The mere tafk of underilanding what Is affirmed to us Is of a very different nature from that of comparifon, or any other fpecies of judgment that is to be formed concerning this affirma- tion. "When a number of ideas are prefented in a train, though in one fenfe there be variety, yet in another there is unity. I'irft, there is the unity of uninterrupted fucceffion, the perennial ■ flow as of a flream, where the drop indeed that fucceeds is nu- merically diftindt from that v^hich went before, but there is no ceffation.
OF THE HUMAN MIND. 329 ccfTation. Secondly, there is the unity of method. The mind "^OOK iv. -^' ^ CHAP.vrr.
apprehends, as the difcourfe proceeds, a ftrift aflbciation, from * » ' fimilarity or fome other fource, between each idea as it follows in the procefs, and that which went before it.
The faculty of underftanding the different parts of a difcourfe in their connexion with each other, fnnple as it appears, is in reality of gradual and flow acquifition. "We are by various caufes excluded from a minute obfervation of the progrefs of the infant mind, and therefore do not readily conceive by how im- perceptible advances it arrives at a quicknefs of apprehenfion relative to the fimpleft fentences. But we more eafily remark its fubfequent improvement, and perceive how long it is be- fore it can apprehend a difcourfe of any length or a fentence of any abllradion.
Nothing is more certain than the poffibility of my perceiving the fort of relation that exifts between the different parts of a methodical difcourfe, for example, Mr. Burke's Speech upon Oeconomical Reform, though it be impoffible for me after the fevereft attention to confider the feveral parts otherwife than fucceffively. I -have a latent feeling of this relation as the dif- courfe proceeds, but I cannot give a firm judgment refpeding it otherwife than by retrofpedt. It may however be fufpedted that, even in the cafe of fnuple apprehenfion, an accurate at- tention to the operations of mind would £how, that we fojcely U u- in 330 OF THE MECHANISM In any inftance hear a fmgle fentence, witliout returning again and again upon the fteps of the fpeakcr, and drawing more clofely in our minds the preceding members of his period, before he arrives at its conclufion; though even this exertion of mind, fubtle as it is, be not of itfelf thought fufficient to authorife us to give a judgment upon the whole. There may perhaps be cafes where the apprehenfion is more inftantaneous. A fimilar exception appears to take place even in fome cafes of judgment or comparifon. A new affociation, or a connedling of two ideas by means of a middle term, which were never brought into this relation before, is a talk of fuch a nature, that the ftrongeft mind feels fome fenfe of effort in the operation. Eut, where the judgment accurately fpeaking is already made, the operation is in a manner inftantaneous. If you fay, that a melon is a larger fruit than a cherry, I immediately affent. The judgment, though perhaps never applied to this individual fubjed:, may be faid to have been made by me long before. If again you tell me that Ctsfar was a worfe man than Alexander, I inftantly apprehend your meaning; but, unlefs I have upon fome former occafion confidered the queftion, I can neither affent nor diffent till after fome refledlion.
Rapldky of But, if the principle here ftated be true, how infinitely rapid the fucceflion _ ©f ideas. muft be the fucceffion of ideas? While I am fpeaking no two ideas are in my mind at the fame time, and yet with what fa- cility do I pafs from one to another? If my difcourfe be argu- mentative, OF THE HUMAN MIND. 331 mentative, how often do I pafs the topics of which It confifls In ^^'^'^^ J7; '■ '■ CtiAP.VIT.
review before I utter them, and even while I am fpcaking con- *^ ^^ ' tinue the review at intervals without producing any paufe in my difcourfe? How many other fenfations are perceived by me du- ring this period, without fo much as interrupting, that is, with- out materially diverting the train of ray ideas? My eye fuccef- fively remarks a thoufand objedls that prefent themfelves. My mind wanders to the different parts of my body, and receives a fenfatica from the chair upon which I fit, from the table upon which I lean; from the pinching of a flioe, from a fmging in my ear, a pain in my head, cr an irritation of the bread. When thefe moft perceptibly occur, my mind paffes from one to another, without feeling the minuteft obllacle, or being in any degree diflraited by their multiplicity. From this curfory view of the fubje£t it appears that we have a multitude of different fuc- ceffive perceptions in every moment of ourexiftence*.
