After this follows that nature which is divisible about bodies, and in^ separable from matter, which the fourth hypothesis delivers supemally suspended from the Gods. And the last hypothesis is the procession of matter, whether considered as one, or as various, which the fifth hypo- thesis demonstrates by negations, according to its dissimilar similitude' to the first. But sometimes, indeed, the negations are privations, and sometimes the exempt causes of all the productions. And what is the mo&t wonderful of all, the highest negations are only enunciative, but some in a supereminent manner, and others according to deficiency. But each of the negations consequent to these is affirmative; the one para- digmatically, but the other iconicaJly, or after the manner of an image. But the middle corresponds to the order of soul, for it is composed from affirmative and negative conclusions. But it possesses negations coor- dinate to affirmations. Nor is it alone multipHed, like material natures,' nor does it possess an adventitious one; but the one which it contains, though it is still one, yet subsists in motion and multiplication, and in its progressions is, as it were, absorbed by essence. And such are the hypo- theses which unfold all beings, both separable and inseparable, togethqr with the causes of wholes, as well exempt, as subsisting in things them- selves, according to the hyparxis of the one.
But there are four other hypotheses besides these, which by taking away the oncy evince that all things must be entirely subverted, both beings and things in generation, and that no being can any longer have any subsist* ence; and this, in order that he may demonstrate the one to be the cause of being and preservation, that through it all things participate of the nature of being, and that each has its hyparxis suspended from the one^ And in short, we syllogistically collect this through all beings, that if the one is, all things subsist as far as to the last hypostasis, and if it is not, no being has any subsistence. The one^ therefore, is both the hypostatic and ' For uvofMivn^ra, it is necessary to read oftoioniTA. * Instead oS ort (»$ra oKa, read ouri »$ ra iwXct.
^ ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK t preservative cause of all iinngs; which Parmenides also himself coll^cU at the end of the dialogue. With respect, however, to the hypothesis of Uie Parmenides, its division, and the speculatioQ of its several parts, we have sufficiently treated in pur commentatries on that dialc^e; so that it would be superfluous to enter into a prolix discussion of these particulars at present. But as from what has been said, it appears whence we may assume the whole of theology, and from what dialogues we may collect into one the thecdogy distributed according to parts, we shall in the next place treat about the common dogmas of Plato, which are adapted to sacred concerns, and which extend to all the divine orders, and shall evince that each of these is defined by him according to the most perfect science. Fot^ things common are prior to such as are peculiar, and are niOTe known according to nature.
CHAPTER XIII.
CHAPTER XIII.
In the first place, therefore, we shall assume the things which are de- monstrated in the Laws, and contemplate how they take the lead, with respect to the truth about the Gods, and are the most ancient of all the other mystic conceptions about a divine nature. Three things, therefore, are asserted by Plato in these writings; that there are Gods; that their providence extends to all things; and that they administer all things ac* cording to justice, and suffer no perversion from worse natures.
That these then obtain the first rank' among all theological dogmas, is perfectly evident. For what can be of a more leading nature, than the hyparxis of the Gods, or than boniform providence,.or immutable and undeviating power? Through which they produce secondary natures uni- formly, preserve themselves in an undefiled manner, and convert them to themselves. But the Gods indeed govern other things, but suffer nothing * For flepxj Stftn-epa, it 18 necessary to re^ ofxf^vnfu^ OHAP. XIIL OF PLATO. 41 from subordinate natures, nor are changed with the variety of the things to which their providence extends. We shall learn, however, how these things are defined according to nature, if we endeavour to embrace by a reasoning process the scientific method of Plato about each of them; and prior to these, survey by what irrefragable arguments he proves that there are Gods; and thus afterwards consider such problems as are conjcnned with this dogma* Of all beings, therefore, it is necessary that some should move only, but that others should be moved only, and that the natures situated be- tween these, should both move and be moved. And with respect to these kst it is necessary, either that they should move others being themselves moved by others, or that they should be self-motive. These four hypo- stases hkewise, are necessarily placed in an orderly series, one after another; that which is moved only and suffers, depending on other primary causes; that which moves others, and is at the same time moved, being prior to this; that which is self-motive, and which is beyond that which both moves and is moved, beginning from itself, and through its own motion imparting the representation of being moved, to other things; and that which is immoveable, preceding whatever participates either producing or passive motion. For every thing self-motive, in consequence of pos- sessing its perfection in a transition and interval of life, depends on an- other more ancient cause, which always subsists according to samenesd, and in a similar manner, and whose life is not in time, but in eternity. For time is an image of eternity.
