Imagination^ when it is diftinguifhed from conception, feems to me to fignify one fpecies of conception; to wit, the conception of vi- fible objects. Thus, in a mathematical pro- portion, I imagine the figure, and I conceive the demonftration; it would not I think be improper to fay, I conceive both; but it would not be fo proper to fay, I imagine the demon- flration.
6. Our conceptions of things may be clear, diftind, andfteady; or they may be obfcure, indiftinct, and wavering. The livelinefs of our conceptions gives pleafure, but it is their dif- tinctnefs and ileadinefs that enables us to judge right, and to exprefs our fcntiments with per- fpicuity.
If 0/* Simple Apprehension in General, 19 If we enquire into the caufe, why among CHAP, perfons fpeaking or writing on the fame fubjed:, ' we find in one fo much darknefs, in another ^-^"^""^ fo much perfpicuity; I believe the chief caufe will be found to be, that one had a diftinft and fteady conception of what he faid or wrote, and the other had not: Men generally find means to exprefs diftin£lly what they have con- ceived diflinclly. Horace obferves, that pro- per words fpontaneoully follow diftincl concep- tions., " Verbaqye provifam rem non invitafe- " quuntur.^' But it is impofiible that a man fhould diftindly exprefs what he has notdiflind- ly conceived.
We are commonly taught that perfpicuity depends upon a proper choice of words,, a pro- per ftructure of fentences, and a proper order in the whole compofition. All this is very true, but it fuppofes difllndlnefs in our conceptions, without which there can be neither propriety in our words, nor in the ftrudure of our fen- tences, nor in our method.
Nay, I apprehend, that indiftinft concepti- ons of things are, for the moft part, the caufe not only of obfcurity in writing and fpeaking, but of error in judging.
Muft not they who conceive things in the fame manner form the fame judgment of their agreements and difagreements? Is it pofiible for two perfons to differ with regard to the conclufion of a fyllogifm who have the fame conception of the premifes?
Some perfons find it difficult to enter into a mathematical demonftration. I believe we fhall always find the reafon to be, that they do not diftindly apprehend it. A man cannot be con- vinced by what he does not underftand. On C 2 the CH A P.thc other hand, 1 think a man cannot under- ftand a demonftration without feeing the force of it. I fpeak of fuch demonftrations as thofe of Euclid, where every flep is fet down, and nothing left to be fupplied by the reader.
Sometimes one who has got through the firrt four books of Euclid's Elements, and fees the force of the demonftrations, finds difficulty in the fifth. What is the reafon of this? You may find, by a little converfation with him, that he has not a clear and ileady conception of ratios and of the terms relating to them. When the terms ufed in the fifth book have become familiar, and readily excite in his mind a clear and Ready cor^ception of their meaning, you may venture to affirm that he will be able to underftand the demonftra- tions of that book, and to fee the force of them.
If this be really the cafe, as it feems to be, it leads us to think that men are very much upon a level with regard to mere judgment, when we take that facult)^ apart from the ap- prehenfion or conception ot the things about which we judge; fo that a found judgment feeras to be the infeparable companion of a clear an^i fteady apprehenfion: And we ought not to cenfider thefe two as talents, of which the one may fall to the lot of one man, and the other to the lot of another, but as talents which always go together.
It may, however, be obferved, that fome of our conceptions may be more fubfervient to reafoning than others which are equally clear and diitind: It was before obferved, that fome of our conceptions are of individual things, others of thing-s general and abftrad.
It Q/" Simple Apprehension in General. 21 It may happen, that a man who has very clear C^H A P. conceptions of things individual, is not io hap- py in thofe of things general and abftrad. And this I take to be the reafon why we find men who have good judgment in matters of commoil life, and perhaps good talents for po- etical or rhetorical compofition, who find it very difficult to enter into abftraft reafoning.
That I may not appear fmgular in putting men fo much upon a level in point of mere judgment, 1 beg leave to fupport this opinion by the authority of two very thinking men, Des CARThS and Cicero. The former, in his diflertation on method, exprefles himfelf to this purpofe: " Nothing is fo equally dif- tributed among men as judgment. Where- fore it feems reafonable to believe, that the power of diftinguifhing what is true from what is falfe, (which we properly call judgment or right reafon), is by nature equal in all men; and therefore that the diverfity of our opinions does not arife from one perfon being endowed with a greater power of reafon than another, but only from this, that we do not lead our thoughts in the fame track, nor attend to the fame things."
