Let a man's moral judgment be ever fo little improved by ex- ercife, or ever fo much corrupted by bad habits, he cannot be indifferent to his own happinefs or mifery. When he is become infenfible to every nobler motive to right conduft, he cannot be infenfible to this. And though to adl from this motive folely may be called prudence rather than virtue, yet this prudence deferves fome regard upon its own account, and much more as it is the friend and ally of virtue, and the enemy of all vice; and as it gives a favourable teftimony of virtue to thofe who are deaf to every other recommendation.
If a man can be induced to do his duty even from a regard to his own happinefs, he will foon find reafon to love virtue for her own iake, and to ad from motives lels mercenary.
I OF THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF MORALS.
I cannot therefore approve of thofe moralifts, who would ba- niHi all perluafives to virtue taken from the confidcration of pri- vate good. In the prefent flate of human nature thefe are not ufelefs to the belt, and they are the only means left of reclaim- ing the abandoned.
2. As far as the intention of nature appears In the conftltu- tion of man, we ought to comply with that intention, and to att agreeably to it.
The Autlior of our being; hath given us not only the power of ading within a limited fphere, but various principles or fprlngs of action, of different nature and dignity, to diredl us in the ex- ercife of our adlive power.
Fron:i the conftitution of every fpecies of the inferior ani- mals, and efpccially from the active principles which nature has given them, we eafily perceive the manner of life for which na- ture intended them; and they uniformly ad: the part to which they are led by their conftitution, without any refledion upon it, or intention of obeying its dictates. Man only, of the inha- bitants of this world, is made capable of obferving his own con- ftitution, what kind of life it is made for, and of ading accord- ing to that intention, or contrary to it. He only is capable of yielding an intentional obedience to the dictates of his nature, or of rebelling againft them.
In treating of the principles of adion in man, it has been fhewn, that as his natural inftinds and bodily appetites, are well adapted to the prefervation of his natural life, and to the con- tinuance of the fjiecies; fo his natural dcfires, alTcdions, and pallions, when uncorrupted by vicious habits, and under the go- vernment of the leading principles of reafon and confcience, are excellently fitted for the rational and fecial life. Every vicious \6tion fliews an exccfs, or defed, or wrong dircdion of fome na- tural CHAP. I. tural fpring of adlion, and therefore may, very juflly, be faid to be unnatural. Every virtuous adlion agrees with the uncorrupt- ed principles of human nature.
The Stoics defined virtue to be a life according to nature. Some of them more accurately, a life according to the nature of man, in fo far as it is fuperior to that of brutes. The life of a brute is according to the nature of the brute j but it is neither virtuous nor vicious-. The life of a moral agent cannot be ac- cording to his nature, unlefs it be virtuous. That confcience, which is in every man's breaft, is the law of God written in his heart, which he cannot difobey without adting unnaturally, and being felf-condemned.
The intention of nature, in the various adlive principles of man, in the defires of power, of knowledge, and of efteem, in the affedion to children, to near relations, and to the commu- nities to which we belong, in gratitude, in compaflion, and even in refentment and emulation, is very obvious, and has been pointed out in treating of thofe principles. Nor is it lefs evi- dent, that reafon and confcience are given us to regulate the in- ferior principles, fo that they may confpire, in a regular and confiflent plan of life, in purfuit of fome worthy end.
3. No man is born for himfelf only. Every man, therefore, ought to confider himfelf as a member of the common fociety of mankind, and of thofe fubordinate focieties to which he be- longs, fuch as family, friends, neighbourhood, country, and to do as much good as he can, and as little hurt to the focieties of ■which he is a part.
This axiom leads diredlly to the practice of every focial vir- tue, and indiredlly to the virtues of felf-govemment, by which only we can be qualified for difcharging the duty we owe to foriet^f, OF THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF MORALS. 375 4. In every cafe, we ought to a(it that part towarils another, p'^^*'- ]• which we would judge to he right in him to adl toward us, if we were in his circumftances and he in ours; or, more gene- rally, what we approve in others, that we ought to pradife in like circumftances, and what we condemn in others we ought not to do.
If there be any fuch thing as right and wrong in the condu(fl of moral agents, it muft be the fome to all in the fame circum- ftances.
