crates also in the Phsedrus indicating things of this kind, and evincing that the mysteries into which souls without bodies are initiated are most blessed, and truly perfect, says, that they are initiated into entire, simple and immoveable visions, such souls becoming situated there, and united with the Gods themselves, but not meeting with the resemblances which are emitted from the Gods into these sublunary realms. For these are more partial and composite, and present themselves to the view attended with motion. But illuminated, uniform, simple, and, as Socrates says, immoveable spectacles exhibit themselves to the attendants of the Gods, and to souls that abandon the abundant tumult of generation, and who ascend to divinity pure and divested of the garments of mortality. And thus much is concluded by us respecting the simplicity of the Gods. For it is necessary that the natm'e which generates things multiform should be simple,* and should precede what is generated, in the same manner as the uniform precedes the multiplied. I^ therefore, the Gods are the causes of ' After airXouy in the original, it U requisite to insert eiyai xmu CHAP. XX. OF FLATO. ^ all compofiitioai imd produce from themselves the variety of beings, it is certainly necessary that the one of their nature irhicb is generative of the whole of things, should have its subsistence in simplicity. For as incor- poreal causes precede bodies, immoveable causes things that are moved, and impartible causes all partible natures, after the same manner uniform intellectual powers precede multiform natures, unmingled powers, things that are mingled togetiber, and simple powers, things of a variegated na- ture* CHAPTER XXv Iir the next place, let us speak concerning the tnilii which is in the Giods; for this in addition to what has been said is concluded by Socrates, because a divine nature is without falsehood, and is neither the cause of deception or ignorance to us, or to any other beings. We must under- stand therefore, that divine truth is exempt from the truth which consists in words, so far as this truth is composite, and in a certain respect is mingled with its contrary, and because its subsistence consists of things that are not true. For the first parts do not admit of a truth of this kind, unless some one being persuaded by what Socrates asserts in the Cratylus, should say that these also are afler another manner true. Divine truth also is ex- empt from psychical truth, whether it is surveyed in opinions or in scien- ces,so far as it is inacertain respect divisible, and is not beings themselves, but is assimilated to and co4iarmonized with beings, and as being perfected in motion and mutation falls short of the truth which is always firm, stable and of a principal nature. Divine truth is likewise again exempt from intellectual truth, because though this subsists according to essence, and is said to be and is, beings themselves, through the power of sameness, yet again, through difference, it is separated from the essence of them, and preserves its peculiar hypostasis unconfused with respect to them. The 70 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I^ V truth thei'efore of the Gods alone, is the undivided uaion and ali-perfect communion of them. And through this the ineffable knowledge of the Grods, surpasses all knowledge, and all secondary forms of knowledge participate of an appropriate perfection. But this knowledge alone of the Gods contractedly comprehends the^e secondary forms of knowledge, ^d all beings according to an ineffable union. And throufgh this the Gods know all things at once, wholes and parts, beings and non*beings, things eternal and things temporal, not in the same manner as intellect by the universal knows a part, and by being, non-being, but they know every thing immediately, such things as are common, and such as are particulars, though you should speak of the most absurd of all things, though you should speak of the infinity of contingencies, or even of matter itself.
