think it difcretion to tempt fortune no farther, knowine how much Ihe is ^ ^fe variable, and inconftant. Wherefore my define is to refign my Authority, and that Zanohi may take it upon him according to the Order propofed of transferring it to the youngeft: and I know he will not refufe that honour, (or rather trouble) both in complacency to me, and as being naturally the more eouragious of the two; for he fears not to engage in thefe kind of conflicts, though there be as much likelihood of his mifcarriagc?sconqaefl.
lanohi. I fhall refufe no GiBce into which youfliall put me, though I muft needs fay, I could more willingly have been an auditor; for your fcruples and demands have hi- thtrco given me more farlsfadtion, than any thing I could have objefted my felf. But I think, SeignoY FahritiOy it would be better if you proceed ( provided your patience will Terve, and that we do not tire you with our Ceremonies ) Takhio. You rather obijgc me. Sir, for this variety of Interrogators gives me to un- (derftand the variety of your Judgments and appetites. Bur is there any thing behind thit you would have added to what has been fpoken before?
Zanobi. There are two things of which I would willingly be fatisficd before we pafs any farther. One is, whether you have any other way of drawing up an Army: The other is, what reflexions or confiderations a General is to have, before he comes to a Battle; and when any accident intervenes, how it is to be avoided.
Fair. I fhall endeavour to fatisfie you, but not by anfwering diftinftly to your de- mands; for whilfl I anfwer to one, it happens many times that I feem to anfwer to the other; I have told you how I would have my Army drawn np, that according to that model any other Figure may be taken, as the number of the Enemy, and the nature of your ground does require; for in that cafe, one is to ad according to the condition both of the one and the other.
But take notice of this. That there is no way more dangerous, than to extend the front of your Army too much, unlefs it be very numerous and ftrong: Othcrwife you are to draw it up clofe and thick, rather than wide and thin. For when your Forces are few in rcfpedt of the Enemy, you muft look out for other remedies; as by drawing your Army up, fo as it may be fortified by feme River, or Fen, that may fecurc you behind; or fortified in the flanks by feme Ditch or Entrenchment, as Cajars was in pfaace; and this ought to be a general rule to you, that you extend or contrad your front according both to your own number, and the number of your Enemy. If the fi- nely be not fo numerous, and your men as well difciplin'd as they, you are to make choice of an open place, where you may not only encorapafs the Enemy, but dillend your own ranks: For in ftreight and narrow places, not being able to make ufe of your or- ders, you cannot make ufe of your advantage. For this reafon the Romans did mofl commonly make choice of open and clear places, and avoided fuch as were difHcult and clofe. But if your Army be fmall, or your men inexperienced, you muff do quite contrary ( as I faid before ) and muft find out fome place where your few men may defend thcmfelvcs, or where their inexperience may do you no hurt: In that cafe you are to choofe lome hill or eminence, from whence you may come down upon the Enemy with more force; yetmuflyou have this caution not to draw up your Army upon any Strand or Sea-coall, nor under the command of any Hill Book IV. The Art ofWAR. 479 of which the Enemy may pofTefs himfelf, becaufe you will be expofed thereby to the Ene- mies Cannon without remedy, and be unable to do them mifchief with any conveni- ence. In the drawing up an Army for Battle, great regard is likewife to be had to the Sun and the Wind, that neither the one nor the other be in your face, for they »re great impediments to your fight, one with its beams, and the other by raifing the duft, and carrying the powder into your eyes j befides, the Wind being contrary, is a great difad vantage in rendring the blows which they give the Enemy more languid and weak; and as to the Sun, you muft not only take care that it be not in your face* nor does you no prejudice in the beginning of the Fight, but that it does you no in- jury when it gets up: wherefore the beft way is when you draw up your men, to have It if poflible on their backs, that many hours may pafs before it can come about into their faces.