Confcioufnefs, as it has been above defined, appears to be one Application. of the departments of memory. Now the nature of memory, fo far as it relates to the fubjedt of which we are treating, is ex- ceedingly obvious. An infinite number of thoughts pafl'ed * An attempt has been made to calculate thefe, but there is no reafon to be- lieve that the calculation deferves to be confidercd as a ftandard of truth. Senfa. tions leave their images behind them, fome for a longer and fome for a (horter tin^e 5 fo that, in two different inftaticcs, the calculation is in one cafe eight, and in another three hundred and twenty to a fecond.
See Watfon on Time, Ch. 11. U u 3 through OF THE MECHANISM BOOK IV. through my mind in the laft five minutes of my exiftence. How CHAP.Vll. fa / J "" " — ^ many of them am I now able to recoiled? How many of them Ihall I recollect to-morrow? One impreffion after another is per- petually effacing from this intelledtual regifter. Some of them may with great attention and effort be revived; others obtrude themfelves uncalled for; and a third fort are perhaps out of the reach of any power of thought to reproduce, as having never left their traces behind them for a moment. If the memory be capable of fo many variations and degrees of intenfity, may there not be fome cafes with which it never conneds itfelf? If the fuccefBon of thoughts be fo inexpreffibly rapid, may they not pafs over fome topics with fo delicate a touch, as to elude the fupplement of confcioufnels?
Duration It feems to be confcioufnefs, rather than the fucceflion of meafured by confcioufnefs. jdeas, that meafurcs tim.e to the mind. The fucceflion of ideas is in all cafes exceedingly rapid, and it is by no means clear that it can be accelerated. We find it impradicable in the experi- ment to retain any idea in our minds unvaried for any percep- tible duration. Continual flux appears to take place in every part of the univerfe. It is perhaps a lav/ of our nature, that thoughts fhall at all times fucceed to each other with equal ra- pidity. Yet time feems to our apprehenfion to flow now with a precipitated and now with a tardy courfe. The indolent man reclines for hours in the fhade; and, though his mind be per- petually at work, the filent lapfe of duration is unobferved. 3 ^ Butj OF THE HUMAN MIND. 33^ But, when acute, pain or uneafy expe<flation obliges confcloufnefs -^S^^ \fn to recur with unufual force, the time then appears infupportably ^ « ^ long. Indeed it is a contradidlion in terms to fuppofe that the fucceffion of thoughts, where there is nothing that perceptibly links them together, where they totally elude or inftant'y vanifli from the memory, can be a meafure of time to the mind. That there is fuch a ftate of mind in fome cafes affuming a per- manent form, has been fo much the general opinion of man- kind, that it has obtained a name, and is called reverie. It is probable from what has been faid that thoughts of reverie, un- derftanding by that appellation thoughts untranfmitted to tho memory, perpetually take their turn wnth our more exprefs and digefted thoughts, even in the moil adive fcenea of our life.
Laftly, thought may be the fource of animal motion, and yet 3.3 dlftlnd . thou;;ht to there may be no need of a diltmcc thought producing each in- ••ich'motion liny be undividual motion. This is a veiy important point in the fubjed neceilary: before us. In uttering a cry for example, the number of mufcles and articulations of the body concerned in-this operation is very great; fliall we fay that the infant has a diftindl thought for each motion of thefe articulations?