If, however, you investigate the mode of the knowledge and trathof the Gods, concerning all things that have a subsistence^n any respect whatever, it is ineffable and incomprt'hensible by the projecting energies of Hie human intellect; but is aJone known to the Gods themselves. And I indeed admire those Platonists that attj ibute to intellect the knowledge of a.U thin^, of individuals, of things preternatural, and in short, of evils, and on this account establish intellectual paradigms of these. But I much more admire those who separate the intellectual peculiarity from divine union. For intellect is the first fiabrication and progeny of the Gods. These therefore assign to intellect whole and first causes^ and such as are according to nature, and to the Gods a power which is capable of adorning and generating all tbmgs. For the one is every where, but whole is not every where. And of Me one indeed matter participates and f*very being; but of intellect and intellectual species and genera, all things do Dot participate. All things therefore are alone from the Gods, and real truth is with tliem who know all things unically. For on this account also, in oracles the Gods similarly teach all things, wholes and parts, things eternal, and such as are generated through the whole of time. For being exempt from eternal beings, and from those that ei^ist in time, thcv con- tract in themselves the knowledge of each and of all things, according to one united truth. If therefore any falsehood occurs in the oracles of the Gods, we must not say tha^ a thing of tliis kind originates fiporo the Gods, CHAP. XX. OF PLATO. 7 1 but from tbe recipients^ or the instruments, or the places, or the times. For all these contribute to the participation of divine knowledge, and when they are appropriately co-adapted to the Gods, they receive a pure illumination of the truth which is established in them. But when they are t^parated from the Gods throu^ inaptitude, and become discordant with them, then they obscure the truth which proceeds from them. Wha£ kind of falsehood therefore can be said to be derived from the Gods, who produce all the species of knowledge? What deception can there be with those w1k> establish in themselves the whole of truth? In the same man- ner, as it appears to me, the Gods extend good to all things, but always that which is willing and able receives the extended good, as Socrates says in the Phaedriis. And a divine nature indeed is causeless of evil, but that which departs from it, and gravitates downward, is elongated through Itself; thus also, the Gods indeed are alv^ays the suppliers of truth, but those natures are illuminated by them, who are lawfully their participants. For the Elean wise jnan says, that the eye of the soul in the multitude, is not strong enough to look to the truth.
The Athenian guest also celebrates this truth which subsists primarily in the Gods; for he says that truth is the leader to the Gods of every good, and likewise of every good to men. For as the truth which is in souls conjoins them with intellect, and as intellectual truth conducts all the intellectual orders to the one, thus also the truth of the Gods unites the divine unities to the fountain of all good, with which being conjoined^ they are filled with all boniform power. For every where the hyparxis of truth has a cause which is collective of multitude into one; since in the Republic also, the light proceeding irom the good^ and which conjoins intellect with the intelligible, is denominated by Plato truth. This cha- racteristic property therefore, which unites and binds together the natures that fill and the natures that are filled, according to all the orders of the Gods, must be arranged as originating supernally and proceeding as far as to the last of things.
72 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I.
CHAWER XXL To us however diftcussing what pertains to cv^ery dirine tiature^ what we assert will be known from those commonly received truths adduced in the Phaedrusy and which we have before mentioned* Socrates therefore says that every thing divine is beautiful, wise^ and good/ and he indicates that this triad pervades to all the progressions of the Gods. What there* fore is the goodness^ what the wisdom, and what the beauty of the Gods? With respect to the goodness of the Gods therefore, we have before ob* served, that it preserves and gives subsistence to the whole of things^ that it every where exists as thesummit, as that which fills subordinate natures, and as pre-existing in every order analogous to the first principle of ttie divine orders* For according to this all the Gods are conjoined with the one cause of all thingSy and on account of this primarily derive their subsistence as Gods* For in all beings there is not any thing more perfect than the good, and the Gods* To the most excellent of beings therefore, and which are in every respect perfect, the best find most perfect of things is adapted.
CHAPTER XXIL CHAPTER XXIL But in the PhilebuS,' I^lato delivers to us the three most principal ele- ments of the good, vix. the desirable, the sufficient, and the perfect. For it is necessary that it should convert all things to itself, and fill all things, and that it should be in no respect deficient, and should not diminish its exuberance. Let no one therefore conceive the desirable to be such as that which is frequently extended in sensibles as the object of appetite.
' lomrov 18 •nrooeoutfly printed jmtead of ayatov.
