for the reafons abovefaid, it is nccelfary to caufe them to advance to fortify the front of the Army, and therefore either you muft caufe your Companies to turn Company by Company as rhey were foliJ Bodies; or e!fe pafs them into the front, thorough the Files of the Bucklers; which wny is a better way, and kfs diforderly, than to caufe them to wheel m whole Companies like a folid body; and the fame thing is to bye done with with thofe in the rear upon any afl'aulc, as I have fhewn before. If the Enemy prcfents himfelf in the rear, you have no more to do but ro face about with your whole Army, and immediately the Figure is altered, the rear becomes the front, and the front the rear; after which you are to obferve all the ways of fortifying your front, as I have direfted before. If the Enemy appears upon your flank, your Army is to face about to that fide, and do the fame things to ftrengthcn your front; fo that your Horfe, your Velites, your Artillery may be in fuch places as are convenient for the making up chat front; and if there be any difference in this variation of fronts, it is oniy this, that fome of thofe who are to remove, have farther to advance than others. Neverthelefs, in making a front of your right flank, your Velites are to enter into the intervals, betwixt the wings of the Army; and the Horfe fiiou Id approach to the left flank, into whofc place the two Companies of Pikes extraordinary (which were placed in the middle) ihould fucceed: But the carriages fliould remove, and the unarm'd people, (by the great fpace and overture that is made) and retire behind the left flank, which is now become the rear of the whole Army: And the other Velites who were placed in the rear at firft, are not to budge in this cafe, becaufe that place /hould not remain open, being of the rear become the flanks. All other things are to be done as in my hr/i di- redions for the making of a front.
What is faid before of making a front of the right flank, will ferve for making a front of the left flank, for the fame order is to be ufed: If the Enemy comes upon you fo ftrong that he ii able to attack you on both fides; you muft fortify the places where you fufped he will charge, by doubling your ranks from the place where he does not appear to fall on; by dividing your Artillery, your Fe/ites, and your Horfe, and diflnbuc/ng them equally in both Places. If he afl'aults you in three or four fides at once, you or he muft be very imprudent; for had you been wife, you would never have put your felf into a place where an Enemy could have come at you on fo many fides; efpecially with aform'd and well ordered Army. For to ruin you lecurely, it is neceffary the E- neray be ftrong enough to attack you on all fides, and with as many Men in every place almoft, as in your whole Army: And if you be fo indifcreet to march into his Country, or put your felf into the Power of an enemy, whofe men are three times as many, and as well experienced as yours; if you mifcarry, you can blame nobody but your felf: But if misfortune happens not by your fault, but by accident of war, no body will condemn you, and it will fare with you as it did with Sctpio in Spain, and Af- drubal in Jtaly. But if the Enemy be not much ftronger than you, and ycr ventures to aflault you in feveral places, the rafhnefs will be on his fide, and the fuccefs in all pro- bability on yours; for of neceffity he muft fo weaken himfelf, that you may receive him in one place, and charge him briskly in another, and then you will eafily ruin him. This way of ordering an Army againft an enemy that is not in fight, but is hourly ex- peded, is very ncceflary: And it is very ufeful to accuftom your Soldiers ro clofe, and change, and march in this order, and in their March to fhewthem how to fight accord- ing to ray firft front, and then falling into their march again, upon a new alarm in the rear, to turn that into a front; and then each of the flanks, and fo in their firft pollure again: And thefe exercifes are very necefiary, if you would have your Army ready and well difciplin'd. For which caufe I would recommend it to all Princes and. great Captains to reftore thefe pradices of the ancients; for what is military difcipline, but to Icnow how to command and execute thefe things well? What is a well difciplin'd Ar- my, but an Army train'd up well in thefe kind of exercifes? And he who in our times would but frame his difcipline to this, I am confident could ncvir be worfttd. But to continue our difcourfe; if this fquare Figure be difiiculr, it is not to be laid iifide Joe that, for that difficulty is necefiary: Neverthelefs, exercifewill make it cafy; for having learn'd how to draw your felf up, and preferve your Figure, you will eafily undcrftand afterwards how to maintain other Figures in which there is not fo much difilculty.
Zambi. I am of your mind, that thofe orders arc necefiary, and cannot tell (astomy felf) what can be added or fubftraded. Yet 1 would willingiy be fatisfied in two things. One is, when you would make a front of your rear, or one of your flanks, and would have your men face abour, how you do fignify your commands, whether by word of mouth, or found of trumpet: The other is, whether thofe you fend before ro plain the ways, andfmake them palfable for your Army, are to be Soldiers drawn out of |our Bac- taljas, or other Country people defigncd on purpofe for chut work.
C II A P.
Book V.
The Art of JVA 491 C H A p. IV.
0/ Commands derived ly word of mouth, hy Drums, and Trumpets, and of the natuiri of Pioneers.