If, therefore, all things which are moved by themselves, are moved ac- cording to time, but the eternal form of motion is above that which is 4?arried in time, the self-motive nature will be second in order, and not the- first of beings. But that which moves others, and is Droved by others, must necessarily be suspended from a self-motive nature: and not this alone, but hkewise every alter-motive fabrication, as the Athenian guest demonstrates. For if all things, says he, should stand still, unless self- motive natures had a subsistence among thi^ngs, there would be no such thing as that which is first moved. For that which is immoveable, is by no means naturally adapted to be moved, nor will there then be that Proc. Vol. I. F 4$ ON THE THEDLOGt BOOK L irbich is ^rst moved; but the alter^motive nature is wdigent of another ttoving power. The self-motive nature, therefore, alone, as beginning ff^am its own energy, will move both itself and others in. a secondary manner. For a thing of this kind imparts the power of being moved to ailter-^notive natures, in the same manner as an immoveable nature inr* parts a motive power to aU beings. In the third place, that which is: moved only, must first of all be suspended from things moved by another, but moving others. For it is necessary, both that other things, and the series of things moved, which extends in an orderly manner from on high to the last of things, should be filled with their proper media.
All bodies^ therefore,, belong to those things which are naturally moved eoly, and are* passive. For they are productive of nothing, on account of possessing an hypostasis endued with interval, and participating^ of snagnitude and bnlk; since every thing productive and motive of others^ naturally produces and moves, by employing an incorporeal power^ 3ut of incorporoat natures, some are divisible about bodies,, but cihers are exempt &ovel such a division about the last of things^ Those incorporeals, ^dierefore, which arc divisible about the bulks dt^ bodies, whether they subsist in quaKties, or in material forms, belong to the ^number of things moved by another, but at the same time moving others. For these, because they possess an incorporeal allotment, parti* cipate of a motive power; but because they are divided about bodies, are d^iv^d of the power of verging to themselves, are divided together with their subjects, and are full of sluggishness from these,, they are indigent of a motive nature which is not borne along in a foreign seat, but possesses an hypostasis in itself. Where> therefore, shall we obtain that which moves itself? For things extended into natures possessing bulk and interval or whicb are divided in these, and subsist inaepafably about them, must necesearily eitiier be moved only, or be motive through others* But it is ftecessary, as we have before observed, that a self-motive nature should be prior to these, which is perfectly established ih itself, and not in others, and which fixes its energies in itself, and not in things different from itself. There is, therefore, another certain nature exempt from bodies^ both in the heavens and in these very mutable elements, from which bo- dies primarily derive the power of being moved. Hence, if it be requisite CHAP. XIIL OF PLATO. 45 to discover what such an essence as this is, (rightly following Socrates, and considering what the end of things is,) which by being present to alter- motive natures, imparts to them a representation of self-motion, to which of the abore mentioned natures shall we ascribe the power of things being moved from themselves? For all inanimate natures are alone alter-motive, and whatever they suffer, they are adapted to suffer, through a certain power externally moving and compelling. It remains, therefore, that animated natures must possess this representation, and that they are self-motive m a secondary degree, but that the soul which is in them, primarily moves itself, and is moved by itself, and that through a power derived from itself as it imparts life to bodies, so likewise it extends to them from itself a ve* presentation of being moved by themselves.
