that enter into it, and cause it to be passive. For the change in quality of that which is inherent, is not casually effected. Neither, therefore, does matter suffer; for it is. of itself without quality. Nor do the forms which enter into, and depart from it, suffer; but the passion subsists about the composite from matter and form, the very being of which consiéts in the union of the two. For this, in the contrary powers and qualities of the things which enter and produce passion, is seen to be the subject of them. On which account, also, those things, the life of which is externally derived, and does not subsist from themselves, are capable of suffering both the participation and the privation of life. But those beings whose existence consists in an impassive life, must necessarily possess a permanent life; just as a pri- vation of life, so far as it is a privation of it, is attended | with impassivity. As, therefore, to be changed and to suffer pertain to the composite from matter and form, and this 1s body, but matter is exempt from this; thus also, to live and to die, and to suffer through the participation of life and death, is beheld in the composite from soul and body. Nevertheless, this does not happen to the soul; because it is not a thing which consists of life and the privation of life, but consists of life alone. And it possesses this, because its essence is simple, and the reason [or form] of the soul is self-motive™.
23. An intellectual essence is so similar in its parts, that the same” things exist both in a partial and an all-perfect intellect. In an universal intellect, however, partial natures subsist universally; but in a partial intellect, both universals and particulars subsist partially.
24. Of that essence, the existence of which is in life, and the passions of which are lives, the death also con- sists in a certain life, and not in a total privation of life; ™ See my translation of the before-mentioned treatise of Plotinus. Ὁ For +a ora here, I read τὰ aura, - PERCEPTION OF INTELLIGIBLE NATURES. 2 because, neither is the deprivation of life in this essence a passion, or a path which entirely leads to a non-vital subsistence, 25. In incorporeal lives, the progressions are effected while the lives themselves remain firm and stable, nothing’ pertaining to them being corrupted, or changed into the hypostasis of things subordinate to them. Hence, neither are the things to which they give subsistence produced with a certain coysruption or mutation. Nor do these incorporeal lives subsist like generation, which parti cipates of corruption and mutation. Hence, they are unbegotten and incorruptible, and on this account are unfolded into light without generation and incorruptibly.
26. Of that nature which is beyond intellect, many things are asserted through intellection, but it is surveyed by a cessation of intellectual energy better than with it°; just as with respect to one who is asleep, many things are asserted of him while he is in that state hy those who are awake; but the proper knowledge and apprehension of his dormant condition, is only to be obtained through sleep. For the similar is known by the similar; because all knowledge is an assimilation to the object of knowledge.
27. With respect to that which is non-being, we either produce it, being ourselves separated from real being, or we have a preconception of it, as adhering to being. Hence, if we are separated from being, we have not an antecedent conception of the non-being. which is above being, but our knowledge in this case is only that of a false passion, such as that which happens to a man ᾿ when he departs from himself. For as a man may him- self, and through himself, be truly elevated to the non- being which is above being, so, by departing from being, ° Hence, it is beautifully said in the Clavis of Hermes Trismegistus, “ that the knowledge of the good [or the supreme principle of things], is a divine silence, and the quiescence of all the senses.” See, also, on this subject, a most admirable extract from Damascius, περι ἀρχῶν; at the end of the Sd volume of my Plato.
212 AUXILIARIES TO THE he is led to the non-being which is a falling off from being. | 28. The hypostasis of body is no impediment what- ever to that which is essentially incorporeal, so as to prevent it from being where, and in such a way, as it wishes to be. For as that which is without bulk 18 incomprehensible by body, and does not at all pertain to it, so that which has bulk cannot impede or obscure an ‘incorporeal nature, but lies before it like a non-entity. Nor does that which is incorporeal pervade locally, when it wishes to pass from one thing to another; for place is consubsistent with bulk. Nor is it compressed by bodies. For that which in any way whatever is connected with bulk, may be compressed, and effect a transition locally; but that which is entirely without bulk and without mag- nitude, cannot be restrained by that which has bulk, and does not participate of local motion. Hence, by a cer- tain disposition, it is found to be there, where it is inclined to be, being with respect to place every where and yet no where’. By a certain disposition, therefore, it is either above the heavens, or is contained in a certain part of the world. When, however, it is contained in a certain part of the world, it is not visible to the eyes, but the presence of it becomes manifest from its works.
