Hence it is not enough to put one’s trust in the tethering of horses, 方 is said here to be equivalent to 縛.
and the burying of chariot wheels in the ground.
These quaint devices to prevent one’s army from running away recall the Athenian hero Sôphanes, who carried an anchor with him at the battle of Plataea, by means of which he fastened himself firmly to one spot. [See Herodotus, IX. 74.] It is not enough, says Sun Tzŭ, to render flight impossible by such mechanical means. You will not succeed unless your men have tenacity and unity of purpose, and, above all, a spirit of sympathetic co-operation. This is the lesson which can be learned from the _shuai-jan_.
32. 齊勇若一政之道也 The principle on which to manage an army is to set up one standard of courage which all must reach.
Literally, “level the courage [of all] as though [it were that of] one.” If the ideal army is to form a single organic whole, then it follows that the resolution and spirit of its component parts must be of the same quality, or at any rate must not fall below a certain standard. Wellington’s seemingly ungrateful description of his army at Waterloo as “the worst he had ever commanded” meant no more than that it was deficient in this important particular—unity of spirit and courage. Had he not foreseen the Belgian defections and carefully kept those troops in the background, he would almost certainly have lost the day.
33. 剛柔皆得地之理也 How to make the best of both strong and weak—that is a question involving the proper use of ground.
This is rather a hard sentence on the first reading, but the key to it will be found, firstly, in the pause after 得, and next, in the meaning of 得 itself. The best equivalent for this that I can think of is the German “zur Geltung kommen.” Mei Yao-ch‘ên’s paraphrase is: 兵無强弱皆得用者是因地之勢也 “The way to eliminate the differences of strong and weak and to make both serviceable is to utilise accidental features of the ground.” Less reliable troops, if posted in strong positions, will hold out as long as better troops on more exposed terrain. The advantage of position neutralises the inferiority in stamina and courage. Col. Henderson says: “With all respect to the text books, and to ordinary tactical teaching, I am inclined to think that the study of ground is often overlooked, and that by no means sufficient importance is attached to the selection of positions...and to the immense advantages that are to be derived, whether you are defending or attacking, from the proper utilisation of natural features.”[180] 34. 故善用兵者攜手若使一人不得已也 Thus the skilful general conducts his army just as though he were leading a single man, willy-nilly, by the hand.
Tu Mu says: 喩易也 “The simile has reference to the ease with which he does it.” 不得已 means that he makes it impossible for his troops to do otherwise than obey. Chang Yü quotes a jingle, to be found in Wu Tzŭ, ch. 4: 將之所揮，莫不從移，將之所指，莫不前死.
35. 將軍之事靜以幽正以治 It is the business of a general to be quiet and thus ensure secrecy; upright and just, and thus maintain order.
靜 seems to combine the meanings “noiseless” and “imperturbable,” both of which attributes would of course conduce to secrecy. Tu Mu explains 幽 as 幽深難測 “deep and inscrutable,” and 正 as 平正無偏 “fair and unbiassed.” Mei Yao-ch‘ên alone among the commentators takes 治 in the sense of 自治 “self-controlled.” 幽 and 治 are causally connected with 靜 and 正 respectively. This is not brought out at all in Capt. Calthrop’s rendering: “The general should be calm, inscrutable, just and prudent.” The last adjective, moreover, can in no sense be said to represent 治.
36. 能愚士卒之耳目使之無知 He must be able to mystify his officers and men by false reports and appearances, Literally, “to deceive their eyes and ears”—愚 being here used as a verb in the sense of 誤.
and thus keep them in total ignorance.
Ts‘ao Kung gives us one of his excellent apophthegms: 民可與樂成 不可與慮始 “The troops must not be allowed to share your schemes in the beginning; they may only rejoice with you over their happy outcome.” “To mystify, mislead, and surprise the enemy,” is one of the first principles in war, as has been frequently pointed out.
