One perfon, we are fure, is a perfeft idiot; another, who feigns idiocy to fcreen himfelf from punifhment, is found upon trial to have the underflanding of man, and to be account- able for his condu£t. We perceive one man to be open, another cunning; one to be ig- norant, another very knowing; one to be flow of underflanding, another quick. Every man forms fuch judgments of thofe he conver- fes with; and the common affairs of life de- pend upon fuch judgments. We can as little avoid them as we can avoid feeing what is be- fore our eyes.
From this it appears, that it is no lefs a part of the human conflitution, to judge of mens charaders, and of their intelledual powers, from the figns of them in their adions and dif- courfe, than to judge of corporeal objects by our fenfes: That fuch judgments are common to the whole human race that are endowed with underflanding; and that they are abfolutely necelfary in the condudl of life.
Now, every judgment of this kind we form, is only a particular application of the general principle, that intelligence, vvifdom, and other mental qualities in the caufc, may be inferred from their marks or figns in the efFe6l.
The actions and difcourfes of men are efFe£ls, of which the actors and fpeakers are the caufes. The effects are perceived by our fenfes; but the caufes are behind the fcene. We only con- clude their exiflence and their degrees from our obfervation of the effects.
From wife condud we infer wifdom in the caufe; from brave actions we infer courage; and fo in other cafes.
This Firji Principles of Ncceffary Truths. 3 1 7 This inference is made with perfeft fecurityC HAP. by all men. We cannot avoid it; it is ne- ^^• ceflary in the ordinary conduct of life; it has therefore the ftrongell marks of being a firft principle.
Perhaps fome may think that this principle may be learned either by reafoning or by ex- perience, and therefore that there is no ground to think it a firft principle.
If it can be fhewn to be got by reafoning, by all, or the greater part of thofe who are governed by it, I fliall very readily acknow- ledge that it ought not to be efteemed a firft principle. But i apprehend the contrary ap- pears from very convincing arguments.
Firjiy The principle is too univerfal to be the efte6: of reafoning. It is common to Phi- lofophers and to the vulgar; to the learned and the moft illiterate; to the civilized and to the favage: And of thofe who are governed by it, not one in ten thoufand can give a reafon for it.
Secondly^ We find Philofophers, ancient and modern, who can reafon excellently in fubjedts that admit of reafoning, when they have occafion to defend this principle, not of- fering reafons for it, or any medium of proof, but appealing to the common fenfe of man- kind; mentioning particular inftances, to make the abfurdity of the contrary opinion more apparent, and fometimes ufing the wea- pons of wit and ridicule, which are very pro- per weapons for refuting abfurdities, but al- together improper in points that are to be de- termined by reafoning.
To confirm this obfervation, I fliall quote two authors, an ancient and a modern, who have 3i8 ESSAY VI.
CHAP, have more exprefsly undertaken the defence of ^^ this principle than any others I remember to '""^'^^^ have met with, and whofe good fenfe and abi- lity to reafon, where reafoning is proper, will not be doubted.
The firft is Cicero, whofe words, /ib. i. cap. 13. De divinatione, may be thus tranflat- ed.
" Can any thing done by chance have all " the marks of defign? Four dice may by " chance turn up four aces; but do you think " that four hundred dice, thrown by chance, " will turn upfour hundred acesPColours thrown " upon canvas without defign may have fome " fimilitude to a human face; but do you " think they might make as beautiful a picture " as that of the Coan Venus? A hog turning " up the ground with his nofe may make " fomething of the form of the letter A; but " do you think that a hog might defcribe on " the ground the Andromache of Ennius? " Carneades imagined, that in the ftone " quarries at Chios he found, in a ftone that *' was fplit, a reprefentation of the head of a " little Pan, or fylvan deity. I believe he " might find a figure not unlike; but furcly '* not fuch a one as you would fay had been " formed by an excellent Sculptor hke Scopas. " For fo, verily, the cafe is, that chance never " perfectly imitates defign.'* Thus Cicero.
Now, in all this difcourfe I fee very good fenfe, and what is apt to convince every un- prejudiced mind; but I fee not in the whole a fingle ftep of reafoning. It is barely an appeal to every man's common fenfe.
