PAGE 174, note 2. Add: Translations of the two pieces last referred to will be found in the Appendix, infra, the Reilage to the letter to Fabri, pp. 699 sq.; the Specimen Dynamicum, pp. 670 sq.
PAGE 175, line 5, "Idea of power." Leibnitz carefully distinguishes between mere power and force ("Macht" and "Kraft"). Cf. De primce philos. einendatione, etc., Gerhardt, 4, 469; Erdmann, 122; Jacques, 1, 453 [in French]; Janet, 2, 525 [in French]; Duncan, Philos. Wks. of Leibnitz, 69.
PAGE 175, line 18, "Because of our ignorance." That is, we are thus far incapable of resolving our sense-impressions, i.e. the simple sense- qualities, into anything more simple, and are therefore compelled to regard them as simple presentations, although in themselves possibly composite and in fact in many cases in indirect ways shown to be so. Cf., also, Neto Essays, Bk. III., chap. 3, § 18, Th., infra, p. 317, and note 2.
PAGE 175, line 24, "Primitive truths." Cf. New Essays, Bk. L, chap. 1, and Bk. IV., chap. 2, infra, pp. 404 sq.
PAGE 176, line 13 from bottom, "Casati." Paolo Casati, 1617-1707, a learned Italian Jesuit, who taught mathematics and theology at Rome, and was said to have converted Queen Christiana, of Sweden, to the Catholic faith. On his return from Sweden he became Director of the University of Parma. Among his works are Vacuum proscriptum, Genoa, 1649; De terra machinio mota, Rome, 1668; Mechanicorum lib. VIII., Lyons, 1684; De igne dissertationes physicce, Venice, 1686, 1695; Hydrostatics dissert., 1695; Optiae dissert., 1705. Lasswitz, Ge.sch. d. Atomistik, 2, 490, says: " Im Einzelnen ebenfalls durchaus korpuskular 752 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE sind die physikalischen Erklarungen des Jesuiten Paolo Casati...Aber seine allgemeine Auffassung der 2<atur 1st dabei vollstandig scholast- isch."
PA UK 176, note 1. Add: Of. Lasswitz, Gesch. d. Atomistik, 2, 421-428, especially 423-424. Malebranche changed bis views under the influence or Iluygens and Leibnitz. The Loix generates de la communication dts mouvements, Lasswitz says, was added as an Appendix to the later edi tions of the liecherche de la verite.
PAGK 180, note 1. Add: Cf. § 13 of this chapter, infra, pp. 182-184, New Essays, Bk. IV., chap. 0, ad fin., infra, p. 462, note 1; also, Ger hard t, 7, 108-111; Erdmann, 669; also the fragment entitled De Libertate, published by Foucher de Careil, Xouvelles Lettres et Opuscules inedits de Leibniz, Paris, 1857, pp. 178-185. "Apart from the freedom of fact and of right," says Schaarschmidt, "Leibnitz distinguishes between ethical freedom and free-will ( Willkur). The former, ethical freedom, is the power to follow the ethical insight in spite of opposing internal hin drances, such as the passions. This concept also is clear and simple. The difficulty proper lies hidden in the conception of free-will (der Willklir}, the libcrum arbitrium, by which, as Leibnitz expresses liim- self, is meant, 'that the strongest reasons or impressions which the understanding presents to the will do not prevent the act of the will from being contingent, and do not give it an absolute and, so to speak, meta physical necessity.' '' Leibnitz regards the action of the will as a motive which inclines, but does not compel, — but at the same time he assumes, Theodicee, Pt. I., § 52, a self-determination of the will over against which the expression incline appears as a mere evasion. Cf, infra, p. 462, note 1. On Leibnitz's doctrine of the Will and Freedom, cf. G. Class, Die metaphys.l'oraussetznngen d. Leibnitziscli Determinismus, Tubingen, 1874, pp. 9, 78 sq.; F. Kirchner, Leibniz's Psychologic, Cothen, 1875, pp. 82 sq.; M. Penzler, Die Monadenlehre u. ihre Beziehung z. griech. Philos., jVIimlen, 1878, p. 23; L. Braeutigam, Leibniz und Herbart liber die Frei- hi-it des menschl. Willens, Heidelberg, 1882, pp. 3-17, 28-39; M. Nour- risson, La Philosophic de Leibniz, Paris, 1860, pp. 268-286; Kuno Fischer, Gesch. d. n. Philos., Vol. 2 [Leibniz] pp. 512-533, 3d ed. Heidelberg, 1889. For a clear analysis and able, though brief, discussion of the vari ous senses in which the " freedom of will " is used, and of " determinism," cf. Robinson, Principles and Practice of Morality, pp. 122-137.