The anfwer to this queftion will be confiderably facilitated, if apparent .,.,,. rr. from the we recollect the manner m which the imprelhons are blended, complexity of which we receive from external objeds. The fenfe of feeling preffions, is difFufed over every part of my body, I feel the different fubftances OF THE MECHANISM BOOK IV. fiances that fupport me, the pen I eulde, various afFedions and ' ' petty irregularities in different parts of my frame, nay, the very air that environs me. But all thefe Impreffions are abfolutely fnnultaneous, and I can have only one perception at once. Out of thefe various impreffions, the moft powerful, or that which has the greateft advantage to folicit my attention, overcomes and drives out the reft; or, which not lefs frequently happens, fome idea of affociation fuggefted by the laft preceding idea wholly withdraws my attention from every external objeft. It is probable however that this perception is imperceptibly modi- fied by the miniature impreffions that accompany it, juft as we adlually find that the very fame ideas prefented to a fick man, take a peculiar tinge, that renders them exceedingly different from what they are in the mind of a man in health. It has been already fhown, that, though there is nothing lefs frequent than the apprehending of a fimple idea, yet every idea, however complex, offers itfelf to the mind under the conception of unity. The blending of numerous impreffions into one perception is a law of our nature, and the cuftomary train of our perceptions is entirely of this denomination. Mean while it deferves to be re- marked by the way, that, at the veiy time that the moft methodical feries of perceptions is going on in the mind, there is another fet of perceptions, or rather many fets playing an under or in- termediate part; and, though thefe perpetually modify each other, yet the manner in which it is done is in an eminent degree minute and unobferved.
Thefe OF THE HUMAN MIND. ^;^s Th^fe remarks furnifli us with an anfwer to the lonp- dlfputed r.OOK IV.
queftion, whether the mhid always thinks? It appears that in The ini:id numerable impreffions are perpetually made upon our body, always thinks.
and the only v»'ay, in which the flighteft of thefe is prevented from conveying a diftindl report to the mind, is in confequence of its being overpowered by fome more confiderable impreflion. It cannot therefore be alledged, " that, as one impreflion is found to be overpow cred by another while we wake, the ftrcngeft only of the fimultaaeous impreflions furnifhing an idea to the mind; fo the whole fet of fimultaneous impreflions during fleep may be overpowered by fome indifpofition of the fenforium, and entirely fail of its effect." For, firft, the cafes are altogether different. From the explication above given it appeared, that not one of the impreflions was really lofl:, but tended, though in a very limited degree, to modify the predominant impreflion. Secondly, nothing can be more unintelligible tlian this indifpo- fition. Were it of the nature which the objedion requires, fleep ought to ceafe of its own accord after the expiration of a certain term, but to be incapable of interruption from any experiment I might make upon the fleeper. To what purpcfe call or fhake him? Shall we fay, that it requires an impreflion of a certain magnitude to excite the fenforium? But a clock fliall ftrike in the room and not wake him, when a voice of a much lower key produces that efi^eft. What is the precife degree of magnitude neceflary? We actually find the ineffedlual calls that are addrefied to us, as well as various other founds, occafionally mixing 2,^6 OF THE MECHANISM EOOK IV. mixins; with our dreams, without our being aware from whence ^ V ' this new perception arofe.
To apply thefe obfervations. If a number of impreflions may- come blended to the mind, fo as to make up one thought or perception, why may not one thought, in cafes where the mind ads as a caufe, produce a variety of motions? It has already been fhown that there is no eifential difference between the two cafes. The mind is completely paffive in both. Is there any fufficient reafon to fhow, that, though it be poffible for one fub- ftance confidered as the recipient of effeds to be the fubjedl of a ' variety of fimultaneous impreflions, yet it is impoffible for one fubftance confidered as a caufe to produce a variety of fimulta- neous motions? If it be granted that there is not, if the mere modification of a thought defigning a motion in chief, may produce a fecondary motion, then it muft perhaps farther be confefled poffible for that modification which my firft thought produced in my fecond, to carry on the motion, even though the fecond thought be upon a fubjed altogether different.