But how about the other process—the mystification of one’s own men? Those who may think that Sun Tzŭ is over-emphatic on this point would do well to read Col. Henderson’s remarks on Stonewall Jackson’s Valley campaign: “The infinite pains,” he says, “with which Jackson sought to conceal, even from his most trusted staff officers, his movements, his intentions, and his thoughts, a commander less thorough would have pronounced useless”—etc.
etc.[181] In the year 88 A.D., as we read in ch. 47 of the _Hou Han Shu_, “Pan Ch‘ao took the field with 25,000 men from Khotan and other Central Asian states with the object of crushing Yarkand. The King of Kutcha replied by dispatching his chief commander to succour the place with an army drawn from the kingdoms of Wên-su, Ku-mo and Wei-t‘ou, totalling 50,000 men. Pan Ch‘ao summoned his officers and also the King of Khotan to a council of war, and said: ‘Our forces are now outnumbered and unable to make head against the enemy. The best plan, then, is for us to separate and disperse, each in a different direction. The King of Khotan will march away by the easterly route, and I will then return myself towards the west. Let us wait until the evening drum has sounded and then start.’ Pan Ch‘ao now secretly released the prisoners whom he had taken alive, and the King of Kutcha was thus informed of his plans. Much elated by the news, the latter set off at once at the head of 10,000 horsemen to bar Pan Ch‘ao’s retreat in the west, while the King of Wên-su rode eastwards with 8000 horse in order to intercept the King of Khotan. As soon as Pan Ch‘ao knew that the two chieftains had gone, he called his divisions together, got them well in hand, and at cock-crow hurled them against the army of Yarkand, as it lay encamped. The barbarians, panic-stricken, fled in confusion, and were closely pursued by Pan Ch‘ao. Over 5000 heads were brought back as trophies, besides immense spoils in the shape of horses and cattle and valuables of every description. Yarkand then capitulating, Kutcha and the other kingdoms drew off their respective forces.
From that time forward, Pan Ch‘ao’s prestige completely overawed the countries of the west.” In this case, we see that the Chinese general not only kept his own officers in ignorance of his real plans, but actually took the bold step of dividing his army in order to deceive the enemy.
37. 易其事革其謀使人無識易其居迂其途使人不得慮 By altering his arrangements and changing his plans, Wang Hsi thinks that this means, not using the same stratagem twice. He says: 已行之事已施之謀當革易之不可再之.
he keeps the enemy without definite knowledge.
Note that 人 denotes the _enemy_, as opposed to the 士卒 of § 36.
Capt. Calthrop, not perceiving this, joins the two paragraphs into one. Chang Yü quotes 太白山人 as saying: 兵貴詭道者非止詭敵也抑詭我 士卒使由而不使知之也 “The axiom, that war is based on deception, does not apply only to deception of the enemy. You must deceive even your own soldiers. Make them follow you, but without letting them know why.”
By shifting his camp and taking circuitous routes, he prevents the enemy from anticipating his purpose.
Wang Hsi paraphrases 易其居 as 處易者 “camp on easy ground,” and Chang Yü follows him, saying: 其居則去險而就易. But this is an utterly untenable view. For 迂其途, cf. VII. 4. Chia Lin, retaining his old interpretation of those words, is now obliged to explain 易其居 as “cause the enemy to shift his camp,” which is awkward in the extreme.
38. 帥與之期如登高而去其梯帥與之深入諸侯之地而發其機 At the critical moment, the leader of an army acts like one who has climbed up a height and then kicks away the ladder behind him.
I must candidly confess that I do not understand the syntax of 帥與之期, though the meaning is fairly plain. The difficulty has evidently been felt, for Tu Mu tells us that one text omits 期如.
It is more likely, however, that a couple of characters have dropped out.
He carries his men deep into hostile territory before he shows his hand.
發其機, literally, “releases the spring” (see V. § 15), that is, takes some decisive step which makes it impossible for the army to return—like 項羽 Hsiang Yü, who sunk his ships after crossing a river. Ch‘ên Hao, followed by Chia Lin, understands the words less well as 發其心機 “puts forth every artifice at his command.” But 機 in this derived sense occurs nowhere else in Sun Tzŭ.
39. 焚舟破釜若驅羣羊而往驅而來莫知所之 He burns his boats and breaks his cooking-pots; Omitted in the _T‘u Shu_.
like a shepherd driving a flock of sheep, he drives his men this way and that, and none knows whither he is going.