PAGE 180, note 2. After " 1881," add: pp. 68 sq. The Greek text of the passages referred to reads thus: "H^t/cd Ni/co^tdxeta, F, 4, 1112a 15: TJ yap irpoalpecris pera \6yov /ecu Stavo/as. 5, 1112a 30: J3ov\ev6fj.eda 8£ irtpi T&V eip' ^fjiiv wpaKTuv. Cf., also, Sir Alexander Grant, The Ethics of Aristotle, 3d ed., London, 1874, Vol. 2, pp. 17, 19, 'H0. NIK., III., chap. 2, § 17; chap. 3, § 7. Peter's translation follows the chapter and section numbering of Grant's text. Cf., also, the following pasages from the so-called 'H0tK<i Me-ydXa — • Marjna Moralia — "which," Schaarschmidt says, " at least for Leibnitz, was a genuine work of Aristotle," — though now regarded, ac- ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS 753 cording to /eller, as "a sketch compiled from botli " the Nicomachean and Eudemian ethics, "but more especially from the Eudemian " (Philos. d. Griech., II., 2 [Vol. 4], 102, note 1; Outlines of the Hist, of Greek Philos., New York, 1886, p. 175): A, 16, 1188b25: e?ret 5£ rb fKovinov ev ov8ffj.iq. op/j.rj fffriv, \OLTTOV av enij rb €K oiavoias yiyv6/j,evov. 1188b 31: d>s TOV CKOVGLOV oWo? ev rif Siavoridrjvai. 1188b 37: evravffa apa. rb eKovaiov TriTrrei ets rb /j.era Oidfot'as. A, 17, 1189a 31: et rolvvv i] Trpoaipecri.* 6pe£is TIS f3ov\evriKri fiera Siavoias, OVK e<rri rb €Kovffi.ov -rrpoaiperov. eubvres yap TroXXd Trpdrro/Jiev irpb rov 5iavoridrjvai Kal fiov\evffafff)ai., olov Kadt£ou.ev Kal dviard/j.f0a Kal dtXXa TroXXd rotavra eKovres fj.fv avev 5^ rou diavoriffTJvat, rb 5£ Kara irpoaipetnv TTO.V rjv fj.era Siai'Oi'as. OVK apa rb eKOvcriov irpoaiperov, dXXd rb irpoaLperbv eKOixriov • av ri yap Trpoaipu/j.e@a irpdrrfLV j3ov\ev<Tdfj.evoi, e/covres irpdrrofnev. With this last passage, c.f. 'H9. NIK., F, 4, llll'J G: ^ Trpoalpeffis Sr/ eicovcriov /j.£v (paiverat, ov ravrbv 6e, d\X' 4iri TrXeov TO fKovcnov. 1112a 14: eKovatov /J.ev drj (paiverai [17 Trpoaipeuts], TO 5" eKovffiov ov wav irpoaiperov. 1113a 9: 5vros 8£ rov wpoaiperov /SofXeuToO dpeicrov r&v e<p' r/fuv, Kal 17 Trpoalpeffis av e(r/ j3ov\evrLK7) Spelts TWK e<p' rnj.1v. The 'H^. Nt/c., T, 3, lllla 22, defines rb eKoi/<riov, the vol- untary, — das Freiwillirje, — thus: TO eKovcrwv 56£eiev av eivai ov 17 dp^T] tv avry fidori ra Ka6' ^Kacrra £v ols 17 Trpafts. 'H^. Eu5^/oita, B, 8, 1224a 0: XetVeTat ev Ttjj diavovu.ev&v TTWS wpdrreiv elvai rb eKovffiov. B, 9, 1225a 3G: eirel 5e TOUT' «xet T^Xos, Kal ovre rrj op^et ovre TTJ irpoaLptffei. rb fKovffiov upicr- Tat, \oiirbv dri 6picrao~()at, ra Kara didvoiav. B, 10, 122Gb 6: 17 yap Trpoaipeffis cupetm u.£v etrriv, ou% aTrXcDs 5^, dXX' er^pov Trpb er^pov ' rovro 8£ oi)% otoi' T€ avev (TKfi/'eajs Kal f3ov\rjs. dtb £K 66^175 /3ov\evrLKr)s earlv 17 wpoatpfffts. Cf., also, Zeller, Philos. d. Griech., 3d ed., II., 2 [Vol. 4], 587 sq.