Conclufion. The confequences, which feem deducible from this theory of mind, are fufficiently memorable. By fhowing the extreme fubtlety and fimplicity of thought, it removes many of the diffi- culties that might otherwife reft upon its finer and more evanef- 'cent operations. If thought, in order to be the caufe of animal motion, need not have either the nature of volition, or the concomitant OF THE HUMAN MIND. 337 concomitant of confcioufnefs, and if a fintrle thought may BOOK IV.
^ '^ ^ CHAP.Vir. become a complex caufe and produce a variety of motions, it ^ v ^ will then become exceedingly difEcvilt to trace its operations, or to difcover any circumftances in a particular inftance of animal motion, which can fufficiently indicate that thought Vv\as not the principle of its production, and by that means fuperfede the force of the general arguments adduced in the beginning of this chapter. Hence therefore it appears that all thofe motions which are obferved to exift in fubftances having perception, and which are not to be difcovcred in fubftances of any other fpecies, may reafonably be fufpeded to have thought, the diftinguiiliing peculiarity of fuch fubftances, for their caufe.
There are various clafles of motion which will fall under The theoi-y this definition, befide thofe already enumerated. An example plier.omenon of one of thefe claffes fuggefts itfelf in the phenomenon of walk- "^ " ing. An attentive obferver M'ill perceive various fymptoms cal- culated to perfliade him, that every ftep he takes during the longeft journey is the produtTtion of thought. Walking is in all cafes originally a voluntary motion. In a child when he learns to walk, in a rope dancer when he begins to pracPcife that particular exercifc, the diftindl determination of mind pre- ceding each ftep is fufiiciently perceptible. It may be abfurd to fay, that a long feries of motions can be the rcfult of fo many exprefs volitions, ^.vhel\ thefe fuppofed volitions leave no trace in the memory. But it is not unreafonable to believe, that a X X i]-)ecies 338 OF THE MECHANISM fpecles of motion which began in exprefs defign, may, though it ceafes to be the fubje£l of confcious attention, owe its con- tinuance to a continued feries of thoughts flowing in that direc- tion, and that, if Ufa were taken away, material impulfe would not carry on the exercife for a moment. We actually find, that, when our thoughts in a train are more than commonly earneft, our pace flackens, and fometimes our going forward is wholly fufpended, particularly in any lefs common Ipecles of walking, fuch as that of defcending a flight of flairs. In afcending the cafe is ftill more diflicult, and accordingly we are accufliomed wholly to fufpend the regular progrefs of reflection during that operation.
to the ci'rcu- Another clafs of motions of a fl:ill fubtler nature, are the re- lation of the blood. gular motions of the animal economy, fuch as the circulation of the blood, and the pulfatlon of the heart. Are thought and perception the medium of thefe motions? We have the fame argument here as in the former infl:ances, conjundlion of event.
When thought begins, thefe motions alfo begin; and, when it ceafes, they are at an end. They are therefore either the caufe or efFe£t of percipiency, or mind; but we fhall be inclined to embrace the latter fide of this dilemma, when we recolle£t that we are probably acquainted with many Infliances In which thoup-ht is the immediate caufe of motions, which fcarcely yield in fubdety to thefe; but that, as to the origin of thought, we are wholly uninformed. Add to this, that there ai^e probably no OF TH E HUMAN MIND. V,o io motions of the animal economy, which we do not find it In BOOK IV.
CHAP.VII. the power of voUtion, and flill more of our invohmtary fenili- *^ v ' tions, to haften or retard.
It is far from certain that the phenomenon of motion can any Of motJon m g-cncriil.
Vsrhere exift where there is not thought. Motion may be diftri- buted into four clafles; the fimpler motions which refult from what are called the efTential properties of matter and the laws of impulfe; the more complex ones which cannot be accounted for by the affumption of thefe laws, fuch as gravitation, elafli- city, electricity and magnetifm; and the motions of the vege- table and animal fyftems. Each of thefe feems farther than that which preceded it from being able to be accounted for by any thing we underftand of the nature of matter.