Fah. 'V'OUR firft demand is of very great importance, for many Armies Have been ^ ruined whicn thie Captain's orders have been miftakcn, or not heard: for vvrTiich reafon, the words of Command in fuch dangers ought to be clear and intelhgible: and if you would fignity your Commands by the found of your Trumpets or Drums, great care is to be taken, that the founds be fo different and diflinguifhable one from the other, that they cannot be miflaken. If your commands are by word of mouth, you mult ufe particular, and be fure to avoid general Terms j and in your particular words you muft be cautious to ufe none that may be liable to an ill interpretation. Many times the crying back, Lmk, has been the lols of an Army: wherefore that word is to be avoided, and inftead of it you are to fay retreat. If you would change your front, and make it either in the flank or the rear, you mufl not fay turtiy but face about to the right or the left, to the front or the rear; and in like manner all the words of com- mand are to be plain and intelligible, as march on^ fiand firm, advance, retreat: and whatever may be done by word of mouth clearly and diflinftly, is to be fignify'd that way: what cannot be done that way, is to be done by the Trumpet and Drum. As to the Pioneers which is your fecond demand, I would have that office performed by my own Soldiers, as w^ll becaufe it was the pradice of ancient times, as becaufe there- by I fhould have fewer idle Perfons in my Aimy, and by confequence fewer impedi- ments. I would command out of every Battalia what number I thought neceflary j I would furnifh them with Pickaxes, and Spades, and caufe them to leave their arms with their next ranks, who fhould carry them for them; fo that when the enemy ap- peared, they fhould have no more to do but to fall back to their ranks, and take them again.
Zambi. But who fhould carry their Pickaxes and Spades? Fab. There fhould be Waggons on purpofe.
TLanobi. I fear you would never prevail with your Soldiers to work.
Fab. We will talk of that in its proper place: at prefent I fhall lay it afiJe, and di'f- courfe of the way how they are to b>. fupply'd with provifions; for having tired them thus long, 'tis but reafonable to ref'refh them with viduals.
C H A P. V.
Of the Provifions that are neceffary for an Army.
Fab. "VrOU mufl know, a Prince is to keep his Army as free, and as fit for cxpedi*' rion as poflible, and to rid it of all Encuihbrances that may make bis enter* prizes difKcult. The firfl difficulty to be remov'd, is want of provifions, and there- lore he is to take particular care that they be furnifhed with bread and wine. The ancients did not think of providing of wine, for when they wanted wine, they made ufe of water with a little vincc^ar to give it a tafle; fo that among the provifions for the Army, vinegar was provided, but not wine. Their Bread was not baked ready to their hands, as in the Towns, but every Soldier had his proportion of meal, whicli he order'd as he picafed, with a certain quantity of Bacon, and Seam, which gave their bread a gufl, and rcnder'd them flrong. So that the provifion for the Soldiers was meal, vinegar, bacon, and fuet or feam^ and barley for the horfes. They had commonly herds of Cattle great and fmall, which follow'd the Armies, which being driven and not carry 'd, were no great encumbrance. By reafon of this order, of old, an Army marched many days journey thorough difficult and folitary places without wane of proviGons, becaule rhey lived upon fuch thinns as might eafily be carry 'd with them.
But in our Armies now a-dsys wc find it quite contraiy; for the Soldiers cannot fubfifl without wine and biskcr, as wiien they are at home, of which, provifjon cannot be made for r.ny confidcr.ible rime, infomuch as they are many times famifhed; or if pro- vifion be rr.Tue, it is with much trouble, and Vift expcnce. I would endeavour there- fore that my Arn-,y misht not be fupp'y'd at that rate; nor would I have them have ary bread bur what they make rhthifcives. As to wine, 1 vvculd not hinder their dr.nking it, r,or proliibic uur any fhoitUi come into the Army; bisr I wonld take no S f f i pains.
The An of WA R. Book V.
pains, nor ufc no induftry to fupply them: and for other provifions, I would follow exaftly the model of the ancients; which way, if rightly confidered, will fhew what difficulties are removed, what wants and diftrefles are prevented to an Army and Ge- neral, and what convenience is added to any enterprize that (hall be undertaken.
Zanobi. Since we have routed the enemy, and marched afterwards into his Country, 'tis but reafonable to believe that we have made our depredations, tax'd his Towns, taken feveral Prifoners: 1 would know therefore how the ancients proceeded in thefc cafes.
CHAP. VI.
