fchemes of policy, in confequence of which men propole to themfelves by a certain plan of condud to prevail upon others to become the tools and inftruments of their purpofes. All the arts of courtfhip and flattery, of playing upon men's hopes and fears, proceed upon the fuppofition that mind is fubjed to cer-- tain laws, and that, provided we be fkilful and affiduous enough in applying the caufe, the effed will inevitably follow,.
in o«r Ideas Laftly, the idea of moral difcipline proceeds entirely upon thts: of moral dif- cipline. principle. If I carefully perfuade, exhort, and exhibit motives, to another, it is becaufe I believe that motives have a tendency to influence his condud. If I reward or punifh him, either with a view to his own improvement or as an example to others, it is becaufe I have been led to believe that rewards and punifh-- ments are calculated in their own nature to afFed the fentiments.
and pradices of mankind.
Objeftion There is but one conceivable objedion againfl: the inference biiityofour from thcfc premifes to the necefl[ity of human adions. It may cxpeftatlons {n human bc allcdgcd, that " though there is a real connexion between conduft^ motives AND NECESSITY. 293 motives and adions, yet that this connexion may not amount BOOK IV.
to a certainty, and that of confequence the mind ftill retains an * — -* inherent adivity by which it can at pleafure diflblve this con- nexion. Thus for example, when I addrefs argument and per- fuafion to my neighbour to induce him to adopt a certain fpc- cies of condutSl, I do it not with a certain expedlation of fuccefs, and am not utterly difappointed if all my efforts fail of their efFe£t. I make a referve for a certain faculty of liberty he is fuppofed to poflefs, which may at laft counteradt the befl digefted projedls."
But in this objedlon there Is nothing peculiar to the cafe of Anfwer^ mind. It is juft fo in matter. I fee a part only of the premifes, and therefore can pronounce only with uncertainty upon the con- clufion. A philofophical experiment, which has fucceeded a hundred times, may altogether fail upon the next trial. But what does the phllofopher conclude from this? Not that there is a liberty of choice in his retort and his materials, by which they baffle the befl formed expectations. Not that the con- nexion between effedls and caufes is imperfed, and that part of the effed happens from no caufe at all But that there was fome other caufe concerned whofe operation he did not perceive, but which a frefh invefligation will probably lay open to him. When the fcience of the material univerfe was in its infancy, men were fufficiently prompt to refer events to accident and chance j but the farther they have extended their enquiries and obfervation.
OF FREE WILL BOOK [V. obfervation, the more reafon they have found to conclude that * — --.^ ' every thing takes place according to neceffary and univerfal laws.
The cafe is exactly parallel with refped to mind. The po- litician and the philofopher, however they may fpeculatively en- tertain the opinion of free will, never think of introducing it into their fcheme of accounting for events. If an incident turn out otherwife than they expected, they take it for granted, that there was fome unobferved bias, fome habit of thinking, fome prejudice of education, fome fmgular affociation of ideas, that difappointed their predidion; and, if they be of an adive and enterprifmg temper, they return, like the natural philofopher, to fearch out the fecret fpring of this unlocked for event.
tDrigin and univerfality of the fenti- nient of free v.-iU.
The refledions Into which we have entered upon the dodrine of caufes, not only afford us a fimple and impreffive argument in fa.vour of the dodrine of neceflity, but fuggeft a very obvious reafon why the dodrine oppofite to this has been in a certain degree the general opinion of mankind. It has appeared that the idea of neceffary connexion between events of any fort is the kffon of experience, and the vulgar never arrive at the uni- verfal application of this principle even to the phenomena of the material vmiverfe. In the eafieft and moft familiar inftances, fuch as the impinging of one ball of matter upon another and ks confequences, they willingly admit the interference of chance, y or ANDNECESSITY. 295 or an event uncaufed. In this inftance however, as both the hn- ^'^^^ ^^' puhe and its effeds are fubje£ls of obfervatiou to the I'enfes, they * * ' readily imagine that they perceive the abfolute principle which caufes motion to be communicated from the firft ball to the fe- cond. Now the very fame prejudice and precipitate conclufion, which induce them to believe that they difcover the principle of motion in objedts of fenfe, a£l in an oppofite diredion with refpe£t to fuch objedls as cannot be fubjeded to the exa- mination of fenfe. The manner in which an idea or propofition fuggelled to the mind of a percipient being produces animal mo- tion they never fee; and therefore readily conclude that there is no neceffary connexion between thefe events.