We ftand all in the fame relation to him who made us, and will call us to account for our condud; for with him there is no refpedl of perfons. We ftand in the fame relation to one another as members of the great community of mankind. The duties confcquent upon the different ranks and offices and rela- tions of men are the fame to all in the fame circumftances.
It is not want of judgment, but want of candour and Impar- tiality, that hinders men from difcerning what they owe to others. They are quickfighted enough in difcerning what is due to themfclves. When they are injured, or ill-treated, they fee it, and feel refentment. It is the want of candour that makes men ufc one meafure for the duty they owe to others, and another meafure for the duty that others owe to them in like circumftances. That men ought to judge with candour, as in all other cafes, fo efpecially in what concerns their moral conduct, is furely felf-evident to every intelligent being. The man who takes offence when he is injured in his perfon, in his property, in his good name, pronounces judgment againft liim- felf if he adl fo toward his neighbour.
As the equity and obligation of this rule of conduct is felf- evident to every man who hath a confcience; fo it is, of all the rules of morality, the moft comprelicnfivc, and truly deferves the CHAP, r. tiie encomium given it by the higheft authority, that it is the law and the prophets.
It comprehends every rule of juftice without exception. It comprehends all the relative duties, ariling either from the more permanent relations of parent and child, of mailer and fervant, of magiftrate and fubjed, of hufband and wife, or from the more tranlient relations of rich and poor, of buyer and feller, of debtor and creditor, of benefadlor and benefici- ary, of friend and enemy. It comprehends every duty of cha- rity and humanity, and even of courtefy and good manners.
Nay, I think, that, without any force or draining, it extends even to the duties of felf-government. For, as every man ap- proves in others the virtues of prudence, temperance, felf-com- mand and fortitude, he muft perceive, that what is right in others muft be right in hirafelf in like circumftances.
To fum up all, he who ads invariably by this rule will never deviate from the path of his duty, but from an error of judg- ment. And, as he feels the obligation that he and all men are under to ufe the beft means in his power to have his judgment well-informed in matters of duty, his errors will only be fuch as are invincible.
It may be obferved, that this axiom fuppofes a faculty in man by which he can diftinguifh right condud from wrong. It fup- pofes alfo, that, by this faculty, we eafily perceive the right and the wrong in other men that are indifferent to us; but are very apt to be blinded by the partiality of felfifh paflions when the cafe concerns ourfelves. Every claim we have againft others is apt to be magnified by felf-love, when viewed diredly. A change of perfons uemoves this prejudice, and brings the claim to appear in its juft magnitude.
OF THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF MORALS. 377 5. To every man who believes the exigence, the perfedlions, and the providence of Gon, tlie veneration and tubniilllon we owe to him is lelf-evident. Right fentinients of the Deity and of his works, not only make the duty we owe to him obvious to every intelligent being, but likewife add the authority of a Di- vhie law to every rule of right condud.
There is another clafs of axioms in morals, by which, when there feems to be an oppofition between the adlions that diffe- rent virtues lead to, we determine to which the preference is due.
Between the feveral virtues, as they are difpofitions of mind, or determinations of will, to a6l according to a certain general rule, there can be no o|)poiition. They dwell together moll amicably, and give mutual aid and ornament, without the polli- bility of hoflility or oppofition, and, taken altogether, make one uniform and confiftent rule of condu(il. But, between par- ticular external adions, which different virtues would lead to, there may be an oppofition. Thus, the fame man may be in his heart, generous, grateful and juft. Thefe difpofitions ftrengthen, but never can weaken one another. Yet it may happen, that an external adlion which generofity or gratitude folicits, juftice may forbid.
That in all fuch cafes, unmerited generofity fliould yield to gratitude, and both to juftice, is felf-evident. Nor is it lefs fo, that unmerited beneficence to thofe who are at eafe fhould yield to compailion to the miferable, and external ads of piety to works of mercy, becaufe God loves mercy more than facrilice.
At the fame time, we perceive, that thofe ads of virtue which ought to yield in the cafe of a competicion, h:ive moil intriulic worth when there is no competitinn. 1 lius, it is evident that there is more worth in pure and unmerited benevolence than iu B b b compalfion.
CHAP. I.
F^^J"- '•, compaffion, more in compaflion than in gratitude, and more in gratitude than in juftice.