29. It is necessary that an incorporeal nature, if it is contained in body, should not be enclosed in it like a wild beast in a den; (for no body is able thus to enclose and comprehend it), nor is it contained in body in the same way as a bladder contains something liquid, or wind; but it is requisite that it should give subsistence to certain powers which verge to what is external, through its union with body; by which powers, when it descends, t becomes complicated with body. Its conjunction, therefore, with body, is effected through an ineffable P For that which is truly incorporeal, is every where virtually, t.e. in power and efficacy, but 1s no where locally.
PERCEPTION OF INTELLIGIBLE NATURES. 213 extension. Hence, nothing else binds it, but itself binds itself to body. Neither, therefore, is it liberated from the body, when the body is [mortally] wounded and cor- rupted, but it liberates itself, by turning itself from an adhering affection to the body. | 30. None of the hypostases which rank as wholes, and are perfect, is converted to its own progeny; but all per- fect hypostases are elevated to their generators as far as to the mundane body [or the body of the world]. For this body, being perfect, is elevated to its soul, which is intellectual: and on this account it is moved in ἃ circle. But the soul of this body is elevated to intellect; and intellect, to the first principle of all things. All beings, therefore, proceed to this principle as much as possible, bewinning from the last of things. The eleva- tion, however, to that which is first, is either proximate or remote. Hence, these natures may not only be said to aspire after the highest God, but also to enjoy him to the utmost of their power. But in partial? hypostases, and which are able to verge to many things, there is also a desire of being converted to their progeny. Hence, likewise, in these there is error, in these there is repre- hensible incredulity. These, therefore, matter injures, because they are capable of being converted to it, being at the same time able to be converted to divinity. Hence, perfection gives subsistence to secondary from primary natures, preserving them converted to the first of things; but imperfection converts primary’ to posterior natures, and causes them to love the beings which have departed from divinity prior to themselves.
31. God is every where because he is.no where: and this is also true of intellect and soul: for each of these is 4 For μερισταις here, I read, μερικαις. For Porphyry is here speaking of essences which are opposed to such as rank as wholes, as is evident from the whole of this paragraph.
* The primary natures of which Porphyry is now speaking, are rational partial souls, such as ours; for the natures superior to these, are never converted to beings posterior to themselves.
214 AUXILIARIES TO THE every where, because each is no where. But God indeed is every where, and no where, with respect to all things which are posterior to him; and he’ alone is such as he is, and such as he wills himself to be. Intellect is in God, but is every where, and no where, with respect to the natures posterior to it. And soul is in God and intellect, and is every where and no where, in [or with respect to} body*. But body is in soul, and in intellect", and in God. And as all beings and non-beings are from and in God, hence, he is neither beings nor non-beings, nor stibsists in them. For if, indeed, he was alone every where, he would be all things and in all, but since he is also no where, all things are produced through him, and are contamed in him, because he is every where. They are, however, different from him, because he is no where. Thus, likewise, intellect beirig every where and no where, is the cause of souls, and of the natures posterior to souls; yet intellect is not soul, nor the natures posterior to soul, nor subsists in them; because it is not only every where, but is also no where, with respect to the natures posterior to it. And soul is neither body, nor in body, bit is the cause of body; because being every where, it is also no where, with respect to body. And this progression of things in the tiniverse extends as far as to that which is neither able to be at once every where, nor at once no where, but partially participates of each of these*.
32. The soul does not exist on the earth [when it is conversant with terrene naturés,] in the same manner » For αὐτου, ssthic, I read, αυτος.
* Tn the original, καὶ ψυχο εν νῳ τῇ καὶ Sey πανταχον, και ουὐδαμισὺ §Y σορῥερτε, but it appears to me to be necessary to read, καὶ ψυχη ev vw τε καὶ Sem, καὶ Wavrayou nas ουδαμου ἐν σωματι.
