SigPhi · Nicolas Malebranche

Treatise Concerning the Search after Truth (incl. Treatise of Nature and Grace)

Page 30 of 87

The Heavens are too remote from our Eyes, to difcover the Changes which happen in them; and there feldom any great enough fall out, to be feen upon Earth; which has been fufficient warrant to a great many Perfons to believe they were really incorruptible. What has been a farther confirmation of their Opinion, is their attributing to the Contrariety of Qualities, the Corruption incident to Sublunary Bodies. For having never been in the Hea- vens, to fee how things were carried on there, they have had no Experience of that contra-. riety of Qualities -being to be found therein, which has induc'd them to believe there were actually nojfuch thing. And hence have concluded the Heavens were exempt from Corruption, upon this Reafon, That what according to their Notion, corrupts Sublunary Bodies, is not to be found in the higher Regions of the World.

'Tis plain that this Arguing has nothing of folidity: for we fee no Reafon why there may not be found fome other Caufe of Corruption, befides that contrariety of Qualities which they imagine: nor upon what grounds they can affirm, There is neither Heat nor Cold, neither Drought nor Moifture in the Heavens, that the Sun is not hot, nor Saturn cold.

There is fome probability of Reafon to fay, That very hard Stones, and Glafs, arid other Bodies of like Nature, are not corrupted, fince we fee they fubfift a long time, in the fame Capacity •, and we are near enough to obferve the Changes that fhould happen to them. But while we are at fuch a Diftance from the Heavens, as we are, it's abfolutely againft all Reafon to conclude they don't corrupt, becaufe we perceive no contrary Qualities in them, nor can fee them corrupting; and yet they don't only fay, they don't corrupt, but that they are un- changeable and incorruptible: And, a little more, the Peripatetich would maintain, That Ce- leftial Bodies were fo many Divinities, as their Mafter Arifhtle did believe them.

The Beauty of the Univerfe confifts not in the Incorruptibility of its parts, but in the Va- riety that is found in them; and this great Work of the World, would have fomething wanting to its Admirable Perfection, without that Vieifiitude of things that is obferv'd in k. A Matter infinitely extended, without Motion, and confequently rude and without Form, and without Corruption, might perhaps manifeft the infinite Power of its Author, but could give no Idea of his Wifdom. And for this reafon all Corporeal things are corruptible; "and there is no Body whatever, whereunto there happens not fome Change, which alters and corrupts it $0Wiudofin procefs 0f Time. GOD forms even in the Bowels of Stones and Glafs, Creatures more '/Aug™~ perfect and admirable, than all the Works of Men. Thefe Bodies though cxtreamly hard and 1666. * ' dry, fail not however to corrupt in Time: The Air and the Sun, which they are exjws'd to, change Chap. Xt The Search after Truth. j*j change fome of their parts « and there are found Worms to feed on them, as gxperient* nrJm lefts.. *-Ai'wicutc There is no other difference between very hard and' very dry Bodies, and others than that the former are compos d of very Grofiand Solid parts, and confequently Ids capable of being agitated, and fcparated from each other, by the motion of thofe that beat againft them • • which makes us look upon them as incorruptible. Notwithstanding they are not fo in their Nature, as Time, Experience, and Real'on fufficiently evince.

Botas to the Heavens they are conflicted of a more fluid and fubtile matter: and efoe- cially fhe&w, which is fo far from wanting Keat, and being incorruptible, as €av Ari&otU's Dilciples, that on the contrary, it is the hotteft of all Bodies, and molt fubieft to change 'Tis he that warms, that agitates, and changes all things. For 'tis he that produces by his Aftion, which is no other than his Heat or the motion of his Parts, all that appears new in the changes of the SeafonS: Reafon demonftrates thefe things: But though Reafon maybe withftood, yet Experience cannot. For, fince we havedifcover'd in the Saw, by the help of a Telefcope, or large Glaffes, ftains or leurf as big as all the Earth, which- have been form'd upon him, anddiffipated in amort time: It can no longer be doubted, but he is more fubjedl: to change,, than the Earth which we inhabit.

All Bodies then are under a perpetual flux, and continual change; and efpecially thofe that are moft fluid, as Fire, Air, and -Water; next the parts of living Bodies, asFlefh and alfo Bones, and laftly the moft hard: and the Mind is not to fuppofe a kind of Immutability in things, becanfe it fees not Corruption or Change in them: For 'tis no Argument that a thing continues always like it felf, becaufe we can difcover no difference in it: nor that things do not exift, becaufe we have no Knowledge or Idea of them.