I call thefe Jirjl principles, becaufe they appear to me to have in themfelves an intuitive evidence which I cannot refift. I find I can exprefs them in other words. I can illuftrate them by examples and authorities, and perhaps can deduce one of them from another j but I am not able to deduce them from other principles that are more evident. And I find the beft moral reafonings of authors I am acquainted with, ancient and mo- dern, Heathen and Chriftian, to be grounded upon one or more of them.
The evidence of mathematical axioms is not difcerned till men come to a certain degree of maturity of underftanding. A boy muft have formed the general conception of quantity, and of more and lefs and equal, oi fum and difference; and he muft have been accuftomed to judge of thefe relations in matters of com- mon life, before he can perceive the evidence of the mathema- tical axiom, that equal quantities, added to equal quantities, make equal fums.
In like manner, our moral judgment, or confclence, grows to maturity from an imperceptible feed, planted by our Creator. When we are capable of contemplating the adions of other men, or of reflecting upon our own calmly and difpaffionately, we begin to perceive in them the qualities of honeft and dif- honefl, of honourable and bafe, of right and wrong, and to feel the fentiments of moral approbation and difapprobation.
Thefe fentiments are at firft feeble, eafily warped by paffions and prejudices, and apt to yield to authority. By ufe and time, the judgment, in morals as in other matters, gathers flrength, and feels more vigour. We begin to diftinguifh the didates of paflion from thofe of cool reafon, and to perceive, that it is not always OF THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF MORALS. 379 always fafe to rely upon the judf^ineiit of others. By an iin- CH^'^v^^ pulfe of nature, we venture to judge for ourfelves, as we ven- ture to walk by ourfelves.
There is a flrong analogy between the progrefs of the body from infancy to maturity, and the progrefs of all the powers of the mind. This progrelllon in both is the work of nature, and in l)oth may be greatly aided or hurt by projjer education. It is natural to a man to be able to walk or run or leap; but if his limbs had been kept in fetters from his birth, he would have none of thofe powers. It is no lefs natural to a man trained in fociety, and accurtomed to judge of his own actions and thofe of other men, to perceive a right and a wrong, an ho- nourable and a bafe, in human condudl; and to fuch a man, I think, the principles of morals I have above mentioned will appear ielf-evident. Yet there may be individuals of the hu- man fpecies fo little accuftomed to think or judge of any thing, but of gratifying their animal appetites, as to have hardly any conception of right or wrong in condud:, or any moral judg- ment; as there certainly are fome who have not the conceptions and the judgment neceflary to underftand the axioms of geo- metry.
From the principles above mentioned, the whole fyflem of moral conduft follows fo eafily, and with fo little aid of rea- foning, that every man of common underflanding, who wiHies to know his duty, may know it. The path of duty is a plain path, which the upright in heart can rarely miftake. Such it muft be, fince every man is bound to walk in it. There are fome intricate cafes in morals which admit of difputation; but thefe feldom occur in pradice; and, when they do, the learned difputant has no great advantage: For the unlearned man, who ufes the bed means in his power to know his duty, and ad:s ac- cording to his knowledge, is inculpable in the fight of God and man. He may err, but he is not guilty of immorality.
B b b 2 CHAP.
380 ESSAY CHAP.U.
Of Syjlcms of Morals.
F the knowledge of our duty be fo level to the apprehenfion of all men, as has been reprefented In the lafl chapter, it may feem hardly to deferve the name of a fcience. It may feem that there is no need for inftrudtion in morals.
From what caufe then has it happened, that we have many large and learned fyftems of moral philofophy, and iyftems of natural jurifprudence, or the law of nature and nations; and that, in modern times, public profefllons have been inftituted in molt places of education for inflruding youth in thefe branches of knowledge?.
This event, I think, may be accounted for, and the utility of fuch fyftems and profefllons juftified, without fuppoling any dif- ficulty or intricacy in the knowledge of our duty.
I am far from thinking inftruction in morals unnecefTary, Men may, to the end of life, be ignorant of felf-evident truths.. They niay, to the end of life, entertain grofs abfurdities. Expe- rience fliews that this happens often in matters that are indiffe- rent. Much more may it happen in matters where intereft, pafllon, prejudice andfafliion, are fo apt to pervert the judgment.
The moft obvious truths are not perceived without fome ripe- nefs of judgment. For we fee, that children may be made to believe any thing, though ever fo abfurd. Our judgment of things is ripened, not by time only, but chiefly by being exer- cifed about things of the fame or of a fimilar kind.
