IV. What, therefore, shall we say, if it is thus one, when any one inquires, in the first place doubting, whether soul can after this manner be at once one in all things? And m the next place, when one soul is in body, but another not, [how this takes place?] For perhaps it follows that every soul is always in body, and especially the soul of the universe. For this soul does not, as ours is said to do, leave the body; though some say iihat even this soul abandons its body, and yet is not entirely out of the body. But if the soul of the universe is entirely out of the body, how is it that one soul leaves the body, but another does not, though both are [essentially] the same? In intellect, therefore, which is separated from itself by difference, according to parts especially distinguished from each other, but which always subsist together at once, the essence of intellect being impartible, no such doubt can arise. But p ■» 210 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.
in the soul which is said to be divisible about bodies, how this which is one certain thing can be all souls, is attended with many doubts; unless that which is one is established in itself, without falling into body, and afterwards all souls proceed from it, both the soul of the universe, and others to a certain extent; existing as it were together with it, and being one in consequence of not belonging to any thing else [i.e. of not being consubsistent with something of a nature subordinate to themselves]. They must, likewise, be suspended from their boundaries, and conspire with «ach other in their tendencies to supernal natures, by the projecting energies of intellect; like a light which is now on the earth, and is distributed in different habitations, yet is not divided into parts separated from the whole, but is nevertheless one. Hence, the soul of the universe is always transcendent, because it does not belong to it to descend, and be converted to these inferior realms. But our souls are subordinate, because a certain part of their essence is limited to this terrene abode, and to a conversion to body which requires solicitude and care. The soul of the world, therefore, in its most inferior part, resembles a great vegetable soul, which without labour and silently governs the plant of which it is the soul [i.e. in the same manner as worms are generated in wounds]. But the government of the inferior part of our soul, resembles the worms that are generated in the putrified part of a plant. For thus the animated body of the universe subsists. Another soul, however, which is similar in species to the superior part of the soul of the world, resembles in its government the husbandman whose attention is directed to the worms that are generated from putrefaction in a plant, and who is solicitously employed in the cultivation of the plant. Or as if some one should say that a man who is well, and is with other men that are in health, is oee persons with whom he co-operates either in DISCUSSION OF DOUBTS RELATIVE TO THE SOUL. 211 acting or contemplating; but that a diseased man, and who is employed in procuring remedies for the body, is with the body, and becomes corporeal through his attention to it.
V. How, therefore, any longer will this be your soul, that the soul of some other person, and that again of another? Shall we say that it is the soul of this person according to its inferior part, but not of this according to its supreme part, but of some other person? Thus, however, Socrates will indeed exist, when the soul of Socrates is in body; but he will perish when he is especially in the most ex- cellent condition {i,e, when he is in the intelligible world]. But no being perishes, since the intellects which are in the intelligible do not perish, because they are not corporeally distributed into one thing, but each remains possessing in difference a sameness of subsistence, in which its very being consists. After this manner, therefore, souls also being successively suspended according to each intellect, being likewise reasons of intellects, though more evolved than an intellectual essence, and becoming as it were much from that which is few, and being in contact with it, they are now willing to be divided by each of those more im- partible essences, yet are not able to proceed to the very extremity of division. For they preserve their sameness and difference, and each remains one, and at the same time all are one. We have, however, summarily shown, that all souls are from one soul, and that all of them are divisible and at the same time indivisible. The soul, also, which abides *[on high], is the one reason of intellect, and from this soul partial and immaterial reasons are derived, in the same manner as there [t.e. in the same manner as partial intellects are derived from one intellect which ranks as a whole].