On Aristotle's doctrine of the Will and Freedom, c/. 'H0. NIK., T. 1-8, 1109-1115; Grant, Ethics of Aristotle, 2, 5-32, and notes; also his Plan of Book III., ibid., Hi., iv., and Essay V., 1, 284 sq.; Essay VII., 1, 376 sq.; J. A. Stewart, Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1892, Vol. 1, pp. 224-230, 232-236, 240, 243-245, 250, 279; Vol. 2, pp. 16, 17, 379, 380; Trendelenburg, Histor. Beitrage z. Philos., 2, 149 sq.; Windelband-Tufts, Hist, of Philos., § 16, 2, pp. 191, ( >n Leibnitz's relations and indebtedness to Aristotle, c/. D. Jacoby, DC, Leibnitii Studiis Aristotelicis, Berlin, 1867; D. Nolen, Quid Leib- nlzius Aristoteli debuerit, Paris, 1875: M. Penzler, Die Monadenlehre u. Hire Bezieliuny z. griech. Philosophic, Minden, 1878, p. 29.
PAGE 183, line 13 from bottom, "The best." Cf. New Essays, Bk. IV., chap. 6, ad fin., infra, p. 462, note 1.
PAGE 184, lines 7, 6 from bottom, "A freedom of equilibrium absolutely imaginary and impracticable." Leibnitz argues against indeterminism and equilibrium of will, c/. Gerhardt, 7, 109: " Libertas indifferentice est impossibilis. Adeo ut ne in Deum quidem cadat, nam determinates ille est ad optimum emciendum. Et creatime semper ex rationibus internis externisque determinantur " (16., 110, in French); Erdmann, 669 (in Latin). Cf. Robinson, Principles and Practice of Morality, p. 126. 3c 754 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE PAGE 185, line 20, "Vigor of Will.'" Of. llobinson, Principles and Practice of Morality, p. 138, where Virtue is defined as "the soul's or the will's persistency of compliance, — its energy in complying with the moral law," — a definition perhaps suggested by that of Kant, quoted in the foot-note: "the strength of the human will in the performance of duty."
PAGE 185, note 1. After "Erdmann," add: Janet.
PAGE 192, line 8, "Clearly felt." Schaarschmidt says: "Our feelings can be very lively, while the ideas causing them may be obscure, con fused, nay even senseless (let one think, for example, of religious fanati cism, of drunkenness, the aberrations of revenge, etc.); on the other hand, our thoughts can be distinctly, i.e. from one another, indeed be distin guishable, without being clearly, i.e. in their own content, conceived."
PAGE 192, note 2. Add: The passage from the Ethica referred to in this note is found in Vol. 1, pp. 270 sq. of this edition. Cf. also the Short Essay on God, etc., Korte Verhandeliny van God, etc., Bk. II., chaps. 5 and 19, ed. Van Vloten and Land, 2, 310, 338; Schaarsclnnidt's German trans., pp. 54, 84 sq., in J. H. v. Kirchmann's Pliilos. Uibliothek, PAGE 193, line 6, "Francisco Borgia." General of the Jesuits, 1565- PAGE 199, note 1. Add: The texts of Erdmann, Jacques, and Janet, and the translation of Schaarschmidt end at "pleasure."
PAGE 203, note 2. The note should read as follows: Gerhardt reads: " Ou venous au propos; " the phrase is wanting in the texts of Erdmann, Jacques, Janet, and in Schaarschmidt's translation.
PAGE 204, note 1. After "proposer," the note should read: wanting in the texts of Erdmann, Jacques, Janet, and in Schaarschmidt's trans lation.
PAGE 204, note 2. After "gauche," the note should read: wanting in the texts of Erdmann, Jacques, Janet, and in Schaarschmidt's transla tion. For the allusion, etc.
PAGE 205, note 1. After " Erdmann," add: Janet. PAGE 205, note 2. After "Erdmann," add: Janet.
