, therefore: by positing the mere going over, you posit in each link that which makes this going over possible, and by positing them as reciprocal links you immediately go from the one to the other. The going from one link to the other becomes possible only by doing it; and it is only possible in so far as it is actually done. It is an absolute act without any other ground. The ground of the going over from one link to the other lies in consciousness itself, not outside of it Conscious ness, because it is consciousness, must go from one link to the other, and would not be consciousness if it did not, because a hiatus would arise in it.
(£.) The form of the reciprocity and its content are mutually to determine each other, The reciprocity, as we have said before, is distin guished from the activity prcsiipposcd through it, by abstracting from this presupposed activity, (for instance, by abstracting from the activity of an in telligence which observes the reciprocity.) In this view, the intcrcJianging links of tJie reciprocity are tJwught as iutcrcJianging through themselves; we transfer into the things what in truth is only in us. How far such an abstraction may be valid will ap pear in time.
From such a stand-point, therefore, the links in terchange through themselves. And their mutual joining is the fonn, while the activity and passi vity, occurring in this joining, (namely, each joins and is joined,) is the content of the reciprocity. We shall call this content here the mutual Relation of the interchanging links.
THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 145 Now, that joining is to determine the relation of the links; that is, immediately and through the mere joining of the links, as joining, is the relation to be determined, and vice versa. Their joining and their relation is to be one and the same. In other words: The relation of the links consists in this, that they interchange, and they have no other mutual relation. If they are not posited as interchanging, they are not posited at all Again: through this mere form of a reciprocity being posited between them, the content of the re ciprocity is immediately and completely determined. The links intcrcJiange necessarily and only in one possible manner, which is absolutely determined by the very fact that they interchange. If they are posited, a determined interchange or reciprocity of them is posited; and if a determined reciprocity of them is posited, then they are posited. The links and a determined reciprocity are one and the same.
(c.) The independent activity as synthetical unity determines the reciprocity as synthetical unify, and vice versa; iJiat is, both of these synthetical unities mutually determine each other, and are themselves synthetically united.
The activity and synthetical unity has been dis covered as an absolute going from one link to an other, the latter as an in itself absolutely determined joining. The former determines the latter signifies, by the going from one link to the other their join ing is posited. The latter determines the former signifies, as the links join, the activity must neces- 145 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
sardy go from the one to the other. Both deter mine each other mutually signifies, the positing of the one posits the other, from each you can and must proceed to the other. It is all one and the same, and the whole is absolutely posited; rests on itself! To make this important result clearer, we apply it to the propositions involved in it The activity which determines the form of the reciprocity determines all that occurs in the reci procity, and vice versa. Determines the form: that is, the mere reciprocity in its form, or the joining of the links, is not possible -without the act of go ing from the one to the other, and only through the going from the one link to the other is their joining posited; and vice versa. Xo joining of the links, no going from the one to the other; no going from the one to the other, no joining. Both is one and the same, and is distinguishable only in reflection.
Determines also the content: that is, through the necessary going from one of the links to the other these reciprocal links are first posited as such, and indeed since they are only posited as such, posited at all, and vice versa; through the positing of these links as interchanging links is the activity first posited which goes from the one to the other.
Hence, you may start from which of the moments you will, the positing of the one always involves the positing of the other three.* * Four moments and their unity, that is to say, fire in alL This fivefold FICHTE has shown up in other works with particular ear nestness, as occurring in even- synthesis of consciousness. — TRANS LATOR'S NOTE.
THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE, M7 The activity which determines the content of the reciprocity determines the whole reciprocity: that is, it posits that by means of which the going over is made possible, and hence necessary. It therefore posits the activity of the form, and through it all the rest Hence, the activity returns into itself by means of the reciprocity, and the reciprocity returns into itself by means of the activity. Every thing re produces itself, and no hiatus is possible; from each link you are driven to all the others. The activity of the form determines that of the content; the activity of the content determines the content of the reciprocity; the content of the reciprocity de termines its form; the form of the reciprocity the activity of the form, etc. They are all one and the same synthetical condition. The act returns into itself through its circular movement. But the whole circular movement is absolutely posited. It is because it is, and there is no higher ground for it And now, having shown the full significance of our proposition, let us proceed to apply it as here tofore.
APPLICATION UNDER THE CONCEPTION OF CAUSALITY.
Our proposition was: TJie reciprocity and tJic ac~ Jivity independent of it are mutually to determine other.
148 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE According to the just established scheme this involves the following: isL The activity of the form determines that of the content, and vice versa.
2d. The form of the reciprocity determines its content, and vice versa.
3d. The synthetically united activity determines the synthetically united reciprocity, and vice versa.