I / CHAP. XXll. OF PLATO. 73 For such is apparent beauty. Nor let him suppose it to be such as is in- deed able to energize upon and excite to itself the natures which are able to participate it, but which at the same time may be apprehended by in- telligence, and is educed by us according to a projecting energy, and an adhesion of the dianoetic power. For it is ineffable, and prior to all knowledge extends to all beings. For all things desire the goody and are converted to it. But if it be requisite summarily to unfold the characte- ristic peculiarity of the desirable, as the supplier of light proceeds by his rays into secondary natures, converts the eye to himself, causes it to be solar-form, and to resemble hifhself, and through a different similitude conjoins it with his own fulgid splendour, thus also I think the desirable of the Gods allures and draws upward all things to the Gods in an ineff- able manner by its own proper illuminations, being every where present to all things, and not deserting any order whatever of beings.. Since even matter itself is said to be extended to this desirable, and through this desire is filled with as many goods as it is able to participate. It is there- fore the centre of all beings, and all beings, and all the Gods have their essences, powers and energies about this. And the extension and desire of things towards this is inextinguishable. For all beings aspire after this desirable which is unknown and incomprehensible. Not being able there- fore either to know or receive that which they desire, they dance round it, and are parturient and as it werp prophetic with respect to it. But they have an unceasing and never^nding desire of its unknown and in- effable nature, al the same time that they are unable to embrace and embosom it. For being at once exempt from all things, it is similarly present to and moves all things about itself, and is at the same time by all of them incomprehensible. By this motion also and this desire it preserves all things, But by its unknown transcendency through which it surpasses the whole of things, it preserves its proper union unmingled with secondary nati^res. Such therefore is the desirable.
But the sufficient is full of boniform power, proceeds to all things, and extends to all beings the gifts of the Gods, For we conceive such a sufficiency as this to be a power pervading and protending to the last of things, extending the unenvying and exuberant will of the Gods, and Froc. Vol. I. K 74 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK 1.
not abiding in itself, but unically comprehending the super-plenitude, the never-failing, the infinite, and that which is generative of good in the divine hyparxis. For the desirable being firmly established, and surpas- sing the whole of things, and arranging all beings about itself, the suffi- cient'begins the progression and multiplication of all good, calls forth that which is primary in the uniform hyparxis of the desirable, by its own pro- lific ' exuberance, and by the beneficent replenishings which pervade to all things, and copiously produces and imparts it to every being. It is owing to the sufficient therefore, that the stability of divine natures, and that which proceeds from its proper causes is full of goodness, and that, in short, all beings are benefited, abiding in, proceeding from, and being united to their principles, and essentially separated from them. Through this power therefore, the intellectual genera give subsistence to natures similar to themselves, souls desire to generate, and imitate the beings prior to souls, natures deliver their productive principles into another place, and all things possess, in short, the love of generation. For the suflficiency of the goodness of the Gods, proceeding from this goodness, is disseminated in all beings, and moves all things to the unenvying communication of good; intellect indeed to the communication of intellectual, but soul of psychical, and nature of natural good.
All things therefore abide throueh the desirable of goodness, and gene- rate and proceed into second and third generations through the suflScient But the third thing, the perfect, is convertive of the whole of things, and circularly collects them to their causes; and this is accomplished by divine, intellectual, psychical and physical perfection. For all things participate of conversion, since the infinity of progression is through this again re- called to its principles; and the perfect is mingled from the desirable and sufficient. For every thing of this kind is the object of desire, and is generative of things similar to itself. Or in the works of nature also, are not perfect things every where lovely and prolific through tlie acme of their beauty? The desirable therefore establishes, all things, and com- prehends them in itself. The sufficient excites them into progressions ' Instead of fuovifuf it is necessaiy to read yovifio;.
CHAP. XXni. OF PLATO. tfg arid generations. And the perfect consummately leads progressions to conversions and convolutions. But through these three causes, the good^ ness of the Gods fixing th&unical power and authority of its proper hy- postasis in this triad, is the primary and most principal fountain and vestal seat of things which have any kind of subsistence whatever.