The _T‘u Shu_ inserts another 驅 after 羊. Tu Mu says: 三軍但知進 退之命不知攻取之端也 “The army is only cognisant of orders to advance or retreat; it is ignorant of the ulterior ends of attacking and conquering.”
40. 聚三軍之衆投之於險此謂將軍之事也 To muster his host and bring it into danger:—this may be termed the business of the general.
Sun Tzŭ means that after mobilisation there should be no delay in aiming a blow at the enemy’s heart. With 投之於險 cf. _supra_, § 23: 投之無所往. Note how he returns again and again to this point.
Among the warring states of ancient China, desertion was no doubt a much more present fear and serious evil than it is in the armies of to-day.
41. 九地之變屈伸之利人情之理不可不察也 The different measures suited to the nine varieties of ground; Chang Yü says: 九地之法不可拘泥 “One must not be hide-bound in interpreting the rules for the nine varieties of ground.
the expediency of aggressive or defensive tactics; The use of 屈伸 “contraction and expansion” may be illustrated by the saying 屈以求伸, which almost exactly corresponds to the French “il faut reculer pour mieux sauter.”[182] Capt. Calthrop, _more suo_, avoids a real translation and has: “the suiting of the means to the occasion.”
and the fundamental laws of human nature: these are things that must most certainly be studied.
42. 凡爲客之道深則專淺則散 When invading hostile territory, the general principle is, that penetrating deeply brings cohesion; penetrating but a short way means dispersion.
Cf. _supra_, § 20.
43. 去國越境而師者絶地也四達者衢地也 When you leave your own country behind, and take your army across neighbouring territory, Chang Yü’s paraphrase is 而用師者.
you find yourself on critical ground.
This “ground” is cursorily mentioned in VIII. § 2, but it does not figure among the Nine 地 of this chapter or the Six 地形 in chap.
X. One’s first impulse would be to translate it “distant ground” (絶域 is commonly used in the sense of “distant lands”), but this, if we can trust the commentators, is precisely what is not meant here. Mei Yao-ch‘ên says it is 進不及輕退不及散在二地之間也 “a position not far enough advanced to be called ‘facile,’ and not near enough to home to be called ‘dispersive,’ but something between the two.”
That, of course, does not explain the name 絶, which seems to imply that the general has severed his communications and temporarily cut himself off from his base. Thus, Wang Hsi says: “It is ground separated from home by an interjacent state, whose territory we have had to cross in order to reach it. Hence it is incumbent on us to settle our business there quickly.” He adds that this position is of rare occurrence, which is the reason why it is not included among the 九地. Capt. Calthrop gives but a poor rendering of this sentence: “To leave home and cross the borders is to be free from interference.”
When there are means of communication on all four sides, the ground is one of intersecting highways.
From 四達 down to the end of § 45, we have some of the definitions of the early part of the chapter repeated in slightly different language. Capt. Calthrop omits these altogether.
44. 入深者重地也入淺者輕地也 When you penetrate deeply into a country, it is serious ground. When you penetrate but a little way, it is facile ground.
45. 背固前隘者圍地也無所往者死地也 When you have the enemy’s strongholds on your rear, 固 = 險固.
and narrow passes in front, it is hemmed-in ground. When there is no place of refuge at all, it is desperate ground.
46. 是故散地吾將一其志輕地吾將使之屬 Therefore, on dispersive ground, I would inspire my men with unity of purpose.
This end, according to Tu Mu, is best attained by remaining on the defensive, and avoiding battle. Cf. _supra_, § 11.
On facile ground, I would see that there is close connection between all parts of my army.
The _T‘ung Tien_ has 其 instead of 之. The present reading is supported by the 遺說 of Chêng Yu-hsien. As Tu Mu says, the object is to guard against two possible contingencies: 一者備其逃逸二者恐 其敵至 “(1) the desertion of our own troops; (2) a sudden attack on the part of the enemy.” Cf. VII. § 17: 其徐如林. Mei Yao-ch‘ên says: 行則隊校相繼止則營壘聯屬 “On the march, the regiments should be in close touch; in an encampment, there should be continuity between the fortifications.” He seems to have forgotten, by the way, what Sun Tzŭ says above: 輕地則無止.
