entitled to commendation. But tlie heart of man unavoidably revolts, against the attempt to correct my error by the infliction of violence. We disapprove of the superior, however well in- formed he may be who undertakes, by chastisement, to induce me to alter in my opinion, or vary in my choice; but we disap- prove still more, and we do well, of the man who officiates as the Argus of my tyrant; who reports my conduct, not for the pur- pose of increasing my wisdom and prudence, not for the purpose of instructing others, but that he may bring down upon me the brute, the slavish and exasperating arm of power.
Such must be the case in extensive governments: in govern- ments of smaller dimensions opinion would be all-sufficient; the inspection of every man over the conduct of his neighbours, when unstained with caprice, would constitute a censorship of the most irresistible nature. But the force of this censorship would depend upon its freedom, not following the positive dictates of law, but the spontaneous decisions of the understanding.
Again, in the distributions of rewards who shall secure us against en'or, partiality, and intrigue, converting that, which was meant for the support of virtue, into a new engine for her ruin? Not to add, that prizes are a very feeble instrument for the generation of excellence, always inadequate to its reward where it exists, always in danger of being bestowed on its semblance, continually misleading the understanding by foreign and degene- rate motives of avarice and vanity.
The force of this argument, respecting the inefficacy of regula- tions, has often been felt, and the conclusions that are deduced from it, have been, in a high degree, discouraging. "The cha- racter of nations," it has been said, "is unalterable, or at least, when once debauched, can never be recovered to purity. Laws are an empty name, when the manners of the people are become con-upt. In vain shall the wisest legislator attempt the reforma- tion of his country, when the torrent of profligacy and vice has once broken down the bounds of moderation. There is no longer any instrument left for tlie restoration of simplicity and frugality. It is useless to declaim against the evils that arise from inequality of riches and rank, where this inequality has already gained an establishment. A generous spirit will admire tlie exertions of a Cato and a Brutus; but a calculating spirit will condemn them, as inflicting useless torture upon a patient whose disease was irremediable. It was from a view of this truth, that the poets derived their fictions, respecting the early history of man- kind; Avell aware that, when luxury was introduced, and the springs of intellect unbent, it would be a vain expectation, that should hope to recal men, from passion to reason, and from effeminacy to energy."* But tliis conclusion from the inefficacy of regulations is so far from being valid, that in reality, A third objection, to the positive interference of society, in its • Book I., Chap. YH.
POLITICAL SUPERINTENDENCE OF OPINION. 107 corporate capacity, for the propagation of truth and virtue, 13, that such interference is altogether unnecessary. Truth and virtue are competent to fight their ovra battles. They do not need to be nursed and patronised by the hand of power.
The mistake which has been made in this case, is similar to the Inistake, which is now imiversally exploded, upon the subject of commerce. It was long supposed that, if any nation desired to extend its trade, the tiling most immediately necessary was for government to interfere, and institute protecting duties, bounties, and monopolies. It is now generally admitted by speculative inquirers, that commerce never flourishes so much, as when it is delivered from the guardianship of legislators and ministers, and is conducted upon the principle, not of forcing other people to buy our commodities dear, when they might purchase them else- where cheaper or better, but of ourselves feeling the necessity of recommending them by their intrinsic advantages. Nothing can be at once so unreasonable and hopeless, as to attempt, by posi- tive regulations, to supersede the dictates of common sense, and the essential principles of human understanding.
The same truth which has gained such extensive footing under the article of commerce, has made some progress, in its applica- tion to speculative enquirj-. Formerly it was thought, that the true religion was to be defended by acts of uniformity, and that one of the first duties of the magistrate, was to watch the prO' gress of heresy. It was truly judged, tliat the connection between error and vice is of the most intimate nature; and it was con- cluded, that no means could be more effectual to prevent men from deviating into error, than to check their wanderings by the scourge of authority. Thus writers, whose political views, in other respects, have been uncommonly enlarged, have been found to maintain, " that men ought indeed to be permitted to think as they please, but not to propagate their pernicious opinions; aa they may be permitted to keep poisons in their closet, but not to ofler them to sale under the denomination of cordials."* Or, if humanity have forbidden them to recommend the extirpation of a sect which has already got footing in a country, they have how- ever earnestly advised the magistrate, to give no quarter to any new extravagance that might be attempted to be introduced. f — The reign of these two errors, respecting commerce, and theoretical speculation, is nearly at an end; and it is reasonable to believe that the idea of teaching virtue, through the instrumen- tality of regulation and government, will not long survive them.