CHAP. XL Inflames of feme Errors of Morality, which depend on the fame Vrin- ciple.

""! H I S Eafinefs and Propenfity of the Mind, to imagine and fuppofe Likenefs, where- ever it does riot vifibly perceive Difference, engages the generality of Men in moft dangerous Errors in point ot Morality. Some inftances whereof are thefe.

A French Man falls in Company of an Englijh Man, or an Italian: This Stranger has par- ticular Humours of his own } he has a Finenefs and Delicacy of Wit; or if you had rather, is arrogant and troublefom. This fhall forthwith incline the French Man to judge that all Englijh Men or Italians have the fame Character of Mind, as the Man that he has met with; and make him praife them, ordifcommend them all in general: And if he meets with another, he is immediately prepoffefTed with a Notion of his being like the former, and he gives way to fome Affection, or fecret Averfion on his Account. In a word, he will judge of all the particulars of thefe Nations, from the notable proof he has taken from one or two, that had fuch certain Qualities of Mind •, becaufe having no Information elfewhere of their Difference he fuppofes them all alike.

A Regular of fome Order, falls into fome enormity, and this is fufficient with the genera- lity of thofe that know him, to condemn indifferently all the Members of the fame Society. They all wear the fame Habit, and bear the fame Name: they are alike in this, and there needs no more grounds for Vulgar-rate-men, to imagine they are fo in every thing, The Reafon why they fuppofe them alike, is becaufe they cannot pierce into the bottom of their Hearts, and fee wherein they pofitively differ.

Slanderers who ftudy for means of Waiting the Reputation of their Enemies, commonly make ufe of this; and Experience verifies that it generally fucceeds. And indeeed it is moft fuited and proportioned to the Vulgar Itandard and capacity. For 'tis not fufficient to find in numerous Communities, as holy as they are, fomePerfons diforderly in Manners, or un- orthodox in Opinion: fince in the Company of the Apoftles, whereof J ESVS CHR IS T Himfelf was the Head, there was found a Robber, a Traitor, an Hypocrite •, and in a word, a Judas.

The Jews doubtlefs had been much to blame, had they pafs'd hard and difadvantagious Cenfures upon the moft Holy Society that ever was, becaufe of the Avarice and Corruption of Judas; and had they condemn'd them all in their Heart, becaufe they fuffer'd fo wicked a wretch in their Company:, and ourlO^D let him go unpunifhed, though he knew his Crimes. • 'Tis then a manifeft repugnance to Reafon, and breach of Chanty, to fuppofe a whole Community in an Error, from fome private Perfon's being engag'd in it •, even though the Heads conniv'd at it, or perhaps were Partifans and Abbetters. 'Tis true, when all the Par- Mm ticulars 134. F.Malebranche Concerning Book til.

ticulars will uphold an Error, orjuftifie the Fault of their Brother, the whole Fraternity is to be concluded culpable: but it may be faid, that this but rarely happens. Foritfeems Morally impofiibie for all the Particulars of an Order to have Thoughts and Sentiments alike.

Men fhould never in this manner conclude a General, from a Particular: but they cannot judge finiply of what they fee, but run to an.extreamon one fide or other. A Regular of futh an Order, is a Great Man, or a good Man ^ from hence they infer that the whole Or- der is full of Great or Good Men. So a Regular of an Order is unfound, and Heterodox, therefore the whole Order is Corrupt and Heterodox. But thefelaft Judgments are much more dangerous than the former:, becaufe we fhould always judge charitably of our Neigh- bour, and the malice and ill-nature of Men, make hard Cenfures and Difcourfes, meant for the Dif-repute of others, more pleafant and welcome, and imprint them deeper on the Mind, than fuch Judgments and Difcourfes, as are made to their Advantage.