Let Firji Principles of Neceffary truths. 319 Let us next fee how the fame point is hand-C H A P. led by the excellent Archbiftiop Iillotson, ^^• ifb Sermon, vol. 1. • " For I appeal to any man of reafon, whe- " ther any thing can be more unreafonable, " than obftinately to impute an etfecl to chance " which carries in the face of it all the argu- " ments and characters of defign? Was ever '* any confiderable work, in which there was " required a great variety of parts, and an " orderly and regular adjuflment of thefe " parts, done by chance? Will chance fit *' means to ends, and that in ten thoufand in- *' fiances, and not fail in any one? How often " might a man, after he had jumbled a fet of *' letters in a bag, fling them out upon the " gound before they would fall into an exact *' poem, yea or fo much as make a good dif- " courfe in profe? And may not a Httle book *' be as enfily made as this great volume of the " world? How long might a man fprinkle co- " lours upon canvas with a carelefs hand before " they would make the exaft picture of a man? " And is a man eafier made by chance than *' his picture? How long might twenty thou- " fand bhnd men, which (hould be fent out " from the remote parts of England, wander " up and down before they would all meet up- " on Salifbury plains, and fall into rank and " file in the exaft order of an army? And yet '* this is much more eafy to be imagined than " how the innumerable blind parts of matter *' (hould rendezvous themfelves into a world. " A man that fees Henry the Seventh's chapel " at Wcflminfter might with as good reafon " maintain, (yea and much better, confider- " ing the vaft difference between that little " flruCture CHAP." ftruclure and the huge fabric of the world), ^ • *' that it was never contrived or built by any *~''^''"^" man, but that the flones did by chance grow " into thofe curious figures into which we fee " them to have been cut and graven; and that *' upon a time (as tales ufually begin), the " materials of that building, the ftone, mor- " tar, timber, iron, lead, and glais, happily '' met together, and very fortunately ranged *' themfelves into that delicate order in which " we fee them now fo clofe compared, that it " mud be a very great chance that parts them " again. What would the world think of a " man that fliould advance fuch an opinion as " this, and write a book for it? If they would " do him right, they ought to look upon him " as mad. But yet he might maintain this opi- " nion with a little more reafon than any man *' can have to fay that the world was made by " chance, or that the firft men grew out of the *' earth, as plants do now. For can any thing " be more ridiculous and againft all reafon, " than to afcribe the produ£lion of men to the " firft fruitfulnefs of the earth, without fo " much as one inflance or experiment in any age or hiftory to countenance fo monftrous " a fuppofition? The thing is at firft fight fo grofs and palpable, that no difcourfe about " it can make it more apparent. And yet " thefe fhameful beggars of principles, who " give this precarious account of the original " of things, affume to themfelves to be the '* men of reafon, the great wits of the world, " the only cautious and wary perfons, who *' hate to be impoftd upon, that muft have " convincing evidence for every thing, and can " admit nothing without a clear demonftration « for it."
In cc lirji Principles of NeceJJary Truths » 321 In this paflage, the excellent author takes CHAP, what I conceive to be the proper method of ^^• refuting an abfurdity, by expofmg it in dif- ferent lights, in which every man of common underftanding perceives it to be ridiculous. And although there is much good fenfe, as well as v/it, in the paflage I have quoied, I cannot find one medium of proof in the whole.
I have met with one or two refredk/ole au- thors who draw an argument from the doctrine of chances, to fliew how improbable it is that a recular arrangement of parts ihould be the efFed of chance, or that it fnould not be the effeft of defign.
I do not obje6t to this reafoning; but I would obferve, that the doctrine of chances is a branch of mathematics little more than an hundred years old. But the conclufion drawn from it has been held by all men from the be- ginning of the W'orld. It cannot, therefore, be thought that men have been led to this con- clufion by that reafoning. Indeed, it mav be doubted whether the firfl principle upon which all the mathematical reafoning about chances is grounded, is more felf-evident than this con- clufion drawn from it, or whether it is not a particular inftance of that general conclufion.
We are next to confider whether we may not learn this truth from experience. That ef- fects which have all the marks and tokens of defign mufh proceed from a defigning caufe.
I apprehend that we cannot learn this truth from experience, for two reafons.
Firji, Becaufe it is a neceifarv truth, not a contingent one. It agrees with the experience of mankind fince the beginning of the world.
