PAGE 67, line 5, "Countess of Connaway." Anne — Viscountess Con- way — died Feb. 23, 1678-9, was a metaphysician and an earnest student of Plato, Plotinus, Philo Judseus and the " Kabbala Denudata." In spite of never-ceasing sufferings from a severe headache lasting till her death, she pursued her metaphysical studies with extraordinary devotion and assiduity. Her physician, Francis Mercury van Helmont (cf. infra, 242, note 2), encoui-aged her in this course. She was very friendly with H. More and corresponded with him on philosophical and theological topics. She wrote many works of which only one has been printed: Opuscula philosophica quibus continentur principia philosophies antiquissimw ct recentissimce, Amsterdam, 1690. It was the first in a collection of philo sophical treatises appearing in Latin in that year at Amsterdam, translated as "a work by a certain English countess, 'learned beyond her sex,' " and ascribed by Leibnitz in a German literary journal, on the authority of Van Helmont, to the Countess of Conway. The treatise was re-trans lated into English and published with the title The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy, etc., London, 1692, 8vo.
PAGE 67, note 1. Add: On Campanella, cf. Stockl, Gesch. d. Philos. d. Mittelalters, III. [Vol. 4.], 343-366; Lasswitz, Gesch. d. Atomistik, 1, 340- PAGE 67, note 2. Add: On Van Helmont, cf. infra, p. 242, note 2; on II. More, cf. infra, pp. 380, note 1; 382, note 2, and addition thereto, infra p. 768.
ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS 733 PAGE 67, note 3. Add: Further references to Arduous in Leibnitz's writings are: Specimen Dynamicnm, Gerhardt, Leibniz, math. Schrift., II., 2 [Vol. 0], 242, also infra, Appendix, p. 079; Hypothesis phys. nova, Thcoria motns concreti, § 60, Gerhardt, Leibniz, philos. Schrift. 4, 217; math. Schrift., II., 2 [Vol. 6], 57; Dutens, Leibnit. op. om., 2, Ft. II., 33; Leibnit. Animadversiones circa Assertioncs aliquas Theories Jfedicx verai Clar. Stahlii, Dutens, op. cit., 2, Pt. II., 13G. Cf., also, Windel- band-Tufts, Hist, of Philos. 371 sq.
PAGE G8, line 10, " Morte carent a/w'ma?." Cf. Ovid, Metamorphoses, PAGE 68, line 20, "Spontaneity." Leibnitz ascribes absolute spon taneity to the soul, to which the activity of the body perfectly corresponds through the Pre-established Harmony, and therefore neither influences nor disturbs it.
PAGE 68, line 7 from bottom, "Epitome." That is in the Monad, each monad representing in itself and to itself the entire universe. Leibnitz constantly recurs to this thought, which is one of the chief points of his system. Cf. Systeme nouveau de la nature, § 16; Monadologie, § 65, etc.
PAGE 69, note 1. Add: also G. Groom Robertson, Philos. Remains, Williams & Norgate, 1894, pp. 334-342.
PAGE 70, line 5 from bottom, " Copernicans." Kant, later in the Preface to the 2d ed. of his Kritik d. reinen Vernunft, makes use of the same comparison of Copernicus.
PAGE 71, line 24, " Confused perceptions." Cf. ante, p. 48 and note to line 7 from bottom, ante, p. 727. " While Leibnitz," says Schaarschmidt, "often returns to this antithesis of truths of reason and of fact, he has unfortunately nowhere given accurate definitions of the former, nor any wholly satisfactory criterion of a truth of reason. Kant first undertook this task, in that he certainly on the one side significantly restricted the service of the truths of reason, on the other, that against Leibnitz he recognized that for the reason as such complete (fertige) concepts are to arise out of the truths of reason."
PAGE 72, note 1. Add: " The Later Arminians," says Schaarschmidt, "are here referred to, as the leaders of this religious sect, such as Episco- pius, Limborch, 3. Clericus, like Descartes and Leibnitz himself, assume a knowledge of God derived from natural reason."
PAGE 74, line 8 from bottom, "Natural light." Cf. infra, pp. 575-576, note 1.