I. — The activity of tJie fonn determines that of the . content, and vice versa.
As mere form, this activity was characterized as a transferring, that is, a positing through a not- positing. This activity of the form is to determine the activity of the content of the reciprocity, which latter was found to be an independent activity in the Non-Ego, which made possible a passivity in the Ego. This latter is determined by the former, means: The activity is posited in the Non-Ego through the Ego, but only in so far as something is not posited. The activity of the Non-Ego is thus inclosed in a limited sphere, that is, in the activity cf the form. The Non-Ego is active only in so far as it is posited active through the Ego, in virtue of a not-positing. No positing by a not-positing — no activity of the Non-Ego. But, on the other hand, the activity of the content, or the independent ac tivity of the Non-Ego, is to determine that of the form, that is, the transferring or the positing through a not-positing.
This means, therefore: the activity of the Non- Ego is to determine the transferring as a transfer- THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 149 ring; or, it is to posit the X, whereby the incom pleteness of the one link is shown up, and thus the necessity of positing it, as interchanging link, or as a link in reciprocity with another link. This second link is a passivity, as passivity. Hence, the Non-Ego is the ground of a «0/-positing, and thus determines and conditions the activity of the form. No activity of the Non-Ego, no positing through a not-positing.
Here we have again the conflict of Realism, which says that activity can not be transferred unless an independent reality of the Non-Ego is presup posed; and of Idealism, which says, that all reality of the Non-Ego is simply transferred to it by the Ego. This conflict is to be reconciled.
This is done in the following synthesis: Activity in the Non-Ego is passivity in the Ego, and both are altogether one and the same. Neither is the ground of the other; both are one and the same act. In so far as the Ego does not posit in itself, it posits in the Non-Ego, that is, in so far it is itself Non-Ego.
Let us explain this: When the Non-Ego is con sidered as limiting the Ego, it is not considered at all zs, positing^ but merely as canceling; hence, it is opposed to the Ego as qualitatively distinct, is real ground of a determination in the Ego. But when the Ego is viewed as limiting itself, it is still viewed as positing; that is, as positing a negative; hence, as in part positing, and in part not-positing. The Ego is, therefore, only quantitatively opposed to it- I5O THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
self — is only the ideal ground of a determination in itself; and since it posits that which it does not posit in itself, in the Non-Ego, it is the ideal ground of the reality of the Non-Ego, to which that deter mination corresponds. But that the ideal ground should thus become a real ground in the Non-Ego, this is what common sense can not comprehend.
Ideal ground and real ground are, therefore, one and the same. The reason why common sense refuses to comprehend it is because it considers the Ego as an external thing. Just as in exter nal things we distinguish the real ground of their mutual relation, that is, the independent content or quality which makes them related; and the ideal ground of their relation; that is, that we posit them as related; so common consciousness posits its Ego as an external thing, related to other things by an inherent something; for instance, as the magnet is related to iron. But in the Ego positing itself is the same as being. In it real and ideal ground are one and the same. Again, not positing itself, -and not being, is for the Ego the same. The Ego does not posit something as itself means, the Ego is not that something. The Non- Ego is to influence the Ego means, it is to cancel a positing in the Ego; it is to cause the Ego not to posit Again, the Ego is to recognize a Non-Ego means, it is to posit reality in the Non-Ego; for the Ego recognizes no other reality but what itself posits. Activity of the Ego and of the Non-Ego are one THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. \$\ and the same means: the Ego can only posit some thing not in itself, by positing it in the Non-Ego; and can only posit in itself by not positing in the Non-Ego. The Ego must posit, however, as sure as it is an Ego; but it need not posit in itself.
Passivity of the Ego and of the Non-Ego is also one and the same. The Ego does not posit some thing in itself means, that something is posited in the Non-Ego.
Activity and passivity of the Ego are one and the same. For what the Ego does not posit in itself it posits in the Non-Ego.
Activity and passivity of the Non-Ego are one and the same. In so far as the Non-Ego is to in fluence the Ego, to cancel something in the Ego, this something has been posited in the Non-Ego by the Ego.
Thus the synthetical solution is complete. None of the moments are grounds of the others; all are one and the same.
The question, What is the ground of the passi vity in the Ego? is, therefore, not a proper one, for there is no such passivity. But one question may be put: What is the ground of this whole reci procity? To say simply it is because it is, is not allowable, for only the Ego is absolutely posited; and the mere Ego does not involve this reciprocity. Such a ground, however, if it is to be found, is not to be found in the theoretical part of the science of knowledge, because it is not involved in its funda mental principle, that " the Ego posits itself as 152 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
•determined by the Non-Ego." On the contrary, the theoretical part presupposes such a ground At the same time, our expression, " limited, re stricted activity of the Ego," is now perfectly clear. It is an activity which is directed upon something in the Non-Ego, hence an objective activity. The activity of the Ego generally is not at all limited, and can not be limited; but its positing of tlie Ego is limited by this, that it must posit a Non-Ego.