Hanibal knew this advantage very \nell, and made ufe of it in the Battle of Cannast and Marius did the fame againft the Ct7nlArians, If you be weaker in Horfe, it is your bcft way to draw up among the Vines or the Woods, and fuch other impediments, as in our times the Spaniards did when they beat the French in the Kingdom of Naples^ near Carignuola. And it has been many times feen that the fame Soldiers which have been worfted and baffled before, by only changing their order, and fhifting their ground, have recovered the Vidory: Thus it was with the Canhageniam^ who having been ma* ny times worfted by Marcus ReguJus, were afterwards Vidorious by the Conduft of Kamippus the Lacedamonian, who caufed them to come down into the plain, where they might have room for their Horfe, and their Elephants, and by fo doing they were too hard for the Romans.
According to the practice of the Ancients, I havcobferved, Thatall great Generals when they have known which quarter of the Enemy was the ftrongeft, and where they have fortify'd moft, they have not oppofed the ftrongeft part of their Army againft it; but have chofe rather to confront it with the weakeft of their divifions, and with their ftrongeft attack the weakeft of their Enemy's. When afterwards they came to engage, they commanded the ftrongeft of their Squadrons that they fhould not only ftand firm, and receive the charge without making any advance, whilft the weaker parts had orders to fuffer themfelves to be overcome, and by giving ground gradually, to fall behind the rear of the Army. The Artifice procures two great diforders to the Enemy: The firll is, that the ftrongeft part of his Army is environ'd infenfibly; the other is, that imagin- ing their Vidory certain by the retreat of their Enemy, they fall frequently into difor- der, which many times robs them of that Vidory of which they thought themfelves fo certain. Cornelius Scipio being in Spain againft the Carthagenians, under the command of Afdrubaly and knowing that Afdrubal underftood very well that in the drawing up his Army, he put the Reman Legions (which were the ftrength and flower of his Ar- my) in the midft, and that Afdrubal in probability would do the like; when they come afterwards to fight, he changed his order, put his Legions in the Wings, and his light-arm'd men in the Body: When the Battle was joined, he commanded his Body to flacken their march on a fudden, and the Wings to double their pace; fo that only the Wings on both fides engaged, and the Bodies on both fides being at a diftance one from the other, came not up to one another, and the ftrongeft part of Scipios Army fighting better than the weakeft of Afdrubal's, he overcame them. In thofe days thaC ftratagem was well enough; but in our days by reafon of our Artillery, it is impradi- cable; for the fpace which would be left betwixt the two Bodies, would give oppor- tunity to the Artillery to play, which as we faid before would be very dangerous i So then that way is to be laid afide; and the way which I recommended before is to be ufed, which is to charge with your whole Army, and let your weakeft Squadrons retire. When a General finds his Army ftronger than his Enemy's, if he would encom- pafs it infenfibly, and that the Enemy may not prevent him, let him draw up his Army to an equal front with the Adverfary: afterwards in the heat of the Fight let him or- der by little and little to retire in the front, and let the Wings advance as gradually* and it will always happen that the Enemy fliall be encompafs'd before he is aware.
When a General would fight, and be fure not to be routed, let him draw up his Army near fome place of retreat or fecurity, as either Fens, Mountains, or fome ftrong inexpugnable Town; for in that cafe he may purfue the Enemy, but the Enemy can- not purfue him Hanibal made ufe of this cunning when his fortune began to decline, and he began to apprehend the condud of Marcellus. Some Generals, to difturb the orders of the Entmy, have commanded their light-armed men to begin the Battle, and when it is once joined, to retire among the ranks. When afterwards it grows hotter, and both fides are thoroughly engaged, they have had orders to draw forth out of the flanks of the Army, and having flanked the Enemy unexpededly, they have diforder'd The An of WA R.
Book IV.
der'd and broke him. If any one finds himfelf weaker in Horfe, befides the ways pro- pofed before, he may place a Battalia of Pikes behind thtm, and draw them np in fuch manner, that in the heat of the Battle they may open, and give way for the Pikes to pafs thorough them, and by fo doing, he (hall be iure to prevail. Several have ac- cuftomed their light armed men to fight among their Horfe, and they have been found to give the Horfe very good affillance.