Some light may be derived from what has been here ad- Of dreams. vanced upon the phenomenon of dreams. " In lleep we fome- times imagine" for example "that we read long paflages from books, or hear a long oration from a fpeaker. In all cafes fcenes and incidents pafs before us that in various ways excite our pafTions and Intereft our feelings. Is It poffible that thefe Ihould be the imconfclous produdlion of our own minds?"
It has already appeared, that volition is the accidental, and by no means the neceffary concomitant, even of thofe thoughts which are mofl aQive and eHicient in the producing of motion.
OF THE MECHANISM OF THE HUMAN MlND.
It is therefore no more to be wondered at that the mind fhould be bufied in the compofition of books which it appears to read, than that a train of thoughts of any other kind Ihould pafs through it without a confcioufnefs of its being the author. In fadl we perpetually annex wrong and erroneous ideas to this phrafe, that we are the authors. Though mind be a real and efficient caufe, it is in no cafe a firft caufe. It is the medium through which operations are produced. Ideas fucceed each other in our fenforium according to certain necefTary laws. The mofb powerful impreffion, either from without or from within, conftantly gets the better of all its competitors, and forcibly drives out the preceding thought, till it is in the fame irrefiftible manner driven out by its fucceflbr.
CHAP.
CHAP. viir.
OF THE PRINCIPLE OF VIRTUE.
HYPOTHESES OF BENEVOLENCE AND SELF LOVE — SUPERIOR- ITY OF THE FORMER. ACTION IS EITHER VOLUNTARY OR INVOLUNTARY. NATURE OF THE FIRST OF THESE CLASSES. ARGUMENT THAT RESULTS FROM IT. — VO- LUNTARY ACTION HAS A REAL EXISTENCE. CONSE- QUENCE OF THAT EXISTENCE. EXPERIMENTAL VIEW OF THE SUBJECT. SUPPOSITIONS SUGGESTED BY THE ADVOCATES OF SELF LOVE — THAT WE CALCULATE UPON ALL OCCASIONS THE ADVANTAGE TO ACCRUE TO US.
FALSENESS OF THIS SUPPOSITION. SUPPOSITION OF A CONTRARY SORT. — WE DO NOT CALCULATE WHAT WOULD BE THE UNEASINESS TO RESULT FROM OUR RE- FRAINING TO ACT EITHER IN RELIEVING DISTRESS OR IN ADDING TO THE STOCK OF GENERAL GOOD.
UNEAs'lNESS AN ACCIDENTAL MEMBER OF THE PROCESS.
THE SUPPOSITIONS INCONSISTENTLY BLENDED.
SCHEME OF SELF LOVE RECOMMENDED FROM THE PRO- PENSITY OF MIND TO ABBREVIATE ITS PROCESS FROM THE SIMPLICITY THAT OBTAINS IN THE NATURES OF THINGS. HYPOTHESIS OF SELF LOVE INCOMPATIBLE WITH VIRTUE. — CONCLUSION. — IMPORTANCE OF THE QUESTION. APPLICATION.
THE fubjed: of intelledual mechanifm fuggefled itfelf as BOOK IV. 1 n r •. 1 • 1 r^- CHAP. \l(r. the molt luitable introduaion to an enquiry into the ^^ ^ -> moral principles of human condudl. Having lirft afcertaincd that 342 OF THE PRINCIPLE CHAP^vnr ^^^^^ thought is the real and efficient fource of animal motion, It *^ " ' remains to be confideved what is the nature of thofe particular thouehts in \Yhich the moral conduct of man originates.
Hypotliefes Upon this Queftion there are two opinions. By fome It Is felFlove'^ fuppofed that the human mind is of a temper confiderably duc- tile, fo that, as we in certain inftances evidently propofe our own advantage for the object of our purfuit, fo we are capable no lefs fuicerely and direcStly in other inftances of defiring the benefit of our neighbour. By others it is affirmed, that we are incapable of acting but from the profpe£t or ftimulant of per- fonal advantage, and that, when our condufb appears moft re- trograde from this cbjeft, the principle from which it flows is Superiority fecretly the fame. It fliall be the bufinefs of this chapter to of the for- mer, prove that the former hypothefis is conformable to truth.