47. 爭地吾將趨其後 On contentious ground, I would hurry up my rear.
This is Ts‘ao Kung’s interpretation. Chang Yü adopts it, saying: 當疾進其後使首尾俱至 “We must quickly bring up our rear, so that head and tail may both reach the goal.” That is, they must not be allowed to straggle up a long way apart. Mei Yao-ch‘ên offers another equally plausible explanation: 敵未至其地我若在後則當疾趨以爭之 “Supposing the enemy has not yet reached the coveted position, and we are behind him, we should advance with all speed in order to dispute its possession.” 其 would thus denote the enemy, 後 being the preposition, and 趨 would retain its usual intransitive sense.
Cf. VII. § 4: 後人發先人至. Ch‘ên Hao, on the other hand, assuming that the enemy has had time to select his own ground, quotes VI. § 1, where Sun Tzŭ warns us against coming exhausted to the attack. His own idea of the situation is rather vaguely expressed: 若地利在前先 分精銳以據之彼若恃衆來爭我以大衆趨其後無不尅者 “If there is a favourable position lying in front of you, detach a picked body of troops to occupy it; then if the enemy, relying on their numbers, come up to make a fight for it, _you may fall quickly on their rear_ with your main body, and victory will be assured.” It was thus, he adds, that Chao Shê beat the army of Ch‘in. [See p. 57.] Li Ch‘üan would read 多 for 趨, it is not easy to see why.
48. 交地吾將謹其守衢地吾將固其結 On open ground, I would keep a vigilant eye on my defences.
As Wang Hsi says, 懼襲我也 “fearing a surprise attack.” The _T‘ung Tien_ reads here 固其結 (see next sentence).
On ground of intersecting highways, I would consolidate my alliances.
The _T‘ung Tien_ reads 謹其市, which Tu Yu explains as “watching the market towns,” 變事之端 “the hotbeds of revolution.” Capt.
Calthrop translates 固其結 by the same words as 合交 in § 12: 49. 重地吾將繼其食圮地吾將進其塗 On serious ground, I would try to ensure a continuous stream of supplies.
The commentators take this as referring to forage and plunder, not, as one might expect, to an unbroken communication with a home base. One text, indeed, gives the reading 掠其食. Cf. § 13. Capt.
Calthrop’s “be careful of supplies” fails to render the force of 繼.
On difficult ground, I would keep pushing on along the road.
Capt. Calthrop’s “do not linger” cannot be called a translation, but only a paraphrase of the paraphrase offered by Ts‘ao Kung: 疾過去也 “Pass away from it in all haste.”
50. 圍地吾將塞其闕死地吾將示之以不活 On hemmed-in ground, I would block any way of retreat.
意欲突圍示以守固 “To make it seem that I mean to defend the position, whereas my real intention is to burst suddenly through the enemy’s lines” [Mêng Shih]; 使士卒必死戰也 “in order to make my soldiers fight with desperation” [Mei Yao-ch‘ên]; 懼人有走心 “fearing lest my men be tempted to run away” [Wang Hsi]. Tu Mu points out that this is the converse of VII. § 36, where it is the enemy who is surrounded. In 532 A.D., 高歡 Kao Huan, afterwards Emperor and canonised as 神武 Shên-wu, was surrounded by a great army under 爾朱兆 Êrh-chu Chao and others. His own force was comparatively small, consisting only of 2000 horse and something under 30,000 foot. The lines of investment had not been drawn very closely together, gaps being left at certain points. But Kao Huan, instead of trying to escape, actually made a shift to block all the remaining outlets himself by driving into them a number of oxen and donkeys roped together. As soon as his officers and men saw that there was nothing for it but to conquer or die, their spirits rose to an extraordinary pitch of exaltation, and they charged with such desperate ferocity that the opposing ranks broke and crumbled under their onslaught. [See Tu Mu’s commentary, and 北齊書 ch. 1, fol. 6.]