All that we should require on the part of government, in behalf of morality and virtue, seems to be, a clear stage upon which for them to exert their ovm energies, and perhaps some restraint, for the present, upon the violent disturbers of the peace of society, • Gulliver's Travels, Part II., Chap. VI.
t Mably, de la Legislation, Liv. IK, Chap. Ill: det Etals Unit d'Amerique, Lettre HI.
108 GENERAL EFFECTS OF THE that the operations of these principles may be permitted to go on uninterrupted to their genuine condusion. Who ever saw an instance, in wliich error, unallied to power, was victorious over truth? Who is there that can bring himself to believe, that, with equal arms, truth can be ultimately defeated? Hitherto it seems as if every instrument of menace or influence had been employed lo counteract her. Has she made no progress? Has the mind of man the cai^acily, to choose falsehood, and reject truth, Avhen evidence is fairly presented? When it has been once thus pre- sented, and has gained a few converts, does she ever fail to go on increasing the number of her votaries? Exclusively of the fatal interference of government, and the violent irruptions of barbarism threatening to sweep her from the face of the earth, lias not this been, in all instances, the history of science?
Nor are these observations less true, in their application to the manners and morals of mankind. Do not men always act, in the manner which they esteem best upon the whole, or most condu- cive to their interest? Is it possible then that evidence of what is best, or what is most beneficial, can be stated to no pur- pose? The real history of the changes of character they experi- ence in this respect, seems to be this. Truth, for a long time, spreads itself unobserved. Those who are the first to embrace it, are little aware of the extraordinary events with which it is pregnant. But it goes on to be studied and illustrated. It in- creases in clearness and amplitude of evidence. The number of those by whom it is embraced, is gradually enlarged. If it have relation to their practical interests, if it show them, that they may be a thousand times more happy and more free than at present, it is impossible that, in its perpetual increase of evidence and energy, it should not, at last, break the bounds of speculation, and become an operative principle of action. What can be less plausible than the opinion, which has so long prevailed, "that justice, and an equal distribution of the means of happiness, may appear, with the utmost clearness, to be the only reasonable b;- is of social institution, without ever having a chance of being reduced into practice? that oppression and misery are draughts of so intoxicating a nature, that, when once tasted, we can never afterwards refuse to partake of them? that vice has so many advantages over virtue, as to make the reasonableness and wisdom of the latter, however powerfully exhibited, incapable of obtaining a firm hold upon our affections?"
While therefore we demonstrate the inefficacy of naked and unassisted regulations, we are far from producing any discourage- ment in the prospect of social improvement. The true tendency of this view of the subject, is, to suggest indeed a different, but a more consistent and promising, method by which this improve- ment is to be produced. The legitimate instrument of effecting political reformation is knowledge. Let truth be incessantly studied, illustrated and propagated, and tlie effect is inevitable. Let us not vainly endeavour, by laws and regulations, to anticipate POLITICAL SUPERINTENDENCE OF OPINION. 109 the future dictates of tlic general mind, but calmly wait till the harvest of opinion is ripe. Let no new practice in politics be introduced, and no old one anxiously superseded, till tlie alter- ation is called for by the public voice. The task, which, for the present, should occupy the first rank in the thoughts of the friend of man, is enquiry, communication, discussion. The time may come, when his task shall appear to be of another sort. Error in- deed, if. with unaltered constancy, we wait its complete detection, may be expected to sink into xmnoticed oblivion, without almost one partisan adventurous enough to intercept her fall. Such would probably be the event, were it not for the restless and mis- judging impetuosity of mankind. But the event may be otlier- Avise. Political change, advancing too rapidly to its crisis, may be attended with commotion and hazard; and it may then be in- cumbent on the generous and disinterested man, suspending, to a certain degree, general speculations, and the labom-s of science, to assist in unfolding the momentous catastrophe, and to investigate and recommend tlie measiires, which the pressure of temporary difficulties shall appear successively to require. If this should at any time be the case, if a concert of action can become preferable to a concert of disquisition, the duty of ihe philanthropist will then change its face. Instead of its present sober, cheerful, and peace- able character, it will be full of ardousness, solicitude and un- certainty, evils which nothing but an assured simplicity and independence of conduct can ever purify or relieve. — To return. In the fourth place, the interference of an organised society, for the purpose of influencing opinions and manners is not only useless, but pernicious. We have already found, that such in- terference is, in one view of the subject, ineffectual. But here a distinction is to be made. Considered with a view to the intro- duction of any favourable changes in the state of society, it is altogether impotent. But, though it be inadequate to change, it is powerful to prolong. This property in political regulation is so far from being doubtful, that to it alone we are to ascribe all the calamities that government has inflicted on mankind. When regulation coincides with the habits and propensities of mankind at the time it is introduced, it will be found capable of maintain- ing those habits and propensities, in the greater part, unaltered for centiuies. In this view it is doubly entitled to jealousy and distrust.