Judgment, even in things feif-evident, requires a clear, diflind OF SYSTEMS OF MORALS. 381 flin<fl and fteady conception of tlic things about which we charit ju(I(';f. Our conceptions are at firft ohfcure and wavering. The habit of attending to them is neccfTary to make them diftind: and Oeatly; and this habit re(]uires an exertion of mind to which many of our animal principles are unfriendly. The love of truth calls for it; but its ftill voice is often drowned by the louder call of fome pafllon, or we are hindered from liftening to it by lazinefs and defultorinefs. Thus men often remain through life ignorant of things which they needed but to open their eyes to fee, and which they would have feen if their at- tention had been turned to them.
The mod knowing derive the greateft part of their know- ledge, even in things obvious, from inftrucl:ion and informa- tion, and from being taught to excrcife their natural faculties, which, without inllrudion, would lie dormant.
I am very apt to tliink, that, if a man could be reared from inf\ncy, without any fociety of his fellow-creatures, he would hardly ever {hew anyfign, either of moral judgment, or of the power of reafoning. His own adions would be direded by his ani- mal appetites and paflions, without cool reflexion, and he would have no accefs to improve, by obferving the condud of other beings like himlelf.
The power of vegetation in the feed of a plant, without heat and moifture, would for ever lie dormant. The rational and moral powers of man would perhaps lie dormant without in- ilrudion and example. Yet thefe powers are a part, and the nobleft part, of his conftitution; as the power of vegetation is of the feed.
Our firft moral conceptions are probably got by attending coolly to the condud of others, and obferving what moves our approbation, what our indignation. Thefe fentiments fpring from 382 ' E S S A Y V.
CHAP. II. from our moral faculty as naturally as the fenfations of fweet and bitter from the faculty of tafte. They have their niitural objeds. But moft human adions are of a mixed nature, and have various colours, according as they are viewed on different fides. Prejudice againfl, or in favour of the perfon, is apt to warp our opinion. It requires attention and candour to diftin- guifli the good from the ill, and, without favour or prejudice, to form a clear and impartial judgment. In this we may be great- ly aided by inftrudtion.
He mufl be very ignorant of human nature, who does not perceive that the feed of virtue in the mind of man, like that of a tender plant in an unkindly foil, requires care and culture in the firft period of life, as well as our own exertion when we come to maturity.
If the irregularities of pailion and appetite be timely checked,' and good habits planted; if we be excited by good examples, and bad examples be fliewn in their proper colour j if the atten- tion be prudently diredled to the precepts of wifdom and virtue, as the mind is capable of receiving them; a man thus trained will rarely be at a lofs to diftlnguilli good from ill in his own condud, without the labour of reafoning.
The bulk of mankind have but little of this culture in the proper feafon; and what they have is often unlkilfuUy applied; by which means bad habits gather ftrength, and falfe notions of pleafure, of honour, and of intereft, occupy the mind. They give little attention to what is right and honeft. Confcience is feldom confulted, and fo little exercifed, that its decifions are weak and wavering. Although, therefore, to a ripe underftand- ing, free from prejudice, and accuflomed to judge of the morali- ty of adions, moft truths in morals will appear felf-evldcnt, it does not follow that moral inftrudion is unneceffary in the firft: part OF SYSTEMS OF MORALS. 383 part of life, or that it may not be very profitable in its more ad- CHAPMI. vancecl period.
The hiftory of pad ap;cs fliews that nations, highly civilized and greatly enlightened in many arts and fciences, may, for ages, not only hold the groflcfl; abfurdities with regard to the Deity and his worihip, but with" regard to the duty we owe to our fel- low-men, particularly to children, to fervants, to ftrangers, to enemies, and to thofe who differ from us in religious opinions.
Such corruptions in religion, and in morals, had fpread fo wide among mankind, and were fo confirmed by cuftom, as to require a light from heaven to correct them. Revelation was not intended to fuperfede, but to aid the ufe of our natural fa- culties; and 1 doubt not, but the attention given to moral truths, in fuch fyllcms as we have mentioned, has contributed much to corred the errors and prejudices of former ages, and may con- tinue to have the fame good effed in time to come.