PAGE 74, lines 4, 3, from bottom, " Verification." Cf. ante, p. 71, note to line 24, above, and also New Essays, Bk. IV., chaps. 9, 11. Leibnitz here presents as the criterion or test of innate ideas their immediacy in consciousness. Spinoza before him (Ethica, Pt. II., Prop. 43, Scholium, ad fin., ed. Van Vloten and Land, 1, 111; Elwes' trans., 2, 115; <•/., also, F. Pollock, Spinoza, his Life and Philosophy, 129 sq.), said: " Sane sicut 734 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE lux seipsam et tenebras manifestat, sic veritas norma sui et falsi est." Cf., also, Descartes, Prin. Philos., Bk. L, § 45; ed. Cousin, 3, 90; Veitch's trans., 212, where he sets forth the doctrine of "clear and distinct" knowledge and of intuition through which we become immediately con scious of the truth as such. Cf., also, Descartes, BeguhK ad directionem ingenii (Regies pour la direction de V esprit), Opuscula posthuma Cartesii, Amsterdam, 1701, III., p. 6; IV., p. 9; VI., p. 14; ed. Cousin, 11, 209, PAGE 75, note 1. Dele note. The Ludolph here referred to by Leibnitz is Ludolph van Ceulen, or Keulen, 1539-1610, Professor of Military Archi tecture in the University of Ley den since 1600, and previously teacher of mathematics in Breda, Amsterdam, and Leyden. He published his Van de Circkel, daarin geleert wird te finden de nceste proportie des Circkels- diameter iegen synen Omloop, Delft, 1596; Latin trans, by Snellius, en titled De circulo et adscriptis, 1615. His De arithmetische en geometrische fondamenten, etc., Leyden, 1616. Fundamenta arithmetica et geometries and Zetemata (seu Problemata) geometrica, both trans, from the Dutch by Snellius, Lugd. Bat., 1615. He computed the ratio of the diameter to the circumference of the circle to 35 places of decimals. The ratio is commonly known in Germany by the name " Ludolphische Zahl." Leibnitz refers to him in his mathematical writings, cf. Gerhardt, Leibniz, math. Schrift. II., 1 [Vol. 5], 95, 119. For Leibnitz's discussions of the subject, cf. infra, p. 424, note 2.
PAGE 77, line 6 from bottom, " Subvenire." Schaarschmidt translates "Beikommen," and in his note to the passage states that "the French souvenir (to remember) made from subvenire, originally means: to come to the aid of. The expression of help introduced by the Herbartian phi losophy could, unfortunately, not be used, since the word-play would be wholly lost."
Leibnitz's thought is that reminiscence, the active and voluntary factor in the reproduction of the past and in bringing the now unconscious knowledge again into consciousness, requires and receives the aid of remembrance or memory, the conservative factor in the process, which in some unknown and mysterious way, and out of consciousness, preserves as in a store-house the knowledge previously acquired or possessed. Cf. Hamilton, Metaphys., Lect. 20, pp. 274-275, American ed., Boston, 1875.
PAGE 78, line 10 from bottom. The sentence should read thus: "For through an admirable arrangement of nature we cannot have abstract thoughts which do not require something sensuous, although this should consist only of such characters as are the forms of the letters and the sounds."
PAGE 79, line 8 from bottom, "Opinion of the Platonists." Cf. ante.. p. 46, and note to line 7 from bottom, ante, p. 726.
PAGE 80, note 1. Add: Janet also reads: " ou." Schaarschmidt translates "wo," cf. his translation, p. 45, line 13 from bottom. The ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS 735 context seems to require here the reading "on," where. The reading " ou " is probably a MS. or typographical error.
PAGE 83, note 1. Add: For an account of his views, cf. Lasswitz, Gesch. d. Atomistik, 2, 188-207. Digby's doctrine on the subject men tioned in Leibnitz's text is found in his Demonstratio immortalitatis animce rationalis, Tract. I., cap. 3, p. 20 sq., ed. Francofurti, 1004, full title of which Lasswitz gives, op. cit., 2, 188, note 3; and in his Institu- tiones penpateticos, published as an Appendix to the Demonstratio, ed. of 1004. Schaarschmidt gives 1st ed. of Demonstratio, Paris, 1055. A treatise of the nature of bodies, Paris, 1044.