To imderstand this more accurately, let us apply it to the case of rewards, which has always been a favourite topic with the ad- vocates of an improved legislation. How often have we been told, " that talents and virtues would spring up spontaneously in a coimtry, one of the objects of whose constitution should be, to secure to them an adequate reward? Now, to judge of the pro- priety of this aphorism, we should begin with recollecting, that the discerning of merit is an individual, not a social capacity. What can be more reasonable, than that each man, for himself, should estimate the merits of lus neighbour?. To endeavour to 110 POLITICAL SUPERINTENDENCE OF OPINION.
institute a general judgment in the name of the whole, and to melt down the diiferent opinions of mankind into one common opinion, appears, at first sight, so monstrous an attempt, that it is impossible to augur well of its consequences. Will this judgment be wise, reasonable, or just? Wherever each man is accustomed to decide for himself, and the appeal of merit is immediately to the opinion of its contemporaries, there, were it not for the false bias of some positive institution, we might expect a genuine ar- dour in him who aspired to excellence, creating and receiving impressions in the presence of an impartial audience. We might expect the judgment of the auditors to ripen by perpetual exer- cise, and mind, ever curious and awake, continually to approach nearer to its genuine standard. What do we gain in compensa- tion for this, by setting up authority as the oracle, from which the active mind is to inform itself what sort of excellence it should seek to acquire, and the public at large what judgment they should pronounce upon the efforts of tlieir contemporaries? What should we think of an act of parliament appointing some individual president of the court of criticism, and judge in the last resort of the literary merit of dramatic compositions? Is there any solid reason why we should expect better things, from authority usui'ping the examination of moral or political excel- lence?
Nodiing can be more unreasonable, than the attempt to retain men in one common opinion by the dictate of authority. The opinion thus obtruded upon the minds of the public, is not their real opinion; it is only a project by which they are rendered incapable of forming an opinion. Whenever government assumes to deliver us from the trouble of thinking for ourselves, the only consequences it produces are torpor and imbecility. This point was perhaps sufficiently elucidated, when we had occasion direct- ly to investigate the principle of the right of private judgment.* We shall be still more completely aware of the pernicious ten- dency of positive institutions, if we proceed explicitly to contrast the nature of mind, and the nature of government. One of the most unquestionable characteristics of the human mind, has ap- peared to be, its progressive nature. Now, on the other hand, it is the express tendency of positive institution, to retain that with which it is conversant, for ever in the same state. Is then tiie perfectibility of understanding an attribute of trivial import- ance? Can we recollect, with coldness and indifference, the advantages with which this quality seems pregnant to the latest posterity? And how are these advantages to be secured? By incessant industry, by a curiosity never to be disheartened or fatigued, by a spirit of enquiry to which a philanthropic mind will allow no pause. The circumstance most indispensably necessary, is that we should never stand still, that everytlxing most interesting to the general welfare, wholly delivered from ♦ Vol. I., Book II., Chap. YI.
POLITICAL SUPERINTENDENCE OP OPINION. Ill restraint, sliould be in a state of change, moderate and as it were imperceptible, but continual. Is there anything that can look with a more malignant aspect upon the general welfare, than an institution tending to give permanence to certain systems and opinions? Such institutions are two ways pernicious; first, which is most material, because they render the future advances of mind inexpressibly tedious and operose; secondly, because, by violently confining the stream of reflection, and holding it for a time in an unnatural state, they compel it at last to rush forward with impetuosity, and thus occasion calamities, which, were it free from restraint, would be found extremely foreign to its nature. If the interference of positive institution had been out of the question, would the progi'ess of intellect, in past ages, have been so slow, as to have struck the majority of ingenuous observers with despair? The science of Greece and Rome upon the subject of politics, was, in many respects, extremely imper- fect: yet could we have been so long in appropriating their dis- coveries, had not the allurements of reward, and the menace of persecution, tmited to induce us, not to trust to the direct and fair verdict of our own understandings?
The just conclusion from the above reasonings, is nothing more than a confirmation, with some difference in the mode of appli- cation, of the fundamental principle, that government is little capable of afibrding benefit of the first importance to mankind. It is calculated to induce us to lament, not the apathy and indif- ference, but the inauspicious activity of government. It incites us to look for the moral improvement of the species, not in the multiplying of regulations, but in their repeal. It teaches us, that truth and virtue, like commerce, will then flourish most, when least subjected to the mistaken guardianship of authority and laws. This maxim will rise upon us in its importance, in proportion as we connect it witli the numerous departments of political justice to which it will be found to have relation. As fast as it shall be adopted into the practice of mankind, it may be expected to deliver us from a weight, intolerable to mind, and, in the highest degree, hostile to the progress of truth.