How the ancients divided the fpoil, and of the pay which they gave to their Soldiers, Pah. T Will fatisfy you as to that: I do notqueftion but you have confider'd (becaufc I have difcourfed it formerly with fome of you) how our prefent Wars do impo- verifh not only thofe Princes which are overcome, but thofe too that arc Conquerors; for as one loofes his Country, fo the other loofes his Money: which was otherwife in ancient times, becaufe the Conqueror enrich'd himfelf by the war. The reafon of this difference is, becaufe in our times no publick account is taken of the prizes, (as for- merly) but all is left to the difcretion of the Soldier, which occafions two very f?reac diforders; the firft is, as before; the other, it renders the Soldier more dcfirous of plun- der, and lefs obfervant of order and military difcipline. And we have heard of many Inftances, where their impatience to be pillaging has wrefted the Vidory out of their hands who had «lmofl: perfeftly obtained it. Whilft the Romans had the command of their own Armies, they provided very well againft both thefe inconveniencies, appoint- ing all the prizes to be deliver'd in, and appropriated to the publick, and that after- wards the publick fhould diftribute as it pleafed. To this purpofe they had their Que- /lores, (which were like our Chamberlains) in whofe hands all their prizes and taxes were depofited, of which the Conful or General of their Army difpofed as he thought good, for the payment of his Soldiers, the curing of the wounded or fick, and difcharging the other neceflities of the Army.
'Tis true, the Conful had power to give the plunder of a Town to his Soldiers, and he frequently did it, but that liberty never bred any diforder; for when a Town was taken, or an Army defeated, all the prize was brought into a publick place, and di- ftributed man by man, according to every one's merit.
This cuftom made the Soldiers more intent upon vidory than plunder: the prafticc of the Roman Legions was to break and diforder an enemy, but not to purfue; for they never went out of their ranks upon any occafion whatever. Only the horfe, the light-arm'd men, and what other Soldiers were not of the Legions, follow'd the chafe: whereas if the plunder of the field had belong'd to any man that cou'd catch it, it would have been neither reafonable, nor poffible, to have kept the Legions to their ranks, or to have expofed them to fo many dangers. Hence it was, that upon a Vidory the publick was always enriched; for when a Conful entred in triumph, he brought with him great riches into the Treafury of Romey and they confifted of Taxes, Contri- butions, Ranfoms, and Plunder. The ancients had likewfe another cuftom that was very well contriv'd, and that was, out of every Soldier's pay, to caufe a third part to be depofited with the Enfign of their refpedive Companies, who never reftor'd it be- fore the War was ended. This they did for two reafons; firft, that every Soldier might have a ftock of his own; for moft of them being young and profufe, the more they had, the more they would have fquandred. The other reafon was, that knowing their flocks were in their Enfign's hands, they fl)Ould have the more care of him, and defend him with the more courage; and this cuftom contributed much to their valour, and is neceflary to be obferved by any man who would reduce his Soldiers to the difcipline of the Romans.
Zanobi. I believe it impoflible for an Army not to meet with feveral ill accidents whilft it marches from one place to another; and that it requires great induftry in the General, and great courage in the Soldiers to prevent or avert them: you would o- bligc me much if you will tell me what has occur'd to your knowledge in the cafe.
492 CHAP.
Book V.
The Art of W A R.
m CHAP VII. To know the fur prizes which are contriving againjl you upon your march.
Fab. T Shall fatisfy you willingly, as being particularly neceflary to any man who is defiroiis to give a perfeft fcheme of this difcipline.
Whilft an Army is marching, the Generals are above all things to be vigilant that rhey fall not into any arabufhments, which may be done two ways j one, when you fall into it bluntly of your felf: the other, when you are drill'd and wheedl'd into ic by the enemy before you perceive it. To prevent the firfl: way, it is convenient to fend out flrong parties to difcover the Country, who are to be the more diligent, by how much the Country is move apt and proper for fuch things, as where it is woody or mountainous; for arobufcades are commonly laid behind fome hill, or under the flielter of fome wood; and, as if you do not difcover them in time, they are very pernici^ ous; fo, if your care be fufficient, they are as eafily prevented. The birds and the duft have many times difcover'd the enemy; for whenever the enemy approaches in a- ny great number, he will be fure to raife the duft, which will give you the alarm. Se- veral Generals obferving the Pidgeons to rife in fome place where they were to pafs, (or other birds that fly together in flocks) and to hover over their Heads without fall- ing again, have thereby difcovered the ambufliments of the enemy, and either pre- vented or defeated them.
As to the fecond way of being drawn in by the artifices of the enemy, you muftbe cautious of believing any thing eafily, that is not reafonable to be fuppofed: as it would be, if an enemy (hould leave fomething for you to pillage on purpofe, you muft fufped there is fome defign at the bottom, and be careful it does not fucceed. If a great number of the enemy be beaten, and purfu'd by a few of your men, if a few of the enemy attacks a greater party of your's, if the enemy runs unexpededly and without any vifiblc occaflon; in thofe cafes you muft always fufped, and never fancy your enemy fo weak as not to underfland his own biifinefs: on the contrary, if you would be lefs cxpofed to his firatagems, and run your felf lefs into danger, the weaker and more carelefs you obferve him to be, the more you are to apprehend him. In this cafe you are to comport your felf in two different manners; you are to fear him in your'own thoughts, and order your affairs accordingly; but in your words and out- ward behaviour you are to feem to defpifc him; this laft way makes your Soldiers more confident of Vidory, the other makes you more cautious, and lefs apt to be circumvented. And you muft know, that to march thorough an Enemy's Country id more dangerous than to fight a Field-Battle.