PAGE 80, line 8, " Sadness is." Says Schaarschmidt: " We are imme diately conscious of the theoretical ground-truths as such. With the practical, the case is different. Joy and sorrow we certainly feel immedi- a,tely as such, but to find out their real nature requires subsequent reflec tion."
PAGE 87, note 2. After " Erdmann," add: Janet; and after "Bohn's edition," add: Fraser's Locke's Essay, 1, 07, line 18.
PACK 88, line 13 from bottom, "Instinct." "Leibnitz understands here by instinct," says Schaarschmidt, "a definite inclination to a certain manner of action, which arises out of need and serves to satisfy the same. ' Truths of instinct ' thus refer themselves back to our nature and are accordingly, in conformity with Leibnitz's general view, innate truths."
PAGE 89, note 2. Add: A German translation, by G. E. Bottger, ap peared at Nordhausen, Gross, 1787.
PAGE 89, note 3. Add: According to Schaarschmidt, the story is found in Bk. II., chap. 1, p. 73, of Baumgarten's, "very interesting but rare," Perigrinatis in ^Eyyptum, Arabiam, Palazstinam et Syriam, Noribergae ex off. Gerlachiana, p. P. Kaufmannum, 1094, 4to.
PAGE 91, line 5, " csse." Cf. Digest or Pandects, Bk. I., Tit. 1, § 3, where Florentines says: " Ut vim atque mjuriam propulsemus. Nam jure hoc evenit, ut quod quisque ob tutelam corporis sui fecerit, jure fecisse existimetur, et, cum inter nos cognationem quandam natura con- stituit, consequens est hominem homini insidiari nefas esse." Corpus Juris Civilis Academicum Parisiense, p. 229, 7th ed., Luteti* Parisiorum 1802; Corpus Juris Civilis (Digesta recog. T. Mommsen, and paged sepa rately), Berlin, Weidmann, 1893, Vol. 1, p. 1.
PAGE 91, line 8 from bottom, " Complete certitude to morals." Schaar schmidt here compares Hume, "the most acute (scharfsinnigste} of the English philosophers," who "reached a similar result, wholly indepen dent of Leibnitz," in his An Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, Section I., cf. TJie Philos. Wks. of David Hume, 4 vols., Little, Brown, & Co., Boston, 4, 233: " The final sentence, it is probable, which pronounces characters and actions amiable or odious, praiseworthy or blamable; 736 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE that which stamps on them the mark of honor or infamy, approbation or censure; that which renders morality an active principle, and constitutes virtue our happiness, and vice our misery; it is probable, I say, that this final sentence depends on some internal sense or feeling, ivhich nature has made universal in the whole species...But in order to pave the way for such a sentiment, and give a proper discernment of its object, it is often necessary, we find, that much reasoning should precede, that nice distinctions be made, just conclusions drawn, distant comparisons formed, complicated relations examined, and general facts fixed and ascertained." Cf., also, Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Bk. III. Of Morals, 1't. I., Sect. II., ed. Green and Grose, 2, 247.
PAGE 91, line 3 from bottom, "Boutan." That is, Bhutan, a district in the Eastern Himalayas, north of Assam.
PAGE 92, line 6, " Often confused." " Feeling here means," as Schaar- schmidt says, "not the sensuous-psychical sensation, but the confused complex of presentations ( Vorstellungeii) — a frequently used significa tion of the term — which occupies the soul and therefore often drives it to action. Feelings of this kind may by self-reflection be resolved into more or less clear and distinct ideas (Vorstellungen'), a process necessary for testing and correctly estimating their content. Leibnitz at this time appears to regard all feelings without exception as such undeveloped ideas and judgments."
PAGE 93, line 20, " Joseph Scaliger." Cf. infra, p. 106, note 2.