If, therefore, the self-motive essence is more ancient than alter-motive natures, but soul is primarily self-motive, from which the image of sdf^ motion is imparted to bodies, soul will be beyond bodies, and the motion of every body, will be the progeny of soul, and of the motion it contains. Pence it is necessary that the whole heaven and all the bodies it contains possessing various motions, and being moved with these different motions; according to nature (for a circulation is natural to every body of this kind) should have ruling souls, which are essentially more ancient than bodies^ iand which are moved in themselves, and supernally illuminate these with the power of being moved. It is necessary, therefore, that these souls which dispose in an orderly manner the whole world and the parts it con- tains, and who impart to every thing corporeal which is of itself destitute of life, the power of being moved, inspiring it, for this purpose, with the cause of motion, should either move all things conformably to reason, or after a contrary manner, which it is not lawful to assert. But if indeed, this world and every thing in it which is disposed in an orderly manner^ and is moved equally and perpetually according to nature, as is demonstrated, partly in the mathematical disciplines, and partly in physical dis- cussions, is suspended from an irrational soul, which moving itself moves also other things, neither the order of the periods, nor the motion which is bounded by one reason, nor the position of bodies, nor any other of thoste things which are generated according to nature, will have a stable cause.
44 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK f.
and which i&able to distribute every tiling in an orderly manner, and accord-* ing to an invariable sameness of subsistence* For every thing irrational is. naturally adapted to be adorned by something different fronoi itself, and i& indefinite and unadorned iaits own nature. But tacoiBmit all heaven to a tlxing of this kind> and a circulation revolving according to reason^ and with an invariable sameness, is by no means adapted, either to the nature of things, or to our undisciplined conceptions. If however, an intellectual soul, and which employs reason, governs all things, and if every thing wlxich is moved with a perpetual lation, is governed by a soul of this kind, and. there is. no one of the wholes in the imiverse destitute of soul (for no body is honorable if deprived of such a power as. this, as Theophrastus- somewhere says) if this be the case, whether does it possess tliis intellectual, perfect^ and beneficent powers according to participation, or according to essence? For iff according to essence, it is. necessary that CTery soul should be of this kind, since each according to its awn nature is self«motive« Bat if, accordingto participation^ there will be another intellect subsisting in energy, more aacient than soul, which essentially possesses intellection^ and by its very beiug pre-assumes in itself the uniform knowledge of wholes; since it is also necessary that the soul which, is essentialized ac* cording to reason^ should possess that which pertains, to intellect through participation, and that the intellectual nature should be twofold; the one subsisting primarily in a divine intellect itself; but the other, ^hich proceeds from this, subsisting secondarily in souL To which, you may add, if you please, the presence of intellectual illumination in body. For whence is the whole of this heaven either spherical or moved ia a circle^ and whence does it revolve with a sameness of circulation according to one definite order? For how could it always be allotted the same idea and power immutably accoiding to nature, if it did not participate of specific formation according to intellect? For soul, indeed, is the supplier of motion; but the cause of a firm establishment, and that which reduces the unstable mutation of things that are moved, into sameness, and also a life which is bounded by one reason, and a circulation which subsists with invariable sameness, will evidently be superior to soul.
Body, therefore, and the whole of this sensible nature belong to things CfttAP. Xllt OF PLATO; ^ which are itkf^r-^motive. Biit soul is self-motive, binding in itself all cor- poreal motions; and prior to this is intellect which is immoveable. Let no one, hoVv^cver, suppose that I assert this immobility of intellect to re- semble thut which is sluggish, destitute of life,.' and without respiration, but that it is the leading cause of alt motion, and the fountain^ if you are wiHing so to denominate it, of all life, both of that which is converted to itself, and of that which has its hypostasis in other things. Through these causes also, the world is denominated by TiniBeusyan animal endued witl^ soul and intellect; being called by him an animal according to its own nature, and the life pervading to H from* soul, and which is distributed aboi^t it, but animated or endued with soul,, according ta the presence of a divine soul in it, and endued with intellect, according to intellectual domination. Eor the supply of life, the government of soul, and the par* ticipation of intellect connect and contain the whole of heaven.