Of all thofe who are famous for drawing up Battles, Hambal and Scipio are the raoft renowned, for the great skill that both of them trxprefled in their conflift iv\ Afri- ca; but becaufe Hambal's Army was compofed of Canhagemans, and Auxiliaries of fe- veral Nations, he placed 80 Elephants in his front; behind them he placed his Auxi- liaries, next them his Canhagemans^ and laft of all his Italians, in whom he could not fafcly confide: and the realbn why he ordered them fo, was becaufe the Auxiliaries having the Enemy in their faces, and finding themfelves clofed up with Carthageni- ans at their backs, Should not think of flying; but being under a neceffity to fight, he did hope they might either overcome, or lo harrafs the Enemy, that when he came up with his frefh men, he might the more eafily overthrow them. Againft this order Set- pio placed his Hajlati, Principes, and Tnarii, in his accuftomed manner, fo as upon oc- cafion they might be received one into the other.
The front of his Army he made up with great fpaces; but that it might appear clofe and united to the Enemy, he filled them up with his Vehtes, with order that as foon as the Elephants come upon them, they (hould retire, and entring among the Legions by the ordinary fpaces, leave a way open for the Elephants to pafs; by which means the fury and execution of the Elephants being evaded, they came prefently to handy- blows, and the Cartbagenians were overcome.
2.anobi. In your defcription of the Fight, you have caufed me to remember how Scipio in the Engagement caufed not his Hajiati to retire into rhe ranks ot the Principesy but divided them, and caufed them to retire into the Wings of the Army, to give place to the Principes when they were to advance againft the Enemy: I would know there- fore for what reafon he differed from the ordinary cullom.
Fahitio. I will tell you: Hanibal had placed the firength of his Army in the fecond divifion; fo that Scipio, to oppofc them with equal courage, united thePrincipes and the Triarii together, infomuch as the intervals of the Principes being filled up by the Triarti, there was no fpaces left for the reception of the Hajiati; wherefore he caufed the Ha- ftati to open to the right and left, and fall in wirh the Wings of the Army. But you mufl obferve that this way of dividing the firft Squadron, is not to be ufed but when the other is Superior; for then you may do it conveniently, as Scipio did; but being Inferior or under any Repulfe, it is not to be done without manifefl danger, and therefore it is neceflary that you have fpaces behind in your other Squadrons that may be ready to receive you.
But to return to our difcourfe. The ancient A/ians, among other contrivances to mif- chief their Enemy, made ufe of certain Chariots with Sythes faftened to the Sides of them, which ferved not only to open the Squadrons of the Enemy with their force, but to cut and kill them with their Sythes. A^ainft thefe Chariots, they had three ways to defend themfelves; either by the clofenefs of their ranks, or by receiving them into their ranks (as they did the Elepnantsj or by fome other vigorous re/iflance, as Silla the Roman did againfl Archelaus, who had ftore of thofe Chariots; to repel them Silla caufed feveral flakes to be pitched into the ground before his firft Squadron, which putting a flop to the carrier of the faid Chariots, prevented the execution which they would otherwife have done. And it is obfervable the new method that Silla ufed in ranging his Army; for placing his Velites and Light-horfe behind, and all his com- plcat arm'd Soldiers before, he left intervals fufficient to receive them, which were be- hind when they had occafion to march up; fo that the Fight being begun, by the afTifl- ance of the Horfe (who had room to pafs thorough the firfl Squadron to the charge) he obtained the Vidory.
CHAP.
Book IV. The An of WA R.
CHAP. ir.
The Arts which are to he ufed during the Fight.
rabr. 'T^O diftnrb the Army of the enemy when the Battle is joined, ft is fieCefTary' •A to invent fome way or other to affright them, either by fpreading a reporc of fupplies that are hard by, or counterfeiting fome reprefentation of them that may difraay the enemy, and facilitate their defeat.