II. — The form and tJic content of tJie reciprocity determine each other mutually.
The form of the reciprocity is the mere mutual in terchange of the links — the content is that in them, which makes them capable of this mutual inter change, and impels them to realize it The charac teristic form of the reciprocity is here (under the ca tegory of causality) a becoming through a vanishing. •(From time we must abstract as yet. The X which becomes through the — X, which vanishes, must both be thought together, or, rather, not at all in time.) The characteristic of the content of this reciprocity is essential opposition of the two links, or the qualita tive incompatibility of both.
The form is to determine the content means, the two links are essentially opposed, because and in so far as they cancel each other. Their actual mutual canceling determines the sphere of their opposition. If they do not cancel each other, they are not essentially opposed. (A seeming paradox, to be explained directly.)
The content determines the form-- means, their THE SCIENCE Of KNOWLEDGE. 153 •essential opposition determines fheir mutual cancel ing; only on condition that the links are opposed, and only in so far as they are mutually opposed •can they cancel each other. Form and content mutually determine each other signifies, the essen tial opposition of the links necessitates their mutual canceling, and hence their actual connection and influence upon each other, and vice versa. Both is one and the same.
The real result of this synthesis is, that a neces sary connection is posited between the links. This synthesis denies the possibility to distinguish a "being in itself from a being in the reciprocity; both are posited as interchanging links, and are other wise not posited at all Real and ideal opposition are one and the same. This is what appears para doxical, but it does not appear so when it is re membered that the one link is the Ego, to which nothing is opposed, which it does not posit as op posed to itself, and which is opposed to nothing, "but to what it posits itself as opposed.
III. — The synthetically united activity and the synthetically united reciprocity mutually determine each other, and constitute in tJicinsclvcs a syntlictical unity.
The activity as synthetical unity may be called a mediated positing, (a positing of reality by means of a not-positing;) the synthetically united reci procity is the identity of essential opposition and real canceling.
The former determines the latter signifies: The 154 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
mcdiatcncss of the positing is the ground and the condition of the identity of essential opposition and real canceling. These two links are identical be cause of the mcdiatcncss of the positing.
If the interchanging links were posited immedi ately, opposition and canceling would be distinct. Call these links A and B. Let A = A and B = B; but now posit also A = — B, in some quantitative respect, and B = — A; and, nevertheless, they do not necessarily cancel each other. For you may abstract from their characteristic as opposites, and again view them as having been posited immedi ately and independent of each other, (A = A and B = B,) in which case they are no longer posited as interchanging links, but also as reality in them selves. Interchanging links can only be posited mediately; A is = — B, and nothing else; and B= — A, and nothing else; and from this medi- ateness of the positing follows their essential op position and their mutual canceling, and the iden tity of both. For if A and B are thus posited, as existing merely in essential opposition to each other, and if they can receive no other predicate (not even that of a thing) — if A can therefore not be posited as real otherwise than through not positing B, and B not except through not positing A — their common essence evidently con sists in this, that the one is posited through the not-positing of the other, and hence — if we abstract from an intelligence which posits them — that they •do cancel each other. Their essential opposition THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 155 and mutual canceling are, therefore, identical, in so far as each link is only posited through the not- positing of another.
Now, this is the case with the Ego and the Non- Ego. The Ego can transfer reality into the Non- Ego only through not positing the same in itself; and into itself only through not positing the same in the Non-Ego. (We speak here of transferred, not of absolute reality.) The essence of the Ego and the Non-Ego, therefore, as interchanging links, consists only in this, that they are opposed to each other, and cancel each other. The mediateness of the positing (that is, the law of consciousness, " no subject no object, and vice versa"} is the ground of the essential opposition of the Ego and the Non- Ego, and hence of all the reality of the Non-Ego as well as of the Ego; that is, in so far as this real ity is posited simply as posited, or, ideal reality; for the absolute reality remains, of course, in the positing. This mediateness, so far as we have now advanced in our synthesis, is not again to be grounded through that whereof it is the ground, nor can it be so in any proper application of the prop osition of the ground. The ground of this mediate- ness, therefore, can not be contained either in the reality of the Non-Ego, or in the posited reality of the Ego. The ground must, therefore, be in the absolute Ego; and this mediateness must be itself absolute, that is, grounded in and through itself