On desperate ground, I would proclaim to my soldiers the hopelessness of saving their lives.
Tu Yu says: 焚輜重棄糧食塞井夷竈示之無活必殊死戰也 “Burn your baggage and impedimenta, throw away your stores and provisions, choke up the wells, destroy your cooking-stoves, and make it plain to your men that they cannot survive, but must fight to the death.” Mei Yao-ch‘ên says epigrammatically: 必死可生 “The only chance of life lies in giving up all hope of it.” This concludes what Sun Tzŭ has to say about “grounds” and the “variations” corresponding to them.
Reviewing the passages which bear on this important subject, we cannot fail to be struck by the desultory and unmethodical fashion in which it is treated. Sun Tzŭ begins abruptly in VIII. § 2 to enumerate “variations” before touching on “grounds” at all, but only mentions five, namely nos. 7, 5, 8 and 9 of the subsequent list, and one that is not included in it. A few varieties of ground are dealt with in the earlier portion of chap. IX, and then chap. X sets forth six new grounds, with six variations of plan to match. None of these is mentioned again, though the first is hardly to be distinguished from ground no. 4 in the next chapter. At last, in chap. XI, we come to the Nine Grounds _par excellence_, immediately followed by the variations. This takes us down to § 14. In §§ 43–45, fresh definitions are provided for nos.
5, 6, 2, 8 and 9 (in the order given), as well as for the tenth ground noticed in chap VIII; and finally, the nine variations are enumerated once more from beginning to end, all, with the exception of 5, 6 and 7, being different from those previously given. Though it is impossible to account for the present state of Sun Tzŭ’s text, a few suggestive facts may be brought into prominence: (1) Chap. VIII, according to the title, should deal with nine variations, whereas only five appear. (2) It is an abnormally short chapter. (3) Chap. XI is entitled The Nine Grounds. Several these are defined twice over, besides which there are two distinct lists of the corresponding variations. (4) The length of the chapter is disproportionate, being double that of any other except IX. I do not propose to draw any inferences from these facts, beyond the general conclusion that Sun Tzŭ’s work cannot have come down to us in the shape in which it left his hands: chap. VIII is obviously defective and probably out of place, while XI seems to contain matter that has either been added by a later hand or ought to appear elsewhere.
51. 故兵之情圍則禦不得已則鬥過則從 For it is the soldier’s disposition to offer an obstinate resistance when surrounded, to fight hard when he cannot help himself, and to obey promptly when he has fallen into danger.
過則從 is rendered by Capt. Calthrop: “to pursue the enemy if he retreat.” But 過 cannot mean “to retreat.” Its primary sense is to pass over, hence to go too far, to exceed or to err. Here, however, the word has lost all implication of censure, and appears to mean “to pass the boundary line dividing safety from danger,” or, as Chang Yü puts it, 深陷于危難之地 “to be deeply involved in a perilous position.” The latter commentator alludes to the conduct of Pan Ch‘ao’s devoted followers in 73 A.D. The story runs thus in the _Hou Han Shu_, ch. 47, fol. 1 _v_^o: “When Pan Ch‘ao arrived at 鄯善 Shan-shan, 廣 Kuang, the King of the country, received him at first with great politeness and respect; but shortly afterwards his behaviour underwent a sudden change, and he became remiss and negligent. Pan Ch‘ao spoke about this to the officers of his suite: ‘Have you not noticed,’ he said, ‘that Kuang’s polite intentions are on the wane? This must signify that envoys have come from the Northern barbarians, and that consequently he is in a state of indecision, not knowing with which side to throw in his lot. That surely is the reason. The truly wise man, we are told, can perceive things before they have come to pass; how much more, then, those that are already manifest!’ Thereupon he called one of the natives who had been assigned to his service, and set a trap for him, saying: ‘Where are those envoys from the Hsiung-nu who arrived some days ago?’ The man was so taken aback that between surprise and fear he presently blurted out the whole truth. Pan Ch‘ao, keeping his informant carefully under lock and key, then summoned a general gathering of his officers, thirty-six in all, and began drinking with them. When the wine had mounted into their heads a little, he tried to rouse their spirit still further by addressing them thus: ‘Gentlemen, here we are in the heart of an isolated region, anxious to achieve riches and honour by some great exploit. Now it happens that an ambassador from the Hsiung-nu arrived in this kingdom only a few days ago, and the result is that the respectful courtesy extended towards us by our royal host has disappeared. Should this envoy prevail upon him to seize our party and hand us over to the Hsiung-nu, our bones will become food for the wolves of the desert. What are we to do?’ With one accord, the officers replied: ‘_Standing as we do in peril of our lives, we will follow our commander through life and death_’ (今在危亡之地死生從司馬).” For the sequel of this adventure, see chap. XII. § 1, note.