CHAPTER XXIIL After this, wisdomyis allotted the second order, being th^ intelligence of the Gods, or rather the hyparxis of their intelligence. For intelligence indeed, is intellectual knowledge; but the wisdom of the Gods is ineffa- ble knowledge, which is united to the object of knowledge and the intel- hgible union of the Gods. But it appears to me that Plato especially surveyed this in the triad [of the beautiful, the wise and the good,] as may be, inferred from the conceptions scattered about it in many places. I say then that Diotima in the Banquet is of opinion that wisdom is full of that which is known, and that it neither seeks, nor investigates, but possesses the intelligible. Hence, she says, that no one of the Gods phi^ losophizes, nor desires to become wise; for a God is wise. Hence that which is philosophic is imperfect, and indigent of truth; but that which is wise is full and unindigent, and has every thing present which it wishes and desires nothipg. But the desirable and the appetible are proposed to the philosopher. Socrates, however, in the Republic considers that which is generative of truth and intellect, as affording an indicaticm of wisdom, to our souls indeed the ascent to divine plenitude being accomplished through knowledge,' but to the Gods intellect being present from the fuln^s of knowledge.^ For the progression in them is not from an ' For ytvyqersco; it is requisite to read yMorso};. ^ The same emendation is necessary here as above* 76 O^ THE THEOLOGY BOOK I.
imperfect habit to the perfect; but from a self-perfect hyparxis a power prolificof inferior natures proceeds. But in the Theaetetus he indicates that the perfective of things imperfect, and that which calls forth con- cealed intelligence in souls, pertain to wisdom. For he says, it compels me to obstetrication, but prevents me from generating. It is evident therefore, from these things, that the genus of wisdom is triadic. Heqce it is full of being and truth, is generative of intellectual truth, and is perfective of intellectual natures that are in energy, and itself possesses a stable power. We must admit therefore, that these things pertain to the wisdom of the Gods. For this wisdom is full indeed of divine goodness, generates divine truth, and perfects all things posterior to itself.
CHAPTER XXIV.
CHAPTER XXIV.
Im" the next place let us consider the beautiful, what it is, and how it primarily subsists in the Gods. It is said therefore to be boniform beauty, and intelligible beauty, to be more ancient than intellectual beauty, and to be beauty itself, and the cause of beauty to all beings; and all such like epithets. And it is rightly said. But it is separate not only from the beauty which is apparent in corporeal masses, from the symmetry which is in these from psychical elegance, and intellectual splendour, but also from the second and third progressions in the Gods; and subsisting in the intelligible place of survey, it proceeds from this to all the genera of the Gods, and illuminates their superessential unities, and all the essences suspended from these unities, as far as to the appa- rent vehicles of the Gods. As therefore through the first goodness all the Gods are boniform, and through intelligible wisdom they have a knowledge ineffable, and established above intellect, thus also, I think, through the summit of beauty, every thing divine is lovely. For from CHAP. XXIV. OF PLATO. 77 thence all the Gods derive beauty, and being filled with it, fill the natures posterior to themselves, exciting all things, agitating them with Bacchic fury about the love of themselves, and pouring supernally on all things the divine effluxion of beauty.
Such therefore, in short, is divine beauty, the supplier of divine hilarity, familiarity and friendship. For through this the Gods are united to and rejoice in each other, admire, and are delighted in communicating with each other, and in their mutual replenishings, and do not desert the order which they are always allotted in the distributions of themselves. Pluto also delivers three indications of this beauty, in the Banquet indeed, denominating it the delicate; for the perfect and that which is most blessed, accedes to the beautiful through the participation of goodness. But he thus speaks of it in that dialogue: " That which is truly beauti- ful, is delicate, perfect and most blessed.*' One of the indications there- fore of the beautiful, is a thing of this kind, viz. the delicate. But we may assume another indication of it from the Phaedrus, viz. the splendid. For Plato attributing this to the beautiful says: " It was then that we were permitted to see splendid beauty shining upon us &c/' And after- wards he adds: " And arriving hither we apprehended it shining most manifestly through the clearest of the senses/' And at last he says: ** But now beauty alone has this allotment to be most splendid and most lovely." These two things therefore are to be assumed, as indications of beauty. Another indication of beauty is this, that it is the object of love, which now also Plato appears to me to have called most lovely. And in many other places he shows that the amatory fiiry is conversant with the beautiful, defining, and in short, suspending love from the monad of beauty. " For love, says he, is conversant with the beautiful.''