PAGE 95, note 1. Add: The five principles here referred to are found in the De Vcritate, and in the De Eeligione Laid, annexed to the 3d ed., London, 1645, of the De Verit. Cf. Eraser's Locke's Essay, 1, 80, note 2; PAGE 96, note 1. After " ad init.," add: 15, Berlin Academy ed., 1106b 36: fffTiv, apa TJ dperi) e£ts TrpoaipeTiKrj ev /j.e<r6T-r)Ti oSaa TTJ TTPOS i]fj.as wpiff[j.£vri \dytfj Kal cbs av 6 (pp6vi/j.os opicreiev • fj.eff6TT]s S£ dvo KO.KI&V, rijs fj.tv \6yov TOV T'L fjv eivai \tyovra. /xecroriys iffrlv ij dper'fi, Kara d£ TO (Lpiarov Kal TO ev aKpoTTjs.
PAGE 97, note 1. Add: A long time after this note was in type, I came across the following in Guhrauer, Leibnitz's Deutsche Schriften, 2, 509, among some Vermischte Bemerkungen und Urtheile...Aus dem Monatliclien Auszuge -. "(October, 1701). Herr Boileait Despreaux, ein franzosischer Academicus und beriihmter Satyricus, hat eine neue und vermehrte Edition seiner Satyren machen lassen, und denselben seinen Namen vorgesetzt, und dabey zu verstehen gegeben, dass er diese und keine andere Edition vor die seine erkenne." Possibly the edition here referred to contained the lines as Leibnitz gives them, the author chang ing them in later editions.
PAGE 99, lines 7-9. Cf. ante, p. 66, and note to line 17, ante, p. 731.
ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS PARK 99, note 1. Add: The Chronicon, 379-468, is also found in M. Bouquet, liec.. hist. Gaules, new ed., Paris, 1869-1880, 19 vols., fol., Vol. 1, p. 612; A. Duchesne, Hist. Franc. Script., 1, 183; Migue, Patrol, PAGE 100, lines 16, 17. "The knowledge of being is wrapped up in that knowledge which we have of ourselves." Cf. New Essays, Bk. II., chap. 27, § 9, Th., infra, pp. 245 sq., and note to p. 247, lines 7-9, infra, p. 760. Also Kant's doctrine of the categories, to which Leibnitz's thought at this point is very closely related. Our self-consciousness gives us an immediate knowledge of being, i.e. of our own particular being, but not yet the concept of being or substance in general nor any " eternal truth." What is given is an internal experience, whose essential and necessary content, implications and full significance are reached only after profound and protracted thought.
PAGE 101, note 1. The following changes or corrections are to be made in this note: In line 23, instead of "Appendix," read: Duncan, 37-40; in line 25, after "Math. Schrift., 6, 234 sq.," insert: trans., Appendix, infra, pp. 670-692; in line 27, instead of "Appendix," read: Duncan, 71-80; in line 28, instead of " Appendix," read: Duncan, 112-126; in line 30, dele " trans., Appendix "; line 5 from bottom, " As Leibnitz was occupied," etc., cf. infra, p. 531, note 2, Iffl 2, 3. The statement made in these two notes would probably more nearly represent the truth in the matter if made thus: "As Leibnitz was occupied with the composition of his 'New Essays' from 1700-1704, and with their revision until the end of 1707, and perhaps later (cf. Gerhardt's Introduction to the ' New Essays,' ante, pp. 8, 9, and Leibnitz's Correspondence with Coste, Ger- hardt, Leibniz, philos. Schrift., 3, 377 sq., especially 391-400) the relative date," etc.
PAGE 103, line 7, " Witsen." Nicolas Witsen, c. 1640-1717, Dutch ambassador at the Russian Court, alderman and burgomaster at Amster dam, published Architectonica nautica nov-antiqua, Amstelod., 1671; Noord-en Oost-Tartarye, met Landkaerten, beschreven, getekent, etc., 2 vols., fol., ib., 1692 and 1705. For Witsen's correspondence with Leibnitz, cf. Dutens, 6, Pt. II., 199-203; Toucher de Careil, (Euvres de PAGE 103, line 8, "Barantola." The old name for Lhasa, the capital of Thibet. Cf. Dutens, 6, Pt. II., p. 201.