52. 是故不知諸侯之謀者不能預交不知山林險阻沮澤之形者不能行軍不用鄉導者不能得地利 We cannot enter into alliance with neighbouring princes until we are acquainted with their designs. We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the face of the country—its mountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps. We shall be unable to turn natural advantages to account unless we make use of local guides.
These three sentences are repeated from VII. §§ 12–14—in order to emphasise their importance, the commentators seem to think. I prefer to regard them as interpolated here in order to form an antecedent to the following words. With regard to local guides, Sun Tzŭ might have added that there is always the risk of going wrong, either through their treachery or some misunderstanding such as Livy records (XXII. 13): Hannibal, we are told, ordered a guide to lead him into the neighbourhood of Casinum, where there was an important pass to be occupied; but his Carthaginian accent, unsuited to the pronunciation of Latin names, caused the guide to understand Casilinum instead of Casinum, and turning from his proper route, he took the army in that direction, the mistake not being discovered until they had almost arrived.
53. 四五者不知一非霸王之兵也 To be ignorant of any one of the following four or five principles Referring, I think, to what is contained in §§ 54, 55. Ts‘ao Kung, thinking perhaps of the 五利 in VIII. § 6, takes them to be 九地之 利害 “the advantages and disadvantages attendant on the nine varieties of ground.” The _T‘u Shu_ reads 此五者.
does not befit a warlike prince.
霸王, “one who rules by force,” was a term specially used for those princes who established their hegemony over other feudal states.
The famous 五霸 of the 7th century B.C. were (1) 齊桓公 Duke Huan of Ch‘i, (2) 晉文公 Duke Wên of Chin, (3) 宋襄公 Duke Hsiang of Sung, (4) 楚莊王 Prince Chuang of Ch‘u, (5) 秦穆公 Duke Mu of Ch‘in. Their reigns covered the period 685–591 B.C.
54. 夫霸王之兵伐大國則其衆不得聚威加於敵則其交不得合 When a warlike prince attacks a powerful state, his generalship shows itself in preventing the concentration of the enemy’s forces. He overawes his opponents, Here and in the next sentence, the _Yü Lan_ inserts 家 after 敵.
and their allies are prevented from joining against him.
Mei Yao-ch‘ên constructs one of the chains of reasoning that are so much affected by the Chinese: “In attacking a powerful state, if you can divide her forces, you will have a superiority in strength; if you have a superiority in strength, you will overawe the enemy; if you overawe the enemy, the neighbouring states will be frightened; and if the neighbouring states are frightened, the enemy’s allies will be prevented from joining her.” The following gives a stronger meaning to 威加: 若大國一敗則小國離而不聚矣 “If the great state has once been defeated (before she has had time to summon her allies), then the lesser states will hold aloof and refrain from massing their forces.” Ch‘ên Hao and Chang Yü take the sentence in quite another way. The former says: “Powerful though a prince may be, if he attacks a large state, he will be unable to raise enough troops, and must rely to some extent on external aid; if he dispenses with this, and with overweening confidence in his own strength, simply tries to intimidate the enemy, he will surely be defeated.” Chang Yü puts his view thus: “If we recklessly attack a large state, our own people will be discontented and hang back. But if (as will then be the case) our display of military force is inferior by half to that of the enemy, the other chieftains will take fright and refuse to join us.” According to this interpretation, 其 would refer, not to the 大國, but to the 霸王 himself.