But, if the vulgar will unlverfally be found to be the advo- The fentf- cates of free will, they are not lefs ftrongly, however inconfift- ceffityaifo ently, impreffed with the belief of the dodrine of neceflity. It is a well known and a juft obfervation, that, were it not for the exiftence of general laws to which the events of the material univerfe always conform, man could never have been either a reafoning or a moral being. The moil confiderable adlions of our lives are directed by forefight. It is becaufe he forefees the regular fucceflion of the feafons, that the farmer fows his field, and after the expiration of a certain term experts a crop. There would be no kindnefs in my adminiftering food to the hungry,, and no injuftice in my thrufting a drawn fword agalnft the bofom.
univerfali 296 OF FREE WILL chTp ^v" ^'-'^'^^'^ °^ "^7 friend, if it were not the eftablifhed quality of food * ^ ' to nourifh, and of a fword to wound.
But the regularity of events in the material univerfe will not of itfelf afford a fufficient foundation of morality and prudence. The voluntary condudl of our neighbours enters for a fhare into almofl: all thofe calculations upon which our own plans and de- terminations are founded. If voluntary condud:, as well as ma- terial Impulfe, were not fubjedled to general laws, included in the fyftem of caufe and efFed:, and" a legitimate topic of predic- tion and forefight, the certainty of events in the material uni- verfe would be produ«3:ive of little benefit. But in reality the mind pafles from one of thefe topics of fpeculation to the other, without accurately dillributing them into clafles, or imagining that there is any difference in the certainty with which they are attended. Hence it appears that the moft uninllrudied peafant or artifan is practically a neceffarian. The farmer calculates as fecurely upon the inclination of mankind to buy his corn when it is brought into the market, as upon the tendency of the feafons to ripen it. The labourer no more fufpeds that his employer will alter his mind and not pay him his daily wages, than he fufpeQs that his tools will refufe to perform thofe functions to- day, in which they were yefterday employed with fuccefs *.
* The reader will find the fubllance of the above arguments In a more diffu- five form in Hume's Enquiry concerning Human Underftanding, being the ihivd part of his Effays.
Another Another argument in favour of the doctrine of neceffity, not ^^^^^^^'• kfs clear and irrefiftible than that from the confideration of caufe > — '- — ' 1 he truth or and efFed, will arife from any confiftent explication that can be ''"^ f'-"''", ' J ^ ment argued eiven of the nature of voluntary motion. The motions of the f''"'" *'"^ "?• o J ture 01 vohanimal fyftem diftribute them-felves into two great clafles, vo- '^'°"' luntary and involuntary. Involuntary m.otion, whether it be conceived to take place independently of the mind, or to be the refult of thought and perception, is fo called, becaufe the coi"u fequences of that motion, either in whole or in part, did not enter into the view of the mind when the motion commenced. Thus the cries of a new-born infant are not lefs involuntary than the circulation of the blood; It being impoflible that the founds firfl; refulting from a certain agitation of the animal frame fhould be forefeen, fmce forefight is the fruit of expe- rience. ^ From thefe obfervations we may deduce a rational and con- fiftent account of the nature of volition. Voluntary motion is that which is accompanied with forefight, and flows from inten- tion and defign. Volition is that.flate of an intellectual being, in which, the mind being affefted in a certain manner by the apprehenfion of an end to be accomplllhed, a certain motion of the organs and members of the animal frame is found to be pro- duced.