It needs not feem ftrange, that fyftems of morals may fwell to great magnitude, if we confider that, although the general prin- ciples be few and fimple, their application extends to every part of human conducft, in every condition, every relation, and every tranfaclion of life. They are the rule of life to the magirtrate and to the fubjed, to the matter and to the fervant, to the parent and to the child, to the fellow-citizen and to the alien, to the friend and to the enemy, to the buyer and to the feller, to the borrower and to the lender. Every human creature is fiibjeft to their authority in his actions and words, and even in his thoughts. They may, in this refpect, be compared to the laws of motion in the natural world, which, though few and fimple, ferve to regulate an infinite variety of operations throughout the univerfe.
And as the beauty of the laws of motion is difplayed in the moft 384 ' E S S A Y V.
CHAP. 11. moft flriking manner, when we trace them through all the va- riety of their effedls j fo the divine beauty and fanftity of the priuciples of morals, appear moft auguft when we take a com- prehenfive view of their application to every condition and rela- tion, and to every tranfadlion of human fociety.
This Is, or ought to be, the defign of fyftems of morals. They may be made more or lefs extenfive, having no limits fixed by na- ture, but the wide circle of human tranfadtions. When the prin- ciples are applied tothefe in detail, the detail is pleafant and profit- able. It requires no profound reafoning, (excepting, perhaps, in a few difputable points.) It admits of the moft agreeable il- luftration from examples and authorities; it ferves to exercife, and thereby to ftrengthen moral judgment. And one who has given much attention to the duty of man. In all the various rela- tions and circumftances of life, will probably be more enllghten- .ed in his own duty, and more able to enlighten others.
The firfl writers in morals, we are acquainted with, delivered (their moral Inftrudlions, not In fyftems, but in fliort unconnedt- ed fentences, or aphorlfras. They faw no need for deductions of reafoning, becaufe the truths they delivered could not but be admitted by the candid and attentive.
Subfequent writers, to Improve the way of treating this fub- jed:, gave method and arrangement to moral truths, by reducing them under certain divlfions and fubdivifions, as parts of one whole. By thefe means the whole Is more eafily comprehended and remembered, and from this arrangement gets the name of a fyftem and of a fcience.
A fyftem of morals is not like a fyftem of geometry, where the fubfequent parts derive their evidence from the preceding, and one chain of reafoning is carried on from the beginning; fo that, If the arrangement is changed, the chain is broken, and the OF SYSTEMS OF MORALS. 38; ihe evidence is loH. It rcfemblcs more a fyftcm of botany, or CHAT\ii. mineralogy, where the fubfcqucnt parts depend not for their evidence upon the preceding, and the arrangement is made to facilitate apprchenfion and memory, and not to give evidence.
Morals have been methodifcd in different ways. The an- cients commonly arranged them under the four cardinal virtues of prudence, temperance, fortitude, and juftice. Chriftian wri- ters, I think more properly, under the three heads of the duty we owe to God, to ourfelves, and to our neighbour. One divi- fion may be more comprehenfive, or more natural, than ano- ther; but the truths arranged are the fame, and their evidence the fame in all.
I fliall only farther obferve, with regard to fyftems of mo- rals, that they have been made more voluminous, and more in- tricate, partly by mixing political queilions with morals, which I think improper, becaufe they belong to a different fcience, and are grounded on different principles; partly by making what is commonly, but 1 think improperly, called the Theory of Morals, a part of the fyftem.
By the theory of morals is meant a juft account of the flruc- ture of our moral powers; that is, of thofe powers of the mind by which we have our moral conceptions, and diftinguifli right from wrong in human adions. This, indeed, is an intricate fub- J€<ft, and there have been various theories and much controver- fy about it in ancient and in modern times. But it has little connection with the knowledge of our duty; and thofe who dif- fer nioft in the theory of our moral powers, agree in the practical rules of morals which they dictate.
As a man may be a good judge of colours, and of the other vifible qualities of objects, without any knowledge of the ana- tomy of the eye, and of the theory of vifion; fo a man may have Geo a ESSAY V.
CHAP. II, a very clear and comprehenfive knowledge of what is right and " what is wrong in human condudt, who never fludied the ftructure of our moral powers.
A good ear in mufic may be much improved by attention and pradlice in that art; but very little by ftudying the anatomy of the ear, and the theory of found. In order to acquire a good eye or a good ear in the arts that require them, the theory of vifion and the theory of found, are by no means necefliiry, and indeed of very little ufe. Of as little neceflity or ufe is what we call the theory of morals, in order to improve our moral judg- ment.