55. 是故不爭天下之交不養天下之權信己之私威加於敵故其城可拔其國可隳 Hence he does not strive to ally himself with all and sundry, 天下, as in § 6, stands for 諸侯 “the feudal princes,” or the states ruled by them.
nor does he foster the power of other states. He carries out his own secret designs, For 信 (read _shên_^1) in the meaning of 伸, cf. VIII. § 8. The commentators are unanimous on this point, and we must therefore beware of translating 信己之私 by “secretly self-confident” or the like. Capt. Calthrop (omitting 之私) has: “he has confidence in himself.”
keeping his antagonists in awe.
The train of thought appears to be this: Secure against a combination of his enemies. 能絶天下之交惟得伸己之私志威而無外交者 “he can afford to reject entangling alliances and simply pursue his own secret designs, his prestige enabling him to dispense with external friendships.” (Li Ch‘üan.)
Thus he is able to capture their cities and overthrow their kingdoms.
This paragraph, though written many years before the Ch‘in State became a serious menace, is not a bad summary of the policy by which the famous Six Chancellors gradually paved the way for her final triumph under Shih Huang Ti. Chang Yü, following up his previous note, thinks that Sun Tzŭ is condemning this attitude of cold-blooded selfishness and haughty isolation. He again refers 其 to the warlike prince, thus making it appear that in the end he is bound to succumb.
56. 施無法之賞懸無政之令犯三軍之衆若使一人 Bestow rewards without regard to rule, Wu Tzŭ (ch. 3) less wisely says: 進有重賞退有重刑 “Let advance be richly rewarded and retreat be heavily punished.”
issue orders without regard to previous arrangements; 杜姦媮 “In order to prevent treachery,” says Wang Hsi. The general meaning is made clear by Ts‘ao Kung’s quotation from the _Ssŭ-ma Fa:_ 見敵作誓瞻功作賞 “Give instructions only on sighting the enemy; give rewards only when you see deserving deeds.” 無政, however, presents some difficulty. Ts‘ao Kung’s paraphrase, 軍法令不應預施懸也, I take to mean: “The final instructions you give to your army should not correspond with those that have been previously posted up.” Chang Yü simplifies this into 政不預告 “your arrangements should not be divulged beforehand.” And Chia Lin says: 不守常法常政 “there should be no fixity in your rules and arrangements.” Not only is there danger in letting your plans be known, but war often necessitates the entire reversal of them at the last moment.
and you will be able to handle a whole army 犯, according to Ts‘ao Kung, is here equal to 用. The exact meaning is brought out more clearly in the next paragraph.
as though you had to do with but a single man.
Cf. supra, § 34.
57. 犯之以事勿告以言犯之以利勿告以害 Confront your soldiers with the deed itself; never let them know your design.
Literally, “do not tell them words;” _i.e._ do not give your reasons for any order. Lord Mansfield once told a junior colleague to “give no reasons” for his decisions, and the maxim is even more applicable to a general than to a judge. Capt. Calthrop translates this sentence with beautiful simplicity: “Orders should direct the soldiers.” That is all.
When the outlook is bright, bring it before their eyes; but tell them nothing when the situation is gloomy.
58. 投之亡地然後存陷之死地然後生 Place your army in deadly peril, and it will survive; plunge it into desperate straits, and it will come off in safety.
Compare the paradoxical saying 亡者存之基死者生之本. These words of Sun Tzŭ were once quoted by Han Hsin in explanation of the tactics he employed in one of his most brilliant battles, already alluded to on p. 28, In 204 B.C., he was sent against the army of Chao, and halted ten miles from the mouth of the 井陘 Ching-hsing pass, where the enemy had mustered in full force. Here, at midnight, he detached a body of 2000 light cavalry, every man of which was furnished with a red flag. Their instructions were to make their way through narrow defiles and keep a secret watch on the enemy.