PAGE 206, line 12 from bottom, "Following the good." Leibnitz is a forerunner of Kant in the expression here used that the chief end of reason is practical. "In Kant's view," says Schaarschmidt, "theo retical reason has only the negative significance of raising us above the contemplation of nature and the sphere of experience to that position where beyond the sensuous the practical principles, by means of a legis lation derived from freedom, unconditionally determine the will." Cf. also Leibnitz's definition in the same sense of " wisdom as the science of ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS 755 happiness," Gerhardt, Leibniz, philos. Schrift., 7, 80; Erdmann, 671: " Weisheit ist nichts anders als die Wissenschaft der Gliickseeligkeit, so uns iiehmlich zur Gliickseeligkeit zu gelaiigen lehret."
PAGE 208, line 21, " Endure forever." Cf. Spinoza, Korte Verhandeling van God, Bk. II., chap. 26, ed. Vloten and Land, 2, 359; Schaarsclnnidt's trans. 105: " Zo konnen wy 't met reden voor een groote oiigerijnitheid achten, 't geene veele, en die men anders voor groote god-geleerde acht, zeggen; namelijk, byaldien op de liefde Gods geen eeuwig leeven en kwam te volgen, zy als dan haar zelfs best zouden zoeken; even als of zy iets dat beter was, als God, zouden uytvinden. Dit is alzo onnozel als of een vis wonde zeggen (voor welke doch buyten het water geen leven is): by aldien my op dit leven in het water geen eeuwig leven en zoude komen te volgen, zo wil ik uyt het water na het land toe; ja maar wat konnen ons die God niet en kennen dog anders zeggen?" i.e. "Thus we can rightly pronounce exceedingly absurd the statement which many, whom we otherwise deem great theologians, make; namely, that if eternal life did not follow from the love of God, then man should seek his own best good, as though man thereby could find something better than God. This were just as foolish as if a fish [for whom out of the water there is no life] should say, if for me after this life in the water no eternal life follows, I will go out of the water on to the land. What else, how ever, can they who do not know God say to us? " Schaarschmidt thinks that Leibnitz's accord with Spinoza was perhaps mediated by the Stoic doctrine.
PAGE 208, line 25, " Absolutely indispensable." Cf. infra, p. 201, note '2. Leibnitz, while admitting the truth of the Aristotelian and Stoic view, nevertheless contests that in this life we cannot always demonstrate the identity of the virtuous and useful, and supports the life of duty and overcomes the dualism between duty and pleasure through the " thought of God and immortality." Kant grounded rational belief in immortality upon this very dualism.
PAGE 210, note 1. After "Erdmann" add: Janet.
PAGE 210, note 2. Add: Eraser, Locke's Essay, 1, 358, reads: § 66. His edition gives full account of all the various readings and changes in the various editions of Locke's Essay, including those in the translation of Coste. It is in all respects the best edition of the Essay yet issued, and the thanks of all students of philosophy are most heartily rendered to Prof. Eraser for his splendid work.
PAGE 212, line 25, "Turn thorn aside from it." Cf. New Essays, Bk. II., chap. 27, § 36, Th.; ante, pp. 194 sq., § 53, Th., 207. Perfectibility is Leibnitz's ethical norm, and the "luminous pleasures" are those which assist us in our efforts to attain this perfection, because they spring out LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE of the need of, and therefore also out of the idea, though obscure, of the true good.
PAGE 213, line 12, "Greatness of the consequent." Janet, (Euvres philos. de Leibniz, 1, 185, note 1, says: " The greatness of the conse quence, i.e. the greater or less probability that the foreseen good or evil will occur; the greatness of the consequent, i.e. the greater or less good or evil which the outcome must bring."
PAGE 213, note 1. After " Erdmann," add: Janet.
TOUT' tffriv et'/c6j, i.e. "The probable," etc. And in line 5, after " 1357" 34," add: rd /JL£V yap eiV6s ecmv is CTT! TO TTO\I) yivt>[j.evov, i.e. " For the proba ble," etc.
PAGE 217, line 2 from bottom, "World." "Because," as Schaar- schmidt says, " mathematics as the science of magnitude is applicable only to sensible things."