When a Man of the World, who is addicted to his Pafllons, flicks refolutely to his Opi- nion, and pretends whilft his Paflion is high, that he has Reafon to follow it, heisdefer- vedly concluded Stubborn, and Opinionated; and he will acknowledge it himfelf, when his Paflion is over. So when a Man of Piety, who is penetrated with what he fays, who is convinced of the Truth of Religion, and of the Vanity of Worldly things, goes upon the ftrength of his Lights and Knowledge, to withftand the Corruptions and Difor- ders of others, and reprimands them with fome Fervency and Zeal: Worldly Men judge him alfo to be an Qfitoiaftre; and fo conclude all Devoutnefs, Wilfulnefs and Bigottry. Nay they think the Vertuous and Good, more Opinionated, than the Vicious and Wicked: Becaufe thefe latter urging their Corrupt Opinions, as they are buoy'd up by the different commotions of their Blood and Paffions; ftaynotlongin the fame Sentiments, but defert them: Whereas the Religious remain conftant, and immovable in theirs, as being built upon fixed and unfhaken Foundations, which depend not on any thing fo wavering, as the Circulation of the Blood.

See now the reafon why the common fort of People judge the Pious and Vertuous, as Opi- nionated as the Vicious; Which is, That Good Men are as Paflionate for Truth and Vertue, as Wicked Men for Vice and Falfhood. Both one and the other talk much after the fame Manner, in defending their Opinions: In this they are alike, though they differ in the Main.

But this is enough for the World, that is unable to diftinguifh their Reafons, and acknow- ledge the Difference, to judge them Alike in every thing j becaufe they are Alike in that external way, whereof every body is a competent Judge.

The Godly then are not Obftinate and Opinionated, they are only Conftant as they ought to be. But the Vicious and Licentious, are ever Opinionated, though they continue but an Hour in their Opinion, For thofe are the Opinionated only, who defend a Falfe Opi- nion, though they defend it but a little time.

The cafe is much the fame with fome Philofophers, who maintain Chimerical Opinions \ which they afterwards rejedf. They would have others who defend certain Truths, the certainty whereof they plainly 'fee, to quit them as Naked Opinions, as themfelves have done thofe they were impertinently conceited with. And becaufe 'tis not eafie to pay De- ference to them to the prejudice of Truth \ and the Love a Man naturally has for her, makes him heartily efpoufe her, they judge this Man an Opi niafire.

Thofe Perfons would be to blame, obftinately to defend their Chimera's; but the others are to be commended for maintaining Truth with Strength and Refolution of Mind: The Manner of them both is the fame, but the Sentiments are different: And 'tis this Difference of Sentiments, which makes the one Conftant, and the other Obftinate, and Opi- niated.

The Conclufion of the Three Firfi Books.

FROM the Beginning of this Treatife, I have diftinguifh'd, as it were, two Parts in the Simple and Indivifible Effence of the Soul, one whereof was purely Pajfive; the other both ABive and Pafjive together. The Firft is the Mind or Vtiderftanding; the Second is the Will: I have attributed to the Mind three Faculties; becaufe it receives its Modifications and its Idea's from the Author of Nature three feveral ways. I have called. ItSenfe, when it receives from GOD Idea's confounded with Senfations, that is, Sen- fible Idea's, upon occafion of fome Motions happening in the Organs of the Senfes, by the Prefence of Objefts. Inam'd it Imagination and Memory, when it received from. G 0 D Idea's confounded with Images; which make a fort of languid and feeble Senfations, which the Chap. XL The Search after Truth., 135 the Mind receives only from forae Traces, produe'd or excited in the Brain, by the Courfe of the Animal Spirits. Laftly, I call'd it Pure Mind, or Pure Intelletl, when it receives from GOD the All-pure Idea's of Truth, without any mixture of Senfations and Imager-, not by the Union it hath with the Body, but with that it has with the WORD, or WIS D 0 M of GOD: not becaufe it exifts in the Material and Senfible World, but becaufe it fubfifts in the Immaterial aad Intelligible World: not for the knowing Mutable things, that are fit for the Prefervation of Corporeal Life; but for piercing into Immutable Truths, which conferve in us the Life of the Spirit. _ I have (hewn in the Firft and Second Book, That our Senfes and Imagination are very ufeful to the knowing the Relations External Bodies have to our own; that all the Idea's the Mind receives by means of the Body, are for the Intereft of the Body: that 'tis impoffible to difco- ver any Truth whatever, with Evidence, by the Idea's of the Senfes and Imagination; that thefe confus'd Idea's are of ufe only in uniting us to our Body, and by our Body^ to all fenfible things: and that laftly, if we defir'd to avoid Error, we fhould not credit their Reports: I concluded likewife, That it was Morally impoffible to know by the pure Idea's of the Mind, the Relations which Bodies have with our own: that we ought not to reafon upon thefe Idea's, to know whether an Apple, or a Stone, are good to eat; but the way to know, is to try by Tafting: And that though we may employ our Intellect, for obtaining a confus'd Knowledge of the Relations foreign Bodies have with ours; 'tis always the fureft way to make ufe of our Senfes. I give one Inftance more, fince fo neceflary and eflential things cannot be too deeply imprinted on the Mind.