Cicero, in his third book De Oratore, makes this obfervation, *' It is wonderful, when the learned and unlearned differ fo much in art, how little they dilFerin judgment. For art being derived from Nature, is good for nothing, unlefs it move and delight Nature.*' From what has been faid in this article, it follows, that it is fo far in our power to write and fpeak perfpicuoufly, and to reafon juftly, as it is in our power to form clear and diftintl conceptions of the fubjed on which we fpeak or CHAP. or reafcn. And though Nature hath put a ^- wide difference between one man and another ^•^'^^''^^ in this refpedt, yet that it is in a very confiderable degree in our power to have clear and diftinft apprehenljons of things about which we think and reafon, cannot be doubted.
7. It has been obferved by many authors, that, when we barely conceive any obje£t, the ingredients of that conception mud either be things with which we were before acquainted by fome other original power of the mind, or they mufl be parts or attributes of fuch things. Thus a man cannot conceive colours, if he ne- ver faw, nor founds, if he never heard. If man had not a ccnfcience, he could not con- ceive what is meant by moral obligation, or by right and wrong in conduct.
Fancy may combine things that never were combined in reality. It may enlarge or dimi- nifh, multiply or divide, compound and fafhion the objects which Nature prefents; but it can- not, bv the utmoll effort of that creative Pow- er which we afcribc to it, bring any one fimple ingredient into its produftions, which Nature has not framed, and brought to our know- ledge by fome other faculty.
This Mr. Locke has expreffed as beautifully as juftly. The dominion of man, in this little world of his own underftanding, is much the fame as in the great world of vifible things; wherein his power, hov/ever managed by art and Ikill, reaches no farther than to compound and divide the m.aterials that are made to his hand, but can do nothing towards making the lead particle of matter, or deftroying one atom that is already in being. The fame inabihty will every one find in himfelf, to fafhion in his Of Simple Apprehension in General. 23 his underftanding any fimple idea not received C HAP. by the powers which God has given him. ^• I think all Philofophers agree in this fenti- ment. Mr. Hume, indeed, after acknow- ledging the truth of the principle in general, mentions what he thinks a iingle exception to it. That a man, who had feen all the fnades of a particular colour except one, might frame in his mind a conception of that fliade which he never faw. I think this is not an excepti- on; becaufe a particular ihade of a colour dif- fers not fpecifically, but only in degree, from other fhades of the fame colour.
It is proper to obferve, that our moft fimple conceptions are not thofe which Nature imme- diately prefents to us. When we come to years of underftanding, we have the power of analyfing the objects of Nature, of dillinguifii- ing their feveral attributes and relations, of conceiving them one by one, and of giving a name to each, whofe meaning extends only to that fingle attribute or relation: And thus our moft fimple conceptions are not thofe of any object in nature, but of fome fingle attri- bute or relation of fuch objects.
Thus nature prefents to our fenfes, bodies that are extended in three dimenfions, and fo- lid. By analyfing the notion we have of body from our fenfes, we form to ourfelves the con- ceptions of extenfion, folidity, fpace, a point, a line, a furface; all which are more limple conceptions than that of a body. But they are the elements, as it were, of which our conception of a body is made up, and into which it may be analyfed. This power of analyfing objeds we propofe to confider parti- cularly in another place. It is only mentioned here.
here.
CHAP, here, that what is faid in this article may not be underitood, fo as to be inconfiftent with it. 8. Though our conceptions muft be confi- ned to the ingredients mentioned in the laft article, we are unconfined with regard to the arrangement of thofe ingredients. Here we may pick and chufe, and form an endlefs vg,- riety of combinations and conipofitions, which we call creatures of the imagination. Thefe may be clearly conceived, though they never exiiled: And indeed every thing that is made, mufl have been conceived before it was made. Every work ot human art, and every plan of conduct, whether in public or in private Hfe, muft have been conceived before it is brought to execution. And we cannot avoid. thinking, that the Almighty before he created the uni- verfe by his pov^'er, had a diflinci conception of the whole and of every part, and faw it to be good, and agreeable to his intention.