VI. Why, however, did the soul of the world being of a uniform nature make the world, but not the soul of each 212 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.
individual, though it likewise contains all things in itself? For we have before shown that productive powet may exist at one and the same time in many things^ Now, however, the reason of this must be assigned. For perhaps the manner may be known by us in which the same thing in different subjects either does or suffers a certain thing, or is with respect to it both an agent and a patient. Or rather let us consider how and why the soul of the universe made the world, but other souls govern a certain part of the world. Perhaps, however, it is not at all wonderful, that of those who possess the same science, some should rule over many, but others over few. But why, it may be said, is this the case? To this it may be answered, that the difference of souls is greater, so far as one of them does not depart from the soul of the universe, but abiding there has a body surrounding it; but other souls, body now existing, and their sister soul having dominion, are alloted an appro- priate destiny, this soul preparing for them proper habita- tions. It may also be said, that the soul of the universe beholds that intellect which ranks as a whole, but that other souls rather behold their own intellects which are of a partial nature. Perhaps, however, these souls also are able to make the universe; but the soul of the world having made it, this is no longer possible to other souls, productive energy having commenced from the first soul.
But the same doubt will arise if any other soul first began to fabricate. It is better, however, to say that the soul of the world rather than other souls fabricated the universe, because it in a greater degree adheres to intelligibles. For the power of those souls is greater that more vigorously tend to the intelligible world. For, preserving themselves in that secure region, they fabricate with facility; since it is the property of a greater power, not to suffer in the things which it produces. But power remains suspended from the supernal region. Abiding, therefore, in itself, it DISCUSSION OF DOUBTS RELATIVE TO THE SOUL. 213 produces [other things] acceding. But other souls which proceed from the one soul, depart from it into the pro- fundity [of a material nature]. Perhaps, also, that which is most abundant in them, being drawn downward, draws them likewise into an inferior condition, their own decisions conspiring with the downward impulse. What, however, is said in the " Timseus " of mixture in a second and third degree, must be considered as signif jing that some souls are nearer to, but others more remote from the soul of the world; just as in oUr souls, all of them are not similarly disposed with reference to supernal natures, but some are united to them, others through [ardent] desire accede near, and others accomplish this in a less degree, because they do not energize with the same powers. For some, indeed, energize with a first, others with a second, and others with a third power, all souls nevertheless possessing all powers.
VII. And thus much concerning these particulars. What is said in the " Philebus," however, may lead us to suspect that other souls are parts of the soul of the universe. But the meaning of what is ther^ asserted, is not what some one may fancy, but was useful to Plato in demonstrating that the world is animated. This, therefore, he renders credible by saying that it is absurd to assert that the universe is inanimate, and that we who have a part of the body of the universe, have a soul. For how can a part have a soul, if the universe is inanimate? The opinion of Plato, however, is especially manifest in the " Timseus; " where the Demiurgus having generated the soul of the universe, afterwards pro- duces other souls, mingling them in the same crater in which he had mingled the soul of the world, and making them to be of a similar species with it, but assigning them a difference in a second and third degree. Nor is what he asserts in the " Phsedrus " wonderful, that every soul pays a guardian attention to that which is inanimate. For 214 SELECT WOBKS OF PLOTINUS.
what is it except soul which governs, fashions, arranges, and produces the nature of body? Nor must it be said, that one soul is naturally adapted to do this, but another not. The perfect soul, therefore, says he, revolves on high, not verging downward, but fabricates, riding in the world as it were as in a vehicle. Every other perfect soul, also governs the universe in a similar manner. But when he speaks of the soul whose wings suffer a defluxion, he evidently makes a difference between such a soul as this, and that of the universe. And when he adds, that souls follow the circulation of the universe, derive their manners from thence, and suffer from it, this does not at all indicate that our souls are parts of the soul of the world. For soul is sufficiently able to represent many things in itself, from the nature of places, and water, and air. And to this ability, the habitations of different cities, and the tempera- ture of bodies, also contribute. And if we should grant that since we are in the universe we have something from the soul of the world, and that we suffer from the celestial circulation, yet we shall oppose to these things another soul [i.e„ the rational soul], and which by its resistance especially demonstrates itself to be a different soul. To the assertion, also, that we are generated within the world, we reply that the foetus in the womb of the mother has a soul different from that of the mother, and which accedes to it externally.^ VIII. Such, therefore, is the solution of these particulars; the sympathy of souls being no impediment to our argu- ments. For since all of them originate from the same ^ i.e. It has a rational soul different from that of the mother.