Here then the advocates of intellcdual liberty have a clear Q^q dilemma BOOK IV. dilemma propofed to their choice. They mull afcribe this free^ ^ V ' •* dom, this imperfed; connexion of effects and caufes, either to our voluntary or our involuntary motions. They have already made their determination. They are aware that to afcribe freedom ta that which is involuntary, even if the affumption. could be main- tained, would be altogether foreign to the great fubjefts of mo- ral, theological or political enq^uiry. Man would not be in any degree more of an agent or an accountable being, though it could be proved that all his involuntary motions fprung up in a for- tuitous and capricious manner^ But on the other hand to afcribe freedom to our voluntary aftions is an exprefs contradi£tion in terms. No motion is vo- luntary any farther than it is accompanied with intention and defign, and flows from the apprehenfion of an end to be ac- complifhed. So far as it flows in any degree from another fource,. fo far it is involuntary. The new-born infant forefees nothing, therefore all his motions are involuntary. A perfon arrived at maturity takes an extenfive furvey of the confequences of his ac- tions, therefore he is eminently a voluntary and rational being. If any part of my condudt be deftitute of all forefight of the ef- feds to refult, who is there that afcribes to it depravity and vice? Xerxes aded juft as foberly as fuch a reafoner, when he caufed his attendants to inflidl a thoufand laflies on the waves of the Hellefpont, The AND NECESSITY.
The truth of the dodlrlne of neceffity will be ftill more evl- T^OOK iv.
^ CHAP.V.
•dent, if we confider the abfurdity of the oppofite hypothefis,.V — 'f-r-^ One of its principal ingredients is felf detei-mination. Liberty of^'^wll in an imperfedt and popniar fenfe is afcribed to the motions of ^^\ii determi- the animal fyflem, when they refult from the forefight and de- liberation of the intelle(5b, and not from external compulfion. It is in this fenfe that the word is commonly ufed in moral and po- litical reafoning. Philofophical reafoners therefore, who have defired to vindicate the property of freedom, not only to our external motions, but to the a£ts of the mind, have been obliged to repeat this procefs. Our external actions are then faid to be free, when they truly refult from the determination of the mind. If our volitions, or internal adts be alfo free, they muft in like manner refult from the determination of the mind, or In other words, " the mind in adopting them" muft be " felf determined." Now nothing can be more evident than that that in which the mind exercifes its freedom, muft be an adl of the mind. Liberty therefore according to this hypothefis confifts in this, that every •choice we make has been chofen by us, and every z£t of the mind been preceded and produced by an a£t of the mind. This Is fo true, thai in reality the ultimate adt is not ftyled free from •any quality of its own, but becaufe the mind in adopting It was felf determined, that Is, becaufe It was preceded by another ad:. The ultimate adt refulted completely from the determination that was its precurfor. It was itfelf necefliuy; and, If we would look for freedom, it muft be in the preceding ad. But In that Q^q 2 preceding ^^\Vy/ preceding a<3: alfo, if the mind were free, it was felf determihed„\ ^ ■^ ' that is, this volition was chofen by a preceding volition, and by the fame, reafoning this alfo by another. antecedent to itfelf. All. the a<fls except the {irft were necefiary, and followed each other as inevitably as the links of a chain do, when the firft link- is ■ drawn forward. But then neither was this firft a£l free, unlefs the mind in adopting it were felf determined, that is, unlefs this a£t were chofen by a preceding a£t. Trace back the chain.as far as you pleafe, every aO. at which you arrive is necelTary,. That ad, which gives the charadter of freedom to the whole, can never be dlfcovered; and, if it could, in its own nature includes a cojatradidion. - Indifference. Another Idea which belongs to the hypothefis of felf detsr- mination, is, that the mind is not necelfarily inclined this way or that by the motives which are prefented to it, by the clear- nefs or obfcurity with which they are apprehended, or by the tamper and character ■ which preceding- habits may have gene- rated; but that by its inherent adivity it is equally capable of proceeding either way, and pafles to its determination from a previous ftate of abfolute indifference. Now what fort of adivlty is that which is equally inclined to all kinds of adions? Let us fuppofe a particle of matter endovvcd with an inherent propenfity to motion. This propenfity muft either be to move in one par- ticular diredion, and then it muft for ever move in that direc- tion unlefs counteraded by fome external impreffion j or it muft have AND NECESSITY. 301 idencyto a be a ftate of perpetual reft.
Irave an equal tendency to all diredions, and then the refult muft BOO" iv.