It is the bufmefs of man, as a rational crea- ture, to employ this unlimited power of con- ception, for planning his condud and enlarg- ing his knowledge. It feems to be peculiar to beings endowed with reafon to act by a pre- conceived plan. Brute animals ieem either to want this power, or to have it in a very low degree. They are moved by inftinct, habit, appetite, or natural aiieclion, according as thefe principles are ftirred by the prefent occafion. But I fee no reafon to think that they can propofe to themfelves a connected plan of life, or form general rules of conduct. Indeed, we fee that many of the human fpe- cies, to whom God has given this power, make little ufe of it. Ihey ad without a plan, as Of Simple ArPREiiENSioN in General. 55 as the paffion or appetite which is (Irongefl atC H A P. the time leads them. ^■ 9. The lafl: property I ihall mention of this ^^ faculty, is that which efl'entially diitingui{he:j it from every other power of the mind; and it is, that it is not employed folely about things which have exiflence. I can conceive a wing^ ed horfe or a centaur, as eafily and as diflindl:- ly as I can conceive a man whom I have feen. Nor does this diftincl conception incline my judgment in the leafl to the belief, that a wing-* ed horfe or a centaur ever exifted.
It is not fo with the other operations of our minds. They are employed about real exig- ences, and carry with them the belief of their objecls. When I feel pain, T am compelled to believe that the pain that I feel has a real exifl- ence. When I perceive any external objed:, my behef of the real exiflence of the objecl is irrefiftible. When I diftindly remember any event, though that event may not now exifl, I can have no doubt but it did exilt. That confcioulnefs which we have of the ope- rations of our own minds implies a belief of the real exiflence of thofe operations.
Thus we fee, that the powers of fenfation, of perception, of memory, and of confciouf- nefs, are all employed folely about objects that do exift, or have exifled. But conception is often employed about objects that neither do., nor did, nor will exift. This is the very na- ture of this faculty, that its objecl, though diflinftly conceived, may have no exiflence. Such an objeft we call a creature of imagina- tion; but this creature never was created.
That w^e may not impofe upon ourfelves in this matter, we mufl diflinguifh between that CH A P.aft or operation of the mind, which we call conceiving an objed:, and the obje£l which we ^'"^^^^ conceive. When we conceive any thing, there is a real act or operation of the mind; of this we are confcious, and can have no doubt of its exiftence: But every fuch ad mud have an objed; for he that conceives, mufl conceive fomething. Suppofe he conceives a centaur, he may have a diftind conception of this ob- jed, though no centaur ever exifted.- I am afraid, that, to thofe who are unac- quainted with the dodrine of Philofophers upon this fubjed, I fliall appear in a very ridiculous light, for infilling upon a point fo very evident, <is that men may barely conceive things that never exifled. They will hardly beheve, that any man in his wits ever doubted of it. In- deed, I know no truth more evident to the common fenfe and to the 'experience of man- kind. But if the authority of philofophy, an- cient and modern, oppofes it, as I think it does, I wiih not to treat that authority fo fafti- dioufly, as not to attend patiently to what may be faid in fupport of it.
CHAP.
THEORIES concerning CONCEPTION. 27 CHAP. II.
Theories conceryiing Conception, THE theory of ideas has been applied to the conception of objeds as well as to perception and memory. Perhaps it will be irkfome to the reader, as it is to the writer, to return to that fubjedl, after fo much has been faid upon it; but -Jts application to the conception of objefts, which could not proper- ly have been introduced before, gives a more comprehenfive view of it, and of the preju- dices which have led Philofophers fo unani- moufly into it.
There are two prejudices which feem to me to have given rife to the theory of ideas in all the various forms in which it has appeared in the courfe of above two thoufand years; and though they have no fupport from the natural diftates of our faculties, or from attentive re- flection upon their operations, they are preju- dices which thofe who fpeculate upon this fub- jecl, are very apt to be led into by analogy.