It is better, however, to say with Proclus, that as nature does nothing in vain, the presence of the rational soul to the foetus in the womb would be useless, as it could not then energize; but * I* becomes united to the irrational soul in the very moment "^ infant leaves the womb.
DISCUSSION OF DOUBTS RELATIVE TO THE SOUL. 215 source as the soul of the universe, they are co-passive. For it has been already asserted by us that there is one [first] soul, and many souls. And we have likewise shown what the difference is between part and whole; and have in short spoken concerning the difference of souls. Now, also, we shall summarily observe, that besides bodies souls differ, especially in their manners, in the operations of the reasoning power, and from a pre-existent Ufe. For in the " Republic" of Plato it is said, that the choice of souls is made conformably to their antecedent lives. But if any one in short assumes the nature of soul, he will assert that there are differences in the souls in which it is admitted there are second and third degrees. It has, likewise, been said by us, that all souls are all things; and that each is characterized by that which energizes in each. This, however, is the same thing as to assert, that one soul indeed is united in energy, another in knowledge, and another in appetite. Different souls also behold different objects, and are and become the very objects which they behold. Plenitude, likewise, and perfection pertain to souls, yet all of them have not the same of either of these; but the whole co-ordination of them is various. For every reason [or productive principle] is one, abundant, and various, in the same manner as a psychical animal, which has many forms. But if this be the case, there is co-ordination, and beings are not, in short, divulsed from each other. Nor is there any where that which is casual in beings; not even among bodies. Hence it follows, that the number of things is definite. For again, it is necessary that beings should stop [in their progression], that intelligibles should con- tinue the same, and that each thing should be one in number; for thus it will be this particular thing. For every body being naturally in a continual flux, in conse- quence of having an adventitious form, the perpetual existence of bodies according to form takes place through 216 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.
an imitation of [real] beings. The essence of the latter, however, as not subsisting from composition, consists in that which is one in number, which exists from the beginning, and neither becomes that which it was not, nor will be that which it is not; since if there were anj thing in some future time which could produce them, it would not produce them from matter. But if this be the case, it is necessary to add something which is of itself essential; so that there will be a mutation about this very thing, if it now produces more or less. Why, likewise, should it pro- duce now, and not always after the same manner? That, likewise, which is generated will not be perpetual, if it admits of the more and the less. But soul is supposed to be a thing of this kind. How, therefore, is it infinite if it is stopped [in its progression]? May we not say, that it is infinite in power, because power is infinite; since God him- self is not bounded. With respect to souls, therefore, each is not that which it is, as if it were so much in quantity, through a foreign boundary; but it is as great as it wishes to be. Nor will it ever proceed out of itself, but will per- vade every where, to bodies and through bodies, as it is naturally adapted to do; yet it is not divulsed from itself, when it is in a finger and a foot. Thus also in the universe, soul remains entire, into whatever it may proceed, and in another and another part of a plant. Hence, when any part of a plant is cut off, it is both in the plant as it was at first, and in the part which is separated from it. For soul is every where in the body of the universe, as in the one of it, this body being one. But when an animal becomes putrid, if many animals are generated from it, soul is then no longer the soul of the whole animal in the body; for it has not then a proper receptacle of itself; nor yet does it perish. But the putrified matter being adapted to the generation of animals, has partly the soul of these, and partly the soul of those animals, soul never being DISCUSSION OF DOUBTS RELATIVE TO THE SOUL. 217 absent from any thing, though one thing is adapted to re- ceive it, and another is not. The parts of matter, however, which thus become animated, are not the cause of there being many souls. For these [spontaneously generated] animals are suspended from one soul, so far as it remains one; in the same manner as in us, when certain parts of the body are amputated, and others grow instead of them, the soul indeed is absent from [i.e, is not participated by] the former, but is present with the latter, so long as it remains one. In the universe, however, it always remains one. But of the natures within the universe, some indeed have soul, but others not, the same psychical [powers] still remaining.