112 OF RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENTS.
CHAP. IT.
OF RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENTS.
Their general tendency, — Effects on the clergy: they introdtice, 1, im-plicit faith. — 2, hypocrisy: topics by which an adherence to them is vindicated. — Effects on the laity. — Application.
One of the most striking instances of the injurious effects of the political patronage of opinion, as it at present exists in the world, is to be found in the system of religious conformity. Let us take our example from the church of England, by the constitution of which subscription is required from its clergy, to thirty-nine arti- cles of precise and dogmatical assertion, upon almost every subject of moral and metaphysical enquiry. Here then we have to con- sider the whole honours and revenues of the church, from the archbishop, who takes precedence next after the princes of the blood royal, to the meanest curate in the nation, as employed in support of a system of blind submission and abject hypocrisy. Is there one man, through this numerous hierarchy, that is at liberty to think for himself? Is there one man among them, that can lay his hand upon his heart, and declare, upon his honour and conscience, that the emoluments of his profession have no effect in influencing his judgment? The supposition is absurd. The most that an honest and discerning man, under such circum- stances, can say, is, "I hope not; I endeavour to be impartial." First, the system of religious conformity, is a system of blind submission. In every country, possessing a religious establish- ment, the state, from a benevolent care, it may be, for the manners and opinions of its subjects, publicly excites a numerous class of men to the study of morality and virtue. What institution, we might obviously be led to inquire, can be more favourable to pub- lic happiness? Morality and virtue are the most interesting topics of Imman speculation; and the best effects might be expected to result from the circumstance, of many persons perpetually re- ceiving the most liberal education, and setting themselves apart for the express cultivation of these topics. Bat, unfortunately, these very men are fettered in the outset, by having a code of propositions put into their hands, in a conformity to which all their enq\uries mtist terminate. The direct tendency of science, is to increase from age to age, and to proceed, from the slenderest beginnings, to the most admirable conclusions. But care is taken, in the present case, to anticipate these conclusions, and to bind men, by promises and penalties, not to improve upon the science of their ancestors. The plan is designed indeed to guard against degeneracy and decline; but it makes no provision for advance. It is founded in the most sovereign ignorance of the nature of mind, which never fails to do eitlier the one or the other.
or RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENTS. 113 Secondly, the tendency of a code of religious conformity, is to make men hypocrites. To understand this, it may be sufficient to recollect the various subterfuges, that have been invented by ingenious men, to apologise for the subscription of the English clergy. It is observable, by the way, that the articles of our church are founded upon the creed of the Calvinists, though, for one hundred and fifty years past, it has been accoimted disreputa- ble among the clergy, to be of any other than the opposite, or Ar- minian tenets. Volumes have been written to prove that, while these articles express Calvinistic sentiments, they are capable of a different construction, and that the subscriber has a right to take advantage of that construction. Divines of another class have rested their arguments upon the known good character and bene- volent intentions of the first reformers, and have concluded that they could never intend to tyrannise over the consciences of men, or to preclude the advantage of further information. Lastly, there are many, who have treated the articles, as articles of peace; and inferred that, though you did not believe, you might allow your- self the disingenuity of subscribing them, provided you added the further guilt, of constantly refraining to oppose what you consi- dered as an adulteration of divine trutti.
It would perhaps be regarded as incredible, if it rested upon, the evidence of history alone, that a whole body of men, set apart as the instructors of mankind, weaned, as they are expected to be, from temporal ambition, and maintained upon the supposition that the existence of human virtue and divine truth depends on their exertions, should, with one consent, employ themselves in a casuistry, the object of which, is to prove the propriety of a man's declaring his assent to what he does not believe. These men either credit their own subterfuges, or they do not. If they do not, what can be expected from men so unprincipled and profli- gate? With what front can they exhort other men to virtue, with the brand of infamy upon their own foreheads? If they do yield this credit, what must be their portion of moral sensibility and discernment? Can we believe Uiat men shall enter upon their profession, with so notorious a perversion of reason and truth, and that no consequences will flow from it, to infect their general character? Rather, can we fail to compare their unnatu- ral and unfortimate state, with the wisdom and virtue which the same industry and exertion might unquestionably have produced, if they had been left to their genuine operation? They are like