The abfiirdlty of this confequence Is fo evident, that the ad-^ "^TOcates of intelledual liberty have endeavoured to deftroy its force by means of a diftindion, " Motive," it has been faid, *' is indeed the occafion, xht fihe qua non of volition, but it has no inherent power to compel volition.- Its influence depends' upon the free and unconftrained furrender flf the mind. Be- tween oppofite motives and confiderations the mind can chcofe as it pleafes, and by its determination can convert the motive which Is weak and infufficlent In the comparlfon Into theftrongeft." But this hypothefis will be found exceedingly inadequate to the purpofe for which It is produced. Motives muft either have a neceflary and irrefxftible influence, or they can have no influence^ at alh- For, firft, it muft be remembered, that the ground or reafon ' of any event, of whatever nature It be, muft be contained among the circumftances which precede that event. The mind is fuppofed to be in a ftate of previous indifference, and there-^ fore cannot be, in Itfelf confidered, the fcurce of the particular- choice that is made. There is a motive on one fide and a m_o^ tive on the other: and between thefe lie the true ground and- reafon of preference. But, wherever there is tendency to pre- ference, there may be degrees of tendency. If the degrees beequal, 503 OF FREE WILL pHAP v^' ^^'^^^» preference cannot follow: it Is equivalent to the putting * ^ ' equal weights Into the oppofite fcales of a balance. If one of them have a greater tendency to preference than the other, that which has the greateft tendency muft ultimately prevail. When two things are balanced againil each other, fo much amount may be conceived to be llruck off from each fide as exlfls in the fmaller fum, and the overplus that belongs to the greater is all that truly enters into the confideration.
Add to this, fecondly, that, if motive have not a neceflary In- fluence, it Is altogether fuperfluous. The mind cannot firft choofe to he influenced by a motive, and afterwards fubmit to its operation: for In that cafe the preference would belong wholly to this previous volition. The determination would in reality be complete In the firft inftance; and the motive, which came in afterwards, might be the pretext, but could not be the true fource of the proceeding*.
Tlw win not Lafl;ly, it may be obferved upon the hypothecs of free will, xuky? ^" that the whole fyftem Is built upon a diftlndion where there is no difference, to wit, a diftlndion between the Intelledual and adtive powers of the mind. A myilerious phllofophy taught men to fuppofe, that, when the underftanding had perceived any cbjed to be defirable, there was need of fome dIftIn<Sl * The argument from the impofllbility of free will is treated with great force -of reafoning in Jonathan Edwards's Enquiry into the Freedom of the Will.
2 power AND NECESSITY. 303 power to put the body in motion. But reafon finds no ground BOOK IV.
for this fuppofition; nor is it poffible to conceive, that, in the * « ' cafe of an intelle<3:ual faculty placed in an aptly organifed body, preference can exift, together with a confcioufnefs, gained from experience, of our power to obtain the objedt preferred, without a certain motion of the animal frame being the neceflary refult. We need only attend to the obvious meaning of the terms in order to perceive that the will is merely, as it has been happily termed, the laft a(£t of the underftanding, one of the different cafes of the aflbciation of ideas. What indeed is preference,^ but a perception of fomething that really inheres or is fuppofed to inhere in the objet!s themfelves? It is the judgment, true or erroneous, which the mind makes refpedting fuch things as are brought into comparifon with each other. If this had been fufficiently attended to, the freedom of the will would never have been gravely maintained by philofophical writers, fmce no man ever imagined that we were free to feci or not to feel an impreflion made upon our organs, and to believe or not ta believe a propofition dem.onftrated to our underftanding..
It muft be unnecelfary to add any thing fartha- on this head, ^'"«« ^^'1' difatlvantageous unlefs it be a momentary recolleilion of the fort of benefit that '° "^ poAeffor; freedom of the will would confer upon us, fuppofing it to be poffible. Man being, as we have now found him to be, a fimple fubftance, governed by the apprehenfions of his under- ftanding, nothing farther is requifue but the improvement of hi& reafoning 5C4 OF FRE^E WILL AND NECESSITY.
reafoning faculty, to make him virtuous and happy. But, did he poflefs a faculty independent of the underftanding, and capa- ble of refifting from mere caprice the moft powerful arguments, the beft education and the moft fedulous inftrudlion -might be of no ufe to him. This freedom we fhall eafily perceive to be his bane and his curfe; and the only hope of lafting benefit to the fpecies would be, by drawing clofer the connexion between the external motions and the underftanding, wholly to.extirpate it. The virtuous man, in proportion to his improvement, will be under the conftant influence of fixed and invariable principles; and fuch a being as we conceive God to be, can never in any one mftance have exercifed this liberty, that is, can never ofnofervlce have aded in a foolifh and tyrannical manner. Freedom of the will is abfurdly reprefented as neceffary to render the mind fuf- ceptible of moral principles; but in reality, fo far as we a£l with liberty, fo far as we are independent of motives, our conduift Is as independent of morality as it is of reafon, nor is_ it poffible that we fhould deferve either praife or blame for a proceeding -thus capricious and indifciplinable.