“When the men of Chao see me in full flight,” Han Hsin said, “they will abandon their fortifications and give chase. This must be the sign for you to rush in, pluck down the Chao standards and set up the red banners of 漢 Han in their stead.” Turning then to his other officers, he remarked: “Our adversary holds a strong position, and is not likely to come out and attack us until he sees the standard and drums of the commander-in-chief, for fear I should turn back and escape through the mountains.” So saying, he first of all sent out a division consisting of 10,000 men, and ordered them to form in line of battle with their backs to the River 泜 Ti. Seeing this manœuvre, the whole army of Chao broke into loud laughter. By this time it was broad daylight, and Han Hsin, displaying the generalissimo’s flag, marched out of the pass with drums beating, and was immediately engaged by the enemy. A great battle followed, lasting for some time; until at length Han Hsin and his colleague 張耳 Chang Ni, leaving drums and banner on the field, fled to the division on the river bank, where another fierce battle was raging. The enemy rushed out to pursue them and to secure the trophies, thus denuding their ramparts of men; but the two generals succeeded in joining the other army, which was fighting with the utmost desperation. The time had now come for the 2000 horsemen to play their part. As soon as they saw the men of Chao following up their advantage, they galloped behind the deserted walls, tore up the enemy’s flags and replaced them by those of Han. When the Chao army turned back from the pursuit, the sight of these red flags struck them with terror. Convinced that the Hans had got in and overpowered their king, they broke up in wild disorder, every effort of their leader to stay the panic being in vain. Then the Han army fell on them from both sides and completed the rout, killing a great number and capturing the rest, amongst whom was King 歇 Ya himself...After the battle, some of Han Hsin’s officers came to him and said: “In the _Art of War_ we are told to have a hill or tumulus on the right rear, and a river or marsh on the left front. [This appears to be a blend of Sun Tzŭ and T‘ai Kung. See IX. § 9, and note.] You, on the contrary, ordered us to draw up our troops with the river at our back. Under these conditions, how did you manage to gain the victory?” The general replied: “I fear you gentlemen have not studied the Art of War with sufficient care. Is it not written there: ‘_Plunge your army into desperate straits and it will come off in safety; place it in deadly peril and it will survive_’? Had I taken the usual course, I should never have been able to bring my colleagues round. What says the Military Classic (經)?—‘Swoop down on the market-place and drive the men off to fight’ (毆市人而戰之). [This passage does not occur in the present text of Sun Tzŭ.] If I had not placed my troops in a position where they were obliged to fight for their lives, but had allowed each man to follow his own discretion, there would have been a general _débandade_, and it would have been impossible to do anything with them.” The officers admitted the force of his argument, and said: “These are higher tactics than we should have been capable of.” [See _Ch‘ien Han 59. 夫衆陷於害然後能爲勝敗 For it is precisely when a force has fallen into harm’s way that it is capable of striking a blow for victory.
Danger has a bracing effect.
60. 故爲兵之事在於順詳敵之意 Success in warfare is gained by carefully accommodating ourselves to the enemy’s purpose.
Ts‘ao Kung says: 佯愚也 “Feign stupidity”—by an appearance of yielding and falling in with the enemy’s wishes. Chang Yü’s note makes the meaning clear: “If the enemy shows an inclination to advance, lure him on to do so; if he is anxious to retreat, delay on purpose that he may carry out his intention.” The object is to make him remiss and contemptuous before we deliver our attack.
61. 并敵一向千里殺將 By persistently hanging on the enemy’s flank, I understand the first four words to mean “accompanying the enemy in one direction.” Ts‘ao Kung says: 幷兵向敵 “unite the soldiers and make for the enemy.” But such a violent displacement of characters is quite indefensible. Mei Yao-ch‘ên is the only commentator who seems to have grasped the meaning: 隨敵一向然後發伏 出奇. The _T‘u Shu_ reads 并力.
we shall succeed in the long run in killing the commander-in-chief.
Always a great point with the Chinese.
62. 此謂巧能成事者也 This is called ability to accomplish a thing by sheer cunning.
The _T‘u Shu_ has 是謂巧於成事, and yet another reading, mentioned by Ts‘ao Kung, is 巧攻成事. Capt. Calthrop omits this sentence, after having thus translated the two preceding: “Discover the enemy’s intentions by conforming to his movements. When these are discovered, then, with one stroke, the general may be killed, even though he be one hundred leagues distant.”
63. 是故政舉之日夷關折符無通其使