Vol. II. Y that C H A P. that the area of a triangle is equal to half the ^^- reclangle under its bafe and perpendicular. It agrees no lefs with experience, that the fun rifes in the eaft and fets in the weft. So far as experience goes, thefe truths are upon an equal footing. But every man perceives this diflinftion between them, that the firft is a necefl'ary truth, and that it is impoffible it fhould not be true; but the lad is not necef- fary, but contingent, depending upon the will of him who made the world. As we cannot learn from experience that twice three muft ne- ceflarily make fix, fo neither can we learn from experience that certain effefts muft proceed from a defigning and intelligent caufe. Expe- rience informs us only of what has been, but never of what muft be.
Secondly^ It may be obferved, that experi- ence can fliow a connection between a fign, and the thing fignined by it, in thofe cafes only, where both the fign and thing fignified are perceived, and have always been perceived in conjunclion. But if there be any cafe where the fign only is perceived, experience can ne- ver fhew its connection with the thing fignified. Thus, for example, thought is a fign of a thinking principle or mind. But how do we know that thoug^ht cannot be without a mind, if anv man fhould fay that he knows this by experience, he deceives himfelf. It is impof- fible he can have any experience of this; be- caufe, though we have an immediate know- ledge of the exiitence of thought in ourfelves by confcioufnefs, yet we have no immediate knov.ledge of a mind. The mind is not an immediate object either of fenfe or of confci- oufnefs. We may therefore juftly conclude, that Firjl Principles of Neceffary Truths, 323 that the neceffary conneclion between thought^ HAP. and a mind, or thinking being, is not learned ^Ji^ from experience.
The fame reafoning may be applied to the connexion between a work excellently fitted for fome purpofe, and defign in the author or caufe of that work. One of thefe, to wit, the work, may be an immediate object of per- ception. But the defign and purpofe of the author cannot be an immediate objeft of per- ception; and therefore experience can never inform us of any conneclion between the one and the other, far lefs of a neceffary connec- tion.
Thus I think it appears, that the principle we have been confidering, to wit, that from certain figns or indications in the effed:, we may infer, that there muft have been intelli- gence, wifdom, or other intellectual or moral qualities in the caufe, is a principle which we get, neither by reafoning nor by experience; and therefore, if it be a true principle, it muft be a firft principle. There is in the human underftanding a light, by which we fee imme- diately the evidence of it, when there is occa- fion to apply it.
Of how great importance this principle is in common life, we have already obferved. And I need hardly mention its importance in natural theology.
The clear marks and fignatures of wifdom, power and goodnefs, in the conflitution and government of the world, is, of all arguments that have been advanced for the being and pro- vidence of the Deity, that which in all ages has made the ftrongeft impreffion upon candid and thinking minds; an argument, which has Y 2 this ESSAY VI.
this peculiar advantage, that it gathers ftrength as human knowledge advances, and is more convincing at prefent than it was feme centuries ago.
King Alphonsus might fay, that he could contrive a better planetary fyflem than that which Aftronomers held in his day. That fyltem was not the work of God, but the fic- tion of men.
But fmce the true fyftem of the fun, moon, and planets, has been difcovered, no man, however atheiftically difpofed, has pretended to fhew how a better could be contrived.
V/hen we attend to the marks of good con- trivance which appear in the works of God, every difcovery we make in the conflitution of the material or intelledual fyftem becomes a hymn of praife to the great Creator and Go- vernor of the w^orld. And a man who is pof- fefied of the genuine fpirit ot philofophy will think it impiety to contaminate the Divine workmanfhip, by mixing it with thofe fiftions of human fancy, called theories and hypothefes, which will always bear the fignatures of human folly, no lefs than the other does of Divine wifdom..
I know of no perfon who ever called in quef- tion the principle now under our confideration, v.hen it is applied to the actions and difcour- • fes of men: For this would be to deny that we have any means of difcerning a wife man from an idiot, or a man that is illiterate in the hip^heft degree from a man of knowledge and learning, which no man has the effrontery to deny.
But, in all ages, thofe who have been un- friendly to the principles of religion, have made Firjl Principles of Neccjfary Truths, 325 made attempts to weaken the force of the ar- C H A P. gument for the exiflcnce and perfedlons of ^^• the Deity, which is founded on this principle. """^ """"^ That argument has got the name of the argu- ment from final caufes; and as the meaning of this name is well underftood, we iliall ufe it.