PAGE 105, note 1. Add: Cf. Eraser's Locke's Essay, 1,109. Eraser numbers 21, and states in his note that the section was added in the second edition PAGE 108, note 2, line 5 from bottom. Instead of "Vol. 3," read: 3u 738 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE PAGE 109, note 2. Cf. ante, p. 733, note to p. 68, line 7 from bottom. Leibnitz regards each monad, and especially the human soul, as a mirror of the universe. So far as the ideas are clear and distinct, the soul ex presses the picture of the ideal universe existing in the mind of God as the " best world" and realized out of his goodness; so far as they are confused, the soul is like the phenomenal world in space and time.
PAGE 110, lines 18, 19, "Intrinsic connotations." The intrinsic, inner activity of every " substantial thing" determines its external activity and relations to each and all other things. In Leibnitz's view, this activity consists in representation or is conceived as analogous to representation. That is, all external change is apparent merely, depending upon that in ternal change in the condition of substances which we call representation and which is the real occurrence.
PAGE 112, line 11 from bottom, "Certain author." Locke, Bk. II., chap. 1, § 10 (in Coste's translation, which, it will be remembered, was the one used by Leibnitz as the basis of his critique, 4th ed., Amsterdam, 1742, p. Go, 4 vol. ed., Amsterdam, 1774, 1, 152), says: "Car il s'est trouve" un Auteur qui ayant lu la premiere Edition de cet Ouvrage, et n'e"tant pas satisfait de ce que je viens d'avancer contre P opinion de ceux qui soutiennent que YAme pense toujours, me fait dire, qvi'une chose cesse d'exister parceque nous ne sentons pas qu'elle exists pendent noire som- meil," etc.; but he does not name the author referred to. In the English editions of the Essay, for example, Bohn's, Vol. 1, p. 212; Eraser's, Vol. 1, p. 129, Locke makes the reference general: " How could any one make it an inference of mine," etc. Philalethes rightly takes exception to the opinion thus falsely imputed to the partisans of Locke.
PAGE 118, line 10 from bottom, "Beg the question." Schaarschmidt has put the argument in logical form thus: "That of which we are not conscious is not in the soul; We are often conscious of no ideas; there fore, We are often without ideas (or, therefore, often we do not think). And he goes on to say that, the circle, of which Leibnitz speaks, consists in the fact that he who so concludes has already put the conclusion in the major premise in assuming that to have no consciousness of ideas is the same as to be without ideas (Nichtvorstelleii) or not to think (Nicht- denkeii). The latter statement is false. One can have ideas, and actu ally does have them, without being directly conscious of his ideas (Vorstellens}. Thus the major premise of that argument is false, and therefore the conclusion likewise, while the minor is true. According to Leibnitz, substance is always active — is indeed action itself — thus also the soul, since for him it is a substance, and since the proper activity of the soul is to have ideas (das Vorstellen), therefore the soul is always having ideas (vorstellend)."
PAGE 118, note 1, line 2. After " Erdmann," add: Janet.
PAGE 119, line 8 from bottom, "Independently of the senses." Cf. ante, p. 723, note to p. 42, line 10, ad fin.; p. 725, note to p. 44, line 13; ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS 739 p. 733, note to p. 08, lino 20. In accord with Leibnitz's principle of the absolute spontaneity of substances, all activity, that of the soul as well, springs out of the depths of its own being.
PAGE 119, note 1, line 2. After "Erdmann," add: Janet.
PAGE 120, line 0, "Ex professo." Schaarschmidt says the term Ex professo is a technical expression occurring in classical literature (for example, Seneca and Quintilian), which signifies: in a positive, precise way, in a pronounced or aforementioned manner. Leibnitz means to say, hitherto have we each set forth and justified his own speculative point of view (erkenntniss-theoretischen Standpunkt); now we come to the consideration of some classes of ideas in which we shall more than hitherto agree with each other.
PAGE 120, note 1. After " Erdmann," add: Janet. PAGE 121, note 1. After " Erdmann's," add: Janet's.