CHAP.
CHAP.
INFERENCES FROM THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY.
IDEA IT SUGGESTS TO US OF THE UNIVERSE. — INFLUENCE ON OUR MORAL IDEAS — ACTION — VIRTUE — EXERTION •^PERSUASION — EXHORTATION — ARDOUR — COMPLA- CENCE AND AVERSION PUNISHMENT— REPENTANCE — PRAISE AND BLAME — INTELLECTUAL TRANQUILLITY. —LANGUAGE OF NECESSITY RECOMMENDED.
CONSIDERING then the dodrlne of moral neceflity as BOOK IV. CHAP. VI. fufficiently eftablifhed, let us proceed to the confequences * ^. ' Idea it fug- that are to be deduced from it. This view of things prefents us g*=^^ *? "^ °^ the univerfe.
with an idea of the univerfe as connected and cemented in all its parts, nothing in the boundlefs progrefs of things being capable of happening otherwife than it has adlually happened. In the life of every human being there is a chain of caufes, generated in that eternity v^hich preceded his birth, and going on in regu- lar proceffion through the whole period of his exiftence, in con- fequence of which it was impoflible for him to ad in any inftance otherwife than he has aded.
R r The 3o6 INFERENCES FROM THE The contrary of this having been the conception of the mafs of mankind in all ages, and the ideas of contingency and acci- dent having perpetually obtruded themfelves, the eftablifhed language of morality has been univerfally tinctured with this error. It will therefore be of no trivial importance to enquire how much of this language is founded in the truth of things, and how much of v/hat is exprefled by it is purely imaginary,>^ Accuracy of language is the indifpenfible prerequifite of found knowledge, and without attention to that fubjedt we can never afcertain the extent and importance of the confequences of necefEty* i&.hn: Firft then it appears, that, in the emphatical and refined fenfe in which the word has fometimes been ufed, there is no fuch thing as adtion. Man is in no cafe ftridly fpeaking the begin- ner of any event or feries of events that takes place in the uni- verfe, but only the vehicle through which certain caufes operate, which caufes, if he were fuppofed not to exift, would ceafe to operate. Adion however, in its more fimple and obvious fenfe, is fufEciently real, and exifts equally both in mind and in matter* When a ball upon a billiard board is ftruck by a perfon playing, and afterwards impinges upoa a fecond ball, the ball which was firft in motion is faid to a£l upon the fecond, though it operate in the ftridleft conformity to the impreffion it received, and ^he motion it communicates be precifely determined by the cir- cumftances of the cafe. Exadly fimilar to this, upon the prin- ciples DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 307 ciples already explained, are the a£lions of the human mind. BOOK IV.
Mind is a real caufe, an indifpenfible link in the great chain of * ' the univerfe j but not, as has fometimes been fuppofed, a caufe of that paramount defcription, as to fuperfede all neceffities, and be itfelf fubjedl to no laws and methods of operation. Upon the hypothefis of a God, it is not the choice, apprehenfion or judgment of that being, fo properly as the truth which was the foundation of that judgment, that has been the fource of all con- tingent and particular exiftences. His exiftence, if neceffary, was neceffary only as the fenforium of truth and the medium of its operation.
Is this view of things incompatible with the exiftence of virtues virtue?
If by virtue we underftand the operation of an Intelligent being in the exercife of an optional power, fo that under the fame precife circumftances it might or might not have taken place, undoubtedly it will annihilate it.