Thtjirji is. That in all the operations of the underftanding there muft be fome immediate intercourfe between the mind and its object, fo that the one may a6t upon the other. The fecond. That in all the operations of under- ftanding there muft be an obje£t of thought, which really exifts while we think of it; or, as fome Philofophers have expreffed it, that which is not, cannot be intelligible.
Had Philofophers perceived, that thefe are prejudices grounded only upon analogical reafoning.
CH A P.reafoning, we had never heard of ideas in the ^^' philofophical fenfe of that word.
The firil of thefe principles has led Philofo- phers to think, that as the external objects of fenfe are too remote to ad: upon the mind im- mediately, there mud be fome image or fliadow of them that is prcfent to the mind, and is the immediate objed of perception. That there is fuch an immediate object of perception, dif- tindl from the external objed, has been very unanimoully held by Philofophers, though they have differed much about the name, the nature, and the origin of thofe immediate objects.
We have confidered what has been faid in tliefupport of this principle, Eifay II. chap. 14. to which the reader is referred, to pre- vent repetition.
I fhall only add to what is there faid. That there appears no fliadow of reafon why the mind mud have an objeQ: immediately prefent to it in. its intellectual operations, any more ' than in its affections and palFions. Philofo- phers have not faid, that ideas are the immedi- ate objects of love or refentment, of efteem or difapprobation. It is, I think, acknowledged, that perfons and not ideas are the immediate objects of thofe affections; perfons, who are as far from being immediately prefent to the mind as other external objects, and fometimes perfons who have now no exiflence in this world at leaft, and who can neither ad upon the mind, nor be aded upon by it.
The fecond principle, v/hich I conceive to be likewife a prejudice of Philofophers ground- ed upon analogy, is now to be confidered.
It contradids diredly what was laid down in the lad article of the preceding chapter, to wit, that THEORIES concerning CONCEPTION. 29 that we may have a diftind conception of C H A P, things which never exifted. This is undoubt- ^^• edly the common belief of thofe who have not ^'""^ been intruded in philofophy; and they will think it as ridiculous to defend it by reafoning, as to oppofe it.
The Philofopher fays, Though there may be a remote objed which does not exilt, there mud be an immediate objecl which really ex- iils; for that v/hich is not, cannot be an object of thought. The idea mufl be perceived by the mind, and if it does not exifl there, there can be no perception of it, no operation of the mind about it.
This principle deferves the more to be exa- mined, becaufe the other before mentioned de- pends upon it; for although the laft may be true, even if the firft was falfe, yet if the lafl be not true, neither can the firft: If we can conceive objeds which have no exiftence, it follows, that there may be objects of thought which neither act upon the mind, nor are acted upon by it; becaufe that which has no exift- ence can neither act nor be acled upon.
It is by thefe principles that Philofophers have been led to think, that in every a<3: of memory and of conception, as well as of per- ception, there are two objects. The one, the immediate objett, the idea, the fpecies, the form: The other, the mediate or external ob- jed. The vulgar know only of one objed, which in perception is fomething external that exifts; in memory, fomething that; did exift, and in conception, may be fomething that never exifted: But the immediate obje£t of the Philofophers, the idea, is faid to exift, and to be perceived in all thefe operations, Thefe CHAP. Thefe principles have not only led Philofo- ^^^ phers to iplit objeds into two^ where others ^ can find but one^ but likewife have led them to reduce the three operations now mentioned to one, making memory and conception, as well as perception, to be the perception of ideas. But nothing appears more evident to the vulgar, than that, what is only remember- ed, or only conceived, is not perceived; and to fpeak of the perceptions of memory, ap- pears to them as abfurd, as to fpeak of the hearing of fight.
In a word, thefe tv\'o principles carry us into the whole philofophical theory of ideas, and furnifh every argument that ever was ufed for their exiilence. If they are true, that fyftem mud be admitted v/ith all its confequences: If they are only prejudices, grounded upon ana- logical reafoning, the Vvhoie fyflem mud fall to the ground with them.
It is, therefore, of importance to trace thofe principles, as far as we are able, to their origin, and to fee, if poffible, whether they have any juft foundation in reafon, or whether they are rafh conclufions, drawn from a fuppofed ana- logy between matter and mind.