Aaion is j(. ig iQ |je prefumed from the arguments of the preceSing chaptary or mvo- j-gj- that there exift in the theory of the human mind two clafTes of luutary. •' adion, voluntary and involuntary. The laft of thefe v/e have minutely invefligated. It has fufficiently appeared that there are certain motions of the animal fyftem, which have fenfation or thought for their medium of produGion, and at the fame time arife, to have recourfe to a ufual mode of expreffion, Ipon- taneoufly, without forefight of or a dired reflediing on the refult which is to follow. But, if we admit the exiftence of this phenomenon, there does not feem lefs reafon to admit the exiftence of the other clafs of adlion above enumerated, which 6 is IS accompanied In its operation with a forefight of its refult, ^C)OK IV.
and to which that forefight ferves as the reafon and caufe of ex- * • ' iftence.
Vohintary a£lion cannot proceed from all perceptions indif- ^'''"''^ °^ ^.'^^ criminately, but only from!percepticns of a peculiar ciafs, viz. cla*l>^s, fuch perceptions as are accompanied with the idea of fomething as true refpedting them, fomething which may be affirmed or denied. One of the firft inferences therefore from the dodlrine of voluntary adlion, is the exiftence of the underftanding as a fa- culty diftindl from fenfation, or, to fpeak more accurately, the polTibility of employing the general capacity of perception, not merely as the vehicle of diftindt ideas, but as the medium of connedting two or more ideas together. This particular habit, when it has once been created, gradually extends itfelf to every province of the mind, till at length it is impoffible for any thing to make a clear and diftindl impreffion upon the fenforium, with- out its being followed with fome judgment of the mind con- cerning it.
It is thus that man becomes a moral being. He is no farther fo than he is capable of connedling and comparing ideas, of making propofitions concerning them, and of forefeeing certain confequences as the refult of certain motions of the animal fyftem.
But, if the forellght of certain confequences to refult may be the 344 OF THE PRINCIPLE BOOK IV. tiie fufficlent reafon of adion, that is, if there be fuch a thin?
*^ " ^ as volition, then every forefight of that kind has a tendency to a£lion. If the perception of fomething as true, joined with the confcioufnefs of my capacity to aft upon this truth, be of it- felf fufficient to produce motion in the animal fyftem, then every perception fo accompanied has a tendency to inotion. To apply this to the fubjedt before us.
Argument I pcrceive a certain agreeable food, I perceive in myfelf an from it. appetite which this food is adapted to gratify, and thele percep- tions are accompanied with a confcioufnefs of my power to ap- propriate this food. If no other confideration exift in my mind beyond thofe which have jufi; been ftated, a certain motion of the animal fyftem irrefiflibly follows.
Suppofe now that the perfon about whofe appetites thefe pro- pofitions are converfant, is not myfelf but another. This varia- tion cannot materially alter the cafe. Still there remain all the circumftances neceffary to generate motion. I perceive the food, I am acquainted \vith the wants of the perfon in queftion, and I am confcious of my power of adminiftering to them. Nothing more is neceffary in order to produce a certain move- ment of my body. Therefore, if, as in the former cafe, no other confideration exift; in my mind, a certain motion of the animal fyftem irrefiftibly follows. Therefore, if ten thoufand other confiderations exift, yet there was in this, feparately conftdered, OF VIRTUE.
fidered, a tendency to motion. That which, when alone, muft ^^OOK iv.
•' ' CHAP. VII r.
inevitably produce motion, muft, however accompanied, retain *^ ^ ' its internal charader.
Let us however fuppofe, which feeins the only confiftent Y"i""taryac- ^ tion has a real