IX. The manner, however, in which the soul is in gene- rated in the body, must be considered. For this is no less admirable, and no less deserves to be investigated. The mode, therefore, in which the soul enters into the body is twofold. For one of these modes takes place, when the soul being in one body changes it for another, and from an aerial [or fiery], becomes situated in a terrestrial body; which some do not call a transmigration, because that from which the insertion originates is immanifest. But the other mode is a transition from an incorporeal essence to any body whatever; which also will be the first communion of the soul with the body. It will be right, therefore, to consider respecting this communion, what the passion arising from this conjunction then is, when the soul being entirely pure from body, becomes surrounded with the nature of body. Let us, however, first consider how this is effected in the soul of the universe; for perhaps it is proper, or rather is necessary, to begin from hence. For it is requisite that we should explain its ingress into and animation of the body, for the sake of doctrine and per- spicuity. Though there never was a time, therefore, in which this universe was not animated, and it is not 218 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTIXUS.
possible for body to subsist if soul is absent, nor "was matter ever unadorned, yet it is possible in conception and in words to separate these from each other. For by these we may analyze every composition. The truth then is as follows: If body had no existence, there would be no pro- gressions of soul; since there is not any other place, where it is naturally adapted to be. If, however, soul intends to proceed, it will generate for itself a place, so that it will generate body. The stability of soul, however, being as it were corroborated in permanency itself, and soul also re- sembling the effulgence of a great light, a darkness was in the mean time generated in the very extremity of the light, which soul perceiving, gave form to it, since it was likewise the cause of its subsistence. For it was not lavHhil for any thing proximate to soul, to be destitute of form. Hence, by this obscure nature which was generated by soul, that which is called obscure was received. [The universe] there- fore, being generated like a certain beautiful and various edifice, is not separated from its maker [soul], nor yet is mingled with it; but the whole of it is every where con- sidered by its artificer as deserving a providential attention. It is advantageous, therefore, both to its existence and its beauty, to participate as much as possible of its maker; and to the latter this participation is not injurious. For it governs, abiding on high. And the world is animated after such a manner, that it cannot with so much propriety be said to have a soul of its own, as to have a soul presid- ing over it; being subdued by, and not subduing it, and being possessed, and not possessing. For it lies ^ in soul * Similar to this, one of the Chaldaean Oracles, speaking of human souls, says, 'Ev Sk 9{(f Kiivrai, irvpooi^g sXKOVffai uKfiaiovgf *E/c TrarpoOev Kariovrag, a(p' a>v ypvxf) KariovTiav 'Efnrvpiu)v Speinrcu Kapirutv \l/vx6rpo(pov dvOog, i.e. **But they lie in God, drawing vigorous torches [i.e. unities.
DISCUSSION OF DOUBTS RELATIVE TO THE SOUL. 219 which sustains it, and no part of it is destitute of soul; being moistened with life, like a net in water. It is not, however, able to become that in which it lies; but the sea [of soul] being now extended, the net is also co-extended with it, as far as it is able. For each of the parts is in- capable of existing in any other situation than where each is placed. But soul is naturally so great, because it is without quantity. Hence every body is comprehended by one and the same thing. And wherever body is extended, there also soul is. Unless, however, body existed, the attention of soul would not be at all directed to magnitude. For it is of itself that which it is. For the world is so greatly extended, through soul being present with the whole of it. And the extension of the world is bounded, so far as in its progression it has soul for its saviour. The magnitude of the shadow, likewise, is as great as the reason [or productive principle] which is suspended from soul. But the reason was of such a kind as to be able to produce as great a magnitude as the form of it wished might be produced.
X. Thus conceiving, therefore, it is requisite that again betaking ourselves to that which always subsists invariably the same, we should assume all things existing at once, such as the air, light, the sun, and the moon. And, like- wise, that we should again consider light and the sun as at once all things, but having the order of things first, second, and third. Here, also, we must consider soul as being always established; and in the next place, we must assume the natures which are first, and those that are in a consequent order, as the extremity of fire in that which is posterior; from the shadow of that fire which subsists at images of the one\ descending from the father; and from these descending, the soul plucks of empyrean fruits, the soul-nourishing flower." See my Collection of these Oracles, in the " Old Monthly Magazine."