@ xa: ἐν νῷ, is omitted in the original, but ought to be insérted, as is evident from the version of Holstenius.
x The irrational life is a thing of this kind, which is partly separable and partly inseparable from body.” Hence, so far as it is inseparable from body, it partakes of the every where; but, so far as it is séparable,. of the no where.
PERCEPTION OF INTELLIGIBLE NATURES. 215 as bodies accede to the earth; but a subsistence of the soul on the earth, signifies its presiding over terrene bodies. Thus, also, the soul is said to be in Hades, when it presides over its image’, which is naturally adapted to be in place, but possesses its hypostasis in darkness. So that if Hades is a subterranean dark place, the soul, though fiot divulsed from being, will exist in Hades, by attracting to itself its image. For when the soul departs from the solid body, the spirit accompanies it which it had collected from the starry spheres. But as from its adhering affection to the body, it exerts a partial reason, through which it possesses an habitude to a body of a eértain quality, in performing the energies of life;— hence, from this adhesion to body, the form of the phan- tasy is impressed in the spirit, and thus the image is attracted by the soul. The soul, however, is said to be in Hades, because the spirit obtains a formless and obscure nature. And as a heavy and moist spirit per- vades as far as to subterranean places, hence the soul is said to proceed under the earth. Not that this essence of the soul changes one place for another, and subsists in place, but it receives the habitudes of bodies which are naturally adapted to change their places, and to be allotted a subsistence in place; such-like bodies receiving it according to aptitudes, from being disposed after a certain manner towards it. For the soul, conformably to the manner in which it is disposed, finds an appropriate body. Hence, when it is disposed in a purer manner, it has a connascent body which approximates to an ethereal nature, and this is an ethereal body. But when it proceeds from reason to the energies of the phantasy; then its connascent body is of a solar-form nature. And when it becomes effeminate and vehemently excited by corporeal form, then it is connected with a lunar-form y 3. 6. The animal spirit, or pneumatic soul, in which the rational soul suffers her punishments in Hades.
~ 216 AUXILIARIES TO THE body. When, however, it falls into bodies which consist of humid vapours, then a perfect ignorance of real being follows, together with darkness and infancy.
Moreover, in its egress from the body, if it still possesses a spirit turbid from humid exhalations, it then attracts to itself a shadow, and becomes heavy; a spirit of this kind naturally striving to penetrate santo the recesses of the earth, unless a certain other cause draws it in a contrary direction. As therefore the soul, when surrounded with this testaceous and terrene vestment, necessarily lives on the earth; so likewise when it attracts a moist spirit, it is necessarily surrounded with the image. But it attracts moisture when it continually endeavours to associate with nature, whose operations are effected in moisture, and which are rather under than upon the earth. When, however, the soul earnestly endeavours to depart from nature, then she becomes a dry splendour, without a shadow, and without a cloud, or mist. For moisture gives subsistence to a mist in the air; but dryness constitutes a dry splendour from exha- lation.
33. The things which are truly predicated of a sensible and material nature, are these: that it has, in every respect, a diffused and dispersed subsistence; that it is mutable; that it has its existence in difference; that it is a composite; that it subsists by itself, [as the subject or recipient of other things;] that it is beheld in place, and in bulk: and other properties similar to these are asserted of it. But the following particulars are pre- dicated of truly existing being, and which itself subsists from itself; viz. that it is always established in itself; that it has an existence perpetually similar and the same; that it 3s essentialized in sameness; that it is immutable according to essence, is uncompounded, is neither disso-. luble, nor, in place, nor is dispersed into bulk; and ig neither generated, nor capable of being destroyed: and other properties are asserted of it similar to these. To PERCEPTION OF INTELLIGIBLE NATURES. 217 which predications adhering, we should neither ourselves assert any thing repugnant to them, concerning the different nature of sensible and truly-existing beings, nor assent to those who do.
SECTION II.