Mmutius Ruffus and Acitlus Glabrio, two of the Roman Confuls, were skilful in this art. Caias Salpitius caufed all the boys and refu(e of his Army to mount upon mules and other beafts that were unferviceable in fight, and placed them at a diftance upon 3 hill, and drawn up infuch order that they appeared like a compleatBody of horfe, when he was engaged with the French, and the enemies apprehenfion of that body got Sul- pitius the Vidory. Marnis made ufe of the fame ftratagem when he fought againft the Germans. If then thefe falfe alarms and reprefentations are of fuch ufe and advantage in time of Battle, true ones muft needs be more efficacious, efpecially if they fall upon the enemies flank or rear whilft the battle is joined: which indeed is not eafy to be done, unlefs the nature of the Country contributes; for if it be open and plain, you cannot conceal any part of your Forces, as is necelfary to be done in thofe cafes; but in woody or mountainous Countries you may conceal fome of your Troops in fuch manner, as they may fall fuddenly and unexpededly upon the enemy, which will give you a Certain Vidory. It is many times of great importance to fpread a rumour abroad during the Fight, that the enemies General is flain, or that he is beaten in another part of the Ar- my, which (as the other) has many times been the caufe of a Viftory. The enemies horfe are often difordered by the reprefentation of ftrange figures, or the making of fome unufual noife, as Croefus did, who oppofed camels againft horfe; and Pyrrhus when he confronted their Calvalry with his Elephants; the ftrangenefs of which fight affrighted them fo, that nothing was ftrong enough to keep them from diforder. In our days the *Turk defeated the Sophi of Perfia, and the Soudan of Syria only with the noife of his Guns, which being unufual to their horfe, difordered them in fuch manner, that the T'ttrk got the Vidory without any great trouble. The Spaniards y to diftraft the Army of Amilcar, placed in the front of their Army certain Chariots filled with flax, and drawn by oxen, to which flax (when the enemy came up to charge) they put fire, and the oxen running from the fire, rufh'd furioufly into the Army of Ami/car, and put it to the rout. It is an unufual pradice (as we have faid before) to furprize and diflurb the e- nemy with ambufcades where the Country is convenient: but where it is open and large, many have made great holes in the ground, and covered them with flraw and earth lightly, leaving certain places folid and firm for their own retreat; over which having re- tired cunningly in the heat of the fight, the enemy purfuing, has fallen in, and been ruin- ed. If during the Fight any ill accident happens that may difcourage your Soldiers, 'cis prudence to difiemble it, and turn it to advantage, as Tuf/us Bo/iihm did, and Lu- cius Sylla, who obferving in the hear of the Battle a party of his Troops go over to the enemy, to the great difheartning of the reft, caufed it to be publifbed quite thorough his Army that it was done by his order, which not only difpeiled the apprehenfionthat was among them, but encouraged them in fuch m; nner that got him the Vidory. //a having commanded out a party upon fome enrerprize, and all of them being killed in fighc of his Army, that the reft might not be terrify 'd, told them he fent them on purpofe, becaufe he had found them unfaithful. Sertorms fighting a battle in Spain, flew one of his, own men, who brought him news that one of his great Ofiiccrs was killed, and the rea- fon was, left telling it to the reft, it might poflibiy have difcouraged them. It is no eafy matter ro detain an Army, (it ic be once tottering and inclining to run) and to bring it 10 fight again: but you muft confider it with this diftindion, cither it is wholly difor- deied, and then It is impoifible to recover it; or elfe it is difordered but in part, and there is fome remedy. Many of the Reman Generals have flop'd the flight of their Armies, by putting themfelves at the head of them, and as it were upbraiding them by their co- wardice. Lucrus Syiia feeing part of his Troops routed, and purfued by the forces of A//» thr-.datesy rode up to the head of them with hisfword in his liand, and cried out to them, // any tody ask ym "where you Live hf your General, tell him you lift him fighting in Boetia. Attthus the Conful oppofed thofe who fought bravely againff thofe who ran away; teJl- ing tf.er.i that ir they did not face about, they fhould be killed f>y their friends as well as their enemies. Vhiltp King ot Mactdon underllanding riiat his Soldiers were afraid of thcL, Rrr Sij' 2 The An of WA R.