The unlearned, who are guided by the dic- tates of Nature, and exprefs what they are confcious of concerning the operations of their own mind, believe, that the objetl which they diftinftly perceive certainly exifts; that the ob- ject which they difliniSlly remember certainly did exift, but now may not; but as to things that are barely conceived, they know that they can conceive a thoufand things that never ex- ifted, and that the bare conception of a thing does not fo much as afford a prefumption of its exiftence.
THEORIES concerning CONCEPTION. 31 exiflence. They give themfelves no trouble toC H A P. know how thefe operations are performed, or to account for them from general principles.
But Philofophers, who wifh to difcover the caufes of things, and to account for thefe ope- rations of mind, obferving, that in other ope- rations there mud be not only an agent, but fomething to a61 upon, have been led by ana- logy to conclude that it mult be fo in the ope- rations of the mind.
' The relation between the mind and its con- ceptions bears a very flrong and obvious ana- logy to the relation between a man and his work. Every fcheme he forms, every difco- very he makes by his reafoning powers, is ve- ry properly called the work of his mind. Thefe works of the mind are fometimes great and im- portant works, and draw the attention and ad- miration of men.
It is the province of the Philofopher to con- fider how fuch works of the mind are produc- ed, and of what materials they are compofed. He calls the materials ideas. There muft there- fore be ideas, which the mind can arrange and form into a regular ftrudure. Every thing that is produced, muft be produced of fomething; and from nothing, nothing can be produced.
Some fuch reafoning as this feems to me to have given the firft rife to the philofophical no- tions of ideas. Thofe notions were formed into a fyftem by the Pythagoreans two thou- fand years ago; and this fyftem was adopted by Plato, and embelliftied with all the powers of a fine and lofty imagination. I fhall, in compliance with cuftom, call it the Platonic fyftem CHAP. fyilem of ideas, though in reality it was the ^^- inventioti of the Pythagorean fchool.
The mofl: arduous queftion which employed the wits of men in the infancy of the Grecian philofophy was, A¥hat was the origin of thfc world? From what principles and caufes did it proceed? To this queuion very different anfwers were given in the different fchools. Moft of them appear to us very ridiculous. The Py- thagoreans, however, judged very rationally, from the order and beailty of the univerfe, that it mud be the workmanfiiip of an eternal, intelligent and good Being: And therefore they concluded the Deity to be one firft principle or caufe of the univerfe.
But they conceived there muft be more. The univcrTe muft be made of fomethincr. Every workm.an muft have materials to -work upon. That the world ftiould be made out of nothing feem.ed to them abfurd, becaufe every thing that is made muft be made of fomething.
Nullam rem e nihihgigni divinitus unquam.
LucR. De nibilo nihil^ in nihilum nil poffe rererti.
Pers.
This maxim never was brought into doubt: Even in Cicero's time it continued to be held hy all Philofophers. What natural Philofopher (fays that author in his fecond book of Divi- nation) ever afferted that any thing could take its rife from nothing, or be reduced to nothing? Becaufe m.en muft have materials to work upon, they concluded it m.uft be fo with the Deity. This was reafoning from analogy.
From this it followed, that an eternal un- created THEORIES concern'mg CONCEPTION. 33 created matter was another firft principle of the CHAP, univerfe. But this matter they beheved had ^^• no form nor quality. It was the fame with the materia prima ^ or firfl matter of Aristotle, who borrowed this part of his philofophy from his predecefTors.
To us it feems more rational to think that the Deity created matter with its qualities, than that the matter of the univerfe fhould be eternal and felf-exiftent. But fo ftrong was the prejudice of the ancient Philofophers againfl what we call creation, that they rather chofe to have recourfe to this eternal and unintelligible matter, that the Deity might have materials to work upon.
The fame analogy which led them to think that there mull be an eternal matter of which the world was made, led them alfo to conclude that there muil be an eternal pattern or model according to which it was made. Works of de- fign and art muft be diftinftly conceived before they are made. The Deity, as an intelligent Being, about to execute a work of perfett beauty and regularity, mull have had a diftind: conception of his work before it was made. This appears very rational.
But this conception, being the work of the Divine intelled, fomething muft have exilLed as its objed. This could only be ideas, which are the proper and immediate objed of intelled.