34. There is one kind of virtues pertaining to the political character, and another to the man who tends to contemplation, and who, on this account, is called theo- retic, and is now a beholder [of intellectual and in- telligible natures]. And there are also other virtnes per- taining to intellect, so far as it is intellect, and separate | from soul. The virtues indeed of the political character, and which consist in the moderation of the passions, are characterized by following and being obedient to the reasoning about that which is becoming in actions. Hence, looking to an innoxious converse with neighbours, these virtues are denominated, from the aggregation of fellowship, political. And here prudence indeed subsists about the reasoning part; fortitude about the irascible part; temperance in the consent and symphony of the epithymetic? with the reasoning part; and justice, in each of these performing its proper employment with respect to governing and being governed. But the virtues of him who proceeds to the contemplative life, consist in a departure from terrestrial concerns. Hence, also, they are called purifications, being surveyed in the refraining from corporeal actions, and avoiding sympathies with the body. For these are the virtues of the soul elevating itself to true being. The political virtues therefore ° adorn the mortal man, and are the forerunners of purifi- cations. For it is necessary that he who is adorned by the cathartic virtues, should abstain from doing any thing precedaneously in conjunction with body. Hence, in * 3. ὁ. That part of the soul which is the source of all-various desires., 218 AUXILIARIES TO THE these purifications, not to opine with body, but to ener-— gize alone, gives subsistence to prudence; which derives its perfection through energizing intellectually with purity. But not to be similarly passive with the body, constitutes temperance. Not to fear a departure from body, as into something void, and non-entity, gives sub- sistence to fortitude. But when reason and intellect are the leaders, and there is no resistance [from the irrational part], justice 1s produced. The disposition therefore, according to the political virtues, is surveyed in the moderation of the passions; having for its end to live as man conformable to nature. But the disposition, accord- ing to the theoretic virtues, is beheld in apathy*, the end of which is a similitude to God.
Since, however, of purification, one kind consists in purifying, but another pertains to those that.are purified, the cathartic virtues are surveyed according to both these significations of purification. For the end of purification is to become pure. But since purification, and the being purified, are an ablation of every thing foreign, the goad resulting from them will be different from that which purifies; so, that if that which is purified was good prior to the impurity with which it is defiled, purification is sufficient. That, however, which remains after purifi- cation, is good, and not purification. The nature of the soul also was not good [prior to purification], but is that which is able to partake of good, and 15 bomform. For if this were not the case, it would not have become situated in evil. The good therefore of the soul consists in being united to its generator, but its evil in an associ- ation with things subordinate to itself. Its evil also is twofold; the one arising from an association with terres- trial natures, but the other from doing this with an excess of the passions. Hence, all the political virtues which liberate the soul from one evil, may be denomi- @ This philosophic apathy is not, as is stupidly suppesed by most of the present day, insensibility, but a perfect subjugation of the passions to reason.
ΟΠ PERCEPTION OF INTELLIGIBLE NATURES. 219 nated virtues, and are honourable. But the cathartic are more honourable, and liberate it from evil, so far as it is soul. It is necessary therefore, that the soul, when purified, should associate with its generator. Hence, the virtue of it, after its conversion, consists in a scientific _ knowledge of [true] being; but this will not be the case, unless conversion precedes.
There is, therefore, another genus of virtues. after the cathartic and political, and which are the virtues of the soul energizing intellectually. And here, indeed, wisdom and prudence consist in the contemplation of those things which intellect possesses. But justice consists in per- forming what is appropriate in conformity to, and ener- gizing according to intellect. Zemperance is an inward conversion of the soul to intellect. And fortitude is apathy, according to a similitude of that to which the soul looks, and which is naturally impassive. These virtues also, in the same manner as the others, alternately follow each other..
The fourth species of the virtues, is that of the para- digms subsisting in intellect: which are more excellent than the psychical virtues, and exist as the paradigms of these’; the virtues of the soul being the similitudes of them. And intellect indeed is that in which all things subsist at once as paradigms. Here, therefore, prudence is science; but intellect that knows [all things] 18 wisdom. Temperance is that which is converted to itself. The proper work of intellect, is the performance of its appro- priate duty, [and this is justice®.| But fortitude is same- ness, and the abiding with purity in itself, through an abundance of power. There are therefore four genera of virtues; of which, indeed, some pertain to intellect, concur with the essence of it, and are paradigmatic. Others pertain to soul now looking to intellect, and > The words xa: δικαιοσύνη, are omitted in the original. But it is evident from the treatise of Plotinus “ On the Virtues,” that they ought to be inserted. For what Porphyry says in this Section about the virtues, 1s derived from that treatise.