1 mean not to depreciate this branch of knowledge. It is a very important part of the philofophy of the human mind, and ought to be confidered as fuch, but not as any part of morals. By the name we give to it, and by the cuftom of making it a part of every fyftem of morals, men may be led into this grofs miftake, which I wifh to obviate. That in order to underftand his duty, a man muft needs be a philofopher and a metaphyfi- cian.
CHAP.
OF SYSTEMS OF NATURAL JURISPRUDENCE. 387 CHAP. iir.
Of Syflems of Natural fur if prudence.
SYSTEMS of natural jurifprudence, of the rights of peace and war, or of the law of nature and nations, arc a modern invention, which foon acquired fuch reputation, as gave occafion to many public eftablifliments for teaching it along with the other fciences. It has fo clofe a relation to morals, tliat it may anfwer the purpofe of a fyftem of morals, and is commonly put in the place of it, as far, at leaft, as concerns our duty to our fellow-men. They differ in the name and form, but agree in fubftance. This will appear from a llight attention to the na- ture of both.
The dired intention of morals is to teach the duty of men: that of natural jurifprudence, to teach the rights of men. Right and duty are things very different, and have even a kind of op- pofition; yet they are fo related, that the one cannot even be conceived without the others and he that underftands the one mufl undcrftand the other.
They have the fame relation which credit has to debt. As all credit fuppofes an equivalent debt; fo all right fuppofes a cor- refponding duty. There can be no credit in one party without an equivalent debt in another party; and there can be no right in one party, without a correfponding duty in another party. The fum of credit fliews the fum of debt; and the funi of mens rights fliews, in like manner, the fum of their duty to one another.
The word right has a very different meaning, according as it is applied to actions or to perfons. A right adion is an adiou C c c 2 agreeable CHAP. Ill, agreeable to our duty. But when we fpeak of the rights of men, the word has a very different and a more artificial meaning. It is a term of art in law, and fignifies all that a man may law- fully do, all that he may lawfully poflefs and ufe, and all that he may lawfully claim of any other perfon.
This comprehenfive meaning of the word right, and of the Latin wordyW, which correfponds to it, though long adopted in- to common language, is too artificial to be the birth of com- mon language. It is a term of art, contrived by Civilians when th ecivil lr>w became a profeifion^ The whole end and obje<S of law is to protect the fubjedls in all that they may lawfully do, or pofl^efs, or demand. This threefold objed: of law. Civilians have comprehended under the \iovdi jus ox right, which they define, Facultas aliquid agendi, vel pojfidendi, vel ab alio confequendi: A lawful claim to do any thing, to poflefs any thing, or to demand fome preftatioa from feme other perfon. The firft of thefe may be called the right of //- bertv, the fecond that of property, which is alfo called a real rigbty the third is called perfonal right, becaufe it refpedls fome particu lar perfon or pei^fons of whom the preflation may be demanded.
We can be at no lofs to perceive the duties correfponding to the feveral kinds of rights. What I have a right to do, it is the duty of all men not to hinder me from doing. What is my property or real right, no man ought to take from me j or to mo- left me in the ufe and enjoyment of it. And what I have a right to demand of any man, it is his duty to perform. Between the rio-ht, on the one hand, and the duty, on the other, there is not only a neceffary connexion, but, in reality, they are only diffe- rent expreflions of the fame meaning; juft as it is the fame thing to fay I am your debtor, and to fay you are my creditor; or as it is the fame thing to fay I am your father, and to fay you are my fon.
Thus OF SYSTEMS OF NATURAL JURISPRUDENCE. 389 Thus \vc fee, tliat there is Inch a correfpondencc between tlie CHAP. ill. rights of nifn and the ihitics of men, that the one points out the other; and a lylUnn of the one may be fubftituttd for a fyllem of the other.
Rnt here an objedlion occurs. It may be faid, That although every right implies a chity, yet every duty does not imply a right. Thus, it may be my duty to do a humane or kind office to a man who has no claim of right to it; and therefore a fyftem of the rights of men, though it teach all the duties of Itrid juflice, yet it leaves put all the duties of charity and hu- manity, without which the f^fteni of morals muft be very lame.