I have a Mind to examine, for Example, Whether 'tis more advantagious to be Juft or Rich. If I open the Eyes of my Body, Juftice looks like a Cbimara, I fee no Allurements that it has. The Juft I fee mifcrable, deferted, perfecuted, naked of Defence, and deftitute of Comfort: For He that is their Comforter and Supporter, is not apparent to my Eyes: In a word, I fee not what ufe Juftice and Vertue can be put to. But if I contemplate Riches with my Eyes open, I prefently fee the Luftre and Splendor of them, and am dazl'd. Power, Greatnefs, Pleafure, and all fenfible Goods, are the Retinue and Attendants of Wealth; and I have no room to doubt but a Man muft be Rich, if he will be happy. Again, If I employ my Ears; I hear how all Men have Riches in Efteem; and that their Talk is only about ways of ac- quiring them; and that they are conftantly giving Praifes, Incenfe, and Honour to thofe that pofTefs them. This Senfe then, and all the reft inform me, that I muft be Rich, before I can be Happy. But let me fhut my Eyes, and ftop my Ears, and only interrogate my Imagina- tion, and it will conftantly represent what my Eyes had feen, what they had read, and what my Ears had heard, to the Advantage and Commendation of Riches; but it will reprefent them in a quite other iranner,than my Senfes: For the Imagination always augments the Idea's of thofe things which are related to the Body, and are the Objefts of our Love. If I refign my felf to its Condnft, it will prefently lead me into an Inchanted Palace, much what the fame with thofe celebrated by Poets and Romancers, in magnificent Defcriptions; and here I fhall be ravifh'd in gazing oft thofe Beauties, that need not be defcrib'd, which will convince me, that the God of Riches that inhabits it, is the only capable of making me Happy..Lo here, what my Body is able to perfwade me, for it fpeaks only on its own behalf; and 'tis neceflary to its welfare, that the Imagination bow beneath the Grandem-, and proftrate it felf before the Luftre of Riches.

But if I coniider, that the Body is infinitely inferiour to the Mind; that it is not its Mafter, nor can inftruft it in Truth, nor any ways illuminate it; and if upon this Scene and Profpecf I re-enter into, or enquire of my felf, or rather (fince I am neither my own Mafter, nor my own Light) if I approach unto GOD, and in the calm and filence of my Senfes and Paffions, make this Demand, Whether Riches ox Vertue is preferable? I fhall hear a clear and difrinft An- fwer, concerning what is to be done; an Eternal Anfwer, that has been always given, and which is, and always will be: an Anfwer that's not neceflary to be explain'd, fince every body know it; fuch as read this, andfuch as do not read it; which is neither Greek, nor Latin, nor French, nor German, but which all Nations under Heaven underftand: An Anfwer laftly, that confolates the Juft in their Poverty, and defolates Sinners in the abundance of their Riches. I fhall hear this Anfwer, and remain convine'd; and then fhall laugh at the Vifions of my Ima- gination, and the Delufons of my Senfes. The Internal Man that is in me, fhall ridicule the Ani-. mal and Terreftrial Man, that I carry about me. In fine, the New Man fhall thrive, and the Old Man fhall be deftroy'd; provided in the mean time I continually obey the Voice of Him, who delivers Himfelf fo clearly, in the moft fecret recefs of my Reafon; and who becoming fenfible to accommodate Himfelf to my Weaknefs and Difeafe, and to give me Life by that which gave me Death, fpeaks to me anew, in a moft ftrong and lively, and familiar way by my Senfes; I mean by the preaching of His Gofpd: But if I interrogate Him in all Metaphy- fcal, Natural, and purely Philofophical Queftions, as well as thofe which refpeft the Rule of Manners, I fhall always have a faithful Mafter, who will never deceive me. I fhall not only be a Chnfiian, but a Philofopher; I fhall be*a found Thinker, and a Lover of what is Good: In a word, I fhall follow the Road that leads me to all Perfection I am capable of, either by Na- ture or by Grace.