PAGE 218, lines 18, 19, " The term thought in the same general way." " We exercise an inner activity," says Schaarschmidt, " either so that we produce perception-(phantasie-) images or (formulated — sprachgeformte) thought-images. The lower situated entelechies do the former, of the latter minds only are capable. We can, continues Leibnitz, in case of necessity designate both of these activities as thought. To-day we [the Germans] use ' Vorstellen ' as the most general expression to indicate the inner activity."
PAGE 219, line 26, "Comes from thought.]" Schaarschmidt says in his note to this passage: "These weighty expressions are the pure result of the fundamental thought, that every substance acts from an inner spontaneity. Passion thus has for the spirit only the significance of a confused and therefore imperfect activity, whose most pregnant expres sion for the subject is pain; for bodies, however, passion means an imparted or mediated activity, in connection with which it is to be con sidered that, since bodies are mere phenomena, their changes are also only phenomenal, whose grounds must always be sought in the spontane ous forces of simple substances (out of whose joint-existence — Zitsam- mensein — our confused thought forms the corporeal mass)." Cf. New Essays, Bk. II., chap. 8, ante,, p. 131, note 1. Schaarschmidt adds: "Activity in the absolute sense, however, is the transition to greater perfection and thence also accompanied with pleasure."
PAGE 219, note 1. After " Jacques," add: and Janet.
PAGE 220, line 2 from bottom, "Complete separation." Schaarschmidt says in his note to the text at this point, "Separation arises from the Aristotelian concept x«vio>6s. Xuptfriv is the separation or loosing of the ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS 757 purely spiritual from the material. After Descartes had again renewed the ancient Platonic-Aristotelian Dualism in another way,.Spinoza and Leibnitz, each in his own way, again set up a monism, which the realistic tendency of Locke in another way and towards another goal also endeav ored to attain."
PAGE 220, note 1, line 2. After "Erdmann,".add: Janet.
PAGE 222, line 10 from bottom, " Old word." That is " chevauchier," "chevalchier," " chevaucher," " chevalcher," "cevaucier," all these dif ferent forms occurring in the old writers. For examples, cf. Littre", who gives the Provencal "cavalcar," "cavalguar," Italian "cavalcare," all derived from the Low-Latin " caballicare." "Chevaucher," says Littre', is reserved for elevated style and especially for narrations regarding the Middle Age; " aller a cheval " is the common and daily form of speech.
PAGE 222, line 2 from bottom, "Seen." Schaarschmidt says: "That Locke here makes the formation of the mixed or compound modes pro ceed from wider experience, to which he certainly adds ' invention ' — from a purpose — Leibnitz not only allows in a noteworthy fashion, but he also adds thereto as a further source the activity of the fancy. Locke undoubtedly understands by mixed modes something wholly different from that which is formed by means of dreams and fancies; namely, abstractions from given compound relations, which, according to the measure of our interest, or at least of our attention, are formed and linguistically fixed."
PAGE 223, note 1. Add: For Leibnitz on Mademoiselle de Scudery, in the " Monatlicher Auszug aus allerhand neu herausgegeben, niitzlichen und artigen Buchern," Dec., 1700, pp. 909, 910, and Dec., 1701, IV., cf. Guhrauer, Leibnitz"1 s Deutsche Schriften, 2, 414-420. Cf., also, Foucher de Careil, Lettres et opuscules inedits de Leibniz, Paris, 1854, pp. 254- 260; F. de Careil, (Euvres de Leibniz, 2d ed., Paris, 1809, 2, 515-517.
PAGE 224, line 23, "Called causes in the schools." Cf. Appendix, infra, pp. 637, 672 sq., 699 sq., for Leibnitz's further exposition of the doctrine here set forth. In this place, "without allowing himself to enter upon a critique of Locke's exposition of the term primal cause, Leibnitz," says Schaarschmidt, "contents himself with ascribing to it a double signification, one of which goes back to the Aristotelian termi nology; the other indicates the end. At the same time, however, he mentions the fact that the primal cause may also be understood as the material ground of a thing. Critical investigation of this important con ception lirst begins with Hume."