If, however> this intellect is essentially intellect, since Timseus indi* eating that the essence of intellect i& the same with its intellection, d^io- minates it divine; for he says> that soul receiving a divine intellect led ai| vprightand wise life; if, therefore, this be the case, it is necessary that the whole world should be suspended from its divinity, and that motion in- deed should be present to this universe from, soul, but that its perpetual permanency and sqmeness of subsistence should be derived from intellect, and that its one unions the conspiration in it and sympathy, and its all- perfect measure should originate from that unity,^ from which intellect is uniform, soul is one^' every being is whole and perfect according to its own nature, and every thing secondary together with perfection, in it& own proper nature, participates of another more excellent peculiarity, from an order which^ is always estabhshed above it For that which is corporeal being alter'4notive, derives from soul the representation of sel£« motive pow^r,.and is.thrx)ugh.it an animal. But soul being self-motive participates of a life according to intellect, and energizing according to time, possesses a never-ceasing energy, and an ev^errvigilant life from it» ^ For xai rris ivaZog, read^ xcn otxo n}; §vah6^.
46 ON THE THEOLOGY BOO K I.
proximity to intellect. And intellect possessing its life in eternity, always subsisting essentially in energy/ and fixing all its stable intellection at once in intellect, is entirely deific through the cause prior to itself. For it has two-fold energies as Plotinus says, some as intellect, but others as being inebriated with nectar. And elsewhere he observes, that this in- tellect, by that which is prior to itself and is not intellect, is a god; in the same manner as soul, by its summit which is above soul, is intellect; and as body, by the power which is prior to body, is soul.
All things therefore, as we have said, are suspended from tke one through intellect and soul as media* And intellect indeed has the form of unity; but soul has the form of intellect; and the body of the world is vital But every thing is conjoined with tliat which is prior to itself. And of the natures posterior to these, one in a more proximate^ but the other in a more remote degree, enjoys that which is divine. And divinity, indeed^ is prior tb intellect, being primarily carried in an intellectual nature; but intfeUeet is most divine, as being deified prior to other things; and soul is divine, so far as it requires an intellectual medium. But the body which participates of a soul of thi« kind, so for as body indeed, is also itself divine; for the illumination of divine* light pervades supemally as far as tb the last dependencies; yet it is not simply divine; but soul by looking to intellect, and living from itself, is primarily divine.
My reasoning is also the same about each of the whole spheres, and about the bodies they contain. For all these imitate the whole heaven, since these likewise have a perpetual allotment; and with respect to the ^sublunary elements, they have not entirely an essential mutation, but they abide in the universe according to their wholenesses, and contain in them* selves partial animals. For every wholeness has posterior to itself more partial essences. As, therefore, in the heavens, the number of the stars^ proceeds together with the whole spheres, and as in the earth the multi- tude of partial terrestrial animals subsists together with their wholeness, thus also it appears to me to be necessary that in the wholes which have * For oum eve^i^, read, an »v evegy^ta.
* The sense requires that itm should be here supplied.
OHAP. xnr.
«r PLATOr: n an intermediate subsifttoneet each element should be filled up vfith apptbr priate numbers. For how in the extremes can wholes whicli subsi&t prkur to parts^ be arranged together with parts, unless there is the same analogy of them in the intermediate natures?