Book IV Scythians^ placed behind his Army certain of the faithfullell of his horfe, wirh commilTion to kill any man that fled; fo that his men c hoofing to die rather Hghting than flying, o- vercame their adverfaries. Several of the Roman Generals have wrefled an Enlign out of the hands of their Soldiers, and throwing it among the enemy, proraifed a reward to him who fhould recover it; and this they did not fo much to hinder the flight of their own men, as to give them occafion of doing fome greater exploit upon the enemy.
CHAP. III.
Stratagems after the Fight.
Fair. T Do not think it impertinent to add to this difcourfc fuch things as happen after the Fight, efpecially feeing they are but fhort, and not to be omicred becaufe they are conformable to the matter which we have in hand. Butfince one of thefetwo things muft happen, either that we gain the Vidory, or loofe it,• I fay, that when we gain it, we are to purfue it with the greateft diligence we can, and rather imitate Capir in this cafe than Hanibal, who for not following his Vifiory, and pufhing it on after he had defeated the Romans at Cannast loft the whole Empire of l\^<i Romans, which fortune had alraoft thruft into his hands. Cafar on the other fide never refled after a Viciory, but followed the enemy with greater fury than he attack'd them at h'rft. But when the day is loft, a v/ife General is to confider the beft that he can make of it, efpec;ally it there be any thing of his Army remaining.
The advantage that may arife is from the inadvertency of the enemy, who many times tranfported with his fuccefs, grows negligent and reraifs, and gives opportunity to the enemy to revenge himfelf, as Martins the Roman did upon the Carthaginian Array, who having flain the two Scipios, and routed their forces, not valuing thofe which re- mained, were fuddenly aflaulted and broken; for it is frequently feen, nothing is perpe- trable fo eafiiy, as what the enemy fancies you can never attempt; for commonly men fuffer moft, where they are moft fecure. A General therefore, when he cannot carry the Vidory, is to endeavour with all poffible induftry that liis lofs may be as little as may be; and to do this, it is neceffary to order things fo, that the enemy may not eafiiy purfue, or be in a capacity to retard you.
As to the way of hindering the purfuit of the Conqueror; feveral Generals, as foon as they found thcirxondition, and that it was not poffible to continue the Fight, have ordered their inferior Commanders to feperate, and fly in feveral parties, and meet a- gain at a place which he afligned; and the enemy not daring to divide his Army for fear of a defign, has let all or the greateft part of the conquered efcape. Others have thrown the beft of their goods in the way, that the enemy following might be delayed by the prize, and fuffer them to get o£ "Titus Dimius ufed no fmall art to conceal the lofswiiich he had fuftained in the fight j for having endured the brunt of the Battle from morning till night with the lofs of many of his men; when night came, hccaufed moft of them to be buried privately: the next morning the enemy finding fo many of their own men dead and fo few of the Romans, concluded themfelves beaten, and fled. And now I fuppofe (though confufedly) I have in fome meafure fatisfy'd your demands.
C H A P. IV.
Two other ways of ranging an Army to fght.
Fahr. "T^Is true, as to the form and mode! of drawing up an Army to fight, it remains that I let you know, that fometimes fome Generals have drawn them up in the figure of a wedge pointing in the front, fuppofinc; it the propcreft way to pierce and make an impreflion upon the enemy. In oppofition to this, the way was for the adverfary to draw up in the figure of a pair of fiiears, which being opened, were to re- ceive the point of the wedge, enclofe it, and charge it on all fides. And about this, let me recommend to you this general rule, that the beft remedy to be ufed againft the de- i lign of an enemy, is to do that bravely of your felf, to which you perceive he would en- \ deavour to force you, for doingit voluntarily you doit orderly, and to your own profit and advan- Book IV. The Art ojWAR.,.,, 483 advantage; whereas if you do it by conftrainr, you do it to your ruin. I will not repeat any thing that I have faid before, to confirm my difcourfe. But this is mofl: certain, if your advevfary thinks to open, and ds it Wefe ckave your Army with his wedge, if you keep your Army open in the figure of the (hears, and receive them in the middle, you cut thenl to pieces, and they can do you no hurt.