The argument from final caufes, when redu- ced to a fyllogifm, has thefe two premifes: Firji, That defign and intelligence in the caufc, may, with certainty, be inferred from marks or figns of it in the eife£l. This is the prin- ciple we have been confidering, and we may call it the major propofition of the argument. The fecond, which we call the 7ninor propofiti- on, is. That there are in fad the cleareft marks of defign and wifdom in the works of Nature; and the conclufion is, that the works of Nature are the effeds of a wife and intelli- gent caufe. One mufl either affent to the con- clufion, or deny one or other of the premifes.
Thofe among the ancients who denied a God or a Providence, feem to me to have yielded the major propofition, and to have de- nied the minor; conceiving that there are not in the conftitution of things fuch marks of wife contrivance as are fufficient to put the conclufion beyond doubt. This, I think, we may learn, from the realoning of Cotta the Academic, in the third book of Cicero, of the Nature of the Gods.
The gradual advancement made in the know- ledge of Nature hath put this opinion quite out of countenance.
When the ftrudure of the human body was much lefs known than it is now, the famous Galen faw fuch evident marks of wife contri- vance CHAP, vance in it, that though he had been educated v-A--^ an Epicurean, he renounced that fyftem, and wrote his book of the ufe of the parts of the human body, on purpofe to convince others of what appeared fo clear to himfelf, that it was impoffible that fuch admirable contrivance Hiould be the eiiect of chance.
Thofe, therefore, of later times, who are diffatished with this argument from final caufes, have quitted the ftrcng hold of the ancient Atheifts, which had become untenable, and have chofen rather to make a defence againll the major propofition.
Des Cartes feems to have led the way in this, though he was no Atheifl. But, having invented fome new arguments for the being of God, he was perhaps led to difparage thofe that had been ufed before, that he might bring more credit to his own. Or perhaps he was offended with the Peripatetics, becaufe they often mixed final caufes with phyfical, in order to account for the phsenomena of na- ture.
He maintained therefore that phyfical caufes only fhould be affigned for phsenomena; that the Philofopher has nothing to do with final caufes; and that it is prefumption in us to pre- tend to determine for what end any work of nature is framed. Some of thofe who were great admirers of Des Cartes, and followed him in many points, differed from him in this, particularly. Dr. Henry More and the pious Archbifhop Fenelon: But others, after the example of Des Cartes, have fhewn a con- tempt of all reafoning from final caufes. Among thefe, I think, we may reckon Mau- pertttis and Buffon. But the moft dire6t attack attack Firjl Principles of Neceffary Truths. 327 attack has been made upon this principle byCH AP. Mr. Hume, who puts an argument in the ^^• mouth of an Epicurean, on which he feems to ' • -^ lay great itrefs.
The argument is, That the univerfe is a fm- gular efteft, and therefore we can draw no conclufion from it, whether it may have been made by wifdom or not.
If I underftand the force of this argument, it amounts to this. That, if we had been ac- cuftomed to fee worlds produced, fome by wifdom and others without it, and had ob- fcrved, that fuch a world as this which we in- habit was always the efte<Sl of wifdom, we might then, from pail experience, conclude, that this world was made by wifdom; but hav- ing no fuch experience, we have no means of forming any conclufion about it.
That this is the ftrength of the argument, appears, becaufe if the marks of wifdom feen in one world be no evidence of wifdom, the like marks feen in ten thoufand will give as lit- tle evidence, unlefs, in time paft, we perceiv- ed wifdom itfelf conjoined with the tokens of it; and, from their perceived conjundtion in time paft, conclude, that although, in the prefent world, we fee only one of the two, the other muft accompany it.
Whence it appears, that this reafoning of Mr. Hume is built on the fuppofition, that our inferring defign from the ftrongeft marks of it, is entirely owing to our pad experience ol having always found thefe two things con- joined. But I hope I have made it evident that this is not the cafe. And indeed it is evident, that, according to this reafoning, we can CHAP can have no evidence of mind or defign in any of our fellow-men.
^"^'^^^^ How do i know that any man of my acquain- tance hab underftanding? 1 never faw his un- derftanding. • I fee only certain effects, which my judgment leads me to conclude to be marks and tokens of it.
But, fays the fceptical Philofopher, you can conclude nothing from thefe tokens, unlefs pail experience has informed you that fuch to- kens are always joined with underftanding. Alas! Sir, it is impofTible I can ever have this experience. The underliandin^ of another man is no immediate object of fight, or of any other faculty which God hath given me; and unlefs I can conclude its exiftence from tokens that are vifible, I have no evidence that there is underftanding in any man.