PAGE 122, lines 1, 2. "The membranes receive the sensation," etc. Cf. Leibnitz's letter to Arnauld, April, 1087 (Gerhardt, Leibniz, philos. tic/trift., 2, 90, 91): " Les nerfs et les membranes sont des parties plus sensibles pour nous que les autres, et ce n'est peutestre que par elles que nous nous appercevons des autres, ce qui arrive apparemment, parceque les mouvemens des nerfs ou des liqueurs y appartenantes imitent mieux les impressions et les confondent moins, or les expressions plus distinctes de Tame repondent aux impressions plus distinctes du corps. Ce n'est pas que les nerfs agissent sur Paine, & parler metaphysiquement, mais c'est que Pun represente 1'estat de 1'autre spontanea relational i.e. " The nerves and the membranes are the parts more sensitive for us than the others, and it is perhaps only by them that we perceive the others, which happens apparently, because the movements of the nerves or of the fluids belonging thereto imitate better the impressions and confuse them less, now the more distinct impressions of the soul correspond to the more distinct impressions of the body. Not that the nerves act upon the soul, to speak metaphysically, but that the one represents the state of the other by reason of a spontaneous relation." Modern psychological investigation and experiment prove that the end-organs rather than the nerves "receive the sensation," or, in modern phrase, 'are acted upon directly by the stimulus,' the character of the sensation depending upon the peculiar structure of these different end-organs, and not upon the nerves. The formerly held doctrine of the "specific energy of the nerves" as being the cause of specific sensations, or as 'accounting for the quality of the sensation' — a doctrine which, according to Schaar schmidt in his note to the passage (Erliiuterunyen z. d. Neuen Abhand- lunyen u. d. mensrhlich. Verstand v. Gf. W. Leibniz, Berlin, 1874, J. H. v. Kirchmann's Philos. Jiibliothek, Bd. 50, Erlauterung, 92, p. 27) con tradicts Leibnitz's statement in the text, — is now given up. Leibnitz's statement, while partly true, is nevertheless incomplete. He is right in stating " that tastes make themselves known to some extent through the 740 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE nose, by reason of the connection of these organs," — modern experiments having proved taste and smell to be interdependent in their action in sen sation. — but wrong as to the assistance of the teeth in the transmission of sound, the teeth not being ordinarily concerned in the process. If by "membranes" Leibnitz meant "end-organs," his statement, with the exception of the part regarding the hearing, would be correct, and his theory exhibit a remarkable degree of insight and foresight and of ap proximation to the modern view of the subject. But this interpretation of his language seems on the whole inadmissible, "membranes" with him signifying probably the skin and the muscles, so that, while we may not justly regard him as having attained the fulness and completeness of the modern understanding of the sensation-process, we may yet justly attribute to him a measure of insight into, and foresight of, what through subsequent investigation and experiment has been proved to be its true nature.
PAGK 122, Chap. IV., § 1, line 5, "Solidity." On Locke's idea of solidity, cf. Lasswitz, Gesch. d. Atomistik, 2, 505-508.
PAGE 123, note 3. After " Erdmann," add: Janet.
PAGE 124, lines 9, 10 from bottom, "The scholastic conception of the air." Cf. New Essays, Bk. I., chap. 1, § 18, Th., ante, p. 83, lines 11, 12. On "rarefaction and condensation," line 12 from bottom, cf. Lasswitz, Gcsch. d. Atomistik, Vol. 1, passim.
PAGE 125, last line of text and note 1, " Animant." Some time after the text and note were in type, I came upon Leibnitz's letter to Leuwen- hoek, " Sur 1'Aimant," cf. Dutens, Leibnit. op. om., 2, Pt. II., 92-94. In the correspondence, in Latin, of Leibnitz with Des Bosses there is con siderable allusion to the Magnet, cf. Gerhardt, Leibniz, philos. Schrift., 2, 437 (Postscript to Letter of Leibnitz to Des Bosses, February 5, 1712), 492-495, 497-498 (Leibnitz to Hartsoeker, April 29, 1715, in French), 505, 513 (Response de Mr. Hartsoeker, in French). As from this corre spondence it is evident that Leibnitz was occupied more or less with the study of the Magnet, it seems as if the reading of the text should be "aimant," and the translation accordingly "magnet," and thus the view expressed in the last sentence of note 1, ante, p. 125, is confirmed. Janet also reads "aimant." Cf., also, a rough draft of letter of Leibnitz to Peter the Great, January 10, 1712, Foucher de Careil, (Envres de Leibniz, 7, 507, and a rough draft of a memorial of Leibnitz concerning the study of languages and the observation of the variation of the magnetic needle in the Russian Empire, ibid., 519, 531 sq.; also, Observations ilber die Magnet-Nadel, ibid., 562 sq.