220 AUXILIARIES TO THE being filled from it. Others belong to the soul of man, purifying itself, and becoming purified from the body, and the irrational passions. And others are the virtues of the soul of man, adorning the man, through giving measure and bound to the irrational nature, and producing mode- ration in the passions. And he indeed, who has the greater virtues, has also necessarily the less; but the contrury ts not true, that he who has the less, has also the greater virtues. Nor will he who possesses the greater, energize prece- daneously according to the less, but only so far as the necessities of the mortal nature require. The scope also of the virtues, is, as we have said, generically different in the different virtues. For the scope of the political virtues, is to give measure to the passions in their practical energies according to nature. But the scope of the. cathartic virtues, 1s entirely to obliterate the remembrance of the passions; and the scope of the rest subsists analogously to what has been before said. Hence, he who energizes according to the practical virtues, is a worthy man; but he who energizes ‘according to the catharti virtues, is an angelic man, or is also a@ good demon. He who energizes according to the intellectual virtues alone is ua God; but he who energizes according to the paradigmatic virtues, is the father of the Gods. We, therefore, ought especially to pay attention to the cathartic virtues, since we may obtain these in the present life.
But through these, the ascent is to the more honourable virtues. Hence, it 1s requisite to survey to what degree purification may be extended: for it is a separation from body, and from the passive motion of the irrational part. But how this may be effected, and to what extent, must now be unfolded..
In the first place, indeed,.it 1s necessary that he who intends to acquire this purification, should, as the found- ation and basis of it, know himself to be a soul bound in a foreign thing, and in a different essence. In the second place, as that which is raised from this foundation, he should collect himself from the body, and as it were from ΟΡΕΒΟΕΡΤΙΟΝ OF INTELLIGIBLE NATURES, 22] different places, so as to be disposed in a manner perfectly impassive with respect to the body. For he who ener- gizes uninterruptedly according to sense, though he may not do this with an adhering affection, and the enjoy- ment resulting from pleasure, yet, at the same time, his attention is dissipated about the body, in consequence of becoming through sense‘ in contact with it. But we are addicted to the pleasures or pains of sensibles; in con- junction with a promptitude, and converging sympathy; from which disposition it is requisite to be purified. This, however, will be effected by admitting necessary pleasures, and the sensutions of them, merely as remedies, or as a liberation from pain’, in order that (the rational part] may not be wnpeded [in tts energies]. Pain also must be taken away. But if this is not possible, it must be mildly diminished. And it will be diminished, if the soul is not copassive with it. Anger, likewise, must as much as possible - be taken away; and must by no means be premedi- tated. But if it cannot be entirely removed, deliberate choice must not be mingled with it, but the unpremeditated motion must be the impulse of the irrational.
part. That however which is unpremeditated, is wnbecile and small. All fear likewise must be expelled. For he who is addpted to this purification, will fear nothing. Here, however, if it should take place, it will be un- premeditated. Anger therefore and fear must be used for the purpose of admonition. But the desire of every thing base must be exterminated. Such a one also, so far as he is a cathartic philosopher, will not desire meats and drinks [except so far as they are necessary]. Neither must there be the unpremeditated in natural venereal connexions; but if this should take place, it must only be as far as to that precipitate wnagination which © Instead of κατ᾽ αὐτὴν, here it is necessary to read, κατ᾽ αἰσϑησιν.
4 Conformably to this, as we have before observed, Aristotle says in the 7th Book of his Nicomachean Ethics, ‘6 that corporeal pleasures are remedies against pain, and that they fill up the indigence of nature, but perfect no energy of the rational soul.”
" ἊΨ» «δ.