But if each of the spheres is an animal, and is always established after the same manner, and gives completion to the universe, as possessing life indeed, it will always primarily participate of soul, but as preserving its own order immutable iathe world, it will be comprehended by intellect, and as one and a whole, and the leader and ruler of its proper parts^ it will be illuminated by divine union. Not only the universe, therefore, but each also of its perpetual parts is animated and endued with in- tellect, and as much as possible is similar to the universe.' For each. of these parts^ is a universe with respect to its kindred multitude. Id short, there is indeed one corporeal-formed wholeness of the universe, but there are many others under this, depending on this one; there is one soul of the universe, and after this, other souls, together with this dispos- ing in an orderly manner the whole parts of the universe with undefiled purity; one intellect, and an intellectiial number under this, participated by these souls; and one god who connectedly contains at once all muh* iiane and supermundane^ natures, and a multitude of other gods, who distribute intellectual essences, and the souls suspended from these, and all the parts of the world. For it is not to be supposed that each of the productions of nature is generative of things similar to itself, but that wholes and. the first of mundane beings should not ia a much greater degree extend in themselves the paradigm of a generation of this kind» For the similar is more allied, and more naturally adapted to the reason of cause than the dissimilar, in the same manner as the same than the different, and bound than the infinite. These things, however, we shall accurately survey in what follows. But we shalLnow direct our attentiob to the second of the things demonstrated in the Laws, viz. that the Gods^ providentially attend at once to wholes and parts, and shall summarily 'Instead of o/cmiov fki} xctra. ivvaii^v, it is necessary to read xai xetru tvfufjuv r(p irctm^ 9ii9t0¥, a&-holbi the sense of the whole sentence atid the version of Portus require.
* It' seems exquisite to supj^ly here the WGxdjjin^xoffifrmr^s in the translation*.
4S ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK!• iKScuss the irreprehensible coDception of Plato about the provjdence of the Gods« CHAPTER XIV.
From what has been said, therefore, it is evident to everyone, that the Gods being the causes of all motion, some of them are essential and vivific, according to a self-motive, self-vital, and self-energetic power. But others of them are intellectual, and excite by their very being all secon- darj' natures to the perfection of life, according to the fountain and principle of all second and third progressions of motion. And others are unical^ or characterized by unity, deifying by participation all the whole genera of themselves, according to a primary, all-perfect, and unknown power of energy, and who are the leaders of one kind of motion, but are not the principle of another. But again others supply to secondary natures motion according to place or quality, but are essentially the causes of motion to themselves- For every thing which is the cause of essence to other things is much prior to this the cause to itself of its own proper energies and perfection. Farther still, that which is self-motive is again the principle of motion, and being and life are imparted by soul to every thing in the world, and not local motion only and the other kinds of motion, but the progression into being is from soul, and by a much greater priority from an intellectual essence, which binds to itself the life of self-motive natures and precedes according to cause all temporal energy. And in a still greater degree do motion, being, and life proceed from a unical hyparxis, which connectedly contains intellect and soul, is the source of total good, and proceeds as far as to the last of things. For of life indeed, not all the parts of the world are capable of participating, nor of intellect and a gnostic power; but of tJie one all things participate, as far ' For iguTifov read iitmfa.
Digitized by.
Google CHAP. XIV. OF PLATO. 4g, as to matter itself, both 'wholes and parts, things which subsist according to nature, and the contraries to these; and there is not any thing which is de* prived of a cause of this kind, nor can any thing ever participate of being, if it is deprived of the one. If, therefore, the Gods produce all things, and contain all things, in the unknown comprehensions of themselves, how is it possible there should not be a providence of all things in these compre-' hensions, pervading supernally as far as to the most partial natures? For it is every where fit that oflfepring should enjoy the providential care of their causes. But all alter-motive are the progeny of self-motive natures. And things which subsist in time, either in the whole of time, or in a part of it, are the effects of eternal natures; because that which always is, is the cause of that which sometimes exists. And divine and unical genera, as they give subsistence to all multiplied natures, precede them in existence. In short, there is no essence, or multitude of powers, which is not allotted its generation from the one. It is necessary, therefore, that all these should be partakers of the providence of preceding causes, being vivified indeed from