Because, therefore, beauty converts and moves all things to itself, causes them to energize enthusiastically, and recalls them through love, it is the object of love, being the Jleader of the whole amatory series^ walking on the extremities of its feet, and exciting all things to itselr through desire and astonishment. But again because it extends to secondary natures plenitudes from itself, in conjunction with hilarity and divine facility, alluring, enflaming, and elevating all things, and pouring on 73 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK 1.
them illuminations from on high, it is delicate, and is said to be so ^ by Hato. And because it bounds this triad, and covers as with a veil the inefiable union of the Gods, swims as it were on the light of forms, causes intelligible light to shine forth^ and announces the occult nature of goodness, it is denominated splendid, lucid and manifest. For the goodness of the Gods is supreme and most united; their wisdom is in a certain respect now parturient with intelligible light, and the first forms; but their beauty is established in the highest forms, is the lumin- ous precursor of divine light, and is the first thing that is apparent to ascending souls, being more splendid and more lovely to the view and to embrace than every luciferous essence, and when it appears is received with astonishment. This triad therefore filling all things, and proceeding through all things, it is certainly necessary that the natures which are filled should be converted to and conjoined with each of the three through kindred, and not through the same inedia. For of different things that are filled by this triad there is a difierent medium; and difierent powers are converted to a different perfection of the Gods. I think therefore, it is manifest to every one, and it is frequently asserted by Plato, that the cause which congregates all secondary natures to divine beauty, which familiarizes them to it and is the source of their being filled with it, and of their derivation from thence, is nothing else than love, which always conjoins according to the beautiful, secondary to the first ' Gods, and the more excellent genera, and the best of souls. But again^ truth is certainly the leader to, and establishes beings in, divine wisdom, with which intellect being filled, possesses a knowledge of beings, and souh participating of this energize' intellectually. 'For the full participation of true wisdom is effected through truth, since this every where illumi* nates intellective natures, and conjoins them with the objects of intellection, just as truth also is the first thing that congregates intellect and the intelligible. To those however who hasten to be conjoined with the good, knowledge and co-operation are no longer requisite, but collo^ cation, a firm establishment and quiet are necessary.
' Instead of xpo^ eturw it is requisite to read vporri^Tot^. ' CHAP. XXV. OF PLATO. 79 CHAPTER XXV.
What therefore is it which unites us to the good? What is it which causes in us a cessation of energy and motion? What is it which estabhshes all divine natures in the first and ineflfable unity of goodness? And how does it come to pass that every thing being estabHshed in that which is prior to itself according to the good which is in itself, again establishes things posterior to itself according to cause? It is, in short, the faith of the Gods^ which ineflfably unites all the genera of the Gods, of daemons, and of happy souls to the good. For it is necessary to investigate the good neither gnostically, nor imperfectly, but giving ourselves up to the divine light, and closing the eyes of the soul, after this manner to become established in the unknown and occult unity of beings. For such a kind of faith as this is more ancient than the gnostic energy, not in us only, but with the Gods themselves, and according to this all the Gods are united, and about one centre uniformly collect the whole of their powers and pro- gressions.
If however it be requisite to give a particular definition of this faith, let no one suppose that it is such a kind of faith as that which is conver- sant with the wandering about sensibles. For this falls short of science, and much more of the truth of beings. But the faith of the Gods sur- passes all knowledge, and according to the highest union conjoins secon« dary with first natures. Nor again, let him conceive a faith of a similar species with the celebrated belief in common conceptions; for we believe in common conceptions prior to all reasoning. But the knowledge of these is divisible,^ and is by no means equivalent to divine union; and the science of these is not only posterior to faith, but also to intellectual simplicity. For intellect is estabUshed beyond all science, both the first science, and that which is posterior to it. Neither, therefore, must we say that the energy according to intellect is similar to such a faith as this. For intellectual energy is multiform, and is separated from the 80 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I;