H.inibal placed his Elephants in the front of his Army, thinking thereby to have pier- ced the Army of S-ip'to with more eafe ^ but Scipio ranging his men in the form of a pair of (hears, and receiving him in an open pofture, gained the Vidory, and Hanibal was loft.
Afdrubal placed the beft and ftrongeft of his men in the front of his Army, to make the better charge upon the Enemy; Scipio commanding his middle men in the front to retreat infenfibly, and give place, was fo cunningly obeyed, that the Enemy was drawn in, and defeated: fo that you fee thofe defigns are many times the occafion of his Vifto- ry againft'w horn they are defigned.
C H A P V; bf the con^raint and advantage a matt tHay have to Fight.
Fahr.TV my memory does ndt fail, it remains yet that I fay fomething touching thfe things which a wife General is to confider before he comes to an engagement. And the firil thing I fhall fay upon this fubjecft is, that a General is never to come to ^ Field-fight unlefs he be conftrained, or has fome more than ordinary advantage. His advantage may lie in the nature of the Place, in the difcipline of his Army, or the num- ber or excellence of his Men. And his nece/Iity confifts in finding his condition fuch, that without fighting hemuft be certainly deftroyed: as where money is wanting, where viftuals are defedive, and where the Enemy is in expedation of fupplies: in thefe cafes a General is always to venture, tho' he fights upon difadvantage; for 'tis better fighting where fortune may favour you, than not to try her at all, and be certainly ruined j and in this cafe it would be as great a fault in a General not to fight, as it would be if he had an opportunity of defeating his adverfary, and was either too ignorant to know rr, or too cowardly or dilatary to make ufe of it. The advantages which occur in the con- dud of war, do many times proceed from the Enemy, and fometimes from your prudence. Many have been furprized and routed in their paflage over Rivers, by the dex- terity of the Enemy, who having forborn them till half of them were over, have fallen fuddtnly upon them, and put them to the rout, as Cafar ferved the Swi7.curs v^hen he cut off a fourth part of their Army, by reafon that they were feparated by a River. Sometimes it happens that your Enemy is tired, and weary, having followed you with too much hafle and inconfideration; and in that Cafe, finding your own Army vigorous and ftrong, you are not to lofe your opportunity. Befides, it your Enemy prefertts you Battle in the morning betimes, you are not immediately to draw out your Army and fight him, but are rather to protrad and fpin out the time for fome hours, (ftill ottering and pretending to come forth) that their impatience of delay, or ftandifig fo long to their Arm^, may rebate the fury with which they came; and as foon as you find theni cool, and off of their firft ardor, then you may come forth, and charge them as fmartlj^ as you can. Scipio and Metelhis made ufe of this way in Spain, the one againft Afdrubal, the other againfl; Sertonus. If the Enemy has leffened his power by dividing his Army, (.IS Scipio did in Spain) or by any other occafion, then alfo a good General may try his fortune with credit.
The greareft part of the grarell Generals have chofen rather to receive than give the charge, becanfe the fury of an Enemy is eafily fuftained by thofe who ftand firm and clofc in their ftation; and being once check'd, it turns into cowardice. Fnbius being fent a- gainft the Samnites and the Gauls, received their fury with that compofednefs and tranquility, that he conquered thenl both, but Decius his Colleaf^ue not following his example, mi/carried, and was flain. Some who have been pofleflcd too much oi the courage Oi' their Enemy, have chofe to begin the Fight in the Evening towards night, th.lr their Aimy being worfted, might get off, or defend themfelves by the benefit of the darkncfs (>ri:ers nhdcrflanding the fupcrftition of the Enemy, and that on certain days they dt-votfe them ft. Ives wholly to Religion, and will not endeavour to fight, have chofen that time to arracl. thtm, and have carried rhe Vidory. Cttfnr made ufe of this way a- gainft Ariovifius in F-aiire, and Vefpajian did the fame in S^ria af^ainft the 'Je^vs, who upon ihcir Satbacli would not fo much as defend themfelves againft the Romans.
Rtr2 CHAP.
The An of WA R Book IV.
CHAP. VI.
Dire^ions for a General.