1 We 156 F. Malebranchb Concerning Book III.

We ought then to conclude from all that has been faid, that to make the belt ufe poffible of the Faculties of our Soul, of our Senfes, Imagination, and Vnderftanding; we muft ap- ply them only to thofe things, for which they were given us. We ought carefully to di- ftinguifh our Senfations and Imaginations,from our Pure Idea's; and judge by the former of the Relations our Body has with thole about us; but never make ufe of them in difcovering Truths, which they always confound. Whereas Pure Idea's muft be us'd in the finding out of Truths, but omitted, when we judge of the Correfpondencies between Exteri- our Bodies, and our own: becaufe their Idea's have never reach and extent enough, to give a thorough Reprefentation of them.

'Tis impoffible for Men to have fuificient Knowledge of all the Figures and Motions of the little parts of their Body and Blood:, and of thole of a particular Fruit; at a certain See the Seafon of their Sicknefs,. to know whether there is a Relation of Agreement between that Illuftrati- Fruit and their Body •, and that if they eat of it they lhall recover: Thus our Senfes alone ons. are more ufeful for the Converfation of our Body, than the Rules of Experimental Medi- cine} and Experimental Medicine, than Theoretical. But Theoretical Medicine, that deferrs much to Experience, and more to the Senfes, is the bell of all. Becaufe all thefe mould be caball'd together.

Reafon then is of univerfal ufe; and this is the Privilege it obtains over the Senfes and Imagination, which are limited and confin'd to Senfible things: yet this is to be regularly em- ploy'dj for though it be the principal part of Our felves, it often happens to deceive us, by our letting it aft too much \ becaufe it cannot adf enough without tiring \ I mean it cannot know enough to make a right Judgment, and yet it will ftill be judging. ~ F. MALE- F. MALEBRANCHEs TREATISE Concerning the SEARCH after TRUTH BOOK IV.

Concerning the Inclinations, or Natural Motions of the Mind.

CHAP. I.

I. Inclinations are as neceffary to Spirits, as Motions to Bodies. II. GOD gives no Motion to Spirits, but what tends towards Himfelf. III. The Tendency Spirits have to particular Goods^ proceeds but from their Mo- tion towards Good in general. IV. The Original of our chiefeji Natural Inclinations: Which will makg up the Divifwn of this Fourth Book.

THERE had been no occafion of Treating on the Natural Inclinations, which are to be the SubjeQ: of this Fourth Book, nor on the Paffions, which I am to ipeak to in the Fifth, to difcover the Caufes of our Errours, did not the Underftanding depend on the Will, in the Perception of Objects. But becaufe the Underftanding receives its Di- rection from the Will, and is determin'd and fix'd by it, rather to lome Objects than others: in order to penetrate into the Caufes of the Errours whereunto we are fubjecf, it will be abfolutely neceflary to be well acquainted with the Nature of our Inclinations.

Had God in the Creation of the World, produc'd a Matter infinitely Extended, without im- r., printing on it any Motion, there had been no diverfity in Bodies. The whole Vifible, World at Inclinations this day, would have been nothing but an unweildy Mafs of Matter, or Extenfion, which might artLas m' perhaps have ferv'd to (new the Greatnefs and Power of its Author; but wanting that Succeflion 'M^f*0 & of Forms, and Variety of Bodies, wherein the^Beauty of the Univerfe confifts, would have little Motions to to invite Spiritual Beings to admire, and adore the Infinite Wifdom of its Governour. Bodies.

Now the Inclinations of Spirits feem to be in the Spiritual World, what the Motions of Bo- dies are in the Material: and that if Spirits had no Inclinations or Volitions, that Variety would be wanting to the Order of Spiritual things, which not only excites to the Admiration of the profound Wifdom of God, (as does the diverfity obferv'd in Material things,) but alfo of his Mercy, Juftice, and Goodnefs, and all his other Attributes in general. The difference then of In- clinations, has an EfFett in Spirits much like that which the diverfity of Motions produces iri Bodies: and the Inclinations of Spirits, together with the Motions of Bodies, make up all the Beauty of Created Beings. So that 'tis requifite for the former to have leverai Inclinations, as for the latter to have different Motions. But' let us try to difcovet what Inclinations thefe ought to be.