But the dodlrine of neceffity does not overturn the nature of things. Happinefs and mifery, wifdcm and error will ftill be diftlnd: from each other, and there will ftill be a connexion between them. Wherever there is diftindion there is ground for preference and defire, or on the contrary for negledl and averfion. Happinefs and wifdom will be obje<3;s worthy to be R r 2 defired, 3o8 INFERENCES FROM THE BOOK IV. defired, mifery and error worthy to be difliked. If therefore * V ' by virtue we mean that principle which aiferts the preference of the former over the latter, its reality will remain undiminifhed by the dodrine of neceffity.
Virtue, if we would fpeak accurately, ought to be confidered by us in the firft inftance objedively, rather than as modifying any particular beings. It is a fyftem of general advantage, in their aptitude or inaptitude to which lies the value or worth- lefsnefs of all particular exiftences. This aptitude is in intel- ligent beings ufually termed capacity, or power. Now power Id the fenfe of the hypothefis of liberty is altogether chimerical. But power in the fenfe in which it is fometimes affirmed of in- animate fubftances, is equally true of thofe which are animate* A candleftick has the power or capacity of retaining a candle in a perpendicular dire<ftion. A knife has a capacity of cutting. In the fame manner a human being has a capacity of walking: though it may be no more true of him, than of the inanimate fubftance, that Ke has the power of exercifmg or not exercifmg that capacity. Again, there are different degrees as well as dif- ferent claffes of capacity. One knife is better adapted for the; purpofes of cutting than another..
Now there are two confiderations relative to a«y particular- being, that excite our approbation, and this whether the being- be poffeffed of confcioufnefs or no. Thefe confiderations are capacity DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 309 capacity and the application of that capacity. We approve of a BOOK IV.
fliarp knife rather than a blunt one, becaufe its capacity is greater. ^ * ' We approve of its being employed in carving food, rather than in maiming men or other animals, becaufe that application of its capacity Is preferable. But all approbation or preference is relative to utility or general good. A knife is as capable as a man of being employed in the purpofes of virtue, and the one is no more free than the other as to its employment. The mode in which a knife is made fubfervient to thefe purpofes is by ma- terial impulfe. The mode in which a man is made fubfervient is by inducement and perfuafion. But both are equally the affair of neceffity. The man differs from the knife, juft as the Iron candleftick differs from the brafs one; he has one more way of being a£ted upon. This additional way in man is mo^- tlve, in the candleftick is magnetifm.
But virtue has another fenfe, in which it Is analogous to duty. The virtue of a human being Is the application of his capacity to the general good; his duty is the beft poffible application of that capacity. The words thus explained are to be confidered as rather fimilar to grammatical diftindion^ than to real and phl- lofophlcal difference. Thus In Latin bonus is good as affirmed of a man, botia is good as affirmed of a woman. In the fame manner we can as eafily conceive of the capacity of an inanimate as of an animate fubftance being applied to the general good, and as accurately defcribe the beft poffible application of the one 3IO INFERENCES FROM THE BOOR IV. as of tlie other. There is no effential difference bctw^een the CHAP. VI, ^-- — ^~ — ' two cafes. But we call the latter virtue and duty, and not the former. Thefe words may in a popular fenfe be confidered as either mafculine or feminine, but never neuter.
exertion: But, If the dodrine of neceffity do xtot annihilate virtue, it tends to Introduce a great change into our ideas refpedling it. According to this do£trine it will be abfurd for a man to fay, " I win exert myfelf," " I will take care to remember," or even " I will do this." All thefe expreffions imply as if man was or could be fomething elfe than what motives make him. Man is in reality a paffive, and not an aftive being. In another fenfe however he is fufEciently capable of exertion. The operations of his mind may be laborious, like thofe of the wheel of a heavy machine in afcending a hill, may even tend to wear out the fubftance of the Ihell in which it a£ts, without in the fmalleft degree impeaching its pafhve character. If we were conftantly aware of this, our minds would not glow lels ardently with the love of truth, juftice, happinefs and man- kind. We fhould have a firmnefs and fimplicity in our condudt, not wafting itfelf in fruitlefs ftruggles and regrets, not hurried along with infantine impatience, but feeing events with their confequences, and calmly and unrefervedly given up to the influ- ence of thofe comprehenfive views which this dod:rine infpires.
perfuafion: As to GUI condii(!t towards others in inftances where we were 2 concerned