PAGE 227, line 11, "Promoter." Che'ruel, Dictionnaire des Institu tions Franraittcs, sub voc., says: " Promoteur ": " Ecclesiastique charge" du ministere public dans les officialite's (voy. ce mot) [in that article it is explained that officialitd = the court of a bishop or archbishop], dans les assemblies du clerge", dans les chambres supe'rieurs ecclesiastiques, en un mot dans tous les tribunaux ecclesiastiques. Les fonctions des pro- 758 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE moteurs consistaient surtout a maintenir les droits, libertes et immunite's de 1'Eglise; a veiller a 1'observation de la discipline eccle'siastique et a poursuivre les crimes et delits qui etaient de la competence des juges de 1'Eglise. II y avail quelquefois dans les officialite's un vice-promoteur; il e"tait, comme le promoteur, nomine" par 1'eveque."
In short, the promoteur was a sort of ecclesiastical district attorney, and he is here on the opposite side of the case from the young lawyer. When he calls the lawyer " doctor juris," the latter objects that he ought to call him " doctor juris utriusque," i.e., doctor of both civil and canon law, or in our phrase, doctor of laws, LL.D. To which the promoteur replies sarcastically.
PAGE 227, note 2, line 3. After "Eucken," insert: Gesch. urid Kritik der Gnindbeyriffe der Gegenwart, Leipzig, 1878, pp. 60-78 (Leibnitz, p. 70); Die Grundbeyriffe der Gegenwart historisch und kritisch entwickelt, 2te, vb'llig umgearbeitete Auflage, Leipzig, 1893, pp. 98-102 (Leibnitz, p. 98), but not so fully as in the 1st ed., the author stating in the Preface, that "the historical statements are strictly limited to that which appears immediately requisite to the understanding of the present time." Eng. trans, of 1st ed., The Fundamental Concepts, etc. At end of note, add: Schaarschmidt states Leibnitz's view thus: "Knowledge a priori means with Leibnitz, who with his predecessors in this matter attached himself to the Aristotelian conception of the wpbrepov ry (pucrei, knowledge from the cause, and, accordingly, knowledge a posteriori means with him knowledge from the working or result, and therefore from external ex perience resting upon the phenomenon of things." Kant's usage differs from that of Leibnitz. A priori knowledge is for Kant that which pro ceeds from pure reason and not from experience; while a posteriori knowledge comes only from external experience, not "from result and working in general." Of., also, J. H..von Ivirchmann's Krlauterung, No. 25, to the Theodicee, Bk. I., § 44; p. 34 of his Erliiuterunyen zur Theodicee v. Leibniz, Leipzig, 1879.
PAGE 228, note 2. Of. infra, pp. 399, note 3, 551, note 4.
PAGE 229, note 2, line 1. After " II. and VI.," add: ed. Cousin, 1, PAGE 230, note 1. After "Dioptrica, IV., 1 sq.," add: ed. Cousin, 5, 34 sq.; after "Passions Animce, I., 31 sq.," add: ed. Cousin, 4, 63 sq.; after "Prin. Philos., IV., 189, 196, 197," add: ed. Cousin, 3, 500, 507, PAGE 230, note 1. Add: Cf., also, Cousin, CEnvres de Descartes, 8, 200, where Descartes, in a letter (dated by the annotator 1640 — the letter in Bk. IF., No. 36, in ed. of 1666) to Meissonier, " me"decin de Lyon," says: " Mon opinion est que cette glande " ["la petite glande nommee conarion "] " est le principal siege de 1'ame, et le lieu ou se font toutes nos pensdes. La raison qui me donne cette cr^ance est que je ne trouve aucune partie en tout le cerveau, excepte" celle-la seule, qui ne soit ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS 750 double," etc. In a letter to Mersenne, dated by the annotator April 1, 1040, Cousin, (Euvres de Descartes, 8, 215 sq. [ed. of 1066, Bk. II., Letter No. 38], Descartes makes substantially the same statement and gives the same reasons therefor, and adds: " Mais je crois que c'est toute le reste du cerveau qui sert le plus a la nie"inoire," etc.
PAGE 233, line 4 from bottom, "The union of the soul and the body." Leibnitz was undoubtedly satisfied that his Pre-established Harmony satisfactorily explained the "union of the soul and the body," and for those who accept his philosophy it does. But those who look for another explanation, for example, in a real reciprocal action between the soul and certain substances of the body, find in Leibnitz's semi-spiritualistic inter pretation of matter a clue or suggestion thereto.