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the extremity of things, forming a conception of the fire which ranks as the first. In the next place, we must con- ceive this ultimate fire to be at the same time illuminated, so as to resemble form running into that nature which is hurled towards it, which was first generated, and is entirely obscure. It is, however, adorned accoi'ding to reason by the power of soul, which possesses in itself wholly a power of adorning by reasons [or productive principles]; just as the reasons in seeds fashion and give form to animals, as if they were certain little worlds. For whatever comes into contact with soul, is made to be such as the essence of soul is naturally adapted to make it. Soul, however, makes, not by an adventitious decision, nor by waiting for counsel and consideration; for thus it would make not according to nature, but according to adscititious art. For art is posterior to, and imitates soul; producing obscure and im- becile imitations, which are things of a ludicrous nature, and not of much worth, and employing many machines in the formation of images. But soul by the power of essence has dominion over bodies in such a way, that they are generated and subsist, just as she leads them, since they are unable from the first to oppose her will. For in things of a posterior nature which impede each other, matter ^ is frequently deprived of the attainment of the appropriate form which the productive principle [latent] in the seed wished it to have. There, however [i.e., in the universe], the whole form being generated by soul, and the generated natures having at the same time an arrangement, that which is produced becomes beautiful without labour, and without impediment. But in the universe are fabricated, some things indeed which are statues of the Grods, others which are the habitations of men, and others which are adapted to other things. For what else ought to be gene- ^ From the version of Ficinus, it is necessary here to supply the word 7) vXt], DISCUSSION OF DOUBTS RELATIVE TO THE SOUL. 221 rated about soul, except those things which it possesses the power of producing? For the property of fire is to pro- duce heat, and of another thing [cold] to refrigerate. But the peculiarity of soul is, partly to produce something from itself into another thing, and partly to produce something in itself. For in inanimate natures, indeed, that which is from themselves, lies in them as it were in a dormant state; but that which tends to another thing, endeavours to assi- milate to itself that which is able to be passive to it. And this is common to each of them, to lead other things to a similitude to itself. That which energizes, however, in soul is something of a vigilant nature, and this is also the case with that which tends from it to another thing. Hence, it causes other things to live which do not live from themselves* and confers on them such a life as it lives itself. The life of soul, therefore, being essentialized in reason, imparts reason to body, as an image of that which it possesses itself. For that which it imparts to body is an image of life. Body, also, receives from soul corporeal morphcBf of which soul contains the productive principles. Soul, likewise, comprehends in itself the productive prin- ciples of Gods,^ and of all things. Hence, the world also contains all things in itself.
XI. Those ancient wise men, likewise, who wishing that the Gods should be present with them, fabricated temples and statues, appear to me to have directed their attention to the nature of the universe, and to have intellectually perceived, that the nature of soul is every where tractable; and that it may be received the most easily of all things, if any thing is fashioned so as to be passive to it, and io able to receive a certain portion of it. But every thing is disposed to be passive which is in any way imitative, so as ^ i.e. Of divine souls, each of which is a God according to partici- pation. See the first book of my translation of Proclus *' On the Theology of Plato."
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to be able like a mirror to seize a certain form. For the nature of the universe has fashioned all things most arti- ficially in imitation of those forms the participations of which it contains in itself. And since every thii^ is thus generated, the reason [or productive principle] in matter, which was fashioned according to a reason prior to matter, is conjoined to that God, conformably to whom it was generated, and which the soul looks to, and possesses while it fabricates. Hence it was not possible for any thing to be generated destitute of this God; nor again, is it possible for him to descend hither; since this Gtod is intellect, the sun of the intellectual world. Let this, therefore, be assumed by us as the paradigm of reason. But next to this soul follows, suspended from permanently abiding intellect, and being also itseK permanent. Soul, therefore, imparts the terminations of itself which are prior to this visible sun, to this sun; and causes it through itself as a medium to be conjoined to intellect, becoming as it were an interpreter of the things derived from intellect to the sun, and also of those which revert from the sun to intellect, so far as the former recurs through soul to the latter. For no one thing is very remote from another; and yet again, it is remote through difference and mixture. But every thing [in the intellectual region] is in itseK, not locally, and each is united to each, and is at the same time separate from