It feems then, that the man who maintains, that there is no force in the argument from fi- nal caufes, muft, if he will be confiftent, fee no evidence of the exiftence of any intelligent being but himfelf.
CHAP.
X OPINIONS ahoui firjl PRINCIPLES. 329 CHAP.
VII.
CHAP. VII.
Opinions ancient arid modern about jirft Princi- ples.
I Know no writer who has treated exprefsly of firft principles before Aristotle; but it is probable, that, in the ancient Pythago- rean fchool, from which both Plato and Aristotle borrowed much, this fubject had not been left untouched.
Before the time of Aristotle, confidera- ble progrefs had been made in the mathema- tical fciences, particularly in geometry.
The difcovery of the forty-feventh propofi- tion of the firft book of Euclid, and of the five regular folids, is, by antiquity, afcribed to Pythagoras himfelf; and it is impoffible he could have made thofe difcoveries without knowing many other propofitions in mathema- tics. Aristotle mentions the incommenfu- rability of the diagonal of a fquare to its fide, and gives a hint of the manner in which it was demonftrated. We find likewife fome of the axioms of geometry mentioned by Aristotle as axioms, and as indemonftrable principles, of mathem.atical reafoning.
It is probable, therefore, that.j before the time of Aristotle, there were elementary Treatifes of geometry, which are now loft; and that in them the axioms were diflinguifhed from the propofitions which require proof.
To iuppofe, that fo perfeQ: a fyflem as that of Euclid's Elem.ents was produced by one man, without any preceding model or mate- rials.
C H A P. rials, would be to fup-.ofe Euclid more than \\- a man. We afcribe to him as much as the ^ weaknefs of human underilanding will per- mit, if we fuppofe that the inventions in geo- metry, which had been made in a tract of pre- ceding ages, were by him not only carried much farther, but digefled into fo admirable a fyftem, that his work obfcured all that went before it, and made them be forgot and loft.
Perhaps, in like manner, the writings of Aristotle v/ith regard to lirft principles, and with regard to many other abllraft fubjefts, may have occafioned the lofs of what had been written upon thofe fubjecls by more ancient Philofophers Whatever may be in this, in his fecond book upon demonft ration he has treated very fully or firil principles; and though he has not attempted any enumeration of them, he fliows very clearly, that all demonftration muft be built upon truths which are evident of them- felves, but cannot be demonftrated. His whole doftrine of fyllogifms is grounded upon a few axioms, from v/hich he endeavours to demonftrate the rules of fyllogifm in a mathe- matical way; and in his topics he points out many of the firit principles of probable rea- foning.
As long as the philofophy of Aristotle prevailed, it was held as a fixed point, that all proof muft be drawn from principles already known and granted.
We miuft obferve, however, that, in that philofophy, many things were aftumed as firft principles, which have no juft claim to that character; fuch as, that the earth is at reft; that Nature abhors a vacuum j that there is no change OPINIONS about firjl PRINCIPLES. 33 1 change in the heavens above the fphere of the^ ^ ^ ^• moon; that the heavenly bodies move in cir-,^,^^L, cles, that being the mofl perfed: figure; that bodies do not gravitate in their proper place; and many others.
The Peripatetic philofophy, therefore, in- ftead of being deficient in firll principles, was redundant; inftead of reje(5ling thofe that are truly fuch, it adopted, as firll principles, many vulgar prejudices and rafli judgments: And this feems in general to have been the fpirit of ancient philofophy.
It is true, there were among the ancients fceptical Philofophers who profeffed to have no principles, and held it to be the greatefl virtue in a Philofopher to with-hold afl'ent, and keep his judgment in a perfect equilibrium between contradictory opinions. But though this feft was defended by fome perfons of great erudi- tion and acutenefs, it died of itfelf, and the dogmatic philofophy ot Aristotle obtained a complete triumph over it.
What Mr. Hume fays of thofe who are fcep- tical with regard to moral diftinclions, feems to have had its accomplifliment in the ancient feci of Sceptics. " The only way, fays he, '• of converting antagonifts of this kind, is to " leave them to themfelves; for finding that " nobody keeps up the controverfy with them, " it is probable they will at lad of themfelves, " from mere wearinefs, come over to the fide " of common fenfe and reafon.** Setting afide this fmall fe6l of the Sceptics, which was extin£t many ages before the autho- rity of Aristotle declined, I know of no op- pofition made to firft principles among the an- cients. The difpofition was, as has been obferved.