PAGE 235, end of chap. 24, "Comprising substances." Leibnitz, ac cording to Schaarschmidt, means to say that, strictly understood, the collective ideas are not signs of substances, rather, indeed, are the single objects themselves substances, as, for example, the army, the herd, con sist of substances. Yet the collective ideas serve to a certain extent indi rectly to indicate substances. Leibnitz adds this concession here because in his system of monads he departs very widely from the customary con ception of substance, and yet may not lose all touch with the linguistic usage.
PAGE 235, line 6, 5 from bottom, '•'•Essence of reason." That is, ens rationis, which actuality reaches only so far as it is a thought-image.
PAGE 235, line 3 from bottom, "Comes from the supreme reason." "Relations, so Leibnitz will have us understand the matter," says Schaar schmidt, "are in the first place products of our thought, for they are neither the expression of substances, nor of the determinations (Attribute, J/odi) inhering in them, but the expression of our subjective conception of the relation of things to one another. But this human conception, although also subjective, is yet again grounded in the nature of things, in particular in the nature of the mind, and to this extent springs out of its own constitution, like the eternal truths. And the constitution of the mind, as the 'mirror of the universe,' corresponds again to reality in virtue of the pre-established harmony. The thoroughgoing parallelism of the inner with the outer occurrence gives consequently to the relations, according to Leibnitz, a certain real meaning."
PAGE 239, note 1, line 4. Instead of "Leben," read: Eine Bioyraphie.
PAGE 241, note 1. Add: Corpus Juris Civilis, Oth stereotyped ed., Vol. 1, p. 059, a; Di'jcsta, ed. Mommsen, Berlin, Weidmann, 1893. Schaarschmidt says it is "a definition springing from Stoicism," and compares Gop- pert, Ueber dnheitliche, zusammengesetzte und Gesammtsachen nach rom. Becht, pp. 7 sq., 20 sq., Halle, 1871.
PAGE 242, line 4, " Soul." Leibnitz is right in placing the identity of man in the soul and its conservation, instead of in the "well-organized 760 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE body," as Locke does. The relative unity of the bodily organism results from the absolute unity of the soul.
PAGE 245, note 1. Cf. Eraser, Locke's Essay, 1, 448, note 3. This sec tion is numbered § 11 in Eraser's ed.
PAGE 245, note 2. After " Erdmann," add: Janet. PAGE 246, note 1. After " Erdmann," add: Janet.
PAGE 247, lines 7-9. " The self constitutes identity real and physical," etc. This sentence contains the gist of the whole discussion. " The self " or the ego which "constitutes identity real and physical" is "the pre supposition of that consciousness of the subject of itself to which the conviction of its own reality attaches." Consciousness itself is an active though involuntary modification or state of this self or ego. " The phe nomenon of self " is the ego's actual consciousness of itself, as the subject of all its inner experience, and as the constant accompaniment of the same. The self is accordingly by Leibnitz regarded as a real entity, a substance, constituting in itself "real and physical identity" which is recognized as "personal" in consciousness. But it must be remembered that for Leibnitz substance is dynamic, its essence is action, and its real identity consists in the continuity and connection of its activity. When this activity becomes distinctly conscious or is brought into distinct con sciousness, it constitutes moral and personal identity.
PAGE 249, note 1. Add: Janet reads: " e"tant."
PAGE 250, note 1. Add: Cf., also, The Immortality of the Soul, Bk. II., chaps. 13, 14; Philos. Writings, ed. in 1 vol., London, 1662, pp. 116-121 (each treatise paged separately in this ed.).
PAGE 251, lines 12, 13, "Indifferent to every sort of matter." Janet, (Euvres philos. de Leibniz, I, 224, in his note to this passage, says: " Aristotle believed also that the soul is not indifferent to every kind of matter, and avails himself of the fact to combat the doctrine of metemp sychosis." Cf. Kept ^ux^s, Bk. I., chap. 5, Berlin Academy ed., 409a 31-411b 30; ed. E. Wallace, Cambridge, 1882, pp. 44-57.
PAGE 251, note 1. After "Gerhardt," add: Janet. PAGE 251, note 2. After " Erdmann," add: Janet.
PAGE 252, line 6 from bottom, "Two persons." On double and alter nate personality, cf. James, Psychology, 1, 379-392.
PAGE 254, note 1. After " Erdmann," add: Janet. PAGE 254, note 2. After " Erdmann," add: Janet.
ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS 761