292 AUXILIARIES TO THE energizes in sleep. In short, the intellectual soul itself of the purified man must be liberated from all these [cor- _poreal propensities]. He must likewise endeavour, that what is moved to the irrational nature of corporeal passions, may be moved without sympathy, and without animadversion; so that the motions themselves may be immediately dissolved, through their vicinity to the reasoning power. This, however, will not take place while the purification is proceeding to its perfection; but will happen to those in whom reason rules without oppo- sition. Hence, in these, the inferior part will so venerate reason, that it wilt be indignant if it is at all moved, in consequence of not being quiet when its master is present, and will reprove itself for its imbecility. These, however, are yet only moderations of the passions, but at length terminate in apathy. For when copassivity is entirely exterminated, then apathy is present with him who is purified from this passivity. For passion becomes moved when reason imparts excitation, through verging [to the irrational nature]. | 35. Every thing which is situated somewhere, is there situated according to its own nature, and not preter- naturally. For body, therefore, which subsists in matter and bulk, to be somewhere, is to be in place. Hence, for the body of the world, which is material and has bulk, to be every where, is to be extended with interval, and to subsist in the place of interval, But a subsistence ip place, is not at all present with the intelligible world, nar, in short, with that which is immaterial, and essentially incorporeal, because it is without bulk, and without inter- val; so that the ubiquity of an incorporeal nature is not local. Hence, neither will one part of uw be here, but another there; for if this were the case, it would not be out of place, nor without interval; but wherever it is, the whole of it is there. Nor is it indeed in this, but not . in another place; for thus it would be comprehended by one place, but separated from another. Nor is it remote from this thing, but near to that; im the same manner as ~ ΠΟ PERCEPTION OF INTELLIGIBLE NATURES. 223 remoteness and nearness are asserted of things which are adapted to be in place, according to the measures of intervals. Hence, the sensible is present, indeed, with the intelligible world, according to interval, but [a truly] incorporeal nature is present with the world impartibly, and unaccompanied by interval. The impartible, like- wise, when it is in that which has interval, is wholly in every part of it, being one and the same in number [in every part of it]. That which is impartible, therefore, and without multitude, becomes extended into magnitude, and multiplied, when intimately connected with that which is naturally multitudinous, and endued with magni- tude; and thus the latter receives the former in such a way as it is adapted to receive it, and not such as the former truly is. But that which is partible and multitudinous, is received by that which is naturally impartible and without multitude, impartibly and non- multitudinously, and after this manner is present with it; i.e. the impartible is present impartibly, without plurality, and without a subsistence in place, conformably to its own nature, with that which is partible, and which is naturally multitudinous, and exists in place. But that which is partible, multiplied, and in place, is present with the impartible essence, partibly, multitudinously, and locally. Hence, it is necessary, in the survey of these natures, to preserve and not confound the peculiarities of each; or rather, we should not imagine or opine of that which is incorporeal, such properties as pertain to bodies, or any thing of the like kind. For no one would ascribe to bodies the peculiarities of a genuinely imcorporeal essence. For all of us are familiar with bodies; but the knowledge of incorporeal natures is attainable by us with great difficulty; because, through not being able to behold them intuitively, we are involved in doubt about their nature; and this takes place as long as we are under the dominion of imagination.
Thus, therefore, you should say, If that which is in place, is out of, or has departed from itself, through 224 AUXILIARIES TO THE having proceeded into bulk, that which is intelligible is not in place, and is in itself, because it has not proceeded into corporeal extension. Hence, if the for- mer is an image, the latter is an archetype. And the former, indeed, derives its being through the intelligible; but the latter subsists in [and through] itself. For every [physical] image is the image of intellect. It is also requisite that, calling to mind the peculiarities of both these, we should not wonder at the discrepance which takes place in their congress with each other; if, in short, it is proper on this occasion to use the word congress. For we are not now surveying the congress of bodies, but of things which are entirely distinct from each other, according to peculiarity of hypostasis. Hence, also, this congress is different from every thing which is usually surveyed in things essentially the same. Neither, therefore, is it temperament, or mixture, or conjunction, or apposition, but subsists in a way different from all these; appearing, indeed, in all the mutual participations of consubstantial natures, in whatever way this may be effected; but transcending every thing that falls under the apprehension of sense. Hence, an intelligible essence is wholly present without interval, with all the parts of that which has interval, though they should happen to be infinite im number. Nor is it present distributed into parts, giving a part to a part; nor being multiplied, does