CHAP.ferved, not to oppofe, but to multiply them ^^ beyond meafure.
Men have always been prone, when they leave one extreme to run into the oppofite; and this fpirit in the ancient phiiofophy to multiply firft principles beyond reafon, was a ftrong prefage, that, when the authority of the Peripatetic fyilem was at an end, the next reigning fyltem would diminifh their number beyond reafon.
This accordingly happened in that great re- volution of the philofophical republic brought about by Des Cartes. That truly great re- former in philofophy, cautious to avoid the fnare in which Aristotle was taken, of ad- mitting things as firft principles too raflily, refolved to doubt of every thing, and to with- hold his aflent, until it was forced by the clear- efl evidence.
Thus Des Cartes brought himfelf into that very ftate of fufpenfe, which the ancient Scep- tics recommended as the highcil perfection of a wife man, and the only road to tranquillity of mind. But he did not remain long in this ftate; his doubt did not arife from defpair of finding the truth, but from caution, that he might not be impofed upon, and embrace a cloud inftead of a goddefs.
His very doubting convinced him of his own exiftence; for that which does not exift, can neither doubt, nor believe, nor reafon.
Thus he emerged from univerfal fcepticifm by this fhort enthymeme, cogito ergo fum.
This enthymeme confifts of an antecedent propofition, / think, and a conclufion drawn from it, therefore I ex'i/i.
If OPINIONS about firjl PRINCIPLES. y:,^-, If it fhould be aflced, how Des CartesCHAP. came to be certain of the anLecedent propofi- ^'^^' tion, it is evident, that for this he trufled to' — ^^~~^ the teftimony of confcioufnefs. He was con- fcious that he thought, and needed no other argument.
So that the firfl principle which he adopts in this famous enthymeme is this, That thofe doubts, and thoughts, and reafonings, of which he was confcious, did certainly exift, and that his confcioufnefs put their exiftencc beyond all doubt.
It might have been objected to this firft prin- ciple of Des Cartes, how do you know that vour confcioufnefs cannot deceive you? You have fuppofed, that all you fee, and hear, and handle, may be an illufion. Why therefore fhould the power of confcioufnefs have this pre- rogative, to be believed implicitly, when all our other powers are fuppofed fallacious?
To this objection, I know no other anfwer that can be made, but that we find it impoffiblc to doubt of thmgs of which we are confcious. The conftitution of our nature forces this be- lief upon us irrefiflibly.
This is true, and is fufficient to juPtify Des Cartes, in affuming, as a firft principle, the exiftence of thought, of which he was con- fcious.
He ought, however, to have, gone farther in this track, and to have confidered whether there may not be other firft principles which ought to be adopted for the fame reafon. But - he did not fee this to be neceffary, conceiving that, upon this one firft principle, he could fupport the whole fabric of human knowledge.
To To proceed to the conclufion of Des Car- TEs's enthymeme. From the exiflence of his thought he infers his own exiflence. Here he aflumcs another fuft principle, not a con- tingent, but a neceflary one; to wit, that where there is thought, there mud be a think- ing being or mind.
Having thus eftabliflied his own exiflence, he proceeds to prove the exiflence of a fupreme and infinitely perfeft Being; and, from the perfeftion of the Deity, be infers that his fen- fes, his memory, and the other faculties which God had given him, are not fallacious.
Whereas other men, from the beginning of the world, had taken for granted, as a firfl principle, the truth and reality of what they perceive by their fenfes, and from thence in- ferred the exiflence of a Supreme Author and Maker of the world, Des Cartes took a con- trary courfe, conceiving that the teflimony of our fenfes, and of all our faculties, excepting that of confcioufnefs, ought not to be taken for granted, but to be proved by argument.
Perhaps Ibme may think that Des Cartes meant only to admit no other firft principle of contingent truths befides that of confcioufnefs; but that he allowed the axioms of mathema- tics, and of other neceffary truths, to be re- ceived without proof.
But I apprehend this was not his intention: For the truth of mathem.atical axioms muft de- pend upon the truth of the faculty by which we judge of them. If the faculty be fallaci- ous, we m.ay be deceived by trufting to it. Therefore, as he fuppofes that all our faculties, excepting confcioufnefs, may be fallacious, and attempts to prove by argument that they are not.
OPINIONS about firjl PRINCIPLES. 335 not. It follows, that, according to his princi- C \\ A P. pies, even mathematical axioms require proof. •