From this inveftigation of the principles or caufes of the univerfe, thofe Philofophers con- cluded them to be three in number, to wit, an eternal matter as the material caufe, eternal ideas as the model or exemplary caufe, and an eternal intelligent mind as the efficient caufe..
Vol. II. D As Vol. II. D As P. As to the nature of thofe eternal ideas, the Philofophers of that fed: afcribed to them the moft magnificent attributes. They were im- mutable and uncreated; the objeft of the Di- vine intelled before the world was made; and the only objed of intellcd: and of fcience to all intelligent beings. As far as intelled is fu- perior to lenfe, fo far are ideas fupcrior to all the objefts of fenfe. The obje6:s of fenfe be- ing in a conftant flux, cannot properly be faid to exifl. Ideas are the things which have a real and permanent exiftence. They are as various as the fpecies of things, there being one idea of every fpecies, but none of indivi- duals. The idea is the effence pf the fpecies, and exifted before any of the fpecies was made. It is entire in every individual of the fpecies, without being either divided or multiplied.
In our prefent ftate, we have but an imper- fect conception of the eternal ideas; but it is the higheft felicity and perfection of men to be able to contemplate them. While we are in this prifon of the body, fenfe, as a dead weight, bears us down from the contemplation of the intelledual objedts; and it is only by a due purification of the foul, and abftraction from fenfe, that the intellectual eye is opened, and that we are enabled to mount upon the wings of intellect to the celeltial world of ideas.
Such was the mod ancient fyftem concern- ing ideas, of which we have any account* And however different from the modern, it appears to be built upon the prejudices we have mentioned; to wit, that in every operation, there muft be fcmething to work upon; and that THEORIES concerning CONCEPTION.;^s that even in conception there muft be an objeftC HAP. which really exifts. ^^• For if thofe ancient Philofophers had thought ' ~' it poffible that the Deity could operate without materials in the formation of the world, and that he could conceive the plan of it without a model, they could have feen no reafon to make matter and ideas eternal and neceffarily cxiflent principles, as well as the Deity himfelf. Whether they believed that the ideas were not only eternal, but eternally, and without a caufe, arranged in that beautiful and perfedt order, which they afcribe to this intelligible world of ideas, I cannot fay; but this feems to be a neceflary confequence of the fyflem: For if the Deity could not conceive the plan of the world which he made, without a model which really exifted, that model could not be his work, nor contrived by his wifdom; for if he made it, he muft have conceived it before it was made; it muft therefore have exifted in all its beauty and order independent of the Deity; and this I think they acknowledged, by making the model, and the matter of this world, firft principles, no lefs than the Deity. If the Platonic fyftem be thus underftood, (and I do not fee how it can hang together otherwife), it leads to two confequences that are unfavourable to it.
Firjl, Nothing is left to the Maker of this world but the fkill to work after a model. The model had all the perfection and beauty that appears in the copy, and the Deity had only to copy after a pattern that exifted indepen- dent of him. Indeed, the copv, if we believe thofe Philofophers, falls very far ftiort of the original; but this they feem to have afcribed C HA P. to the refraftorinefs of matter, of which it was ^^' made. ^-"''^'"^ Scco7idly, if the world of ideas, without be- ing the work of a perfedly wife and good in- teUigent Being, could have fo much beauty and perfection, how can we infer from the beauty and order of this world, which is but an imperfect copy of the other, that it muft have been made by a perfedlly wife and good Being? The force of this reafoning, from the beauty and order of the univerfe, to its being the work of a wife Being, which appears in- vincible to every candid mind, and appeared fo to thofe ancient Philofophers, is entirely de- ftroyed by the fuppofition of the exiftence of a world of ideas, of greater perfection and beau- ty, which never was made. Or, if the rear foning be good, it will apply to the world of ideas, which muft of confequence have been made by a wife and good intelligent Being, and muft have been conceived before it was made.
It may farther be obferved, that all that is myfterious and unintelligible in the Platonic ideas, arifes from attributing exiftence to them. Take away this one attribute, all the reft, however pompoufly exprefied, are eafily ad- mitted and underftood.