CHAR VIII.
One is fo know the Country perfe^ly well thorough which he is to pafsy and keep his enterprizes fecret.
Tab. "npHE marching thorough an Enemy's Country being fo extraordinarily dange* rous, it is necefJary that a General doubles his diligence; and the firft thing he is to do, he is to have a Chart made of all the Country by which he is to pafs, that he may know the Towns, their number, and diftance, the roads, and mountains, the rivers, the fens, and the nature and qualities of them all: and to better his knowledge, it is convenient that he difcourfes and interrogates fome body who underftands the places, objeding, and asking them feveral queftions, and obferving their anfwers. He is likewife to fend fome parties of his light-horfe before, under the command of prudent Officers, not fo much to face the enemy, as to fpeculate the Country, and fee whether it agrees with his Map, and the defcription which he has received. He is alfo to fend out fpies and guides with good guards, prom ifing them rewards if they tell true, and threatning them with punifhment, if falfe. But above all, he is to have a care that his Army knows nothing of his defign; for in the whole Art of War there is nothing fo ufeful, as to conceal the enterprizes that you are about.
CHAP, 494 The Art of WA R.
Book V.
CHAP. IX.
0/ c^tain things which are requifite upon a march.
Fah. 'TpHAT no fudden attack may be able to diforder your Soldiers, you muft command them to ftand ready with their arms, for things that are forefecn and expefted, are lefs terrible and hurtful. Many perfons to avoid confufion, in their march, have difpofed their Carriages and unarm'd people near the Coloms, with com- mand to follow them clofe, that upon a halt, or retreat, (if there ftiould be occafion) they might do it more eafily; which is a good way, and I like it well. A General is likewife to have a great care that his men do not ftraggle in their march, or march un- equally, fome too faft, others too flow, which would weaken his Army, and expofc it to great diforder. It is convenient therefore to place their Officers in the flanks, that they keep them uniform in their motion, rcftraining thofe who are too hafty, and foliciting thofe who arc too flow, and that cannot be done better than by the Trumpets and Drums. The ways are likewife to be enlarged and repair'd, fo as one Company at Icaft may always march in order. Befides this, the cuftom, qualitv and humour of your enemy is to be confider'd, whether he be like to aflault you in the morning, at noon, or at night. Whether he be ftrongeft in horfe or in foot, and as you are inform'd of that, you order your men, and provide every thing necellary. But to come to fome particular accident.
•: C H A P. X.
Hovo to avoid fghting near a River ^ though prejfed hy the enemy; and in what manner you may pafs it.
Fab. TT falls out fometimes that you are forced to decline the enemy, as thinking your felf too weak, and are therefore unwilling to engage him; the enemy follows you what he can to ftop you, or cut you off in your pallage over the river, to which you are marching to that purpofe; and your palfage will take up fo much time, that in probability the enemy will reach you. Some who have been in that dan- gerous condition, have drawn a trench round the rear of their Army, fill'd it with faggots and other combuftibles, and fet them on fire, whilft in the mean time their Army pafled over without any impediment from the enemy, by reafon the fire that was betwixt them hinder'd their defigns.
Zanobi. I cannot eafily believe that fuch a fire as that could hinder them; becaufc I remember I have heard how Hamo the Carthageniany being befieged by an enemy, on that fide where he defigned to efcape, caufed ftore of wood and faggots to be laid, and then fet them on fire: fo that the enemy not obferving him fo flri&ly on that fide, he pafled his Troops thorough the flames, only by ordering them to hold their Tar- gets before their faces.
Fair. You fay well, but confider a little what I told yon, and what Hanno did; I told you that the Generals I mention'd caus'd a trench to be digg'd, and fill'd with combuftible matter; fo that when the enemy was to pafs, he was to encounter with two great difficulties, the trench and the fire. Hanm made his fiits withci:t any ditch, and becaufe he defigned to pafs over them, he commanded that they fhould not be made too violent; for without a trench, that would have flop'd hira. Do you not know the ftory of A/ifl^/> the Spartan^ who being befieged \nSfartn by the Rmar.s, he fet part of the Town on fire, ro hinder the advance of the Rvf^ans, who had already ctif ter'd in fome places; and by that fire he not only hinder'd their advance, but repulfcd them.