Were not our Nature corrupted, we mould not need to feek by Reafon, as we are now to do, what fhould be the Natural Inclinations of Created Spirits. We need but have defcended into our own Breaft, to have difcovefd, by an inward Feeling, or Self-confcioufnefs of what pafTes with- in us, all the Inclinations we ©ught Naturally to have. But fince we are taught by Faith, that Sin has inverted the Order of Nature, and even by Reafon, that our Inclinations are diforder'd, as we mall fee better in the fequel, we are oblig'd to another courfe. For our Senfations being N n not 1 28 KMalebranche Concerning not to be credited, we are forc'd to explain things in an higher and more traiifcendent man- ner; but fueh as will doubtlefs feem Chimerical to thofe who take the Eftimate of all things from the Senfes. 1 ir. 'Tis an undeniable Truth, That God can have no other Principal End of his Atfions, than Him- God ha- ye/j~: and tnat ne may fore many s inordinate Ends, tending all to the Prefervation of the Beings th?rPrinci-he h3iS created. He can have no Principal End befides Himfelf ^ becaufe, being not liable to pal End of Errour, he cannot place his ultimate End in Beings that include not all forts of Perfe&ion. bnAtlions, But he may have a lefs Principal, namely, the Prefervation of Created Beings; becaufe all par- thanhim- taking of His Goodnefs, are necelTarily Good, ort in the Style of Scripture Valde Bona. And noMtionto therefore God loves them; and 'tis His Love that preferves them: for their Subfift ence is wholly Spirits, but owing to the Love of God. Diligis omnia quazfunt, fays the Wife Man, & nihil odifti e or urn qu<e what tends fecifti: nee enim odiens aliquid conftituijii & fecifti. ^iio?nodo autem poffet aliquid permanere, nifi towards j^ vo/uiffes, aut quod a te vocatmn non ejfet confervaretur? And indeed 'tis unconceivable, that himfelf. things mould fubfift, which are not pleafing to an infinitely Perfett and Omnipotent Being -, fince all things, have their Subfiftence only from His Will. God therefore Wills His Glory, as the Prin- cipal End; and the Prefervation of His Creatures, only for His Glory.

Natural Inclinations of Spirits, being undoubtedly the conftant Impreffions of the Will of Him, ' who has Created and Preferves them, muft, we may conclude, be entirely like thofe of their Creatour and Preferver. Wherefore they naturally can have no other Principal End, than His Glory; nor any other Second End, than their own, and others Prefervation: but this ftill with reference to him who gives them their Being. For in brief, it feeming undeniable that God cannot Will that the Wills He has Created fhould love a Lefs Good, more than a Greater 5 that is, fhould love what is lefs amiable, more than what is more fo; it is impoffible for Him to Create any Creature, without Direcling it towards Himfelf, and commanding it to love Him more than all things elfe -, though He may create it Free, and with a Power of difengaging it fclf, and diverting from Him. HL As there is but One Love properly in God, that is, the Love of Himfelf; and as He can love the ten- nothing but by that Love, fince He can love nothing but with reference to Himfelf. So He im- ^tuhct't Prints ^ut one L°ve ln us, which is the Love of Good in general: and we can love nothing but Partkutar through that Love, fince we can love nothing but what's a Real or Apparent Good. This Love Goods, pro- of Good in general is the Principle of all our particular Affe&ions, fince this Love is really no- ceedsfrom thing but our Will: The Will of Man, as I have faid before, being only the Continual Im- their Mo- prejfion 0f fa Author of Nature, which carries the Mind towards Good in general. Surely we wards Good ouglit not to imagine that this Power of Loving either proceeds from, or depends on our felves; in general, on whom only depends the Power of Loving wrong, or rather of Rightly Loving Evil things: becaufe being Free, we can determine, and do actually determine to particular, and confequently falfe Goods, the Good Love wherewith God continually influences our Souls, as long as He pre- ferves them.

But not only our Will, or our Love for Good in general, comes from God-, our Inclinations likewife for particular Goods, which are common to, though unequally ftrong in all Men, ( fuch as the Inclination for the Prefervation of our Being, and that of others, to whom Nature has united us ) are the Impreffions of the Will of God upon us: For I term indifferently natural Inclination all the Impreffions of the Author of Nature, that are common to all Created Spirits.

Iv I have been faying, that God loves his Creatures, and that 'tis this His Love that both gives the ori- and. preferves their Being: and whereas he continually imprints on us a Love like His own, ( fince g'mai of the His Will both makes, and governs ours, ) He gives us all thofe Natural Inclinations, which dechiefeii va- penci not on our Choice, and which neceffarily difpofe us to the preferving our own, and our SI':"" Neighbour's Being.

which will make up the Divifton of thit Fourth Book.