PAGE 120, line 1, " Vacuum." That is, the effort of all bodies, particu larly air and water, to fill up empty space. The doctrine of the universal attraction of all bodies has put an end to this false notion of " the fear of a vacuum " — horror vacui. On the vacuum, cf. Lasswitz, Gesch. d. Ato mistik, passim.
ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS 741 PAGE 127, note 2. Add: Leibnitz's correspondence with Guerike, cf. Gerhardt, Leibniz, philos. Schrift., 1, 89-112.
PAGE 129, line 1, "The view of the Cartesians." Janet, OSuvres philos. de Leibniz, 1, 95, note 1, refers to Descartes, Prin. Philos., II., § 4. Cf. Veitch's trans., pp. 233-234.
PAGE 129, line 6, "Disagreement." Schaarschmidt remarks on this chapter as follows: "In this chapter on Solidity the antithesis of the Lockian and Leibnitzian view comes out with great acuteness. Locke, starting out from Sensualism, affirms that solidity is the most real property of bodies, a statement which, if logically developed, must lead to the as sumption of hard impenetrable atoms. On the other hand, Leib'nitz rightly maintains that all the properties of the body which Locke derives from solidity may be won without the assumption of a space-filling and im penetrable first being, and that ' solidity...is conceivable by pure reason, although the senses furnish the reason with the means of proof thereto.' " He also compares, on the atoms, Leibnitz's Nouvc.au systeme de la nature, § 11 sq.
PAGE 129, last line, "Demonstration." This view of Leibnitz, as developed by Christian Wolf, became the seed from which sprang the Kantian doctrine of the categories.
PAGE 130, line 13 [Chap. 7, line 0], "Idea of existence." Schaar schmidt says: " The validity of this protest is clear, although Sensualism until the present time has not allowed itself to be brought back from the Lockiau view. The concept of existence springs from the source of self- consciousness, not from the sensitivity. Sense-perception is as such first possible, after we have won the concept of existence from self-conscious ness, and now after the analogy of our own being have placed it under the sense-phenomena for their explanation."
PAGE 130, note 1. Add: Schaarschmidt translates: " Inbetracht- nahme des Daseins."
PAGE 13(5, note 1. Add: Dr. E. G. Robinson, President of Brown University, and Professor of Philosophy, 1872-1889, gave in his MS. Lectures to his classes on Psychology the following account of Con sciousness: CONSCIOUSNESS " As this is the one controlling source of all our knowledge of mind, it is indispensable that we determine as precisely as we can just what we understand by it.
" It is manifest at the outset that consciousness is the invariable accom paniment and necessary condition of all actual knowledge and of every cognitive act. It is itself never an act but always a state of mind without which mental acts are impossible and which itself is possible only through 742 LEIBNITZ'S CEITIQUE OF LOCKE cognitive acts, and this is true whatever the acts of cognition may be, whether relating to objects in the external world, to the bodily organism, or to strictly subjective thought and feeling.
"It is evident, therefore, that we cannot with Reid regard conscious ness as a faculty. A faculty can be called into exercise, consciousness cannot be, but always exists as a condition of the exercise of a faculty. Neither can we regard it as an intuitive idea, a regulative notion. An intuitive idea can exist only in consciousness. If consciousness be an intuitive idea, it must itself exist as the condition of its own existence. Neither can we regard it as identical with feeling, as sundry sensational ists do, since feeling can exist only in consciousness. Nor yet again can we with Sir William Hamilton regard consciousness as the genus of which cognitive acts are the species, as the complement of the cognitive faculties.1 A genus can exist only as made up of species. The distinc tion between consciousness and cognition is, according to their definition when analyzed, only verbal and not real. Consciousness can be neither a special faculty, nor an intuitive idea, nor a distinct species of knowl edge, nor the complement of the cognitive faculties, but is that within which all ideas must exist, any species of knowledge be acquired, and every faculty be exercised.